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This  thesis  argues  for  a  reading  of  George  Eliot's  early  fiction  -  Scenes  of  CledcalLife, 
Adam  Bede,  and  The  Mill  on  the  Floss  -  as  an  exercise  in  developing  what  I  have  termed  a 
. 
poefies  ofJesus.  This  constitutes  a  poetics  that  is  a  space  of  continual  clearing  (Iicbtung)  and 
an  ultimate  deconstruction  of  barriers  that  inhibit  the  nexus  of  the  subject  and  the 
sacred.  I  reflect  on  the  work  of  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  Anglo-German 
Fligher  Criticism  and  Victorian  novelists  and  situate  George  Eliot  as  a  writer  who  seeks 
to  transfigure  poetics  as  that  which  recovers  what  John  Flick  has  termed  a  'language  of 
love'.  This  is  a  language  that  comes  before  the  systemic  formalism  found  in  Christian 
poetics  after  Augustine  to  F.  C.  Baur,  Ludwig  Feuerbach,  and  David  Friedrich  Strauss.  In 
her  fiction  George  Eliot  achieves  what  I  term  a  traq7guradonal  language  that  is  different 
from  contemporary  writers  of  the  Victorian  period.  In  the  development  of  her  poetics 
from  Scenes  of  Clerical  Life,  Adam  Bede,  and  through  The  Mill  on  the  Floss,  George  Eliot 
juxtaposes  the  evoked  image  of  Christ  with  her  fiction  in  order  to  let  both  image  and 
word  interact.  Eliot's  fiction  allows  the  tension  between  representation  and  conception 
of  Christ  to  produce  a  recovery  of  a  poetics  that  is  similar  to  the  notion  of  Christ 
expressed  by  Thomas  Altizer  as  'an  apocalyptic  totality  if  only  because  it  embodies  such  a 
radical  and  total  transformation'.  Ultimately,  Eliot's  fiction  offers  what  I  term  apoefic 
cartograpby  ofgrace  that  provides  a  map  of  meaning  which  cannot  be  lin-ýited  within  the 
space  of  language.  In  the  act  of  moving  through  the  sign/signifiers  of  the  sacred,  George 
Eliot  exemplifies  a  poetics  that  reaches  beyond  language  and  outside  the  limits  of 
theological  discourse,  evoking  an  'a/christology'  that  actually  embodies  the  figure  of 
Jesus  as  'true  fiction'. 
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4 1.0  Introduction:  George  Eliot  and  Jesus  -  An  Elective  Affinity 
,e 
If  it  happens  to  have  been  cut  Who  shall  tell  what  may  be  the  effect  of  uridn 
in  stone,  though  it  he  face  down-most  for  ages  on  a  forsaken  beach,  or 
'rest  quietly  under  the  drums  and  tramplings  of  many  conquests,  '  it  may 
end  by  letting  us  into  the  secret  of  usurpations  and  other  scandals 
gossiped  about  long  empires  ago:  -  this  world  being  apparently  a  huge 
whispering-gallery.  Such  conditions  are  often  minutely  represented  in  our 
petty  lifetimes.  As  the  stone  which  has  been  kicked  by  generations  of 
clowns  may  come  by  curious  little  links  of  effect  under  the  eyes  of  a 
scholar,  through  whose  labours  it  may  at  last  fix  the  date  of  invasions  and 
unlock  religions,  so  a  bit  of  ink  and  paper  which  has  long  been  an 
innocent  wrapping  or  stop-gap  may  at  last  be  laid  open  under  one  pair  of 
eyes  which  have  knowledge  enough  to  turn  it  into  the  opening  of  a 
catastrophe.  1 
This  thesis  will  discuss  the  effect  of  writing  as  giving  and  releasing  of  form  as  a  poetics.  I 
1  George  Eliot  Middlemarch:  A  Study  in  Provincial  Life  -  1871,1872.  (Oxford:  Oxford  World's 
Classics,  1998)  pp.  406-407. 
2  In  "On  the  Idea  of  a  Theology  of  Culture",  Paul  Tillich  distinguishes  between  content,  form,  and 
import,  to  which  he  links  the  terms  autonomy,  heteronorny,  and  theonomy.  "Substance  or  import  is 
something  different  from  content.  By  content  we  mean  something  objective  in  its  simple  existence, 
which  by  form  is  raised  up  to  the  intellectual-cultural  sphere.  By  substance  or  import,  however,  we 
understand  the  meaning,  the  spiritual  substantiality,  which  alone  gives  form  its  significance.  We  can 
therefore  say:  Substance  or  import  is  grasped  by  means  of  a  form  and  given  expression  in  a  content. 
Content  is  accidental,  substance  [or  import]  essential,  and  form  is  the  mediating  element.  The  form 
must  be  appropriate  to  the  content;  so  there  is  no  opposition  between  the  cultivation  of  form  and  the 
cultivation  of  content;  it  is  rather  that  these  two  represent  one  extreme,  and  the  cultivation  of  substance 
[or  import]  represents  the  other.  "  pp.  165-166.  According  to  Tillich,  a  cultural  formation  in  which 
form  predominates  over  substance  is  autonomous,  while  one  in  which  import  predominates  over  form  is 
heteronomous.  Form  in  synergistic  balance  with  import  is  theonomous.  Theonomous  cultural  forms 
(e.  g.  a  poetics  of  Jesus)  are  in  the  nature  of  the  case  explicitly  open  to  and  disclosive  of  the 
unconditioned  depth  of  ultimate  meaning.  The  revelation  of  a  predominant  import  consists  in  the  fact 
that  the  form  becomes  more  and  more  inadequate  to  the  import.  The  import  in  its  overflowing 
abundance  shatters  the  form  meant  to  contain  it.  For  Tillich,  this  overflowing  and  shattering  of  form  by 
import  is  itself  the  pre-eminent  form  of  religiously  charged  cultural  products.  My  use  ofform,  content, 
and  import  throughout  this  thesis  are  in  keeping  with  Tillich's  definitions  and  Tillich's  understanding 
offorin  in  synergistic  balance  with  import  as  theonomous  is  central  to  what  I  term  'a  poetics  ofJesus'. 
See  Paul  Tillich,  "On  the  Idea  of  a  Theology  of  Culture,  "  in  What  is  Religion?  Trans.  James  L.  Adams 
(New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  1969)  pp.  165ff,  "The  Nature  of  Religious  Language'  in  Theology  of 
Culture,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1959)  pp.  53ff,  and  "The  Spiritual  Presence  and  the 
Ambiguities  of  Culture'  in  Sytematic  Theology  3:  Life  and  the  Spiritl  History  and  the  Kingdom  of  God 
5 In  particular,  this  is  an  extended  reflection  on  the  question  of  poetics  and  how  poetics 
acts  as  "a  declaration  of  principle  with  regard  to  the  ideas  about  literature  [and  writing] 
that  have  been  embodied  in  the  events  of  a  given  teXel.  3  Martin  Heidegger,  in  the 
,g  and  Time,  states  that  what  drove  him  to  centre  his  discussion  opening  sentence  of  Bein 
on  the  question  of  Being  is  that  it  was,  for  him,  the  question  that  had  "been  forgotten"  in 
Western  philosophy.  4  In  a  similar  way,  I  am  asserting  that  the  question  of  poetics  in 
relation  to  the  cultural  iconic  sign  and  signifier  Jesus  has  "been  forgotten"  in  most 
theological  writing.  This  'forgetfulness'  has  led  to  critical  misjudgements  where  thefom 
of  writing  that  seeks  to  figure  Jesus  as  representing  the  ultimate  nexuss  of  subject  and 
sacred  'other"  often  disregards  the  import  in  question.  Such  a  declaration  of  principle  as 
to  how  literature  functions  as  an  incarnation  of  this  coming  together  of  subject  and 
sacred7,  and  what  this  embodiment  within  literary  space  ultimately  concerns  is  what  I  am 
(London:  SCM  Press,  1997)yp.  245  -  262. 
3  Mieke  Bal,  Narratology  2"  edition  (Toronto:  University  of  Toronto  Press,  1997)  p.  59.  The  use  of 
the  term  'poetics'  throughout  this  thesis  will  be  in  keeping  with  this  operational  definition. 
4  Martin  Heidegger,  Being  and  Time  trans.  Joan  Stambaugh  (New  York:  SUNY  Press,  1996)  p.  I 
51  am  employing  the  term  'nexus'  as  the  demonstrative  moment  and  place  of  continual  organic 
connection  between  agents  of  cause  and  effect.  Nexus  has  traditionally  been  utilised  to  describe 
properties  in  philosophy  and  physics  whereby  causal  agents  in  seeming  opposition  come  into  a  mutually 
causal  relationship.  In  this  way  it  is  a  term  that  has  heritage  across  disciplines.  Recorded  use  of  nexus 
goes  back  to  Roman  law  where  the  term  was  used  (both  nexus  and  nexum)  to  describe  a  transaction 
whereby  a  man  subjects  himself  to  somebody  else's  power  of  seizure,  usually  as  a  self-pledge  by  which 
a  debtor  enslaves  himself  to  the  creditor  until  he  has  worked  off  a  debt.  This  practice  continued  until 
the  fourth  century  when  it  was  abolished  due  to  class  struggles.  In  the  nineteenth  century,  writers  such 
as  Thomas  Carlyle  used  the  term  to  describe  the  possible  relationship  of  man  to  man  that  transcends  the 
material,  as  he  wrote  in  chapter  VI  of  Chartism  that  the  material  is  not  "the  universal  nexus  of  man  to 
man7'  -  Chartism  (London:  Fraser,  1840)  p.  49.  The  currect  English  term  nexus  has  a  semantic  relation 
to  the  mid  17th  century  French  term  nectere  which  is  "to  binX'.  I  am  using  the  term  to  denote  not  only 
the  demonstrative  moment  and  place  of  continual  organic  connection  between  agents  of  cause  and 
effect,  but  that  which  evokes  a  sense  of  a  'continual  passing  over'  oneself  as  another  which  Emmanuel 
Levinas  explores  in  "La  Trace  de  LAutre'  and  "God  and  Philosophy".  See  also  H.  F.  Jolowicz, 
Historical  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Roman  Law  P  ed.  (London:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1972) 
164ff. 
6  See  Emmanuel  Levinas,  "La  Trace  de  L'Autre"  trans.  A  Lingis  in  Deconstruction  in  Context: 
Literature  and  Philosophy.  ed.  Mark  C.  Taylor  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1986)  pp. 
346ff. 
7  This  statement  is  made  with  the  understanding  that  Jesus  is  that  manifestation  of  the  ultimate  nexus  of 
subject  and  sacred  within  the  Christian  tradition.  Other  religious  systems  have  similar  albeit  unique 
manifestations  of  a  nexus  of  subject  and  sacred.  Writers  such  as  Joseph  Campbell  in  The  Power  of 
Myth  and  The  Hero  With  A  Thousand  Faces  and  Mircea  Eliade  in  The  Sacred  and  the  Divine  have 
made  foundational  work  in  the  area.  In  this  thesis  I  am  seeking  to  delimit  how  such  a  poetics  is 
attempted  within  the  Christian  tradition  in  which  George  Eliot  was  deeply  immersed. 
6 terming  apoefics  ofjesuS.  8  It  is  the  search  for  this  poetics  ofjesus  and  the  manifested 
results  throughout  this  search  in  theology  and  literature  that  is  the  central  concern  of  this 
work. 
Given  the  questions  brought  forward  during  the  nineteenth  century  through 
Anglo-German  higher  criticism  as  to  the  nature  ofjesus,  I  will  focus  much  of  this 
discussion  within  the  Victorian  era.  In  particular,  the  work  of  writer  George  Eliot  will 
serve  to  exemplify  the  tensions  surrounding  poetics  in  nineteenth  century  theological  and 
literary  circles.  Much  has  been  written  throughout  the  history  of  George  Eliot 
scholarship  in  relation  to  her  evangelical  childhood,  the  turning  from  the  faith  of  her 
father  symbolised  by  a  refusal  to  take  the  Eucharist,  her  extensive  reading  and  translation 
work  of  formative  German  thinkers,  and  her  immersion  with  her  partner,  G.  H.  Lewes,  in 
the  scientific  developments  of  the  Victorian  period.  Philosophical  themes  of  Comtean 
positivism  and  Feuerbachian  humanism  have  been  discussed  in  relation  to  her  work.  9  As 
a  translator,  critic,  and  ultimately,  writer  of  fiction,  George  Elioes  prodigious  output  is  a 
detailed  account  of  questions  of  meaning  raised  by  a  life  of  nineteenth  century 
scholarship  and  artistry  that  sought  to  find  'the  mystery  beneath  the  processes'.  In  this 
regard,  George  Eliot  embodies  the  search  for  a  poetics  of  Jesus  in  nineteenth  century 
theology  and  fiction.  As  she  noted  in  her  oft-quoted  journal  entry  of  6th  December  1857 
entitled  "How  I  Came  to  Write  Fiction,  "  George  Eliot  saw  her  fiction  as  a  "shadowy 
I  am  employing  Jesus  as  a  linguistic  embodiment  of  the  ultimate  nexus  of  the  subject  and  sacred.  I 
am  doing  so  in  keeping  with  Ferdinand  de  Saussure's  assertion  in  Cours  de  linguistique  ginerale 
(Course  in  General  Linguistics)  that  the  sign  or  "the  linle'between  signifier  and  sign  is  arbitrary  within 
a  language  system  -  other  terms  have  been  utilized  to  figure  this  embodiment  and  use  of  the  sign  Jesus 
within  this  thesis  is  not  to  the  delimiting  of  other  possible  signs  that  may  be  employed.  See  Ferdinand 
de  Saussure,  Course  in  General  Linguistics  trans.  Roy  Harris  (La  Salle:  Open  Court  Press,  1986)  pp. 
67ff. 
9  T.  R.  Wright  states  that  the  role  Positivism  plays  in  George  Eliot's  thought  is  difficult  to  assess  since 
the  evidence  of  her  engagement  with  Auguste  Comte  comes  late  in  her  career.  "One  of  the  main 
difficulties  in  assessing  Comte's  influence  on  George  Eliot's  philosophical  development  is  its  relative 
lateness.  Her  first  recorded  reference  to  him  came  in  a  review  of  January  185  1,  and  revealed  an 
ignorance  of  the  importance  of  history  in  his  system.  "  See  T.  R.  Wright,  "George  Eliot  and  Positivism: 
A  ReassessmenC',  Modem  Language  Review,  LXXVI,  Spring  198  1,  pp.  257ff. 
7 conception  [which]  varied,  from  one  epoch  of  my  fife  to  another".  10  The  veiled  and 
shadowy  cast  of  her  early  characters  -  from  Milly  Barton  to  Tina  Gilfil,  Janet  Dempster 
to  Dinah  Morris,  Hetty  Sorrel  to  Maggie  Tulliver  -  differing  though  they  were,  embodied 
similar  questions  of  meaning  that  showed  different  expressions  of  a  common  'face'  that 
troubled  Eliot  from  the  beginning  of  her  fictional  output.  This  'face'  that  had  troubled 
her  and,  I  will  argue,  gave  form  to  her  resulting  fiction,  was  that  which  is  found  in  what 
she  termed  "the  beautiful  story"  of  Jesus. 
In  her  1868  essay  entitled  "Notes  on  Form  in  Are',  Eliot  addresses  the  complex 
issue  of  form  in  artistic  representation"  with  regard  to  what  she  terms  'old  subjects', 
which  are  those  culturally  bound  artefacts  such  as  "abstract  words  and  phrases  which 
have  an  excellent  gencaloe'.  For  Eliot,  such  things  as  well-turned  phrases,  ovcr-used 
terms,  and  representations  of  key  figures  of  cultural  import  such  as  the  person  of  Christ, 
are  apt  to  live  a  little  too  much  on  their  reputation  and  even  to  sink  into 
dangerous  impostors  that  should  be  made  to  show  how  they  get  their  living.  For 
this  reason  it  is  often  good  to  consider  an  old  subject  as  if  nothing  had  yet  been 
said  about  it;  to  suspend  one's  attention  even  to  revcred  authorities  and  simply 
ask  what  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  are  the  facts  which  can  with  any 
congruity  be  tied  and  labeRed  by  a  given  abstractiom" 
In  order  to  recover  "an  old  subjece,  from  its  demise,  Eliot  raises  the  central  question  of 
how  we  derive  and  delimit  the  form  of  a  given  subject  -  whether  it  be  a  word  used  in 
10  George  Eliot,  "How  I  Came  to  Write  Fiction"  in  Selected  Critical  Writings  ed.  Rosemary  Ashton 
(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1992)  p.  322.  In  her  reading  of  Eliot's  letters  alongside  her  fiction  in 
The  Real  Life  ofMary  Ann  Evans:  George  Eliot  Her  Letters  and  Fiction  (Ithaca:  Cornell  University 
Press,  1996),  Rosemarie  Bodenheimer  explores  the  way  in  which  Eliot  wrote  'herself  and  'about 
herself  simultaneously.  This  study  looks  at  the  ways  in  which  the  major  crises  in  her  life  such  as  her 
conflicts  with  her  father,  her  choice  of  a  pseudonym,  and  her  decision  to  marry  John  Cross  are  'made 
flesh'  in  her  letters  and  fiction.  In  short,  Bodenheimer  argues  convincingly  that  fiction  played  as  key  a 
role  in  Eliot's  subjectivity  as  did  her  non-fictional  writing. 
11  This  essay  provides  an  excellent  lens  with  which  to  view  George  Eliot's  philosophy  of  poetics.  A.  S. 
Byatt  makes  this  comment  with  regard  to  her  essay  in  Selected  Essays,  Poems,  and  Other  Writings 
(London:  Penguin  Classics,  1990):  "although  written  in  1868,  at  the  same  time  of  The  Spanish  Gypsy, 
its  formal  preoccupations  extend  beyond  poetry"  p.  23  1. 
12  George  Eliot,  "Notes  on  Form  in  Arf  'in  Selected  Essays,  Poems,  and  Other  Writings  ed.  A.  S.  Byatt 
(London:  Penguin  Classics,  1990)  p.  23  1. poetry  or  a  key  figure  in  cultural  and  religious  history.  For  George  Eliot,  the  question  of 
Torm'is 
distinguished  from  merely  massive  impression,  [Form]  must  first  depend  on  the 
discrimination  of  wholes  and  then  on  the  discrimination  of  parts. 
Fundamentally,  form  is  unlikeness,  as  is  seen  in  the  philosophic  use  of  the  word 
'Form'  in  distinction  from  'Matter';  and  in  consistency  with  this  fundamental 
meaning,  every  difference  is  Form.  Thus,  sweetness  is  a  form  of  sensibility,  rage 
is  a  form  of  passion,  and  green  is  a  form  both  of  light  and  of  sensibility.  13 
In  order  to  perceive  the  Form  of  a  given  subject,  it  is  first  a  question  of  cliscrin-dnation  of 
wholes  that  allows  for  the  presentation  of  Form  as  unlikeness  amidst  other  wholes 
before  a  discrimination  of  parts  can  be  considered.  In  this  way,  "the  fullest  example  of 
such  a  whole  is  the  highest  example  of  Form:  in  other  words,  the  relation  of  multiplex 
interdependent  parts  to  a  whole  which  is  itself  in  the  most  varied  and  therefore  the  fullest 
relation  to  other  wholes".  14 
George  Eliot  exemplifies  this  theory  of  Form  by  describing  the  human  organism. 
The  human  organism  is  made  up  of  various  parts,  such  as  fingernails,  toothaches,  and  a 
nervous  system,  which  can  register  a  toothache  "as  the  nervous  stimulus  of  muscle 
manifested  in  a  shoue,.  ls  Yet,  although  all  these  'parts'  are  part  of  the  human  organism, 
one  cannot  understand  them  as  part  of  the  human  organism  in  isolation  nor  can  a 
conception  of  the  whole  'form'  be  derived  merely  by  categorising  the  discrimination  of 
parts: 
Ube  human  organism  in]  all  its  different  elements  or  parts  of  experience  is 
bound  together  in  a  more  necessary  wholeness  or  more  inseparable  group  of 
common  conditions  than  can  be  found  in  any  other  existence  known  to  us.  The 
highest  Form,  then,  is  the  highest  organism,  that  is  to  say,  the  most  varied  group 
of  relations  bound  together  in  a  wholeness,  which  again  has  the  most  varied 
13  ibid.,  p.  232 
14  ibid. 
15  ibid. 
9 relations  with  all  other  phenomena.  16 
What  is  interesting  in  George  Ehoes  discussion  of  the  nature  of  Form  within  her  work  is 
the  assertion  that  Form  is  not  dependent  upon  'contexe,  but  arises  within  and  through 
the  subject  itself  by  its  own  'parts'  calling  back  to  its  own  assertion  of  wholeness.  This  is 
true  of  a  work  of  art,  the  human  organism,  or  even  other  cultural  signifiers  such  as  Jesus. 
In  speaking  of  the  human  organism,  George  Eliot  states  that 
the  outline  defining  the  wholeness  of  the  human  body  is  due  to  a  consensus  or 
constant  interchange  of  effects  among  its  parts.  It  is  wholeness  not  merely  of 
mass  but  of  strict  and  manifold  dependence.  The  word  'consensus'  expresses 
that  fact  in  a  complex  organism  by  which  no  part  can  suffer  increase  or 
diminution  without  a  participation  of  all  other  parts  in  the  effect  produced  and  a 
consequent  modification  of  as  a  whole.  17 
The  analogy  of  this  notion  given  by  Eliot  to  the  arising  of  Form  is  that  of  a  shell  arising 
from  a  snail  -  the  shell  does  not  precede  the  organism  anymore  than  the  Form  of  a  work 
of  art  (be  that  poetry,  prose,  painting,  or  any  other  forming  action  such  the  writing  of 
theology  regarding  the  fife  ofjesus)  precedes  the  work  itself: 
Form  was  not  begotten  by  thinking  it  out  or  framing  it  as  a  shell  which  should 
hold  emotional  expression,  any  more  than  the  shell  of  an  animal  arises  before  the 
living  creature;  but  emotion,  by  its  tendency  to  repetition,  i.  e.,  rhythmic 
persistence  in  proportion  as  diversifying  thought  is  absent,  creates  a  form  by  the 
recurrence  of  its  elements  in  adjustment  with  certain  given  conditions  of  sound, 
language,  action,  or  environment.  just  as  the  beautiful  expanding  curves  of  a 
bivalve  shell  are  not  first  made  for  the  reception  of  the  unstable  inhabitant,  but 
grow  and  are  limited  by  the  simple  rhythmic  conditions  of  its  growing  life.  18 
Turning  from  the  question  of  form  to  that  of  import  in  regards  to  Eliot's  early  fiction, 
scholarship  that  has  considered  George  Elioes  work  in  relationship  to  Christian  themes 
has  been  dismissive  as  to  the  role  Jesus  had  in  her  work.  Many  have  tended  to  view 
16  ibid. 
17  ibid.  p.  234 
18  ibid.,  p.  235 
10 Christian  themes  as  manifestations  of  merely  philosophical  rather  than  theological 
questions,  or  echoes  of  Eliot  herself  as  steps  along  a  personal  intellectual  genealogy  that 
she  moved  beyond  after  her  departure  from  the  Evangelical  period  of  her  childhood. 
The  result  is  seen  as  a  form  of  'Christian  humanism'.  This  is  particularly  true  in  many  of 
the  biographies  of  George  Eliot,  a  genre  which  George  Eliot  herself  called  "a  disease  of 
English  Uterature".  19  A  number  of  critical  works  surmise  Eliot's  efforts  as  a  novelist  as 
merely  revisioning  Christianity  for  a  Victorian  audience  in  search  of  the  human  condition 
illurnined  in  a  divine  light  -'the  human  face  divine'.  20  This  thesis  challenges  this 
conclusion.  In  short,  I  view  Elioes  poetics  as  seeking  to  accomplish  more  than 
reframing  an  ethical,  iconoclastic,  or  purely  aesthetic  stance  of  Christianity  in  fictional 
space.  As  I  will  discuss  throughout  this  thesis,  Eliot  was  indeed  concerned  with  the 
human  condition  as  scholars  such  as  Knoepflmacher,  Paris,  and  others  have  argued.  Yet, 
by  figuring  her  fiction  through  a  poetics  that  is  deeply  christological,  we  see  that  she 
evidences  a  concern  that  is  beyond  writing  for  merely  utilitarian  ends.  Unlike  the  works 
previously  mentioned,  this  thesis  views  George  Eliot's  poetics  as  a  search  for  the 
meaning  of  what  it  is  to  be  authentic  in  relation  to  what  is  truly  sacred. 
In  exploring  the  search  for  a  poetics  ofjesus  in  the  nineteenth  century,  d-ds  thesis 
will  look  at  the  questions  that  situate  George  Ehoes  early  fiction  amidst  the  concerns 
raised  in  Anglo-German  criticism,  in  particular  the  key  issues  raised  by  Strauss, 
Feuerbach,  and  other  key  tl-dnkers  within  the  nineteenth  century.  It  is  my  assertion  that 
George  Eliot  continued  to  (re)write  throughout  her  fiction  the  (re)embodied  person  of 
Jesus  as  a  poetics  that  critics  such  as  D.  F.  Strauss  sought  through  the  limited  formalism 
19  George  Eliot,  The  George  Eliot  Letters  ed.  George  S.  Haight  (London:  Oxford  University  Press, 
1954-1956)  vol.  7,  p.  230.  As  Eliot  states,  "rhe  best  history  of  a  writer  is  his  writings  -  these  are  his 
chief  actions.  "  ibid. 
20  For  examples  of  this  argument,  see  T.  R.  Wright,  The  Religion  of  Humanity  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  1986),  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher,  Religious  Humanism  in  the  Victorian  Novel  (Princeton: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1965),  B.  J.  Paris,  Experiments  in  Life:  George  Eliot's  Questfor  Values 
(Detroit:  Wayne  State  University  Press,  1965),  and  Bernard  M.  G.  Reardon,  Religious  Thought  in  the 
Victorian  Age:  A  surveyfrom  Coleridge  to  Gore  2d  Ed.  (London:  Longman,  1995). 
11 of  theological  poetics.  It  was  within  fiction  that  George  Eliot  sought  to  actualise  the 
merely  theoretical  query  raised  by  thinkers  such  as  D.  F.  Strauss  in  his  magnum  opus  Das 
Lebenjesu,  whose  form  of  writing  "made  her  ill"  in  its  hiding  of  what  she  saw  as  "the 
beautiful  story".  21  As  the  narrator  muses  in  NEddlemarch:  Wlbo  sball  tell  wbat  maj  be  the 
,eI 
believe  George  Eliot  was  fully  aware  of  the  effects  of  writing  and  saw  in  effect  of  nrifin 
works  such  as  Strauss'  "Concluding  Dissertation"  of  Das  Leben  jesu  an  unwillingness  to 
finish  that  which  he  had  begun  -a  figuring  of  the  person  of  Jesus  with  authenticity22.  In 
looking  to  contemporary  writers  of  Eliot  in  the  Victorian  period  such  as  Froude,  Ward, 
and  Pater,  one  also  sees  the  opting  for  prescriptive  conclusions  by  these  writers  in 
poetics  that  attempt  to  recover  a  false  Christ  -  one  that  had  already  been  exposed  as 
false,  thereby  stripping  this  recovered  'Chriseof  his  own  words  and  power  altogether.  It 
is  the  disturbingly  true  Christ,  such  as  Strauss  sought  to  discuss  and  "critically  examine", 
that  remains  veiled  and  unseen.  Akin  to  George  Elioesmetaphorical  stone  -  this  Christ 
is  one  "which  has  been  kicked  by  generations  of  clowns  [that]  may  come  by  curious  little 
links  of  effect  under  the  eyes  of  a  scholar  through  whose  labours  it  may  at  last  fix  the 
date  of  invasions  and  unlock  religions".  But  George  Eliot  saw  such  conclusions  to  be 
nothing  more  than  "little  links  of  effece'.  This  Christ  sought  through  theform  of  higher 
criticism  is  only  authentic  through  the  act  of  (re)writing  as  an  act  of  true  fiction  "under... 
eyes  which  [have]  knowledge  enough  to  turn  it  into  the  opening  of  a  catastrophe".  23 
Eliot  saw  that  what  was  being  sought,  the  'pale  Galilean'  of  the  historical  quest,  was  not 
the  Jesus  she  sought  and  would  not  be  fýunAihrough  the  employment  of  systems  by 
those  whom  she  termed  "German  system-mongers".  Rather,  "the  beautiful  story"  that 
she  saw  under  erasure  by  the  Ekes  of  Strauss  and  others  could  only  appear,  not  in  the  act 
21  Gordon  S.  Haight  George  Eliot:  A  Biography.  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1968)  p.  58 
22  1  use  this  notion  of  authenticity  in  the  Heideggerian  sense  of  existenz  (mode  of  being-in-the-world) 
found  only  through  lichtung  or  a  "clearinglilluminated  moment".  I  will  address  this  more  in  depth  in 
chapter  6. 
23  George  Eliot  Middlenzarch:  A  Study  in  Provincial  Life.  1871-72  (Oxford:  Oxford  World  Classics, 
12 of  disembodied  systems  of  thought,  but  through  a  poetic  cartography  of  embodied 
truth24whereby  that  which  had  been  viewed  as  inaccessible  in  traditional  philosophical 
paradigms  is  imagined  as  possible  and  approachable2s.  In  this  way,  George  Eliot 
announces  through  the  act  of  writing  a  subversive  power  in  poetics  that  offers  a  tia  media 
between  the  Scylla  of  Higher  Criticism  and  the  Charybdis  of  Victorian  fiction  that  sought 
only  to  re-tell  a  'life  of  Jesus'  as  'the  human  face  divine'.  This  search  for  a  poetics  as 
form  awake  with  import  has  a  very  contemporary  feel  to  questions  raised  by  post- 
structuralists.  As  noted  by  Kathryn  Bond  Stockton  in  her  book  God  BeAveen  Their  Li 
. 
ps, 
Post-structuralistfeminists  are  caugbt  in  the  borns  of  a  Victorian  obsession:  bow  to  ebart 
proacbable  and  those  consideredfinalyl  y  considered  a  cbannels  between  realms  commonl 
inaccessible.  If,  for  Victorians,  'God'  seems  the  realm  that  is  finally  inaccessible,  for 
post-structuralist  feminists,  as  we  shall  see,  it  has  become  the  body-apart-from- 
its-constructions  that  eludes  conceptual,  linguistic  grasps...  Post-structuralists  ...  are 
the  new  Victorians.  26 
The  nineteenth  century  represented,  in  Ren6  Welleks  words,  the  "attempt,  apparently 
doomed  to  failure  and  abandoned  by  our  time,  to  identify  subject  and  object,  to  reconcile 
man  and  nature,  consciousness  and  unconsciousness  by  poetry  which  is  'the  first  and  last 
of  all  knowledge.  "'27  At  the  centre  of  much  of  this  attempt  to  reconcile  'man  and  nature, 
consciousness  and  unconsciousness  by  poetry'  was  Jesus  of  Nazareth.  Friederich 
1998)  pp.  406-407. 
24  By  this  statement  I  am  inverting  the  usual  image  of  cartography  as  a  mapping  on  a  two-dimensional 
field  of  north/east/west/south.  In  a  poetic  cartography,  the  'mapping'  is  not  merely  of  space,  but  space 
and  that  which  exists  within  it.  In  a  poetic  cartography  that  is  embodied,  the  'mapping'  that  has  no 
boundary  or  'edge'  that  would  announce  the  end  of  the  world  ,  but  is  fully  enclosed  and  three- 
dimensional,  moving  in  time  and  space.  See  E.  Ann  Matter  "Internal  Maps  of  an  Eternal  External"  in 
Maps  of  Flesh  and  Light  ed.  Ulrike  Wiethaus  (New  York:  Syracuse  University  Press,  1993)  pp.  60ff 
25  As  I  will  discuss  in  my  conclusion,  this  poetics  that  Eliot  employs  in  her  fiction  is  a  way  of  saying 
beyond  words  -  where  the  form  of  poetics  is  itself  a  means  of  speaking  without  being  limited  by 
sign/signifier  restrictions.  As  a  poetics  ofJesus,  this  is  an  embodied  poetics  that  does  not  restrict,  but 
frees  meaning  beyond  the  constriction  of  the  sign/signifier. 
26  Kathryn  Bond  Stockton,  God  Between  Their  Lips:  Desire  Between  Women  in  Irigaray,  Bronte,  and 
Eliot  (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,  1994)  pp.  xvi,  3-4.  This  theme  is  also  dealt  with  at  great 
length  in  Helena  Mitchie's  The  Flesh  Made  Word. 
27  Ren6  Welleck.  "Romanticism  Re-examined,  "  in  Concepts  of  Criticism.  (New  Haven:  Yale  University 
Press,  1963)  p.  221. 
13 Schleiermacher's  platonic  dialogue  about  Christ  in  his  lecture  Cbristmas  Eve  Cekbrafions  in 
180628  and  Ws  later  work  The  Cbrisfian  Faitb  (1821-22)  lead  to  his  conception  ofjcsus  as 
an  archetype  (Urbila)  of  authentic  humanity  in  relation  to  God.  29  As  Karl  Barth  noted, 
"Jesus  of  Nazareth  fits  extremely  badly  into  [nineteenth  century]  theology  11-le 
historical  in  religion,  the  objective  element,  the  Lord  Jesus  is  a  problem  child  (Sorgenkina) 
to  the  theologian,  a  problem  child  that  ought  throughout  to  be  accorded  respect  and  that 
somehow  does  receive  respect,  but  a  problem  child  nonethelesS".  30  One  approach  to 
this  Sorgenkind  is  that  taken  up  by  post-structuralists  such  as  Stephen  D.  Moore  in  the  act 
of  recovering  the  oft  overlooked  elements  of  writing  as  an  act  of  incarnation  that  reflects 
the  essence  ofjesus.  As  Plato  noted  in  Phaedrus, 
once  a  thing  is  put  into  writing,  the  composition  drifts  all  over  the  place,  getting 
into  the  hands  not  only  of  those  who  understand  it,  but  equally  of  those  who 
have  no  business  with  it-it  doesn't  know  how  to  address  the  right  people,  and  I 
not  address  the  wrong.  And  when  it  is  ill-treated  and  unfairly  abused  it  always 
needs  its  parent  to  come  to  its  help.  31 
Ibroughout  the  nineteenth  century,  many  would-be  parents  arose  to  "come  to  the  help" 
of  the  "ill-treated  and  unfairly  abused"  central  character  of  much  nineteenth  century 
fiction  -Jesus.  Where  concern  arose  in  the  face  of  the  early  quest  for  the  Historical 
Jesus  in  the  projects  of  D.  F.  Strauss  and  F.  C.  Baur,  writers  of  fiction  had  found  that  it 
was  in  the  continuous  act  of  writing  and  reading  that  the  very  figure  that  Biblical  critics 
28  Pelikan  states  that  Schleiermacher's  lectures  marked  the  first  in  the  modem  University  to  "lecture 
publicly  on  the  topic  of  the  life  of  Jesus"  and  "making  this  the  subject  of  academic  lectures  at  the 
University  of  Berlin  five  times  between  1819  and  1832,  although  the  book  to  come  out  of  student  notes 
on  the  lectures  did  not  appear  until  1864".  See  Jaroslav  Pelikan,  Jesus  Through  the  Centuries  (New 
York:  Harper  and  Row,  1985)  p.  195. 
29  "rhe  archetype  (Urbild)  must  have  become  completely  historical...  and  each  historical  moment  of 
this  individual  must  be  bom  within  the  archetypal".  Friedrich  Schleiermacher,  The  Christian  Faith, 
trans.  H.  R.  Mackintosh  and  J.  S.  Stewart  (Edinburgh:  T  and  T  Clark,  1928)  chap.  90.  Cited  by  Jaroslav 
Pelikan,  Jesus  Through  the  Centuries,  p.  195. 
30  Karl  Barth,  Die  protestantische  Theologie  im  19.  Jahrhundert  (Zurich:  Evangelischer  Verlag,  1947) 
p.  3  85,412-13. 
Plato,  Phaedrus.  In  The  Collected  Dialogues  of  Plato.  ed.  Edith  Hamilton  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  196  1)  p.  275. 
14 were  seeking  to  stabilise  was  finding  new  fife.  As  Stephen  D.  Moore  aptly  puts  it, 
as  writing,  Jesus  must  contend  with  invisible  forces  other  than  demons.  As 
writing,  he  must  be  delivered  up  to  powers  other  than  the  Jewish  and  Roman 
authorities.  This  force,  this  power,  is  the  reader.  Ternma  F.  Berg  asks:  "Who  is 
the  reader?  "  She  replies:  "Me  reader  is  legion  ffor  we  are  many$  -  Mark  5:  9). 
And  to  give  oneself  to  readers,  to  allow  strange  others  the  power  of  breathing  life 
into  you,  is  to  deliver  yourself  into  the  unknown.  It  is  to  take  the  greatest  risk  of 
all,  the  risk  of  annihilation,  of  death".  But  if  to  write  is  to  run  the  risk  of  death,  it 
is  also  to  seize  the  chance  of  life  after  death  (undead,  the  author  lives  on  in  his  or 
her  tome)...  writing  also  offers  Uesus]  a  body  to  Eve  on  in.  32 
It  is  this  task  of  developing  apoedes  ofjesus  which  seeks  that  which  is  explicitly  open  to 
and  disclosive  of  the  unconditioned  import  as  'the  shattering  of  form'  found  in  the  Jesus 
that  is  central  to  much  biblical  criticism  and  fiction  of  the  nineteenth  century.  As  will  be 
reflected  upon  throughout  this  thesis,  many  writers  who  sought  such  a  poetics  in  the 
nineteenth  century  found  merely  form  devoid  of  import  while  others,  such  as  George 
Eliot,  recovered  a  poetics  for  the  figuring  of  sacred  and  subject  that  recaUs  a  depth  of 
meaning  that  evokes  the  genre  of  gospel  -  writing  which  bears  good  news. 
32  Stephen  D.  Moore,  ibid.  pp.  17,18. 
15 1.1  Chapter  Summaries 
pter  two  will  discuss  how  the  form  within  which  Christianity  has  chosen  to  work  out  Cba 
its  doctrine  of  the  person  of  Christ  is  seen  in  early  Christian  poetics.  Given  the  literary 
foundations  of  the  Church  from  the  New  Testament  onward,  a  continued  search  for  the 
essentialform,  content,  and  im  fo  da  on  of  port  of  the  person  of  Christ  has  been  the  very  un  ti 
Christianity's  self  understanding.  Often  discussions  surrounding  the  person  of  Christ 
have  centred  on  ousiological  arguments  (bomo  -,  beterv  -,  or  bomoi  -)  that  arose  from  the 
Council  of  Chalcedon  seeking  reasonably  to  render  the  'nature'  ofjesus  as  one  who  is  at 
once  sacred  and  human.  This  chapter  will  instead  look  at  early  examples  of  the  search 
for  Jesus  in  poetics.  I  argue  that  it  is  the  dominance  of  form  over  content  and  import 
found  in  these  early  creeds  that  demonstrates  the  beginning  of  arguments  for  the 
reasonableness  of  Christianity  as  a  gstem  of  beliefs  that  eclipses  the  content  and  import 
of  this  system  -  the  figure  of  Jesus. 
Cba  pter  tbree  wM  discuss  the  need  for  poetics  after  Augustine's  conception  of  the  subject 
in  the  form  of  the  sacred.  I  wiU  argue  that  an  understanding  of  this  conception  of 
Augustine  -  where  the  subject  is  primarily  known  in  itsform  rather  than  its  content  or 
port  ni  gni  im  -  is  fundamental  to  any  discussion  of  how  one  speaks  of  the  ico  c  si  fier  Jesus 
within  poetics  and  is  of  particular  importance  for  a  reading  of  George  Eliot  as  an 
inheritor  of  Augustine's  philosophical  project.  It  was  Augustine  who  took  the  view  that 
since  humanity  is  fashioned  in  the  Imago  Dei  (image  of  God),  theform  of  the  subject  must  be 
that  of  theform  of  God  -  for  Augustine  this  is  a  multi-valiant  and  gestalt  form  resembling 
the  Trinity  -  triune  yet  singular.  For  Augustine,  by  looking  to  theform  of  being  rather 
than  the  nature  or  content  of  being,  one  is  able  to  see  the  affinity  of  the  sacred  with  the 
16 subject  -  form  mirrors  form.  In  this  way,  Augustine  provides  what  seems  to  be  a 
reasonable  account  of  the  possibility  of  relationship  between  God  and  subject.  As  will 
be  seen,,  after  Augustine  this  conception  of  form  regarding  subjectivity  presumes  the 
subject  to  have  Emits  given  its  ultimate  grounding  in  God.  This  idea  will  be  challenged 
as  the  notion  of  primary  subject  and  object  reverses  after  Kant  whereby  the  'subject' 
God  becomes  the  'objece  of  an  ever-  creative  subject  -humanity. 
pterfour  wiU  begin  an  assessment  of  the  nineteenth  century's  sense  of  the  shifting  Cha 
nature  of  poetics  of  the  subject  and  the  sacred  after  Kant.  I  wiH  first  assess  the  questions 
raised  in  the  work  of  such  writers  as  Schiller,  H61derlin,  and  Goethe  to  show  how  literary 
poetics  in  Germany  had  announced  many  of  the  issues  that  would  arise  in  George  Elioes 
poetics.  This  reflection  is  important  given  the  well-researched  connection  between 
German  literature  of  the  period  and  George  Ehoes  fiction.  Most  scholarship  that 
reflects  on  Ehoes  reading  of  German  literature  tends  to  focus  primarily  upon  plot 
comParisonS33or  purely  philosophical  issues  arising  from  German  idealiSM34.  What  I  will 
add  to  this  body  of  scholarship  is  a  reflection  on  the  question  of  poetics  of  the  subject 
and  the  sacred  that  George  Eliot  reflects  in  her  writing,  in  particular  the  notion  of 
pbology  as  subject  in  Goethe's  work.  This  chapter  concludes  with  an  assessment  of  mor 
Hegel's  concern  for  the  embodied  Geist  in  relation  to  subjectivity  and  how  this  notion  is 
then  carried  into  questions  that  give  rise  to  the  quest  for  the  historical  Jesus.  It  is  Hegel 
who  offers  a  reversal  of  Augustine's  conception  of  the  subjective  form  that,  ironically, 
utilises  Augustine's  conceptional  framing  of  multiple  trinities  in  relation  to  the  Trinity  of 
33  Works  such  as  the  recent  study  by  Gerlinde  Roder-Bolton  in  the  series  Studies  in  Comparative 
Literature  entitled  George  Eliot  and  Goethe:  An  Elective  Affinity  is  an  example  of  such  work  that  has 
drawn  comparisons  of  plot  between  George  Eliot's  fiction  and  these  writers. 
34  Of  particular  note  is  Rosemary  Ashton's  The  German  Idea  which  looks  at  the  influence  of  German 
idealism  upon  the  writers  of  the  Victorian  period  of  which  George  Eliot  is  a  central  figure.  Ashton's 
work  is  strong  in  its  reflection  on  the  key  philosophical  questions  raised  after  Kant  and  Hegel,  but  does 
not  engage  the  question  of  poetics.  That  is,  Ashton  addresses  the  "what'  'and  the  "why"  of  George  Eliot 
but  not  the  "how". 
17 the  Christian  tradition,  yet  shows  the  subjective  form  to  be  witbout  Emits  and  thereby 
destabilising  of  the  distinction  between  subject  and  object,  Creator  and  creation.  Hegel 
develops  a  notion  of  the  subject  whose  dominant  feature  is  that  of  an  expressive  object  - 
creafive  and  always  creafing.  Similar  to  George  Elioes  notion  of  wholeness,  Hegel's  notion 
of  being  argues  for  inherent  unity  that  precedes  wholeness  as  a  compilation  of  isolated 
parts.  Likewise,  the  subject  for  Hegel  has  an  overarching,  guiding  theme  whether  it  is 
perceived  or  not.  Hegel's  project  was  ultimately  a  recovery,  in  some  ways,  of  the  unity  of 
Aristotelian  form  that  came  before  the  analytic,  atorrýistic  view  of  the  Enlightenment  and 
sought  to  view  the  subject  as  unity  before  parts.  The  subject  therefore  is  not  merely 
body  and  thought  coexisting  but  a  unity  of  deep  and  abiding  interpenetration  without 
limit  or  boundary. 
Cba  pterfive  will  continue  this  discussion  by  showing  the  effects  of  a  poetics  of  the  self 
and  the  sacred  as  it  relates  expressly  to  theological  poetics  of  the  nineteenth  century 
which  focus  on  the  figuring  of  Christ  in  the  work  of  F.  C.  Baur,  Ludwig  Feuerbach,  and 
D.  F.  Strauss.  These  theological  writers  had  a  direct  impact  on  George  Elioes  formative 
poetics  through  the  questions  that  were  raised  regarding  what  should  be  of  primary 
concern  regarding  the  figuring  of  Christ.  In  each  theologian,  the  questions  raised  suggest 
the  need  for  what  Douglas  Templeton  has  called  a  'true  fiction'-  a  means  of  figuring  the 
Christ  in  the  unbounded  realm  of  fiction  (which  he  argues  is  the  genre  of  the  Gospels) 
rather  than  attempting  to  recover  the  Christ  through  an  historical  quest. 
This  conclusion,  that  one  needs  to  employ  a  religious  imagination  to  truly  recover  the 
Christ,  is  not  fulfilled  by  Baur,  Feuerbach,  and  Strauss.  Reaching  this  conclusion,  their 
respective  poetics  remain  closed  and  overly  systematic.  One  of  the  most  disappointing 
aspects  of  George  Eliot  scholarship  is  the  seeming  disregard  and  indifference  to  her 
18 work  of  translating  Strauss  and  Fcuerbach  and  her  subsequent 
poedCS35.  I  seek  to  rc- 
introduce  these  thinkers  into  the  discussion  of  George  Eliot's  poetics  with  particular 
attention  given  to  the  questioning  nature  of  their  projects  in  relation  to  the  matter  of 
subjectivity  and  the  sacred. 
Cba  pter  si:  v  wifl  attend  to  how  Victorian  contemporaries  of  George  Eliot  sought  to 
address  the  question  of  the  figuring  of  Jesus  within  nineteenth  century  fictional  poetics. 
I  begin  my  discussion  by  looking  at  themes  evident  within  Wordsworth's  Prelude,  arguing 
that  this  work  serves  as  a  necessary  hermeneutical  key  for  unlocking  the  philosophical 
undertones  found  in  much  of  the  nineteenth  century's  attempts  in  fiction  to  re-stabilise  a 
poetics  that  'figures  the  sacred'.  It  is  in  The  Prelude  that  the  creative  act  of  writing  is  itself  a 
journey  of  discovery.  The  Prelude  offers  a  universe  that  is  framed  in  "history  brought  to  its 
appointed  close"  and  controlled  by  the  creating  act  of  the  writer  which  Wordsworth 
states  is  the  only  "work  that  should  endure".  The  Prelude  begins  by  seeking  throughout  the 
lived  world  for  meaning  and  ends  with  a  framing  of  the  never-ending  search  itself.  Eliot 
continued  Wordsworth's  project  into  her  own  fiction36.  In  this  way  George  Eliot  is  the 
extension  of  Wordsworth  -a  woman  writer  of  Prose  who  reflects  the  Wordsworthian 
project.  The  Victorian  novel  provided  the  ideal  space  within  which  to  re-create  poetics 
and  re-imagine  the  claims  and  figuring  of  Jesus  that  had  been  relegated  to  the  space  of 
scripture  until  (borrowing  Ian  Watestitle  from  his  now-classic  text)  "the  rise  of  the 
Novel".  It  was  in  this  period  that  changing  assumptions  surrounding  the  nature  and 
status  of  the  church  as  an  institution  arose.  In  addition,  doubts  regarding  theological 
claims  regarding  the  person  ofjesus,  and  the  pbilosophical.  challenge  arising  ftorn 
35  Most  commentators  seem  unwilling  to  engage  these  texts  as  writing,  either  treating  them  as  an 
'artefact'  that  merely  represents  a  phase  of  intellectual  development  or,  given  that  most  focus  on  these 
thinkers  has  been  within  the  disciplines  of  theology  and  biblical  studies,  as  something  outside  the  scope 
of  George  Eliot  scholarship  as  it  pertains  to  her  fictional  production.  36  Notably  George  Eliot's  use  of  Wordsworth's  The  Excursion  as  a  background  for  herwriting  of  Adam 
19 scientific  thinking,  caused  a  challenge  to  and  a  re-imagining  of  poetics.  The  novel 
provided  an  ideal  platform  and  space  for  these  questions  to  gain  form.  I  will  argue  that 
attempts  to  create  a  stabilising  form  within  the  Victorian  novel  also  attempted  to  stabilise 
the  nature  of  subjectivity  and  provide  a  stable  figuring  of  the  sacred  within  the  space  of 
fiction.  I  will  discuss  three  figurings  of  Jesus  within  the  Victorian  novel  in 
contemporaries  of  George  Eliot  -JA.  Froude's  The  Nemesis  ofFaith  (1849),  Walter 
Pater's  Marius  the  Epicurean  (1885),  and  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward's  Robert  Elsmere  (1888)37.  In 
contrast  to  these  writers,  I  will  argue  that  George  Eliot  offers  a  different  conception  of 
Jesus  that  is  not  formed,  fixed,  nor  exposed  but  is  constantly  forming,  transient,  and 
strangely  veiled  within  the  poetic  space. 
Cbapter  seven  will  begin  with  a  discussion  of  George  Eliot's  first  fictional  publication,  the 
three  short  stories  that  are  collected  together  as  Scenes  of  Clerical  life.  This  thesis  will  argue 
that  George  Eliot  in  Scenes  of  Clerical  Life  is  announcing  an  incarnational  aesthetic  that 
requires  "a  phenomenological  hermeneutic"38  in  line  with  the  hermeneutic  project  of 
Paul  Ricoeur.  In  a  phenomenological  hermeneutic,  interpretation  must  be  focused  at  the 
intersection  of  the  two  directions  of  language,  that  is,  neither  exclusively  with  the  writer's 
text  nor  with  the  reader,  but  in  the  encounter  between  the  two.  Secondly,  any  attempt  to 
reduce  or  remove  the  tensional  aspect  of  poetic  discourse  will  impose  an  arbitrary  closure 
on  it.  Interpretation  must  maintain  the  tensional  character  of  the  text.  Additionally,  the 
act  of  interpretation  must  acknowledge  the  historicity  of  the  writer's  text,  and  the 
historicity  of  the  reader,  so  that  the  interpretative  encounter  can  engage  two  spheres  of 
discourse.  In  this  way,  the  act  of  interpretation  itself  must  be  dialectical  and  produce  on 
Bede.  I  will  discuss  this  in  more  depth  in  the  beginning  of  chapter  seven. 
37  Delimiting  texts  which  represent  this  period  of  literary  output  is  extremely  difficult.  As  noted,  I  will 
use  these  as  representative,  not  exhaustive,  of  various  poetic  attempts  to  capture  the  issues  surrounding 
Victorian  'doubt'  and  the  figuring  of  Jesus  within  fiction. 
38  See  Mario  J.  Valdes,  Reflection  and  Imagination:  A  Ricoeur  Reader  (Toronto:  University  of  Toronto 
20 a  higher  level  of  conceptual  meaning  for  the  reader.  At  its  core,  this  mode  of 
interpretation  is  never  completed,  for  the  aim  cannot  be  to  deplete  the  text  (or  life  for 
that  matter)  of  its  dynamism.  The  aim  must  be  to  arrive  at  a  temporag  statement  that 
participates  in  a  tradition  of  commentary  on  texts. 
In  Scenes  of  ClericalLife,  Eliot  gives  rise  to  a  poetics  that  seeks  for  a  new  form  of 
christology  that  is  profoundly  a/christological  -  figuring  the  Christ  as  that  which  is 
without  static  form,  one  that  is  not  dependent  upon  context  and  is  'seen'  in  its  absence  as 
much  as  in  its  presence.  Here,  Eliot  turns  away  from  the  theological  methodology  of 
Baur,  Feuerbach,  and  Strauss  and  asserts  in  her  writing  a  continued  turn  toward  a  telling 
of  'the  mystery  beneath  the  processes'  that  was  'clothed  in  human  form',  a  turn  which  is 
always  to  the  particular  first  and  foremost.  In  this  way,  her  task  is  a  search  for  an  ever- 
fortrýing  and  dissolving  poetics  that  is  akin  to  the  genre  of  'Gospel'  as  opposed  to 
'theology'  in  its  seeking  to  tell  the  story  rather  thanform  the  story.  In  Scenes  of  Clerical  Life, 
Eliot  addresses  the  idea  of  context  as  form  where  the  fagade  of  context-dependent 
subjectivity  is  removed  so  that  'ultimate  subjectivity-  subjectivity  that  is  tied  to  the 
ultimate  concerns  of  humanity  -  can  be  freed. 
Cba  pter  ei  , gbt  will  move  to  a  discussion  of  George  Ehoes  second  work  of  published  fiction 
and  her  first  full  novel,  Adam  Bede.  This  chapter  will  discuss  how  George  Eliot  continues 
her  developing  'poetics  ofjesus'  through  iconographic  signs  that  travel  the  visual-verhal 
route.  It  is  in  chapter  XVII  of  Adam  Bede  CWhere  the  story  pauses  a  hie)  that  the  reader 
is  provoked  not  merely  to  'read'  but  to  'see'.  Through  the  act  of  tisualpoefics,  Eliot 
subverts  written  language  and  frees  her  text  by  an  act  of  intertexuality  in  the  graffing  the 
verbal  onto  the  tisuaZ  It  is  in  her  use  of  visual  poetics  that  the  reader  is  asked  to  consider 
what  the  true  visual  counterpart  of  the  written/read  word  is.  In  Adam  Bede,  the  reader  is 
Press,  1991)  pp.  15ff. 
21 prompted  to  view/read  the  narrative  and  recognise  the  'density'  of  the  underlying  story 
that  can  so  easily  be  overlooked  -  the  role  of  women,  the  question  of  class,  the  forgotten 
rural  life,  the  face  of  God.  In  this  way,  George  Eliot  juxtaposes  the  evoked  with  the 
narrated  story  (for  example,  the  image  of  humanity's  Fall  from  Grace  with  the  image  of 
Hetty  Sorrel's  fall  in  the  garden  of  Hayslope,  the  image  ofJesus  with  the  image  of  Dinah 
Morris),  in  order  to  let  them  interact  and  to  let  the  tensions  between  the  stories  produce 
new  meanings. 
Cba  pter  nine  will  discuss  The  Mill  on  the  Floss  as  a  culminating  point  of  George  Eliot's 
poetic  formation  in  its  thoroughly  autobiogra  pbical  quality,  which  in  many  ways  acts  as  a 
hermeneutical  key  for  reading  the  fiction  yet  to  come.  In  this  chapter  will  be  discussed 
how  the  notion  of  'Jesus  as  Writing'  is  reflected  in  the  formation  of  the  novel's  central 
protagonist  Maggie  Tulliver  in  relation  to  the  Floss  -a  symbol  for  the  act  of  figuring  and 
erasure.  lbroughout  Mill  on  the  Floss,  Maggie's  development  is  one  of  traný6  guradon  rather 
than  one  of  evolutionag  cbange.  She  is  one  who  is  "moulded  and  coloured"  and  in  constant 
exchanges  with  her  environment,  which  culminates  in  a  transcending  of  self  whilst 
descending  amidst  the  flooding  of  the  Floss.  Readings  of  Millon  the  Floss,  such  as  in 
Gillian  Beer's  Damin's  Plots,  tend  to  focus  primarily  upon  the  rise  in  scientific  writing  of 
the  period  as  a  key  influence  for  the  poetics  within  the  novel  which  George  Eliot  was 
fascinated  with  during  the  period  of  her  writing  of  the  novel.  Unlike  Darwin's  Ori  i  of  ,gh 
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pedes,  the  Bildung  of  Maggie  is  one  of  gradual  and  persistent  definition,  not  of  drastic 
changes,  akin  to  the  theories  of  Lamarck.  As  if  seeking  an  alternative  to  the  work  of 
Charles  Lyell  and  Charles  Darwin,  George  Eliot  is  trying  to  recover  writing  as  a  space  of 
transfiguration  that  is  more  as  an  act  of  clarification  of  essential  and  base  essence  rather 
than  one  of  explosive  and  radical  changes.  Unlike  Darwinism,  the  poetic  organicism  of 
St.  Oggs  on  the  Floss  is  one  that  displays  processes  of  becoming  through  the  gradual 
22 transfigurations  into  what  Heidegger  would  term  Teing'  after  the  unnaming  of  naming  - 
Being  that  is  wbat  it  is  rather  than  a  synthesis  of  thesis  and  antithesis  that  is  abstracted  and 
without  ýbiritus.  This  is  notably  demonstrated  by  Ehoes  use  of  I'homas  a  Kempis  as  the 
culminating  intellectual  influence  upon  Maggie  -a  recovery  of  a  mode  of  being  that 
predates  the  Darwinian  theory  of  the  day.  I  wiH  argue  that  George  Eliot  is  instiffing 
within  Mill  on  the  Floss  a  poetics  that  seeks  to  figure  the  sacred  and  subject  and  sees  a 
poefics  ofjesus  as  the  act  of  unwriting  and  writing  that  recaUs  an  affirmation  of  God  in 
presense  and  absense  simultaneously. 
In  conclusion,  I  will  posit  George  Eliot  as  one  whose  poetics  as  a  poetics  ofjesus 
offers  the  reader  what  I  term  a  'poetic  cartography  of  grace'.  In  this  way,  George  Eliot's 
poetics  acts  as  a  'mapping'  not  merely  of  space  ndthin  fiction,  but  the  very  fullness  of 
space  and  time  itself  -a  mapping  of  meaning.  In  the  poetic  cartography  of  George 
Eliot,  the  poetics  are  embodied  both  in  the  poetics  and  the  reader  -  evoking  the  sense 
that  'you  are  in  Christ  as  Christ  is  in  you'.  This  'mapping'  has  no  boundary  or  'edge'  that 
would  announce  the  end  of  the  world  or  a  limit  to  the  universe  that  creates  a  sense  of 
beginning  and  end,  but  is  fully  enclosed  and  three-dimensional,  moving  itselfin  the  fullest 
breadth,  depth,  and  height  of  time  and  space39  as  a  mapping  that  is  not  foHowed,  but  is 
one  that  comes  and  brings  with  it  good  news.  In  short,  it  is  a  poetics  that  offers  'true 
fiction'  as  writing  that  calls  forth  matter  of  ultimate  concern  in  an  overflowing 
abundance  that  shatters  the  form  meant  to  contain  it. 
39  1  am  seeing  this  notion  of  'poetic  cartography'  as  akin  to  the  attempts  put  forward  by  women  mystics 
such  as  Theresa  of  Avila.  See  E.  Ann  Matter  "Internal  Maps  of  an  Eternal  External"  and  Laurie  Finke 
"Mystical  Bodies  and  the  Dialogics  of  Vision"  in  Maps  of  Flesh  and  Light  ed.  Ulrike  Wiethaus  (New 
York:  Syracuse  University  Press,  1993)  pp.  28ff. 
23 2.0  A  Poctics  of  Jesus  -  a/Christology  as  Rupture 
...  You  think  -  because  it  is  becoming  plain  to  the  modem  eye  that  the  ignorant 
love  of  his  first  followers  wreathed  his  life  in  legend,  that  therefore  you  can 
escape  from  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  you  can  put  him  aside  as  though  he  had  never 
been?  Follyl  Do  what  you  will,  you  cannot  escape  him.  His  life  and  deatb  underlie 
our  insfitudons  as  the  a0babet  underlies  our  Aterature.  40 
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The  struggle  to  'figure  the  Christ'  through  various  means  and  media  represents  a 
continual  search  for  not  only  the  content  of  the  figure  in  question  (what  makes  up  and 
makes  possible  this  union  of  human  and  sacred)  but  ultimately  theform  within  which  this 
figuring  is  shown  and  understood.  John  McIntyre,  in  his  Warfield  Lectures  delivered  at 
Princeton  lbeological  Seminary,  begins  his  discussion  of  christology  and  christocentrism 
. 
pe.  As  McIntyre  rightly  by  employing  a  term  not  typically  used  in  doctrinal  discourse  -  sba 
states,  "if  we  were  asked  to  give  in  a  summary  form  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of 
Protestant  theology  in  our  time,  many  of  us  would  reply  that  it  is  its  christocentric  quality 
which  claims  this  title.  And  the  evidence  would  be  convincing".  42As  McIntyre  goes  on 
to  surmise: 
It  is  by  this  time  clear,  then,  that  christology  has  come  to  exercise  in  theology  a 
range  of  functions  for  which  it  was  not  originally  designed:  in  this  range  we  find 
exegetical,  expository  and  hermeneutical.  as  well  as  normative  and  critical 
elements...  classical  christology  has  come  under  severe  strain  in  these  new 
settings  in  which  it  has  of  late  found  itself  and  a  crisis  has  begun  to  develop 
40  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward,  Robert  Elsmere  90'edition  (London:  Smith,  Elder,  and  Co.,  1888  )  P.  495. 
41  "Do  this  in  remembrance  of  me"  -  Luke  22:  19. 
42  John  McIntyre,  The  Shape  Of  Christology  (London:  SCM  Press,  1966)  p.  9. 
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thi  which  can  only  be  resolved  by  a  radical  reassessment  of  the  basic  sba  e  of  s 
central  doctrine  of  the  Christian  faith  as  today  expressed.  43 
McIntyre  rightly  notes  that  there  is  indeed  a  continued  search  for  the  basic  sbape  of  this 
central  doctrine  of  the  Christian  faith  that  is  the  nature  of  Christ  and  it  goes  back  to  the 
very  foundations  of  the  Church  itself. 
As  one  turns  to  some  of  the  earliest  Christian  writings,  this  quest  for  apoedcs  of 
Jesus  -  how  the  form,  content,  and  import  of  writing  itself  makes  claims  of  'ultimate 
concern'44regarding  the  nature  of  Christ  -  is  seen  particularly  in  the  ecumenical  creeds. 
On  the  occasion  of  the  Council  of  Nicaea  in  CE  325,  the  dispute  within  the  Church 
regarding  questions  brought  forward  by  the  Arians  as  to  the  very  form  and  definition  of 
Christ's  relation  to  God  gave  rise  to  the  need  for  a  poetics.  As  the  Arians  argued  iri 
favour  of  a  radical  doctrine  of  monotheism,  they  in  turn  advocated  a  denial  of  Christ  as 
being  one  with  God,  but  asserted  him  to  be  created  and  therefore  not  of  tberame  substance  as 
God.  The  Nicene  Creed  was  drafted  in  response  to  this  assertion.  The  actualpoefics  of  the 
creed  is  presented  in  a  manner  to  assert  the  orthodox  stance  of  Christ  as  one  who  is 
only-begotten  Son  of  God; 
Begotten  of  his  Father  before  all  worlds, 
God  of  God,  Ught  of  Ught,  Very  God  of  Very  God; 
Begotten,  not  made; 
Being  of  one  substance  with  the  Father; 
By  whom  all  things  were  made  ...  45 
Interestingly,  it  also  presents  a  condemnafion  of  those  who  did  not  'fit'  Christ  into  this 
shape.  This  is  marked  in  the  original  form  of  the  Nicene  Creed  which  concludes  with  a 
portion  originally  added  as  an  anathema  against  the  Arians:  "But  to  those  who  say: 
43  ibid.,  p.  11. 
44  To  recollect  Paul  Tillich's  use  of  the  phrase  in  reference  to  that  which  is  of  highest  good  and 
meaning. 
45  Nicene  Creed  circa  CE  325,  in  Readings  in  Christian  Thought-  2  nd  ed.  Hugh  T.  Kerr  ed.  (Nashville: 
25 'There  is  a  time  when  He  was  not';  and  'He  was  not  before  he  was  made';  and  'He  was 
made  out  of  nothing,  '  or  'He  is  of  another  substance  or  essence,  '  or  'Me  Son  of  God  is 
created,  '  or  'changeable  or  alterable'  -  they  are  condemned  by  the  Holy  Catholic  and 
Apostolic  Church".  46Where  a  creed  is  to  be  an  asserfion  of  faith  (the  term  coming  from 
the  Latin  credo,  "I  believe'D  this  original  rendering  stands  as  a  statement  against  "I  don't 
believe"  as  much  as  a  statementfor  certain  beliefs.  The  poetics  thereby  make  claims  that 
overturn  the  very  definition  of  the  genre  itself  (i.  e.  what  constitutes  Credo)  through  its 
construction  as  a  work  and  the  claims  it  makes  on  how  it  is  to  be  read.  In  this  way,  the 
, boedcs  of  the  creed  (and  of  much  literature  as  I  wiU  argue  throughout  this  thesis)  makes 
claims  that  at  times  are  more  profound  than  the  actual  content  or  genre  the  work 
supposedly  represents. 
This  elevation  of  poetics  is  exemplified  regarding  the  further  history  of  the 
ecumenical  creeds  in  the  Council  of  Chalcedon  in  CE  451,  where  the  re-writing  of  the 
Nicene  Creed  as  a  response  to  such  heresies  as  Arianism  as  weH  as  ApoHinarianism  (the 
denial  of  the  full  humanity  of  Christ),  Nestorianism  (the  denial  of  the  union  of  the  two 
natures  in  Christ),  and  Eutycheanism  (which  sought  to  deny  the  distinction  of  the  two 
natures)  rendered  what  is  commonly  known  as  the  S  ymbol  of  Galcedon.  The  very  form 
and  Emits  within  which  the  Church  can  work  out  the  orthodox  doctrine  of  the  person  of 
Christ  is  given  in  its  poetics.  As  a  gmbol,  it  operates  as  aframe  within  which  aU 
subsequent  statements  made  regarding  Christ  can  be  seen  -  that  which  faUs  outside  the 
scope  of  its  language  and  its  intent  is  thereby  outside  the  Emits  of  expression  regarding 
the  person  of  Christ.  Due  to  the  density  of  its  very  form,  the  statement  forged  at 
Chalcedon  is  truly  more  'symbol'  than  credo.  Ibroughout  the  history  of  the  Church,  the 
Symbol  of  Chalcedon  has  "never  had  a  wide  liturgical  or  catechetical  use  because  of  the 
Abington  Press,  1993)  p.  76. 
46  ibid. 
26 complexity  of  language  and  intricacy  of  definition.  "47  This  "complexity  of  language" 
moves  the  Symbol  of  Chalcedon  outside  the  orality  of  language  and  into  a  realm  of  form 
which  seeks  to  judge  subsequent  language  forms  and  uses,  but  does  not  itself  participate 
in,,  the  common  life  of  language  in  its  fullest  capaCity.  48 
Figuring  apoefics  ofjesus  has  continued  to  challenge  subsequent  generations  in 
p  th  both  direct  and  indirect  means  with  the  search  to  find  a  poetics  that  o  ens  ra  er  closes  off 
questions  of  meaning  and  engagement,  allowing  for  the  possibility  of  the  nexus  of  the 
sacred  and  the  subject.  As  mentioned  in  the  Introduction,  such  a  poetics  is  explicitly 
open  to  and  disclosivc  of  the  unconditioned  import  of  meaning  found  in  Jesus.  Finding 
such  a  poetics  thatflows  in  the  act  of  writing  as  continuous  discovery  and  engagement 
with  ultimate  concern,  rather  than  a  poetics  that  delimits  and  ultimately  consfticts  the 
ultimate  concerns  of  the  sacred  and  the  subject  behind  static  renderings  of  dialectical 
logocentrism  was  particularly  active  in  the  work  of  writers  in  Germany  and  England  in 
the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries.  In  the  writing  of  those  concerned  with 
philosophy  and,  biblical  criticism  in  the  eighteenth  century,  the  role  of  bistog  in  the 
discussions  regarding  the  figuring  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth  became  central  to  christology- 
attempting  to  create  a  figuring  ofJcsus  who  was  rather  than  the  Christ  who  is.  As  stated 
by  Gregory  Dawes  in  The  HistoHcaljesus.  Quest., 
Ibc  question  of  the  historical  Jesus  is  such  a  familiar  one  today  that  it  is  difficult 
for  us  to  realise  how  recent  a  question  it  is.  For  more  than  1600  years  the  idea  of 
asking  such  a  question  never  arose.  More  precisely,  in  the  n-ýinds  of  the  Christian 
interpreters  of  the  Bible  there  was  no  difference  between  the  Jesus  of  history  and 
the  Jesus  of  the  Church's  proclamation.  Insofar  as  the  Christian  scriptures  spoke 
47  Hugh  Kerr,  Readings  in  Christian  Thought-  2d  ed.  (Nashville:  Abington  Press,  1993)  p.  75. 
48  Walter  Ong  makes  the  distinction  in  the  way  in  which  the  very  content  of  information  shifts  its 
meaning  as  it  inhabits  a  different  medium  since  different  senses  are  utilised  to  make  'sense'  of  the 
information  received.  What  Ong  terms  as  a  "sensoriurný'  is  the  constructed  form  that  communication 
takes  in  order  to  gain  access  to  the  subject  via  given  senses.  As  he  notes,  the  very  potency  of  religion 
and  the  message  it  is  trying  to  convey  becomes  lost  as  it  moves  into  a  purely  literary  form  since  it  then 
becomes  delimited  by  the  manifold  meanings  of  language.  See  Walter  Ong,  The  Presence  of  the  Word 
(New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  1967)  and  Robert  Detweiler  and  David  Jasper,  eds.  Religion  and 
27 of  the  incarnation  of  God  at  a  particular  point  in  human  affairs,  the  accuracy  of 
their  reports  was  taken  for  granted.  49 
The  challenge  to  traditional  understandings  of  the  person  of  Jesus  during  this 
period  is  exemplified  in  the  pioneering  work  of  the  late  seventeenth  century  philosopher 
and  ethicist  Benedict  de  Spinoza  whose  Ethics  George  Eliot  translated.  In  his  "Of  the 
Interpretation  of  Scripture"  from  Chapter  Seven  of  Tractatus  theologicoplificus,  Spinoza 
argues  that  the  biblical  interpreter  is  interested  in  discovering  only  'the  meaning'  of  the 
biblical  texts  and  not  their  'truth': 
But  for  this  task  [of  interpreting  scripture]  we  need  a  method  and  order  similar  to 
that  which  we  employ  in  interpreting  Nature  from  the  facts  presented  before 
us...  we  must  first  seek  from  our  study,  of  Scripture  that  which  is  most  universal 
and  forms  the  basis  and  foundation  of  all  Scripture;  in  short,  that  which  is 
commended  in  Scripture  by  all  the  prophets  as  doctrine  eternal  and  most 
profitable  for  all  mankind  ...  Scripture  does  not  teach  formally,  and  as  eternal 
doctrine.  On  the  contrary,  we  have  clearly  shown  that  the  prophets  themselves 
were  not  in  agreement  on  these  matters,  and  therefore  on  topics  of  this  kind  we 
should  make  no  assertion  that  claims  to  be  the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  even 
though  the  natural  light  of  reason  may  be  quite  decisive  on  that  point.  ...  with 
regard  to  the  meaning  of  revelation,  it  should  be  observed  that  this  method  only  teaches  us 
how  to  discoverwbat  tbepropbets  really  saw  or  beard,  and  not  what  tby  intended  to  si  n  or  'g  1)ý 
re 
. 
Present  by  the  ymbols  in  question.  The  latter  we  can  only  guess  at,  not  infer  with  certainy 
from  the  basis  of  Scripture.  so  (emphasis  added) 
One  can  hear  strains  of  the  eighteenth  century  writer  Hermann  Samuel  Reimarus,  whose 
writings  George  Eliot  became  familiar  with  through  her  translation  work  of  D.  F. 
Strauss'  Das  Lebenjesu,  in  Spinoza's  conclusions.  In  his  Fragments  written  in  1777  and 
first  published  posthumously  by  Lessing  as  fragments  of  unknown  origin  found  in  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick%  library  at  WolfenbUttel  (Fragments  of  the  Woý`enbfittel  Unknown), 
Literature  (Louisville:  Westminster  John  Knox,  2000)  pp.  36-38. 
49  Gregory  W.  Dawes,  ed.  7he  Historical  Jesus  Quest:  A  Foundational  Anthology  (Leiden:  Deo 
Publishing,  1999)  p.  1. 
50  Benedictus  Spinoza,  Tractatus  77ieologico-Politicus,  trans.  Samuel  Shirley  (Leiden:  E.  J.  Brill,  1989) 
28 Reimarus  argues  for  scripture  itself  as  a  thoroughly  rewritten  genre  -  constantly  revised 
and  reshaped  through  the  years  --thereby  overturning  both  a  historical  grounding  in  an 
coriginal'  text  and  at  the  same  time  supporting,  albeit  by  inference,  a  view  of  scripture  as 
a  re-imagined  space.  With  regard  to  Jesus'  parables,  Reimarus  writes: 
But  since  these  secrets  [the  secrets  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  disclosed  in  Matthew 
13:  11;  Mark  4:  11;  Luke  8:  10]  consist  merely  of  an  explanation  of  figurative 
concepts  and  the  explanation,  insofar  as  it  is  stripped  of  parable,  in  turn  contains 
nothing  more  than  the  common  knowledge  of  the  promised  Kingdom  of  God 
under  the  Messiah,  one  must  confess  that  no  really  new  or  incomprehensible 
precepts  are  to  be  found  among  these  secrets.  Take  notefrom  this,  to  what  extent 
people  let  themselves  be  deceived  by  words!  Today  we  are  accustomed  to  understanding 
by  the  word  'faith'  or  'gospel'  the  whole  body  of  Christian  doctrine  that  we  are  to 
believe,  or  all  the  articles  of  the  Christian  faith  in  their  interconnection,  the  entire 
catechism  and  the  creed,  and  we  particularly  call  'mysteries'  those  doctrines  that 
surpass  understanding  and  that  are  neither  to  be  understood  or  proved  by  reason 
alone.  51 
The  notion  ofjesus  as  a  person  of  history  whose  (to  use  Spinoza's  term)  cedain6, 
as  the  Christ  could  not  be  supported  by  questions  put  forward  by  biblical  criticism 
continued  in  the  days  following  writers  such  as  Spinoza,  Reimarus,  and  Kant.  This  left  a 
new  generation  of  writers  in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  suspicious  of  so- 
called  idle  claims  regarding  the  historicity  of  Jesus,  but  looking  at  the  effects  that  such 
epistemological  fractures  would  have  upon  the  grounding  of  poetics  both  in  theology 
and  literature  after  history  is  rendered  non-essential. 
One  shift  in  the  wake  of  separating  the  Jesus  of  history  from  the  Jesus  of  the 
Church's  proclamation  lay  in  the  notion  ofjesus  as  the  great  wetapbysical  idea  that  became  an 
alternative  means  to  support  Jesus  as  the  Christ  in  a  new  fashion.  This  opens  the 
p.  140. 
51  Hermann  Samuel  Reimarus,  Fragments  of  the  Wolfenbfittel  Unknown  in  Reimarus:  Fragments,  ed. 
Charles  H.  Talbert  (Minneapolis:  Fortress  Press,  1970)  Part  1,  section  9,  p.  75. 
29 opportunity  for  fiction  to  be  a  possible  space  for  the  figuring  of  the  nexus  of  subject  and 
sacred.  As  Lessing  spoke  of  the  "ugly,  broad  ditch"52that  existed  between  the  certainty 
of  history  and  the  certainty  of  reason,  he  saw  the  resolution  to  this  proverbial  chasm  in 
the  advocating  for  a  purely  spiritual  understanding  of  ChriStology.  53  This  move  is  further 
articulated  by  J.  G.  Fichte  in  his  statement  that  "the  metaphysical  only,  and  not  the 
historical,  can  give  us  blessedness;  the  latter  can  only  give  us  understandine'.  54  Schelling 
asserts  this  notion  of  the  purely  metaphysical  and  idealised  rendering  of  Christ  as  Idea  in 
his  "On  the  Study  of  Theology"where  he  makes  the  assertion  that  the  'Christ  idea'is  the 
"incarnation  of  eternity"  in  which  "the  cuh-nination  of  this  process  is  Christ  assuming 
visible  human  form  [appearance  as  the  opposite  concept  to  idea],  and  for  this  reason  it  is 
also  its  beginnine'.  55  This  'beginning  which  is  also  the  end'  in  Schelling's  thought 
prompts  the  speculative  christology  of  Kant  and  Hegel.  As  noted  by  Otto  Weber  in  his 
Dogmatics,  d-ds  'speculative  Christology'  is  that  which  "understood  the  Christ-  idea  as  the 
code,  disguise,  expression,  or  manifestation  of  the  unity  of  the  absolute,  which  is  realising 
itself  in  history,  with  the  relative  [the  world,  man,  the  human  race].  "51  In  Kanes  Religion 
Witbin  the  Limits  of  Reason  Alone,  the  designation  'Son  of  God'  is  aligned  with  the  "ideal  of 
a  humanity  well  pleasing  to  God.  "57This  notion  is  in  keeping  with  Hegel's  later 
52  Gotthold  Ephraim  Lessing,  "On  the  Proof  of  the  Spirit  and  Power"  in  Lessing's  Theological  Writings, 
trans.  Henry  Chadwick  (London:  Adam  &  Charles  Black,  1956)  p.  55.  " 
53  In  the  early  20'h  century  Karl  Barth  would  later  remark  that  "ffie  Lessing  question"  regarding  this 
"ugly,  broad  ditch"  was  within  a  much  larger  context  of  what  Barth  termed  "the  problem  of  distance" 
which  is  the  question  of  the  "rear'  distance  that  humankind  is  in  relation  to  God  (citing  Luke  5:  8).  For 
Barth,  Christ  is  the  first  truly  recognisable  manifestation  of  both  the  problem  of  this  distance  and  its 
ultimate  resolution.  In  short,  Barth  takes  Lessing's  dilemma  beyond  the  philosophical  boundaries  and 
places  it  into  what  Barth  sees  as  the  larger  context,  that  of  the  salvific.  See  Karl  Barth,  Church 
Dogmatics,  IV  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1969)  part,  pp.  287ff. 
54  j.  G.  Fichte,  7he  Way  Toward  the  Blessed  Life,  or,  The  Doctrine  of  Religion  -  1806  trans.  W. Smith 
(London:  Chapman,  1849)  p.  107. 
55  Schelling,  "On  the  Study  of  Theology",  in  On  University  Studies,  trans.  E.  S.  Morgan  (Athens:  Ohio 
University  Press,  1966)  p.  94. 
56  Otto  Weber,  Foundations  of  Dogmatics  Vol.  2  trans.  Darrell  Guder  (Grand  Rapids:  Eerdmans 
Publishing,  1983)  p.  3. 
57  Immanuel  Kant,  Religion  Within  the  Limits  of  Reason  Alone,  trans.  T.  M.  Greene  (New  York:  Harper 
&  Row,  1960)  pp.  54ff.  This  use  of  Kant's  correlation  of  the  'Son  of  God'  with  the  "ideal"  is 
manifested  in  Herder  and  in  a  more  'emphatic'  way  in  Friedrich  Schleiermacher,  The  Christian  Faith, 
trans.  H.  R.  Mackintosh  and  J.  S.  Stewart  (Edinburgh:  T  and  T  Clark,  1928)  pp.  377ff. 
30 conclusions  regarding  Christ  as  "a  history  for  the  spiritual  community  because  it  is 
absolutely  adequate  [as]  idea".  58  With  the  notion  of  the  'idea'  having  the  weight  of  truth 
that  rivalled  that  of  historical  fact,  the  importance  of  a  poetics  becomes  more  apparent. 
Since  it  is  'the  possible'  and  'the  imagined'  as  well  as  'the  factual'  that  can  frame  the 
potential  of  the  sacred  meeting  the  subject,  the  central  issue  moves  beyondwbat  is 
written  and  read  to  bow  writing  and  reading  is  done. 
As  suggested  in  such  works  as  Towards  a  Cbrisdan  Poetics"  by  Michael  Edwards,  the 
rendering  of  a  poetics  that  acknowledges  the  full  ran-Lifications  of  an  answer  to  that 
question  posed  to  Peter  "who  do  you  say  that  I  am?  "  remains  scarce  in  contemporary 
poetics,  nowhere  more  so  than  in  the  very  arena  where  such  a  poetics  should  arise, 
namely  New  Testament  scholarship.  In  their  recent  book  entitled  The  Meaning  ofJesus  - 
Two  Visions,  New  Testament  Scholars  N.  T.  Wright  and  Marcus  Borg  come  together  as 
representatives  of  traditionalist  and  liberal  scholarship  respectively,  in  an  attempt  to 
dissolve  the  tensions  that  surround  current  academic  debates  regarding  the  person  of 
Jesus  of  Nazareth  which  have  become  "acrimonious,  with  a  good  deal  of  name  calling 
and  angry  polemic  in  both  public  and  private  discourse".  601be  ultimate  aim  of  this  'open 
discussion'  is  to  provide  a  way  through  such  forms  of  discussion  and  hopefully  to 
demonstrate  a  means  by  which  scholarly  discussions  surrounding  the  person  of  Jesus  can 
take  place.  As  the  subtitle  of  the  book  denotes,  both  Wright  and  Borg  attempt  to 
approach  the  task  as  Msionaries'  of  sorts,  hoping  to  guide  a  new  generation  toward 
58  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  vol.  3,  trans.  E.  S.  Haldane  (New  York: 
Humanities  Press,  1968)  pp.  72ff. 
59  Michael  Edwards,  Toward  a  Christian  Poetics  (London:  Macmilian,  1984).  In  his  address  to  the 
conference  on  Christianity  and  Literature  at  Macquarrie  University,  5-8  July  1999  in  Sydney,  Australia 
entitled  "Can  We  Speak  of  a  Christian  Poetics?  ",  David  Jasper  cited  Edward's  work  as  "in  Pascal's 
phrase,  un  monstre  incomprihensible  -a  monster  that  passes  all  understanding...  because  it  remains  so 
deeply  embedded  within  the  established  traditions  of  Christianity  and  its  theology,  his  reading  of 
literature  exercised  only  in  terms  of  Christianity,  failing  to  make  the  radical  move  which  acknowledges 
the  true  poet  who  overturns  language  which  sustains  such  theology,  moving  on  the  boundaries  of  a 
silence  which,  like  Augustine,  opens  our  ears  and  eyes  to  the  profound  dichotomy  between  nature  and 
grace"  "Can  We  Speak  of  a  Christian  Poetics?  "  Literature  and  Religion  -  7he  Korean  Society  of 
Literature  and  Religion.  (Vol.  5,  No.  I  Summer  2000)  pp.  139,140. 
31 developing  a  'new  vision'  for  how  one  communicates  the  nature  and  person  ofjesus. 
What  one  finds  at  the  end  of  this  attempt  is  merely  a  rendering  anew  of  forms  and 
analogies  that  bring  about  a  closed  christology,  one  that  bears  little  or  no  resemblance  to 
the  Christ  they  purport  to  acknowledge  and  ultimately  seek  to  locate.  61 
In  his  1990  lecture  published  in  Granta  entitled  "Is  Nothing  Sacred?  "  Salman 
Rushdie  discusses  the  irony  whereby  traditionaUy  'religious'  writing  seems  to  be  anydaing 
but  religious,  whilst  those  who  dweU  in  the  space  of  fiction  seem  to  find  openings  where 
the  possibility  of  the  sacred  is  seen.  As  he  compares  the  genres  of  'religion'  and 
'literature'  he  notes  that: 
Between  religion  and  literature  ...  there  is  a  linguistically  based  dispute.  But  it  is 
not  a  dispute  of  simple  opposites.  Because  whereas  religion  seeks  to  privilege 
one  language  above  all  others,  one  set  of  values  above  all  others,  one  text  above 
all  others,  the  novel  has  always  been  about  the  way  in  which  different  languages, 
values  and  narratives  quarrel,  and  about  the  shifting  relations  between  them, 
which  are  relations  of  power.  The  novel  does  not  seek  to  establish  a  privileged 
language,  but  it  insists  upon  the  freedom  to  portray  and  analyse  the  struggle 
between  the  different  contestants  for  such  priVilCgCS.  62 
As  Rushdie  correctly  surmises,  the  move  into  the  realm  of  the  fictive  that  is  represented 
by  forms  such  as  the  novel  is  a  move  away  from  the  privileging  of  "one  language  above 
all  others"  and  an  approach  toward  a  poetics  that  acknowledges  the  hope  for  "the 
freedom  to  portray  and  analyse  the  struggle"  inherent  in  such  a  search. 
In  order  to  locate  such  a  poetics  ofjcsus  -a  poetics  that  is  free  to  portray  and  analysc 
the  struggle  of  figuring  the  nexus  of  the  subject  and  sacred  -  one  must  place  such 
60  N.  T.  Wright  and  Marcus  Borg,  The  Meaning  of  Jesus  -  Two  Visions  (London:  SPCK,  1999)  p.  x. 
61  Attempts  by  New  Testament  scholars  to  figure  the  Christ  has  also  seen  attempts  at  fictional  accounts 
with  such  recent  works  as  Gerard  Sloyan's  Jesus  in  Focus  and  Gerd  Theissen's  The  Shadow  of  the 
Galilean.  While  these  seek  to  project  a  re-figured  Christ,  these  fall  back  onto  poetics  that  limits  and  is 
primarily  dependent  upon  historical  inquiry. 
62  Salman  Rushdie,  "Is  Nothing  Sacred?  "  -  Herbert  Read  Memorial  Lecture  in  Granta  3  1,  Spring  1990 
pp-102,103. 
32 possibility  of  a  poetics  where  it  is  called  into  judgement  before  such  a  poetics  can  be 
figured  -a  disfiguring  and  figuring  at  once.  Ilds  entry  into  such  a  poetics  is  a  ultimately 
ppojitorum.  nomas  Altizer  asserts  that  such  a  space  evokes  the  foUowing-  a  coinddenda  o 
a  ffill  coming  together  of  total  opposites,  the  opposites  of  total  ending  and  total 
beginning,  and  the  totally  old  world  or  aeon  and  a  totally  new  aeon  or world  a 
coinddenfia  oppositorum  is  at  the  very  centrc  of  the  Christian  epic,  as  is  a  caffing 
forth  and  voyage  into  an  apocalyptic  totality,  and  [the  Christian]  epic  totality  is  an 
apocalyptic  totality  if  only  because  it  embodies  such  a  radical  and  total 
transformation.  Here,  this  transformation  is  deepest  in  envisioning  the  depths  of 
the  Godhead  itself,  depths  that  are  apocalyptic  depths,  and  hence  depths 
unveiling  a  new  Godhead  only  by  bringing  an  old  Godhead  to  an 
end.  63 
As  Altizer  maintains,  at  the  centre  of  the  Christian  epic,  that  is,  the  centre  of  writing  that 
brings  to  mind  the  person  of  Christ,  one  must  acknowledge  that  the  question  of  the 
person  ofjesus  is  the  ultimate  coinddenfia  obpositorum,  that  is  a  disturbing  centre-point  to 
all  concerns.  This  acknowledgement  is  one  of,  as  Altizer  argues,  "eschatological 
proclamation  and  parabolic  enactmene'  that,  Eke  the  true  Jesus,  will  "reverse  every  given 
form  of  God  and  the  world".  To  enter  this  parabolic  enactment  through  the  medium  of 
literature  is  to  take  on  a  poeda  ofjesus  which  wifl 
reverse  every  image  ofjesus  we  have  known  if  we  are  to  be  open  to  his 
contemporary  and  apocalyptic  presence.  just  such  a  reversal  has  continually 
occurred  in  the  Christian  imagination,  a  reversal  not  only  of  given  images  of 
Jesus,  but  also,  and  even  thereby,  a  reversal  of  all  given  Christian  images  of 
God.  64 
This  bears  striking  similarity  to  contemporary  post-structuralist  writers  such  as  Jacques 
63  Thomas  J.  J.  Altizer,  The  Contemporary  Jesus  (New  York:  State  University  of  New  York  Press, 
1997)  pp.  xiv,  xv,  xxiii. 
64  ibid.,  P.  xxv. 
33 Derrida,  who,  while  resolutely  determined  not  to  be  considered  as  a  'religious'  writer, 
actually  attempts  to  form  such  a  poetics  that  Altizer  argues  is  at  the  very  heart  of  the 
persoý  ofJesus.  Jesus,  as  that  subject  of  writing  where  subjectivity  is  both  constructed 
and  destroyed  simultaneously,  bears  marked  resemblance  to  that  which  Derrida  argues 
for  in  his  essay  "Structure,  Sign,  and  Play  in  the  Discourse  of  the  Human  Sciences"  from 
Wlrifi4  and  Dfference. 
In  this  essay,  Derrida  is  seeking  to  situate  ultimate  subjectivity  as  it  is  to  be  determined  by 
a  given  subject  in  a  place  beyond  language.  Seeking  not  to  destroy  the  subject,  his  stated 
wish  is  to  "...  situate  it....  Miis  ultimately  is]  a  question  of  knowing  where  it  [the  subject] 
comes  from!  '.  65  In  this  way,  the  origin  of  a  subject  before  language  is  "named"  by  it, 
prior  to  seeking  definition  of  pre-existent  terms.  Tl-ýs  point  of  origin  is  where  one  draws 
meaning  from  the  "history  of  meanings"  that  form  our  understanding.  This  is  what 
Derrida  terms  "centre".  As  one  follows  his  argument,  this  "centre"  resembles  the 
"centre"  argued  by  Altizer  to  be  that  of  Jesus. 
jean  Hyppolite,  author  of  Logic  and  Eýdste=66,  posed  the  question  to  Derrida  regarding 
his  lecture  on  "Structure,  Sign,  and  Play"  as  to  "what  a  centre  might  mean"67.  In 
Hyppolite's  words,  is  "the  centre  the  knowledge  of  the  general  rules  which,  after  a 
fashion,  allow  us  to  understand  the  interplay  of  the  elements?  Or  is  t:  he  centre  certain 
elements  which  enjoy  a  particular  privilege  with  the  ensemble?  "68.  Derrida's  answer  was 
as  follows:  "I  don't  mean  to  say  that  I  thought  of  approaching  an  idea  of  the  centre  that 
65  Jacques  Derrida,  "Structure,  Sign,  and  Play  in  the  Discourse  of  the  Human  Sciences"  in  Writing  and 
Difference  (London:  Routledge  Press,  1978)  pp.  278ff. 
66  Jean  Hyppolite,  Logic  &  Existence  (New  York:  State  University  of  New  York  Press,  1997). 
67  Richard  Macksey  and  Eugenio  Donato,  eds.  The  Structuralist  Controversy:  The  Languages  of 
Criticism  and  the  Sciences  of  Man.  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1972)  pp.  265ff.  Lee 
Morrissey  makes  interesting  comparisons  between  the  questions  raised  by  Derrida  in  "Structure,  Sign, 
and  Play"  and  the  political  undertones  of  the  essay.  See  Lee  Morrissey,  "Derrida,  Algeria,  and  "Structure,  Sign,  and  Play"  Postmodern  Culture  Volume  9,  Issue  2. 
34 would  be  an  affirmation".  691be  centrc  of  which  he  speaks  is  not  a  certain  place  as  we 
shall  see,  not  a  place  to  be  affirmed  and  locked  into  meaning,  for  this  would  do  to  the 
word  "centre"  what  Derrida  says  the  term  centre  now  does  -  making  a  "substitution  of 
Anguislic  centre  for  true  centre"  -  so  that  "the  centre  receives  different  forms  or  names" 
and  we  ultimately  lose  that  which  we  seek.  Derrida's  definition  of  "centre"  constitutes 
abstracted  definitions  of  a  communaUy  concerned  identity:  "Me  centre,  which  is  by 
definition  unique,  constitutes  that  very  thing  within  a  structure  which  while  governing  that 
pes  structuralitý1.70  structure,  esca 
In  the  fight  to  define,  definition  in  its  truest  sense  is  lost.  To  say,  for  example,  that 
theology  has  the  exclusive  role  and  location  for  the  spiritual  formation  in  people's  lives 
overturns  the  basic  claims  of  Christianity  itself,  As  noted  by  David  Tracy:  " 
...  the  [Church]  lives  in  a  strange  and  healing  paradox  disclosed...  throughout  the 
scriptures:  so  deeply  into  one's  existence  does  the  unmasking  radicality  of  the 
Word  strike  that  the  radical  contingency  and  ambiguity  of  all  culture,  all 
civilisation,  all  institutions,  even  nature  itself  [in  sum,  the  "world']  are  unmasked 
by  the  same  Word  which  commands  and  enables  workfor  the  world,  and  more 
concretely  for  the  neighbour.  TI-ds  Christian  insight  into  the  conventionality,  the 
arbitrariness,  the  radical  contingency  of  all  culture,  all  nature  and  all  institutions 
has  a  reverse  side:  the  radical  ambiguity  of  all  culture,  nature,  institutions  -  all  the 
world  -  and  their  constant  temptation  to  self-aggrandisernent  and  self-delusion. 
Yet  this  very  same  insight  into  the  radical  contingency  and  real  ambiguity  of  the 
world  posits  itself  not  only  by  negating  all  "worldly"  pretensions  to  divinity, 
atemporality,  eternity,  but  also  by  positing  the  command  and  the  possibility  of 
living  in  and  for  tl-ýs  contingent,  ambiguous,  created  and  divinely  beloved 
"world".  72 
68 
ibid. 
69  ibid. 
70  Jacques  Derrida,  ibid.,  p.  279. 
71  1  am  using  the  notion  of  the  Church  collective  [Church]  as  comparable  to  Tracy's  use  of  the 
individual  christian. 
72  David  Tracy,  The  Analogical  Imagination  (London:  SCM  Press,  198  1)  p.  48. 
35 Tracy  goes  on  to  say  that  "rather  than  repeating  the  domesticated  slogans  that  presume 
to  capture  this  dialectic  C'Tbe  [Church]  is  in  the  world,  but  not  ofie),  it  seems  more 
correct  to  say  that  the  [Church]  is  released  (the  violent  imagery  is  exact)from  the  world, 
for  the  world".  73 
Attempts  to  figure  Jesus  in  poetics  will  always  have  to  fight  the  tendency  to  build  walls 
and  choose  a  fixed  centre  rather  than  an  organic  one  -a  poetics  that  is  delimited,  static 
and  closed  rather  than  one  that  provokes  eschatological.  proclamation  and  parabolic 
enactment  that,  like  the  true  Jesus,  will  reverse  every  given  form  of  God  and  the  world  . 
As  Derrida  notes,  we  seek  delimited  structures  such  as  a  closed  and  static  poetics  through 
a  fixed  unchanging  centerpoint  which  ultimately  "neutralise[s]...  [and]  reduce[s]"  the 
truth  of  a  subject  into  merely  "a  point  of  presence,  a  fixed  origin".  74  It  iSthis  false  centre 
then  that  controls,  in  the  sense  of  containing,  the  structurality  of  the  structure,  reducing 
it.  Thus  the  extremes  are  neutralised  by  the  centre. 
In  "Structure,  Sign,  and  Play,  "  Derrida  emphasises  that  true  centre  is  "not  a  fixed  locus 
but  afunedon".  75  In  one  sense,  then,  centering  as  function,  or  import  to  recaU  Tillich's 
category,  need  not  be  put  in  one  place;  the  function  can  be  distributed  throughout  the 
structure.  This  is  another  way  of  understanding  that  the  centre  is  not  the  centre;  the 
centre  as  import  need  not  be  at  the  central  place.  Moreover,  if  the  centre  as  import  is  not 
a  place,  then  it  is  highly  variable;  not  only  can  the  function  or  import  be  fulffflcd  from 
different  places,  but  different  centres  can  fulfil  the  same  function.  Derrida  states  that  "[i]f 
this  is  so,  the  entire  history  of  the  concept  of  structure,  before  the  rupture  of  which  we 
73  David  Tracy,  ibid. 
74  Jacques  Derrida,  op.  cit.,  p.  278 
75  ibid.,  p.  280. 
36 are  speaking,  must  be  thought  of  as  a  series  of  substitutions  of  centre  for  centre".  761n 
short,  the  functionality  of  what  is  'centre'  is  itself  just  a  substitute  for  a  previous  centre; 
the  'function'  remains  the  same  even  if  the  centre  has  moved. 
As  Derrida  notes,  "the  history  of  metaphysics,  like  the  history  of  the  West,  is  the  history 
of  metaphors  and  metonyn-ýies".  77  Derrida  goes  on  to  state  that,  "we  have  no  language  - 
no  syntax  and  no  lexicon-  which  is  foreign  to  tl-ýs  history"  of  metaphors  and 
metonymies.  78  For  example,  in  claims  such  as  the  seeing  the  sign/signifierjcsus  as  the 
"historical  Jesus",  the  "kerygmaticjcsus",  the  "apocalyptic  Jesus",  the  "Eberationjcsus", 
or  what  have  you,  we  must  realisc  that  it  is  only  being  in  the  form  of  metaphors  and 
metonymies.  Although  metaphors  claim  to  state  that  "this  is  thae',  or  while  metonymies, 
as  the  root  indicates,  make  possible  changes  of  names  C'we  will  now  re-name  this  to  be 
called  that'),  they  are  nothing  but  descriptions  and  ultimately  barriers.  This  is  central  to 
Derrida's  project  in  "Structure,  Sign,  and  Play"  in  his  arguing  that  we  need  to  look 
beyond  our  need  in  Western  metaphysics  to  fight  for 
the  determination  of  Being  aspresence  in  all  senses  of  this  word.  It  could  be 
shown  that  all  the  names  related  to  fundamentals,  to  principles,  or  to  the  centre 
have  always  designated  an  invariable  presence  -  eidos,  arcbe,  telos,  energeia,  ousia 
(essence,  existence,  substance,  subject)  aletbeia,  transcendentality,  consciousness, 
God,  man,  and  so  forth.  79 
This  power  is,  on  the  one  hand,  rhetorical,  yet  on  the  other  hand,  substantial  and  real. 
But  words  do  not  necessarily  establish  what  the  object  is;  they  instead  participate  in  "a 
history  of  meanings".  80  Moreover,  to  make  a  claim  of  identity  based  on  signifiers  such  as 
Jesus  takes  the  form  of  both  a  metaphor  (x=y  or  "this"  is  to  "thaeý  and  a  metonymy  (a 
76  ibid.,  p.  278. 
77  ibid.,  p.  279. 
78  ibid.,  p.  280. 
79  ibid. 
37 name  change,  Christ  is  now  Jesus),  so  that  what  the  import  sought  through  form  and 
content  may  still  be  different  from  what  either  the  metaphor  or  the  metonymy  can 
suggest.  Ile  face  we  may  seek  for-  the  authentic  Jesus  -  is  not  to  be  found.  The  face  we 
do  figure  "is  neither  the  face  of  God  nor  the  figure  of  man:  it  is  their  resemblance.  A 
resemblance  which,  however,  we  must  think  before,  or  without,  the  assistance  of  the 
Same".  81  We  who  seek  this  'face'  are  in  the  space  between 
the  difference  between  the  same  and  the  other,  which  is  not  a  difference  or  a 
relation  among  others,  has  no  meaning  in  the  infinite...  this  horizon  is  not  the 
horizon  of  the  infinitely  other,  but  of  a  reign  in  which  the  difference  between  the 
same  and  the  other,  differance,  would  no  longer  be  valid,  that  is,  of  a  reign  in  which 
peace  itself  will  no  longer  have  meaning.  82 
"We  live  in  and  of  difference,  "  according  to  Dcrrida.  If  Derrida's  assertion  is  true,  whirc 
does  import  reside? 
For  Derrida,  given  this  distinction  drawn  between  true  identity  and  metaphor,  it  is  to  be 
concluded  that  identity  ultimately  only  exists  in  "difference"  between  meaning  and  the 
label  placed  upon  it.  These  labels  of  metaphors  and  metonymies  only  have  meaning  in 
their  ability  to  assuage  and  master  a  certain  degree  of  anxiety,  probably  the  anxiety  of 
difference,  which  is  also  the  anxiety  of  similarity.  Anxiety  as  to  what  lies  behind  the  veil 
of  signifiers  such  as  Jesus  in  whatever  manifestation,  forces  institutions  to  double  efforts 
to  re-interpret  terms  as  well  as  look  through  these  signs  to  what  is  beyond.  This  shift, 
according  to  Derrida,  is  the  point  of  "rupture". 
"Rupture  comes  about  when  the  structurality  of  the  structure  had  to  begin  to  be 
go  ibid.,  p.  279. 
81  Jacques  Derrida,  "Violence  and  Metaphysics"  in  Writing  and  Difference  (London:  Routledge  Press, 
1978)p.  109. 
82  Jacques  Derrida,  ibid.,  p.  129. 
38 thought".  83  Once  we  begin  to  recognise  that  the  structure  of  any  given  sign  is  merely  a 
structure,  and  nothing  else,  a  rupture  can  occur.  Derrida  claims  that  "perhaps  something 
has  occurred  in  the  history  of  the  concept  of  structure  that  could  be  called  an  evene' 
where  "its  exterior  form  would  be  that  of  a  rupture".  84  Prior  to  this  realisation,  when 
people  believe  that  the  structure  is  sometMng  other  than  a  structure,  they  have  chosen  a 
mere  metaphor  instead  of  import,  and  in  short,  chosen  form  rather  than  meaning. 
According  to  Lee  Morrissey,  one  way  of  framing  Derrida's  attempt  in  "Structure,  Sign, 
and  Play'  could  be  understood  as  part  of  what  Hal  Foster  in  Return  of  the  Real  describes  as 
"a  shift  in  conception  -  from  reality  as  an  effect  of  representation  to  the  real  as  a  thing  of 
trauma,  "85  that  is,  the  'real'  is  something  that  is  beyond  critique  as  'the  traumatic'  is 
beyond  category  and  escapes  language  altogether.  This  'shift  in  conception'  is  an  attempt 
to  see  jxitb  reality,  not  merely  form  a  reality  to  be  seen.  Similarly,  for  the  question  of  a 
. 
poefics  ofjesus  to  be  resolved,  a  rupture  is  needed  in  the  false  ways  that  meaning  is  made 
and  supported.  The  reality  that  there  is  no  institution,  be  it  the  church  or  the  academy, 
whose  task  it  is  to  preserve  separate  fixed  centering  points  needs  to  be  affirmed.  Rather, 
all  are  part  of  a  larger  enterprise  whose  "centre"  is  shared  beyond  definition.  Ibis  calls 
to  mind  11-iomas  Altizer's  challenge  to  seek  "a  Jesus  who  was  the  first  truly  apocalyptic 
prophet,  the  one  who  first'enacted  a  total  apocalyptic  ending  -  but  an  apocalyptic  ending 
that  is  apocalyptic  beginning,  a  beginning  that  has  been  renewed  again  and  again  by  those 
who  embody  him,  or  those  who  embody  his  acts  and  wordS".  86 
83  Jacques  Derrida,  "Sign,  Structure,  and  Play",  ibid.,  p.  280. 
94  Macksey  and  Donato,  ibid.,  p.  278. 
85  Hal  Foster,  7he  Return  of  the  Real  (Boston:  MIT  Press,  1996)  p.  146.  Foster  maintains  that  this  idea 
of  trauma  is  central  to  critical  theory  after  postmodernity:  "Across  artistic,  theoretical,  and  popular 
cultures  (in  Soho,  at  Yale,  on  Oprah)  there  is  a  tendency  to  redefine  experience,  individual  and 
historical,  in  terms  of  trauma...  Here  is  indeed  a  traumatic  subject,  and  it  has  absolute  authority,  for  one 
cannot  challenge  the  trauma  of  another:  one  can  only  believe  it,  even  identify  with  it,  or  not.  "  p.  168. 
86  Thomas  J.  J.  Altizer,  op.  cit.,  p.  17. 
39 In  an  interview,  Derrida  stated  that  "what  interests  me  today  is  not  strictly  called  either 
literature  or  philosophy,  I'm  amused  by  the  idea  that  my  adolescent  desire  -  let's  called  it 
that  -  should  have  directed  me  toward  something  in  writing  which  is  neither  the  one  or 
the  other.  What  is  it?  Autobiograpby  is  perhaps  the  least  adequate  name,  because  it 
remains  for  me  the  most  enigmatic,  the  most  open,  even  today"87.  This  is  where  I 
suggest  the  centering  character  begins  -  at  its  most  authentic  point.  This  point  which  is 
"the  most  enigmatic,  the  most  open"  is  where  writing  becomes  an  act  of  self-creating 
and  encountering  that  brings  such  open  and  enigmatic  authenticity  is  characteristic  of  a 
poetics  ofJcsus.  George  Eliot  wrote  in  one  of  her  letters  that  writing  that  is  truly 
autobiography  is  that  which  shows  how  a  writer's  mind  "grew,  how  it  was  determined  by 
the  joys,  sorrows  and  other  influences  of  childhood  and  youth  -  that  is  a  precious 
contribution  to  knowledge".  88  In  this  way,  the  genre  of  the  Gospels  is  the  true  fiction  as 
that  which  figures  the  self  and  the  sacred  at  once,  whose  story  is  unique  and  universal  in 
its  writing  and,  to  cite  Heidegger,  strives  to  'unname  naming'  by  providing  an  apocalyptic 
beginning  that  has  been  renewed  again  and  again  by  those  who  embody  it  as  an  act  of 
'remembrance':  rc-membering  the  broken  throughpoiesis. 
Ultimately,  as  I  will  assert  throughout  this  thesis,  a  poetics  ofJesus  is  never 
fomed,  always  on  the  way  but  never  tbere,  so  to  begin  this  dialogue  is  not  an  easy  one.  As 
Derrida  himself  notes  in  "Structure,  Sign,  and  Play",  "there  is  too  much,  more  than  one 
can  Say".  89  It  is  a  continuous  process  that  must  not  be  static  nor  fixed  if  we  are  to 
"'recast,  if  not  rigorously  refound  a  discourse 
...  [O]ne  has  to  go  through  the  experience 
of  deconstruction"90  to  find  another  way,  a  new  way,  all  the  time. 
87  Jacques  Derrida,  "  'This  Strange  Institution  Called  Literature':  An  Interview  with  Jacques  Derrida". 
Acts  of  Literatureflacques  Derrida.  ed.  Derek  Attridge.  Trans.  Geoffrey  Bennington  and  Rachel 
Bowlby.  (New  York:  Routledge,  1992)  p.  34. 
88  George  Eliot,  7he  George  Eliot  Letters  ed.  George  S.  Haight  (London:  Oxford  University  Press, 
1954-1956)  vol.  7,  p.  230. 
89  Jacques  Derrida,  "Structure,  Sign,  and  Play",  ibid.,  p.  289. 
90  Jacques  Derrida,  "This  Strange  Institution  Called  Literature",  ibid.,  pp.  33ff. 
40 What  I  propose  here  is  a  rhetorical  strategy  whereby  one  actually  says  more  than  one 
appears  to  have  said.  The  interplay  found  in  the  "rupture"  of  the  signs  that  denote  Jesus 
whether  in  the  poetic  space  or  within  the  space  of  a  kerygmatic  community  can  lead  to 
new  space  for  Jesus  to  be  'authentic'  in  the  fuH  Heideggerian  sense.  InmanywaysIam 
arguing  for  a  poefics  ofjesus  where  entering  within  is  not  certain  nor  safe,  a  place  that  is 
"the  undiscovered  countrý'  of  Hamlet's  musings  and  a  place  that  is  closest  to  Derrida's 
sense  of  "autobiography"  as  writing  that  is  most  enigmatic  and  most  open.  This  is  a 
place  that  returns  to  forming  questions  of  life  writ  large,  where  people  gather  and  that 
gathering  becomes  the  defining  character.  It  is  a  place  that  is  open  always  to  possible 
destruction  of  the  pre-conceived,  yet  passionate  for  the  clearing  act  of  being-in-the-world 
and  being-for-the-world. 
As  Derrida  has  said,  the  space  of  literature  "aUows  one  to  say  everything.  To  say 
everything  is  no  doubt  to  gather,  by  translating,  all  figures  into  one  another,  to  totalize  by 
formalizing,  but  to  say  everything  is  also  to  break  out  of  prohibitions".  91  George  Ehoes 
desire  to  tell  "the  simple  story"  is  a  concern  to  tell  all  stories  and  ultimately  to  tell  them 
aR  through  a  poetics  that  finds  its  form  in  a  poetic  incarnation  of  the  one  whom 
Schweitzer  felt  "comes  to  us  as  one  unknown  ...  "92While  most  of  the  so-called  Quest  of 
the  Historical  Jesus  concerned  itself  with  the  content  and  facts  concerning  this  one  who 
"comes  to  us  as  one  unknown",  it  was  the  form  of  Jesus  and  what  this  person  represents 
that  intrigued  and  gave  noticeable  shape  to  the  poetics  of  Ehoes  fiction.  In  the  midst  of 
the  "New  Quese'  for  the  Historical  Jesus,  New  Testament  scholar  Ginther  Bornkamm 
stated  in  the  opening  sentence  ofjesus  ofNateratb  that  "[n]o  one  is  any  longer  in  the 
91  ibid.  p.  36. 
92  Albert  Schweitzer,  The  Quest  of  the  Historical  Jesus:  A  Critical  Study  of  its  Progressfrom  Reimarus 
to  Wrede.  (London:  A&C  Black,  1954/1906)  p.  40  1. 
41 position  to  write  a  life  ofjesus"93,  yet  in  works  of  fiction  such  as  those  produced  by 
writers  such  as  George  Eliot,  that  which  was  sought  for  -  the  'one  who  comes  as  one 
unknown'  -does  indeed  arise.  - 
93  Gfinther  Bornkamm,  Jesus  of  Nazareth  trans.  I.  McLuskey,  F.  McLuskey,  and  J.  M.  Robinson 
(London:  Hodder  and  Stoughton,  1960)  p.  13. 
42 3.0  Augustine  and  the  form  of  the  subject  in/of  the  Imago  Del 
Before  experiencing  God  you  thought  you  could  talk  about  God;  when  you  begin  to 
experience  God  you  realise  that  what  you  are  experiencing  you  cannot  put  into 
words.  94 
In  western  poetics  concerning  the  subject,  it  is  with  St.  Augustine  of  Hippo  that  the 
move  to  setform  above  content  as  the  indicator  of  nexus  between  the  subject  and  the 
sacred  begins  and  it  is  Augustine's  project  that  continues  to  shape  poetics  of  the  subject 
into  the  present.  As  Mark  Taylor  rightly  argues,  it  is  Augustine  "who  first  recognised  and 
defined  the  principles  of  subjectivitý'.  95  In  his  Confessions,  Augustine  attempts  to  resolve 
his  questions  of  doubt  regarding  subjectivity  (how  does  one  know  self-as-self?  )  and  the 
possibility  of  nexus  with  the  sacred  through  a  turn  inward,  and  takes  a  reflexive  stance 
upon  one's  own  selfhood  -a  move  in  opposition  to  that  of  Aristotle's  epistemolog.  As 
Augustine  notes,  the  interior  realm  is  vastly  more  complex  than  the  exterior  and 
therefore  a  more  likely  space  to  encounter  ultimate  concerns.  96  As  Mark  Taylor  notes, 
"Ibe  world  within  [for  Augustine],  proved  to  be  as  perplexing  as  the  puzzling  world 
without.  Rather  than  a  simple  individual  or  singular  substance,  Augustine  found  the  self 
94  Augustine,  Homily  on  Psalm  99.6,  cited  by  Marcus  Borg,  The  God  We  Never  Knew  (San  Francisco: 
Harper  Collins,  1997)  p.  48. 
95  Mark  C.  Taylor,  Erring:  A  Postmodern  AlTheology.  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1984) 
Qp-  38ff. 
In  Book  X  of  Confessions,  Augustine  uses  the  metaphor  of  the  inner  life  as  one  of  deep  "secret 
caverns".  Questions  to  the  great  questions  of  being  (P),  such  as  "Does  P  exist?  What  is  P?  What  kind 
of  thing  is  PT'  are  informed  by  the  senses  (sight,  hearing,  touch,  taste,  smell)  yet  the  true  meaning  of 
this  sensory  data  is  only  known  through  retrieval  of  memory.  "The  answer  [Does  P  exist?  What  is  P? 
What  kind  of  thing  is  P?  ]  must  be  that  which  is  already  in  the  memory,  but  so  remote  and  pushed  into 
the  background,  as  if  in  most  secret  caverns,  that  unless  they  [memories  held  within  the  mind]  were  dug 
out  by  someone  drawing  attention  to  them,  perhaps  I  could  not  have  thought  therrf'.  Augustine, 
Confessions.  trans.  Henry  Chadwick  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1998)  Book  X,  section  17,  p.  189. 
43 to  be  complex  and  inwardly  divided".  97  This  "complex  division"  is  seen  as  well 
throughout  the  created  order  where 
opposition  of  spirit/mattcr,  higher/lower,  eternal/temporal, 
immutable/changing  is  described  by  Augustine,  not  just  occasionally  and 
peripherally,  but  centrally  and  essentially  in  terms  of  inncr/outer...  And  this  is 
not  just  one  way  of  describing  the  difference  for  Augustine.  It  is  in  a  sense  the 
most  important  one  for  our  spiritual  purposes,  because  the  road  from  the  lower 
to  the  higher,  the  crucial  shift  in  direction,  passes  through  our  attending  to 
ourselves  as  inner.  98 
The  notable  quotation  by  Augustine  in  this  regard  is  NoNforas  ire,  in  teosum  rediý  in  interiore 
bomine  kabitat  veritas  C'Do  not  go  outward;  return  within  yourself.  In  the  inward  man 
dwells  truth'V9  Augustine  is  in  line  with  Plato  before  him  in  his  search  for  a  unifying 
principle  under  and  throughout  the  oppositions  and  complex  divisions  of  the  world.  But 
Augustine  draws  a  new  direction  in  his  avocation  of  in  interiore  bomine  as  the  babitat  veritas. 
As  noted  by  Charles  Taylor: 
Un]  Plato,  we  find  out  about  this  highest  principle  by  looking  at  the  domain  of 
objects  which  it  organises,  that  is,  the  field  of  the  Ideas.  What  we  saw...  in  the 
image  of  the  eye  of  the  soul  was  the  doctrine  that  the  power  of  seeing  doesn't 
have  to  be  put  into  it;  rather  it  just  has  to  be  turned.  Facing  the  right  field  is  what 
is  decisive.  We  may  have  to  struggle  to  rise  to  this,  but  the  struggle  is  over  the 
direction  of  our  gaze.  For  Augustine,  too,  God  can  be  known  more  easily 
through  his  created  order  and  in  a  sense  can  never  be  known  directly...  But  our 
97  ibid. 
98  Charles  Taylor,  Sources  of  the  Self  (Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  1989)  p.  129. 
99  Saint  Augustine,  De  vera  Religione[On  True  Religion],  XXXIX,  72.,  in  Augustine:  Early  Writings. 
trans.  John  H.  S.  Burleigh  (London:  SCM  Press,  1953)  p.  262.  "What  obstacle  then  remains  to  hinder 
the  soul  from  recalling  the  primal  beauty  which  it  abandoned,  when  it  can  make  an  end  of  its  vices? 
The  Wisdom  of  God  extends  from  end  to  end  with  might.  By  wisdom  the  great  Artificer  knit  his  works 
together  with  one  glorious  end  in  view.  His  goodness  has  no  grudging  envy  against  any  beauty  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest,  for  none  can  have  being  except  him  alone.  So  that  no  one  is  utterly  cast  away 
from  the  truth  who  has  in  him  the  slightest  visage  of  truth.  What  is  it  about  bodily  pleasure  that  holds 
fast?  You  will  find  that  it  is  argeeableness.  Disagreeable  things  beget  grief  and  agreeable  things  beget 
pleasure.  Seek  therefore  the  highest  agreeableness.  Do  not  go  outward;  return  within  yourself.  In  the 
inward  man  dwells  truth.  ...  It  [agreeableness]  has  to  do  no  seeking,  but  you  reach  it  by  seeking,  not  in 
space,  but  by  a  disposition  of  mind,  so  that  the  inward  man  may  agree  with  the  indwelling  truth  in  a 
pleasure  that  is  not  low  and  carnal  but  supremely  spiritual.  "  ibid. 
44 principal  route  to  God  is  not  through  the  object  domain  but  in  ourselves.  This  is 
because  God  is  not  just  the  transcendent  object  or  just  the  principle  of  order  of 
the  nearest  objects,  which  we  strain  to  see.  God  is  also  and  for  us  primarily  the 
basic  support  and  underlying  principle  of  our  knowing  activity.  God  is  not  just 
what  we  long  to  see,  but  what  powers  the  eye  which  sees.  So  the  light  of  God  is 
not  just  'out  there',  illuminating  the  order  of  being,  as  it  is  for  Plato;  it  is  also  an 
'inner'  light.  100 
For  Augustine,  Alia  est  enim  lux  quae  senfitur  oculis;  alia  quaper  oculos  agitur  et  sendatur  C'There 
is  one  fight  which  we  perceive  through  the  eye,  another  by  which  the  eye  itself  is  enabled 
to  perceive').  101  This  light  is  a  "second  lighe,  tothe  light  of  God's  illumination  so  that 
soul  is  illuminated  as  bright  as  the  external  world:  haec  lux  qua  ista  Maný'esta  Sunt,  udque  intus 
in  anima  est.  As  noted  by  Gilson,  this  second  light  "which  watches  within  is  that  of  the 
soul  itself..  so,  contrary  to  all  expectations,  the  analysis  of  sensation  has  brought  us  back 
from  the  exterior  of  things  to  the  interior  of  the  soul...  the  road  which  takes  the  soul  to 
God  passes  there.  "102 
Given  the  ultimate  and  seemingly  infinite  complexity  of  this  notion  of  in  interiore 
bomine,  Augustine  took  the  stance  that  humanity,  as  fashioned  in  the  Imago  Dei  (image  of 
God),  sees  this  Imago  Dei  primarily  in  searching  ever  more  deeper  into  thefom  of  the  self, 
which  is  theform  of  God.  In  this  way,  by  looking  to  theform  of  being  (triune  yet 
singular)  rather  than  the  content  or  im  port  of  being  in  order  to  find  possible  affinity  with 
God,  Augustine  provides  what  seems  to  be  a  reasonable  account  for  the  possibility  of 
relationship  between  God  and  subject  -  form  'fits'  form.  As  Augustine  states  with 
regard  to  this  mimesis  of  the  Trinitarian  God  and  the  Trinitarian  self, 
We  both  [the  Divine  and  subject]  exist,  and  know  that  we  exist,  and  rejoice  in 
this  existence  and  this  knowledge.  In  these  three,  when  the  mind  knows  and 
'00  Charles  Taylor,  ibid. 
101  Saint  Augustine,  cited  in  Etienne  Gilson,  7he  Christian  Philosophy  of  Saint  Augustine  (London: 
Golancz  Press,  1961)  p.  65. 
102  Gilson,  ibid.,  p.  65. 
45 loves  itself,  there  may  be  seen  a  trinity  -  mind,  love,  knowledge;  not  to  be 
confounded  by  any  intermixture,  although  each  exists  in  itself,  and  all  mutually  in 
A,  or  each  in  the  other  two,  or  the  other  two  in  eacW'.  103 
Augustine  goes  on  to  argue  in  De  Trinitate,  IX  that  this  notion  of  in  interiore  bomine  is 
constructed  of  dual  trinities  -  that  of  the  soul  and  its  activity.  As  noted,  the  'inner  man' 
resembles  the  form  of  God  and  has  this  form  reflected  to  himself/herself  deep  within 
over  and  over  as  a  mirror  held  up  to  a  mirror  -  infinitely  repeating  the  displayed  form 
deeper  and  deeper  without  diminishment.  This  form  takes  on  various  dimensions  as  the 
Imago  Dei  is  reflected  within  the  most  inner  man  to  his  ultimate  depths  of  subjectivity. 
As  Augustine  notes  in  De  Trinitate,  Dý,  the  first  Trinitarian  form  of  subjectivity  is  that  of 
mind,  knowledge,  and  love  (mens,  nolifia,  et  amor)  which  act  as  idealised  concepts.  The 
mind  comes  to  know  itself  and,  in  that,  love  itself.  Augustine  also  speaks  of  a  second 
trinity,  that  of  memory,  intelligence,  and  will  (memoria,  intelligenda,  et  voluntas).  Where  the 
initial  trinity  outlines  the  qualitadve  nature  of  the  subject,  the  latter  trinity  evokes  the  basic 
movement  of  the  trinity  in  the  soul  so  that  both  the  concept  and  praxis  are  in  harmony  - 
the  initial  trinity  (mens,  nolifia,  et  amoý  is  the  known  subject,  and  the  secondary  trinity 
(memoiia,  intelligenfia,  et  voluntas)  is  the  knowing  subject.  'Memory'  is  the  subject's  implicit 
knowledge  of  itself  The  subject  holds  'memory'  within  itself,  yet  this  is  latent  and  static. 
For  memory  to  be  brought  into  awareness,  memory  must  be  formulated  and  awakened. 
Yet,  the  latent  memory  of  the  subject  is  overlaid  by  false  images,  or'false  memory'  that 
distract  the  selffrom  itself.  To  dissipate  distorted  memory,  the  subject  is  to  draw  upon 
the  implicit  knowledge  mitbin  which  also  comes  from  above.  This  comes  about  in  verbum 
(in  a  word)  that  the  subject  formulates  through  inwardness  upon  itself.  This  is  what 
Augustine  terms  intelli  th  , genda.  But  to  understand  (intelligenfia)  oneself  as  subject,  e 
intelligenfia  of  awakened  true  memory  must  be  enacted.  This  enactment  of  intelligenfia  is  et 
103  Saint  Augustine,  cited  in  Charles  N.  Cochrane,  Christianity  and  Classical  Culture.  (New  York: 
46 voluntas  -  the  will  freed  to  love.  In  the  willing  forth  of  intelligenda,  the  subject  ultimately 
finds  self-  awareness  and,  in  turn,  love,  which  is  the  nexus  point  between  the  dual 
trinities.  This  notion  of  self-love  reminds  the  subject  that  this  notion  of  love  is  not 
unique  to  self,  but  rather  from  'other  than  oneself.  The  subject  then  reflects  back 
through  memory,  intelligence,  and  will,  via  love,  as  well  as  mind  and  knowledge,  which 
draws  the  subject  into  the  awareness  of  the  one  whose  image  they  share  -  the  Imago  Dei. 
In  this  way,  as  the  subject  looks  upon  its  ownfom  which  in  its  dual  trinities 
reflects  the  Imago  Dei  between  them  to  infinite  depths,  as  one  reflects  a  mirror  into 
another  mirror,  Provoking  seemingly  infinite  reflections,  that  are  never  fully  plumbed.  In 
this  infinite  reflexivity,  one  is  led  to  understand  (intelligenda)  theform  of  God.  Augustine 
introduces  here  a  radical  reflexivity  that  brings  to  the  fore  a  kind  of  "presence  to  oneself 
which  is  inseparable  from  one's  being  as  the  agent  of  experience",  104  something  to  which 
access  by  its  very  nature  is  asymmetrical  and  parenthetical  to  all  other  experience. 
Reflexivity  is  then  a  primary  requisite  for  "being".  In  the  act  of  depth  reflexivity,  the  self 
also  provides  a  proof  for  God  which 
is  a  proof  from  the  first-person  experience  of  knowing  and  reasoning.  I  am 
aware  of  my  own  sensing  and  thinking;  and  in  reflecting  on  this,  I  am  made 
aware  of  its  dependence  on  something  beyond  it,  something  common...  SOI 
recognise  that  this  activity  which  is  mine  is  grounded  on  and  presupposes 
something  higher  than  I,  something  which  I  should  look  up  to  and  revere.  By 
going  inward,  I  am  drawn  upward.  105 
As  evidenced  in  Confenions,  Augustine  took  this  path  out  of  his  concern  to  show  that 
God  is  to  be  found  not  just  in  the  world  but  also  (and  more  importantly)  at  the  very 
foundations  of  subjectivity.  For  Augustine  God  is  to  be  found  in  the  intimacy  of  self- 
presence  that  is  not  organised  by  the  apriod  but  more  basically  by  that  "incorporeal 
Oxford  University  Press,  1957)  p.  403. 
104  Charles  Taylor,  ibid.  p.  13  1. 
47 lighe'106by  which  our  minds  are  somehow  overturned  and  renewed,  so  that  we  may  judge 
rightly  of  all  these  things.  In  this  regard,  the  subject  is  so  akin  to  the  form  of  God,  and 
all  subjects  are  made  in  the  Imago  Dei,  that  regardless  of  the  seeming  differences  that  may 
exist  between  one  subjecesmind,  love,  and  knowledge  and  that  of  another,  unity 
throughout  creation  is  made  possible  via  the  "incorporeal  lighe'  that  illuminated  all 
things.  This  allows  the  subject  to  speak  ofitseý'in  the  first  person  and  still  live  with  the 
possibility  of  an  ethical  society  amidst  other  subjects.  Ultimately,  at  the  end  of  its  search 
for  selfhood,  if  the  subject  goes  to  the  very  end  of  that  which  is  never  reached,  the 
subject,  becomes  aware  of  the  possibility  of  God. 
This  experience  of  radical  reflexivity  results  not  in  self-illumination,  but  in  being 
illuminated  from  another  source,  in  receiving  the  standards  of  reason  from  beyond 
oneself,  which  the  proof  of  God's  existence  already  brought  to  light,  and  which  is  seen  to 
be  very  much  an  experience  of  inwardness.  The  more  the  subject  strives  to  reflect  upon 
itself,  the  more  convinced  the  subject  becomes  of  the  fact  that  subject  and  self  (knower 
and  known)  are  one.  This  unity,  coupled  with  the  evidenced  multiplicity  of  selffiood, 
brings  the  conviction  that  God  stands  alongside  and  not  apart  from  creation  in  sharing 
theform  of  identity  and  imparting  the  ability  through  the  "incorporeal  lighe,  to  judge 
rightly  all  things  throughout  creation  and  the  realm  of  imagination. 
Charles  Taylor  makes  the  following  observadon  on  the  reciprocal  nature  of  form 
regarding  the  subject  and  sacred  in  Augustine's  project: 
...  What  is  striking  here  for  our  purposes  is  that  man  shows  himself  most  clearly 
as  the  image  of  God  in  his  inner  self-presence  and  self-love.  It  is  a  kind  of 
knowledge  where  the  knower  and  the  known  are  one,  coupled  with  love,  which 
reflects  most  fully  God  in  our  lives.  And  indeed,  the  image  of  the  Trinity  in  us  is 
the  process  whereby  we  strive  to  complete  and  perfect  this  self-presence  and  self- 
105  ibid.,  p.  134. 
106  "Lucern  illarn  incorporearif'  See  Augustine,  City  of  God  (New  York:  The  Modem  Library,  1993)  XI, 
27,  P.  372. 
48 affirmation.  Nothing  shows  more  clearly  than  these  images  of  the  Trinity  how 
Augustinian  inwardness  is  bound  up  with  radical  reflexivity,  and  they  also  begin 
to  make  clear  how  essentially  linked  is  the  doctrine  of  inwardness  to  Augustine's 
whole  conception  of  the  relation  of  man  to  God.  107 
One  of  the  issues  growing  out  of  this  assertion  of  form  over  content  as  to  the  primary 
exemplar  and  ground  of  subjectivity  to  the  sacred,  was  the  sense  that  n,  ýi,  6ng  regarding 
Christ  must  also  conform  to  a  particular  'form'  -  there  was  a  certain  'way'  in  which  the 
incarnation  could  be  discussed  and  there  were  ways  that  it  could  not.  As  mentioned  in 
the  Introduction  of  this  thesis,  shortly  after  Augustine  we  see  that  in  the  fbrmýing  of  the 
Creeds  of  the  Church,  a  poetics  is  employed  that  makes  a  statement  as  to  what  form 
literature  that  seeks  to  figure  the  sacred  should  take.  Ultimately,  what  for  Augustine 
proved  to  be  an  answer  to  the  question  of  God's  relation  to  humanity,  and  tbepriorio  of 
form  over  content,  becarne  the  vexation  of  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  as 
challenges  from  writers  employing  a  poetics  that  radically  questioned  that  previously 
enacted  by  the  Church.  While  the  notion  of  theform  of  the  subject  was  comforting  to 
Augustine,  the  question  of  "Wbo  is  the  subject?  "  caused  inteRectual  disturbances  in 
different  forms  from  Descartes  and  Rousseau  through  Kant  and  those  foHowing.  The 
very  question  of  the  form  of  God  and  the  notion  of  the  Incarnation  as  the  "form  of  God 
made  flesh"  is  questioned  as  to  what  it  (the  Incarnation)  represents  and  how  is  it  indeed 
manifested. 
Prior  to  the  Council  of  Nicaea  of  325  CE  and  the  forming  of  the  Symbol  of 
Chalcedon  in  451  CE,  language  used  to  figure  Jesus,  as  noted  by  John  I-Eck,  "seems 
generally  to  have  been  devotional,  or  ecstatic,  or  liturgical  (or  all  three),  rather  than  an 
exercise  in  precise  theological  formulation.  It  was  analogous  to  the  language  of  love,  in  which 
107  ibid.,  pp.  136,137. 
49 all  manner  of  extravagances  and  exaggerations  are  entirely  appropriate...  "log  As  I  will 
assert,  it  is  a  recovery  of  this  'language  of  love'  that  comes  before  form  that  writers  such  as 
George  Eliot  have  sought  and  it  is  this  'language'  that  is  at  the  heart  of  her  poetics. 
108  John  I-lick,  The  Metaphor  of  God  Incarnate  (London:  SCM  Press,  1993)p.  101. 
50 4.0  Poetics  of  the  Subject  and  Sacred  into  the  nineteenth  century 
The  Cartesian  declaration  assure  queje  nepuis  avoir  aucune  connaissance  de  ce  qui  est  hors 
de  moi,  quepar  Pentrrmise  des  idies  quejai  eu  en  moi  C'certain  that  I  can  have  no  knowledge  of 
what  is  outside  me  except  by  means  of  the  ideas  I  have  within  me')  109  had  awakened  the 
"resolution  and  courage"  whereby  humanity  could  acknowledge  its  true  capacity  for  the 
locus  of  certainty  and  truth  to  be  found  in  its  own  subjectivity.  This  was  profoundly 
different  from  the  conclusions  reached  by  Augustine  centuries  earlier.  With  the 
movement  from  Descartes,  through  the  Enlightenment,  to  Idealism  and  Romanticism, 
attributes  traditionaUy  predicated  of  the  divine  subject  are  graduaUy  transferred  to  the 
human  subject.  Ibrough  a  dialectical  reversal,  the  creator  God  dies  and  is  resurrected  as 
the  creative  subject.  As  Mark  C.  Taylor  states  "...  In  different  terms,  the  modern  subject 
defines  itself  by  its  construcdve  activity".  110  As  Descartes  acknowledges  in  the  Discours,  the 
ordering  of  the  res  extensa  by  the  res  cogitans  is  predicated  on  the  possibility  of  the  fictive 
nature  of  this  ordering-  et  su 
, 
pposant  mesme  de  Porde  entre  ceux  qui  ne  seprecedentpoint 
naturellement  les  uns  les  autres  C'assuming  an  order,  even  if  a  fictive  one,  among  those  which 
do  not  follow  a  natural  sequence  relatively  to  one  another".  )111,  Whether  fact  or  fiction, 
the  "world"  is  ours  to  form. 
Immanuel  Kant's  summation  of  the  Enlightenment  project  was  that  it  was  the 
turn  toward  "man's  release  from  his  self-incurred  tutelage.  Tutelage  is  man's  ability  to 
make  use  of  his  understanding  without  direction  from  another.  Self-incurred  is  this 
tutelage  when  its  cause  lies  not  in  lack  of  reason  but  in  lack  of  resolution  and  courage  to 
109  From  letter  to  Gibieuf,  19  January  1642  in  Ren6  Descartes,  Philosophical  Letters,  trans.  Anthony 
Kenny  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1970)  p.  123. 
110  Mark  C.  Taylor,  Deconstruction  in  Context:  Literature  and  Philosophy.  (Chicago:  University  of 
Chicago  Press,  1986)  p.  3. 
111  Ren6  Descartes,  The  Philosophical  Works  of  Descartes,  trans.  E.  S.  Haldane  and  G.  R.  T.  Ross 
(Cambridge:  Dover,  1955)  1,  p.  92.  See  also  Charles  Taylor's  commentary  on  Descartes'  Second  Rule 
from  Discours  de  la  m9thode  in  Sources  of  the  Self,  pp.  144,145. 
51 use  it  without  direction  from  another".  112  In  his  Cridque  ofPure  Reason,  Kant  furthered  the 
Enlightenment  project  beyond  the  mere  definitions  of  res  cogitans  and  res  extensa  by 
categorically  critiquing  the  horizon  of  reason  itself  and  placing  responsibility  of  the 
ordering  of  the  world  upon  the  knowing  subject.  This  is  what  Kant  terms  as  "the 
synthetic  unity  of  self-consciousness"  which  stands  in  conflict  to  Descartes'  notion  of 
"cogito"  which  is  an  "analytical  unity  of  self-consciousness".  Kant  takes  the  next  step, 
beyond  Descartes  in  saying  that  unity  ofform  regarding  the  subject  and  the  subjeces 
world  is  merely  a  synthetic  rendering  of  'spontaneous  moments'  that  come  from 
moments  of  pure  beauty  that  are  not  provoked  ,  yet  arise  and  are  'gathered'  by  the 
forming  subject  in  order  that  the  subject  can  become  self-aware.  In  this  way,  subjectivity 
is  not  only  dependent  on  the  subject  himself,  as  in  Descartes'  project,  but  the  vegform  and 
-0o 
nnx  rind,  th  i  ul  uni  ýf  the  subject  is  seý'-created  and  seff-sustained  i,  the  co  text  of  afir  tP  ! pk  at  is  art  c  ated 
as  Kant's  moral  imperative.  The  split  between  subject  and  object  in  the  mediation  of  an 
objective  God  is  what  Kanes  project  sought  to  resolve  through  the  acknowledgement 
that  it  is  "reason  [that]  brings  unity  to  the  personality  by  subjecting  multiple  and 
conflicting  sense  inclinations  to  the  directives  of  the  apriori  moral  law.  Reason, 
therefore,  in  both  its  theoretical  and  practical  capacities,  functions  to  create  unity  out  Of 
plurality  and  to  reduce  manyness  to  oneness".  113  11-le  form  of  this  oneness  is  apriori  and 
it  is  for  the  subject  to  form  and  create  wholeness  within  the  lin-iits  of  reason.  In  this  way, 
we  see  the  ushering  in  of  Idealism  into  German  thought.  Idealism  "bears  its  name 
because  ideas  are  the  key  to  conclusively  aligning  the  metaphysical  doctrine  put  forth  by 
reason  with  what  is  evident  in  self-consciousness".  114  In  the  Platonic  tradition,  it  is  the 
Idea  that  is  purely  inhabited  within  thought  yet  full  of  substantial  determination. 
Furthermore,  it  is  the  Idea  that  "cuts  through  to  reveal  the  actual  content  of  a  given  thing 
112  Immanuel  Kant,  On  History,  trans.  L.  W.  Beck  (New  York:  Bobbs-Merill,  1965)  p.  3.  113  Mark  C.  Taylor,  op.  cit.  p.  5. 
114  RUdiger  Bubner,  German  Idealist  Philosophy  (London:  Penguin  Books,  1997)  p.  xv. 
52 and...  convey  the  most  basic  sediments  about  reality".  115 
This  fundamental  point  of  departure  in  philosophical  thought,  introduced  by 
Kant  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  which  saw  reason  turning  back  onto  the 
subject,  was  "received  as  a  Copernican  revolution".  '  16  'Ilie  effects  of  this  Kantian 
revolution  are  reflected  in  German  literature  by  the  rejection  of  concreteness 
. 
§&bkeiý.  The  "Idea"  now  had  e  weight  (Anscbaulicbkeiý  in  favour  of  abstraction  (Begri  th 
of  the  Tactum'  of  natural  sciences  and  became  a  valid  currency  within  the  marketplace  of 
thoughtýý  This  transition  is  particularly  evident  in  the  interpretation  of  mythology,  whose 
symbols  have  quite  different  functions,  exemplified  in  the  works  of  German  writers  such 
as  ScbBler,  H61derEn,  and  Goethe. 
4.1  Friedrich  Schiller  and  the  symbolic  mythos  of  the  human  spirit 
Charles  Taylor  states  that  it  was  "Schiller's  aspiration  to  a  condition  beyond  the 
forceful  imposition  of  form  on  matter,  and  a  fusion  of  the  two  in  beautý'  that  gave  rise 
to  his  poetiCS.  117  Form,  for  Schiller,  is  linked  to  the  universal.  This  aspiration  is  seen  in 
his  attempt  to  form  an  anthropologic-aesthetic  foundation  that  is  simultaneously 
dissolved  into  a  symbolic  mythos,  a  continuous  dissolving  of  subject  and  object  that  defies 
analytic  rationalism.  Consequently,  Schiller  considers  his  symbolic  mythology  as  a 
manifestation  of  human  spirit  (akin  to  Hegel's  Absolute  Sphiý  in  which  reason  and  nature 
are  unified  and.,  in  contrast  to  Kanespractical  reason,  SchiHer  sees  aesthetics  as  truth, 
whose  realisation  takes  the  form  of  a  mythology  which  conquers  reality.  In  the  Nintb 
Letter,  Schifler  asserts  this  claim  by  stating  that  the  task  of  the  poet  is  to  free  the  reader 
through  aesthetics:  Wo  dusiefindest,  umgib  sie  mit  edeln,  mitgeistreicben  Formen,  schliesse  jie 
ringsum  mit  den  Sjmbolen  des  Voriefflichen  ein,  bis  der  Schein  die  Wirklichkeit  und  die  Kunst  die 
115  ibid. 
116  ibid.,  p.  xxi 
117  Charles  Taylor,  op.  cit.,  p.  421. 
53 Natur  hýberuindet  C'Surround  them  wherever  you  meet  them,  with  the  great  and  noble 
forms  of  genius,  and  encompass  them  with  the  symbols  of  perfection,  until  Semblance 
conquer  reality  and  art  triumph  over  naturc".  )118  In  addition  to  the  rejection  of 
concreteness  (Anscbaulicbkeiý  in  favour  of  abstraction  (Begri 
. 
§7ichkeiý  relative  to  the 
subject,  the  development  of  a  distinctive  fictional  paradigm  of  identity  arises  in  this 
literature  in  the  wake  of  Kanes  Krifik  der  Urteilskraft  (Cri,  6que  ofJud,  e  en  In  particular,  'g  M  ý. 
works  written  or  published  in  Germany  in  the  last  decade  of  the  eighteenth  century  after 
the  Yjidk  der  Urteilskraft  include  Friedrich  Schiller's  Uber  die  astbetisebe  Er  ýebuý  des 
Menseben  in  einer  Reibe  von  Briefen,  Friedrich  H61derlin's  Em  pedokles,  and  Johann  Wolfgang 
von  Goethe's  Wilbelm  Meister's  Lebýabre.  Given  the  importance  of  German  literature  of 
this  period  upon  the  developing  poetics  of  George  Eliot,  it  is  important  to  review  some 
of  the  key  concerns  that  formed  these  writers  and  others  of  their  tradition. 
Common  to  all  of  these  works  of  Schiller,  H61derlin,  and  Goethe  is  a 
commitment  to  balancing  the  claims  of  the  individual  with  those  of  the  Ideal  which  had 
begun  to  replace  the  idea  of  God  as  the  reflexive  template  where  the  subject  was  to  gain 
its  assurance  of  form.  Yet  while  the  philosophers  of  German  Idealism  (Kant,  Schilling, 
Fichte)  create  rhetoric  to  support  the  agency  of  the  Ideal  in  relation  to  the  form  of  the 
subject,  the  poetics  of  writers  such  as  H61derlin  and  Goethe  showed  a  loss  of  form  in  the 
subject  without  God  in  this  Ideal  universe.  In  Kanes  Krifik  der  Urteilskraft,  he  offers 
Aesthetic  judgement,  or  communal  sense,  as  establishing  a  base  relation  between  an 
individual  idea  and  the  a 
. 
priori  concept;  part  and  the  whole: 
In  a  word,  the  aesthetic  idea  is  a  representation  of  the  imagination,  annexed  to  a 
given  concept,  with  which,  in  the  ftee  employment  of  imagination,  such  a 
multiplicity  of  partial  representations  are  bound  up,  that  no  expression  indicating 
a  definite  concept  can  be  found  for  it  -  one  which  on  that  account  allows  a 
concept  to  be  supplemented  in  thought  by  much  that  is  indefinable  in  words,  and 
118  Cited  by  John  D.  Simons,  Friedrich  Schiller  (Boston:  G.  K.  Hall  and  Co.,  1981)  p.  41. 
54 the  feeling  of  which  quickens  the  cognitive  faculties,  and  with  language,  as  a  mere 
tl-dng  of  the  letter,  binds  up  the  spirit  [soul]  also.  119 
.P 
Yet  in  turning  to  key  writers,  such  as  H61derlin  in  his  poem  EM  edokles  and  Johann 
Wolfgang  von  Goethe  in  Wilbelm  Meister's  Lehýabre,  the  idealised  subject  is  not  comforted 
in  'the  aesthetic  idea  [as]  the  free  employment  of  imagination". 
4.2  Friedrich  H61derlin  and  Empedokles 
What  is  argued  in  Schiller  is  the  assertion  that  particular  sensations  and  experiences  are 
fundamental  and  independent  but  always  already  bound  within  some  intersubjective 
structure  of  the  "given  concept".  Neitberpart  nor  wbole  serves  as  an  absolutepoint  of  origin. 
Friedrich  H61derlin  exemplifies  this  in  his  shorter  ode,  Ex  pedokles: 
Das  Leben  suchst  du,  suchst,  und  es  quillt  undglänZt 
Ein,  göttlich  Feuer  tief  aus  der  Erde  dir, 
Und  du  in  schauderndem  Verlan 
, gen 
Wirfst  dich  hinab,  in  des  Aetna  Flammen... 
(You  look  for  life,  you  look  and  from  deeps  of  Earth 
A  fire,  divinely  gleaming  wells  up  for  you, 
And  quick,  aquiver  with  desire,  you 
Hurl  yourself  down  into  Etna"s  furnace  ...  )120 
In  Empedokles,  there  is  a  merging  of  the  subject  with  concept  that  departs  from  a  search 
for  form  and,  ultimately,  is  the  annibilation  ofform  altogether  in  a  fire  that  is  not  itself 
divine,  but  "divinely  glearning".  Conversely,  the  "fire"  that  H61derlin  speaks  of  (das 
Feuer)  does  not  emanate  from  the  subject,  rather  "wells  up"for  the  subject.  As  we  see  in 
Em 
. 
pedokles,  H61derlin  creates  a  universe  in  his  poetics  where,  as  noted  by  David  jasper, 
"H61derlin's  voice,  as  a  poetic  one,  [suggests]  a  new  mythology  which  moves  from  the 
119  Immanuel  Kant,  Kritik  der  Urteilskraft  (Critique  ofJudgement)  in  Deconstruction  in  Context  ed. 
Mark  C.  Taylor  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1986)  p.  49. 
55 Bible  and  beyond  syncretism  to  a  new  wholeness  and  coherence  as  the  Bible  itself 
seemed  otherwise  to  disintegrate  under  the  probes  of  historical  criticismý1.121  H61derlin 
sought  to  impart  through  his  poetics  "...  the  final  realisation  of  the  truly  'mythological'  by 
the  poet  -  not  a  discovery  of  the  'key'  to  all  mythologies,  but  rather  a  transcending  of  all 
systems  and  historical  moments  in  one  great  timeless  moment  of  truth,  the  moment  of 
Being".  122  Thýs  mode  of  being  is  for  H61derlin  the  dispersal  of  the  particular  into  and 
throughout  tbeformlessness  of  conce  pt,  where  the  seam  points  of  being  and  non-being, 
creator  and  created,  cease  to  be  distinguishable.  In  the  emerging  role  of  the  writer  in 
later  Romanticism,  H61derlin  took  the  Promethean  task  one  step  beyond  the  mere 
stealing  of  fire.  There  is  an  abstraction  regarding  claims  of  truth  that  is  evidenced  in  this 
arising  poetics.  123  In  "Empedokles",  neither  part  nor  whole  could  serve  as  an  absolute 
point  of  origin,  and  a  "divinely  gleaming"  fire  is  all  that  remained  -  Prometheus  is  now 
both  torchbearer  and  torch.  As  noted  by  Nfichael  Hamburger,  H61derfin's  "own  view  of 
the  poet  as  philosopher,  prophet  and  priest  -  and  as  tragic  hero  -  was  subject  to 
perpetual  crisis  and  re-examination.  The  special  significance  for  H61derlin  of 
Empedokles'  mode  of  death  -a  physical  fusion  with  the  primal  elements  and  return  to 
the  very  womb  of  Earth  -  ...  [is]  intimated  in  'EmpedoldeS'.  124 
Schiller,  H61derlin,  and  Goethe  try  to  render  diis  ideal  of  an  interdependent 
relation  and  irreducible  tension  between  part  and  whole  into,  respectively,  historical, 
dramatic,  and  novelistic  accounts.  Yet  all  three,  in  different  measure  and  with  different 
strategies,  simultaneously  strive  to  rebalance  tl-ýs  relation,  to  give  greater  weight  to 
embodiment  and  the  self  than  Kant  grants. 
120  Friedrich  Holderlin,  'Empedokles"  Selected  Poems  and  Fragments,  Trans.  Michael  Hamburger 
(London:  Penguin  Books,  1998)  pp.  4,5. 
121  David  Jasper  The  Sacred  and  Secular  Canon  in  Romanticism  (London:  Macmillian  Press,  1999)  p. 
53. 
122  ibid.,  p.  50. 
123  As  will  be  discussed  in  more  depth  in  chapter  4,  the  destabilising  of  form  regarding  the  figuring  of 
the  subject  through  poetics  has  its  mimesis  in  the  fall  of  historicity  in  biblical  criticism.  124  Michael  Hamburger,  "Introduction"  in  Friedrich  H61derlin,  Selected  Poems  and  Fragments.  Trans. 
56 In  his  Aestbefic  Letters,  Schiller  attempts  to  hold  onto  the  synthetic  and  unifying 
force  of  beauty  while  stretching  and  narrativizing  Kant's  account  to  lend  greater 
emphasis  to  sensation  which  carries  certain  existentialist  leanings.  As  a  result,  a  space 
constantly  opens  up  in  Schiller's  treatise  between  the  empirical  and  formal  dimensions  of 
beauty.  The  poetics  evoked  by  these  writers  strive  to  uphold  the  tension  between 
universal  and  particular  empirical  moments  by  stressing  disjunction  and  negativity.  In 
both  Em  edokles  and  Wilbelm  Meister's  Lebýahre,  the  gap  between  an  embodied  protagonist 
and  the  ideal  opens  up  a  hermeneutic  space  which  can  only  be  reconciled  b  y  the  reader, 
yet  is  destabilising  to  the  very  act  of  reading.  As  seen  earlier  in  Em  edokle  ,  space 
.PSa 
through  which  a  fire  "divinely  glearning"  wells  upfor  the  subject  in  H61derlin's  universe. 
Form  then  dissolves  into  negativity  where  that  which  was  embodied  is  dispersed  into  the 
conceptual.  Yet  this  "flame"  is  not  extinguished  nor  is  the  fissure  through  which  it  came 
upon  the  subject  closed.  As  the  final  stanza  proclaims: 
Doch  heilig  bist  du  mir,  uie  der  Erde  Macht, 
Die  dich  hinwegnahm,  kühner  Getödteter! 
Undfoýen  x&bt'icb  in  die  Titfe, 
Hielte  die  Liebe  mich  nicht,  dem  Helden. 
(Yet  you  are  holy  to  me  as  is  the  power 
Of  Earth  that  took  you  from  us,  the  boldly  killedl 
And  gladly,  did  not  love  restrain  me, 
Deep  as  the  hero  plunged  down  I'd  follow.  )125 
The  completion  of  the  work  is  an  open  invitation  due  to  the  longing  Cdown  I'd  follow) 
of  the  writer  to  fulfil  the  journey.  The  passive  regrets  of  the  writer  serve  as  an  offer  to 
the  reader  to  follow  "deep  as  the  hero  plunged  down".  This  is  a  hermeneutic  invitation 
to  enter  ffilly  into  the  "divinely  glean-ýine'  fire  that  H61derlin  describes  in  his  universe 
that  is  without  a  God  yet  speaks  of  divine  encounter: 
Michael  Hamburger  (London:  Penguin,  1998)  p.  xxiv. 
57 If  biblical  criticism  in  Germany  gave  rise  to  H61derlin's  pure  'Scripture',  it  also 
necessitated,  in  scholars  such  as  Schleiermacher,  the  development  of  the  art  of 
hermcneutics  which  Hblderlin,  in  a  sense,  utterly  denies.  Hermeneutics 
recogniscs  the  gap  between  the  human  and  the  divine  realms  and  the 
incommensurability  finally  existing  between  the  word  and  our  interpretation  of  it. 
111at  gap  is  its  very  lifeblood.  126 
Turning  to  Goethe's  project  in  Wilbem  Meister's  Lebýabre  we  see  that,  similar  to  Schiller 
and  H61derlin,  Goethe  creates  an  abstraction  rather  than  a  solidification  of  the  subject  in 
his  poetics  that  results  in  an  unsettled  space  where  poetic  form  itself  is  called  into 
question.  Ultimately,  how  one  sees  "form"  in  relation  to  a  poetics  of  the  subject  and  the 
sacred  is  shifted. 
4.3  Goethe  and  the  Morphological  Bildung  in  Wilhelm  Meister-'s  Leh#ahze 
In  The  life  and  Forks  of  Goetbe,  G.  H.  Lewes  made  the  following  observation 
regarding  attempts  at  critique  of  Goethe's  lxbýabre. 
He  [the  critic]  is  not  satisfied  with  what  the  artist  has  given,  he  wants  to  know 
what  he  meant.  He  guesses  at  the  meaning;  the  more  remote  the  meaning  lies  on 
the  wandering  tracks  of  thought,  the  better  pleased  is  he  with  the  discovery,  and 
sturdily  rejects  every  simple  explanation  in  favour  of  this  exegetical  Idea.  Thus 
the  phantom  of  Philosophy  hovers  mistily  before  Art,  concealing  Art  from  our 
eyes.  It  is  true  the  Idea  said  to  underlie  the  work  was  never  conceived  by  anyone 
before,  least  of  all  by  the  Artist;  but  that  is  the  glory  of  the  critic:  he  is  proud  of 
having  plunged  into  the  depths.  Of  all  horrors  to  the  German  of  this  school 
there  is  no  horror  like  that  of  the  surýface  -  it  is  more  terrible  to  him  than  cold 
water...  The  obvious  want  of  unity  in  the  work  has  given  free  play  to  the 
interpreting  imagination.  Hillebrand  boldly  says  that  the  "Idea  of  Wilbelm  Meister 
is  precisely  this  -  that  it  has  no  Idea",  -  which  does  not  greatly  further  our 
comprehension.  127 
125  Friedrich  H61derlin,  'Tmpedokles",  ibid. 
126  David  Jasper,  ibid.  p.  55. 
127  G.  H.  Lewes,  77ze  Life  and  Works  of  Goethe  Vol.  2  (London:  T.  Richards,  37,  Great  Queen  Street, 
58 While  the  assertion  that  Wilbelm  Meister's  Leb!  ýabre  has  no  organising  Idea  may  appear  at 
first  blush  to  be  a  rather  extreme  assertion,  the  observations  of  Lewes  do  have  merit.  In 
his  Afterword  to  Lebýabre,  Eric  Blackwell  raises  similar  difficulties  in  approaching  the 
text: 
The  main  difficulty  is  the  apparent  disunity  of  the  book,  which  seems  to  begin  as 
one  thing  -a  novel  of  theatrical  life?  -  and  end  as  something  completely 
different  -a  novel  about  social  or  communal  integration?  About  finding  one's 
way  in  life?...  Add  to  this  that  there  are  elements  in  the  first  five  books  which  are 
hardly  encompassable  by  realistic  criteria  -  the  two  Strangers,  Mignon,  and  the 
Harper  -  characters  that  seem  to  be  at  odds  with  the  generally  realistic 
atmosphere  and  tone,  yet  are  described  realistically.  Where  does  Book  Six  fit  in? 
Can  it  be  conceived  as  a  transition  to  the  last  two;  it  so,  in  what  sense?...  What 
does  it  all  add  up  to?  What  is  Philine  doing  in  a  novel  of  ideas  or  the  Harper  in  a 
realistic  novel?  What  is  NEgnon  doing  in  cither?  128 
Lebýabre  evidences  Goethe  creating  a  space  for  such  questions  to  be  asked  that  blends 
his  aesthetic  and  scientific  theories.  In  Maximen  und  Reflbdonen  he  states  that  "physics 
must  be  divorced  from  mathematics.  It  must  be  completely  independent,  and  try  to 
penetrate  with  all  its  loving,  reverent,  pious  force  into  nature  and  its  holy  life,  quite 
regardless  of  what  mathematics  accomplishes  and  does".  129  Goethe  goes  on  to  note  that 
"mathematics,  for  its  part,  must  declare  itself  independent  of  everything  external,  go  its 
own  distinctive  and  important  way,  and  cultivate  a  greater  purity  than  is  possible  when 
heretofore  it  concerns  itself  with  existence  and  endeavours  to  win  something  from  it  or 
conformto 
iel.  130 
From  his  interest  in  botany,  Goethe  drew  a  conception  of  moýpbolqgv,  a  word 
1855)  pp.  201,202. 
128  Johann  Wolfgang  von  Goethe,  Wilhelm  Meister's  Apprenticeship.  Ed.  and  trans.  Eric A.  Blackwell. 
(Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1995)  pp.  381,382. 
129  Cited  by  Ernst  Cassirer,  Rousseau,  Kant,  Goethe.  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1945)  p. 
63. 
59 which  Goethe  himself  coined,  that  was  a  move  beyond  the  rigidity  of  classification  of 
type131  toward  a  conception  of  nature  asprocess.  In  this  regard,  "for  Goethe  such  an 
enterprise  [merely  labelling  natural  cause  and  effect]  was  not  enough.  According  to  him, 
what  we  grasp  in  this  way  are  only  theproducts,  not  theprocess  of  life.  It  is  into  this  notion 
of  qe  asprocess  he  wanted,  not  only  as  a  poet,  but  also  as  scientist,  to  win  insight;  in  it  he 
saw  what  was  greatest  and  highest".  132 
In  order  to  see  life  as  process,  Goethe  argued  that  one  must  look  beyond  the 
cataloguing  of  type  in  order  to  gain  an  appreciation  of  the  whole.  In  Natunkiss  he  makes 
the  following  comment:  "...  Classes,  genera,  species  and  individuals  are  related  as 
instances  to  a  law;  they  are  contained  in  it,  but  they  do  not  contain  or  retealieO.  133 
The  theme  noted  previously  is  continued  in  Goethe  -  vL  desire  to  look  beyond 
category  and  type  in  order  to  seek  after  that  which  is  beyond  form. 
. 
For  SchiHer  this  is  a 
space  that  constantly  opens  between  the  empirical  and  formal  dimensions  of  beauty  as  he 
strives  to  uphold  the  tension  between  universal  and  particular  through  stressing 
disjunction  and  negativity.  As  seen  in  his  poem  Ew  pedokles,  H61derlin  saw  the  boundary 
between  the  subject  and  the  divine  dissolve  as  one  thrown  into  a  fire.  I'his  space  without 
boundary  is  seen  in  Goethe's  theory  of  morphology  as  well,  particularly  when  seen  as  an 
appropriate  hermeneutic  for  reading  Wilhelm  Meister's  Lehýahrr.  In  this  regard,  Lehýahre  is 
not  a  quantifiable  study  where  the  parts  equal  the  whole,  rather 
[Goethe's  Lebýabre]  narrates  the  acculturation  of  a  self  -  the  integration  of  a 
particular  "I"  into  the  general  subjectivity  of  a  community,  and  thus,  finally,  into 
the  universal  subjectivity  of  humanity...  even  the  knowledge  of  only  a  dozen 
130  Cassirer,  op.  cit.  131  Goethe  had  read  Linnaeus'  system  of  nature  whereby  understanding  of  nature  is  achieved  when  "we 
have  succeeded  in  arranging  it  (nature)  in  the  pigeonholes  of  our  concepts,  dividing  it  into  species  and 
genera,  into  families,  classes,  and  orders".  Cassirer,  op.  cit.  p.  69. 
132  ibid. 
133  Cassirer  op.  cit.,  p.  93. 
60 words  of  German  suffices  to  hear  an  interplay  of  representation  (Bila)  and 
formation  (Bilduti  134  Rt],  in  short,  is  a  tro  pirations  of  aestbefic  bumanism.  pefor  the  as 
This  "interplay"  between  representation  and  formation  is  key  to  reading  Lebýabre,  where 
the  differential  between  representation  (text)  and  formation  (subject)  disappear  leaving  a 
new  hybrid.  Before  the  reader  of  Lebýabre  is  neither  a  solely  pedagogic,  manual  nor  a 
purely  aesthetic  work.  Lebýabre  does  not  attempt  to  be  a  pre-cursive  "novel  of  manners" 
in  the  Victorian  vein  that  offers  a  manual  for  self  actualisation,  nor  do  the  characters 
chronicled  within  the  text  provide  an  objective  means  that  is  necessarily  uniform  in 
ethics  nor  morals.  As  with  Goethe's  morphology,  tl-ýs  is  a  new  "shape"  altogether,  that 
while  idcalised,  is  none  the  less  "real".  135  It  was  Gocthe's  hope  to  be  the  great  liberator 
of  the  poetic  spirit  in  his  age  in  his  re-imagining  of  form,  as  noted  by  Matthew  Arnold: 
"But  to  hear  Goethe  himself:  "If  I  were  to  say  what  I  had  really  been  to  the  Germans  in 
general,  and  to  the  young  German  poets  in  particular,  I  should  say  I  had  been  their 
kberato?  '.  136As  a  liberator,  what  Goethe  was  hoping  to  move  beyond  is  the  privileging  of 
. ystem  over  essence  as  the  primary  quality  of  form.  As  Arnold  assesses  the  beginnings  of 
modernity,  he  notes  the  world  within  which  Goethe  sought  a  different  path: 
Modern  times  find  themselves  with  an  immense  system  of  institutions, 
established  facts,  accredited  dogmas,  customs,  rules,  which  have  come  to  them 
from  times  not  modem.  In  this  system  their  fife  has  to  be  carried  forward;  yet 
they  have  a  sense  that  this  system  is  not  of  their  own  creation,  that  it  by  no 
means  corresponds  exactly  with  the  wants  of  actual  life...  The  modem  spirit  is 
134  Marc  Redfield,  Phantom  Formations:  Aesthetic  Ideology  and  the  Bildungsroman.  (Ithaca:  Cornell 
University  Press,  1996)  p.  38. 
135  In  Goethe's  sketch  Gluckliches  Ereignis  he  reports  the  following  conversation  with  Schiller 
regarding  his  theory  of  metamorphosis:  "We  arrived  at  his  house,  the  conversation  began  drew  me  in; 
there  I  vigorously  expounded  the  metamorphosis  of  plants,  and  with  many  suggestive  strokes  of  the  pen  let  a  symbolic  plant  arise  before  his  eyes.  He  listened  to  and  looked  at  everything  with  great  interest 
with  decided  power  of  comprehension;  but  when  I  ended  he  shook  his  head  and  said:  'That  is  not 
empirical,  that  is  ideal'  (Das  ist  keine  Er  fiahrung,  das  ist  eine  Idee).  I  was  taken  aback  and  somewhat 
vexed;  for  he  had  emphatically  stated  the  point  that  divided  us...  But  I  collected  myself  and  replied:  'I 
am  very  glad  that  I  have  ideals  without  knowing  it,  and  even  see  them  with  my  eyes.  "'  Cited  by 
Cassirer,  op.  cit.  p.  73. 
136  Matthew  Arnold,  "from  Heinrich  Heine"  Poetry  and  Criticism  ofMatthew  Arnold  ed.  A.  Dwight 
61 now  awake  almost  everywhere;  the  sense  of  want  of  correspondence  between  the 
forms  of  modern  Europe  and  its  spirit,  between  the  new  wine  of  the  eighteenth 
and  nineteenth  centuries,  and  the  old  bottles  of  the  eleventh  and  twelfth 
centuries,  or  even  of  the  sixteenth  century  and  seventeenth...  it  is  no  longer 
dangerous  to  affirm  that  this  want  of  correspondence  exists;  people  are  beginning 
to  be  shy  of  denying  it...  Dissolvents  of  the  old  European  system  of  dominant 
ideas  and  facts  we  must  all  be  [after  the  likes  ofl  Goethe,  that  grand  dissolvent  in 
an  age  where  fewer  and  fewer  are  present  ...  137 
One  of  the  key  modes  with  which  Goethe  was  truly  "that  grand  dissolvene,  of  traditional 
form  was  in  his  employment  of  Bildung  as  the  poetics  of  Lebýabre.  As  noted  previously, 
there  is  a  challenge  in  deriving  a  critical  reading  of  Lebýabre,  as  suggested  by  Redfield  in 
discussing  the  Bildun 
, gsroman: 
I'he  Bildungsroman  paradox  derives  from  that  of  aesthetics.  The  "contene,  of  the 
Bildungsmman  instantly  becomes  a  question  of  form,  precisely  because  the  content 
is  the  forming-of-content,  "Bildunf-  the  formation  of  the  human  as  the 
producer  of  itself  as  form.  138 
Precisely  because  Wilhelm's  Bildung  is  sbotvn  more  than  explained139,  the  question  of 
content  and  form  regarding  the  "hoV'  of  his  Bildung  can  be  troubling,  yet  a  fusion  of 
mind  and  feeling  does  progress140  into  the  realising  of  a  subject  who  has  completed  his 
apprenticeship  and  is  ready  for  Efe.  141  For  Goethe,  the  shift  must  be  made  from  an 
empinc  rea  ing  of  the  text  to  a  morphological  reading  in  order  to  see  the  Bildung  of 
Culler  (Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin  Company,  1961)  p.  289. 
137Culler,  op.  cit.,  p.  290. 
139  Marc  Redfield,  op.  cit.,  p.  42. 
139  Book  VII  of  Lehrjahre  provides  an  accounting  of  the  "forces"  at  play  in  Wilhelm's  Bildung  through 
the  Abbe  and  the  "unveiling"  of  the  Society  of  the  Tower's  apprenticeship.  Yet  pedagogy  is  not  given 
beyond  "forces  at  worV. 
140  As  noted  by  Gerlinde  Roder-Bolton,  "The  concept  of  Bildung,  as  advocated  in  Lehrjahre,  is  a  fusion 
of  mind  and  feeling  in  individuals  who  respond  freely  to,  and  are  consciously  and  inseparably  part  of, 
the  creative  forces  of  nature.  Since  this  creative  power  is  also  within  them,  prompting  them  to  reshape 
their  inner  and  outer  world,  they  achieve  the  full  development  of  their  potential".  Gerlinde  Roder- 
Bolton  Studies  in  Comparative  Literature.  Vol.  13:  George  Eliot  and  Goethe:  An  Elective  Affinity. 
(Amsterdam:  Rodopi.  1998)  p.  164. 
141  As  noted  in  the  words  of  the  Abbe  at  the  conclusion  of  Book  VII  "Hail  to  thee,  young  man!  Thy 
apprenticeship  is  done;  Nature  has  pronounced  thee  free!  "  (Goethe,  Wilhelm  Meister's  Apprenticeship 
and  Travels  Vol.  2  trans.  Thomas  Carlyle.  (London:  Chapman  and  Hall,  1858)  Book  VII,  Chapter  IX  p. 
62 Wilhelm  take  shape.  As  Goethe  notes, 
through  me  the  German  poets  have  become  aware  thatY  as  man  must  live  from 
within  outwards,  so  the  artist  must  work  from  within  outwards,  seeing  that,  make 
what  contortions  he  will,  he  can  only  bring  to  light  his  own  individuality.  I  can 
clearly  mark  where  this  influence  of  mine  has  made  itself  felt;  there  arises  out  of 
it  a  kind  ofpoetg  ofnature,  and  only  in  this  way  it  is  possible  to  be  original.  142 
This  notion  of  apoetg  ofnature  is  a  poetics  that  knows  no  systemic  limits  and  is 
profoundly  dialogical  rather  than  dialectical.  In  the  second  portion  of  Kant's  Gifique  of 
judgement  (Krifik  der  UdeilskrqA  entitled  "Critique  of  Teleological  judgernent",  we  see 
Kant's  insights  into  teleology  as  a  heuristic  principle  for  investigation  toward 
understanding.  Commenting  on  the  limits  of  a  purely  quantified  means  for 
understanding  of  biological  nature,  Kant  writes: 
It  is  quite  certain  that  we  can  never  get  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  organised 
beings  and  their  inner  possibility,  much  less  get  an  explanation  of  them,  by 
looking  merely  to  mechanical  principles  of  nature.  Indeed,  so  certain  is  it,  that 
we  may  confidently  assert  that  it  is  absurd  for  men  even  to  entertain  any  thought 
of  so  doing,  or  to  hope  that  maybe  another  Newton  may  some  day  arise,  to  make 
intelligible  to  us  even  the  genesis  of  but  a  blade  of  grass  from  natural  laws  that  no 
design  has  ordered.  Such  insight  we  must  absolutely  deny  mankind.  143 
It  was  here  that  Goethe  made  a  connection  with  Kant's  philosophy  and  gained  language 
for  his  own  work.  As  Kant  states,  one  must  never  assume  that  they  can  capture  what  he 
calls  the  "inner  possibilities"  of  a  subject,  much  less  "an  explanation"  of  its  truest  nature. 
In  his  essay  entitled  "Einwirkung  der  neuren  Philosophie"  from  Naturuiss  he  describes 
the  impact  Kanes  "Critique  of  Teleological  judgement"  had  upon  him: 
But  the  Crifique  ofjudgement  feH  into  my  hands,  and  to  this  book  I  owe  one  of  the 
happiest  periods  of  my  life.  Here  I  saw  my  most  diverse  interests  brought 
63. 
142  Cited  by  Matthew  Amold,  op.  cit.,  p.  290. 
63 together,  artistic  and  natural  production  handled  the  same  way;  the  power  of 
aesthetic  and  teleological  judgement  mutually  illuminated  each  other...  If  my  way 
of  thinking  was  not  always  able  to  agree  with  the  author's,  if  I  seemed  to  miss 
something  here  and  there,  still  the  main  ideas  of  the  work  were  quite  analogous 
to  my  previous  production,  action  and  thought.  The  inner  life  of  art  as  of  nature, 
their  mutual  working  from  within  outward,  were  clearly  expressed  in  this  book.  144 
In  short,  for  Goethe  the  process  of  "becoming"  is  to  be  seen  through  a  morphological 
poetics  rather  than  a  mechanistic  system  -  ordering  that  is  organic  from  the  inner  realms 
extending  to  the  outer  manifestation  of  form.  Matthew  Arnold  summarises  Goethe's 
project  in  this  manner:  , 
Goethe's  profound,  imperturbable  naturalism  is  absolutely  fatal  to  all  routine 
thinking:  he  puts  the  standard,  once  for  all,  inside  every  man  instead  of  outside  of 
him;  where  he  is  told,  such  a  thing  must  be  so,  there  is  immense  authority  and 
custom  in  favour  of  its  being  so,  it  has  been  held  to  be  so  for  a  thousand  years, 
he  answers  with  Olympian  politeness,  "But  is  it  So?  is  it  So  to  Me?  "145 
This  "profound,  imperturbable  naturalism"  calls  into  question  I the  role  of  writing  itself  in 
Goethe's  work.  The  "old  NEddle-Age  machine"146  that  was  "still  creaking  on"  in 
Goethe's  time  that  held  the  task  of  writing  to  be  systematic  was  rendered  organic  in  his 
work,  causing  the  reader  to  'form'  with/through  the  act  of  reading  rather  than  reading 
througb  a  lens  of  form.  This  poetics  calls  into  question  large  epistemological  issues,  not 
the  least  of  which  being  the  nature  of  destiny  and  agency  in  relation  to  the  subject. 
Turning  to  Book  I  of  Wilbelm  Meister's  Lxbýabre,  Goethe  has  the  foUowing  advice 
given  to  his  protagonist  Wilhelm  by  a  stranger  encountered  upon  the  way  to  an  Inn: 
"Do  you  believe  in  destinyý  No  power  rules  over  us,  and  directs  all  our  ultimate 
advantage?  " 
"Ille  question  is  not  now  of  my  belief,  nor  is  this  the  place  to  explain  how  I  may 
have  attempted  to  form  for  myself  some  not  impossible  conception  of  things 
143  Cited  by  Cassirer,  op.  cit.  p.  65. 
144ibid.,  p.  64. 
145  Matthew  Amold,  op.  cit.,  p.  290. 
64 which  are  incomprehensible  to  all  of  us:  the  question  is  here:  What  mode  of 
viewing  them  will  profit  us  the  most?  The  fabric  of  our  life  is  formed  of 
necessity  and  chance;  the  reason  of  man  takes  its  station  between  them,  and  may 
rule  them  both:  it  treats  the  necessary  as  the  groundwork  of  its  being;  the 
accidental  it  can  direct  and  guide  and  employ  for  its  own  purposes;  and  only 
while  this  principle  of  reason  stands  firm  and  inexpugnable  does  man  deserve  to 
be  named  the  god  of  this  lower  world.  But  woe  to  him  who,  from  his  youth,  has 
used  himself  to  search  in  necessity  for  something  of  arbitrary  will;  to  ascribe  to 
chance  a  sort  of  reason,  which  it  is  a  matter  of  religion  to  obeyl"147 
As  Wilhehn  unknowingly  begins  his  apprenticeship,  a  "strangee,  offers  this  advice  to  him 
and  as  well  to  the  reader  of  the  text.  In  Wilhelm's  approach  to  life,  and  the  reader's 
approach  to  the  text,  one  should  venture  not  to  find  solace  in  either  the  seeming  security 
of  necessity  nor  the  supposed  freedom  offered  by  chance.  Instead,  there  is  a  middle  way 
where  "the  reason  of  man  takes  its  station  between  both".  148  Finding  d-ds  balance  wiU 
prove  hard  to  maintain  as  foreshadowed  by  Wilhelm  in  Book  II: 
He  felt  glad  as  having  thus  been  timefully,  though  somewhat  harshly  warned 
about  the  proper  path  of  life;  while  many  are  constrained  to  expiate  more  heavily, 
and  at  a  later  age,  the  misconceptions  into  which  their  youthful  inexperience  has 
betrayed  them.  For,  each  man  commonly  defends  himself  as  long  as  possible 
from  casting  out  the  idols  which  he  worships  in  his  soul,  from  acknowledging  a 
master  error,  and  admitting  any  truth  brings  him  despair.  149 
Wilhelm  gains  a  vision  for  a  life  that  is  free  from  pedagogical  prescriptions  through  his 
encounter  with  Shakespeare's  Hamlet.  Relating  what  is  key  to  an  understanding  of 
Hamlees  character,  Wilhelm  makes  the  following  observation: 
"It  pleases  us,  it  flatters  us  to  see  a  hero  acting  on  his  own  strength;  loving  and 
hating  as  his  heart  directs  him;  undertaking  and  completing;  casting  every 
146  ibid.,  p.  29  1. 
147  Johann  Wolfgang  von  Goethe,  Wilhem  Meister's  Apprenticeship  and  Travels  trans.  Thomas  Carlyle 
(London:  Chapman  and  Hill,  1858)  Book  1,  Chapter  XVII,  p.  61.  148  ibid. 
149  ibid.,  Book  II,  Chap.  IL  p.  67 
65 obstacle  aside;  and  at  length  attaining  some  great  object  which  he  aimed  at. 
Poets  and  historians  would  willingly  persuade  us  that  so  proud  a  lot  may  fall  to 
man.  In  Hamlet  we  are  taught  another  lesson:  the  hero  is  without  a  plan,  but  the 
piece  is  a  full  and  rigidly-accomplished  scheme  of  vengeance:  a  horrid  deed 
occurs;  it  rolls  itself  along  with  all  its  consequences,  dragging  guiltless  persons 
also  in  its  course;  the  perpetrator  seems  as  if  he  would  evade  the  abyss  which  is 
made  ready  for  him;  yet  he  plunges  in,  at  the  very  point  by  which  he  thinks  he 
shall  escape  and  happily  complete  his  course".  150 
Again,  Wilhelm  relates  both  instruction  and  warning  to  the  reader  -  "the  hero  is  without 
a  plan".  To  look  for  a  mechanistic  means  of  connecting  events  in  a  logical  progression 
via  the  protagonist's  forethought  will  be  to  the  reader's  dismay.  Wilhelm,  Eke  the  plants 
that  helped  Goethe  gain  a  concept  of  morphology,  is  himself  an  organic  event  rather 
than  a  static  presence.  There  is  a  remarkable  freedom  that  is  given  to  Wilhelm  upon 
seeing  Hamlet  as  "a  hero  without  a  plan".  In  the  same  vein,  the  poetics  that  Goethe  re- 
imagines  are  remarkably  free  of  constraint  and  morphological  in  nature  -  something  that 
George  Eliot  wiU  exhibit  in  her  writing. 
This  freedom  of  poetics  to  move  "without  a  plan"  is  carried  over  into  Goethe's 
re-imagining  of  scripture  in  Faust.  Part  One  where  Goethe  employs  this  free  play  of  form 
to  the  subjectivity  of  words  and  the  Word.  As  Faust  reads  the  opening  verses  to  the 
Gospel  of  John,  we  see  the  morphological  approach  to  "word": 
Tis  writ,  'In  the  beginning  was  the  Word'. 
I  pause,  to  wonder  what  is  here  inferred. 
The  Word  I  cannot  set  supremely  high: 
A  new  translation  I  will  try. 
I  read,  if  by  the  spirit  I  am  taught, 
This  sense:  "In  the  beginning  was  the  1hought'. 
This  opening  to  need  to  weigh  again, 
Or  sense  may  suffer  from  a  hasty  pen. 
150  ibid.,  Book  IV,  Chap.  XV,  p.  207. 
66 Does  lbought  create,  and  work,  and  rule  the  hour? 
Twere  best:  "In  the  beginning  was  the  Power'. 
Yet,  while  the  pen  is  urged  with  willing  fingers, 
A  sense  of  doubt  and  hesitancy  lingers. 
The  spirit  come  to  guide  me  in  my  need, 
I  write,  'In  the  beginning  was  the  Deed.  '151 
Faust  continues  to  turn  over  the  possible  meanings  of  the  "Word"  that  is  spoken  of  here 
and  can  sense  that  there  is  a  profound  depth  to  what  lies  beneath.  Each  time  a  rendering 
is  offered  (word,  thought,  power,  deed) 
,  another  possible  rendering  can  be  suggested. 
Goethe  demonstrates  the  manifold  meanings  that  such  a  'sign'  (word)  can  recall.  One 
must  allow  the  space  occupied  by  the  sign  continually  to  open  up  and  offer  new 
renderings  as  a  perpetual  discovery  of  possibilities.  In  this  way,  words  themselves  take 
on  a  moobolo*al  quality. 
In  Lebýabre,  both  the  reader  and  Wilhelm  move  forward  in  growth  not  tbrougb 
systematic  understanding,  but  toward  an  end  that  is  the  fulfilment  of  "apprenticeship". 
In  Wilhelm's  reflection  on  the  production  of  Hatnlet,  he  makes  this  observation: 
...  In  the  composition  of  this  play,  after  the  most  accurate  investigation  and  the 
maturest  reflection,  I  distinguish  two  classes  of  objects.  The  first  are  the  grand 
internal  relations  of  the  persons  and  events,  the  powerful  effects  that  arise  from 
the  characters  and  proceedings  of  the  main  figures:  these,  I  hold,  are  individually 
excellent;  and  the  order  in  which  they  are  presented  cannot  be  improved.  No 
kind  of  interference  must  be  suffered  to  destroy  them,  or  even  essentially  to 
change  their  form.  These  are  the  things  which  stamp  themselves  deep  into  the 
soul;  which  all  men  long  to  see,  which  no  one  dares  meddle  with.  Accordingly,  I 
understand,  they  have  almost  wholly  been  retained  in  all  our  German  theatres. 
But  our  countrymen  have  erred,  in  my  opinion,  with  regard  to  the  second  class  of 
objects,  which  may  be  observed  in  this  tragedy;  I  allude  to  the  external  relations 
of  the  persons,  whereby  they  are  brought  from  place  to  place,  or  combined  in 
various  ways  by  certain  accidental  incidents.  These  they  have  looked  upon  as 
151  Johann  Wolfgang  von  Goethe,  Faust.  Part  One  (1808).  Trans.  Philip  Wayne  (London:  Penguin 
Classics,  1949)  ii  p.  71.  Also  see  David  Jasper,  The  Sacred  and  Secular  Canon  in  Romanticism  for 
67 very  unimportant;  have  spoken  of  them  only  in  passing,  or  have  left  them  out 
altogether.  Now,  indeed,  it  must  be 
' 
owned,  these  threads  are  slack  and  slender; 
and  yet  run  through  the  entire  piece,  and  bind  together  much  that  would 
otherwise  fall  asunder,  and  does  actually  fall  asunder,  when  you  cut  them  off,  and 
imagine  you  have  done  enough  and  more,  if  you  left  the  ends  hanging.  152 
Wilhelm  becomes  aware  that  an  understanding  of  one's  Bildung  is  found  in  the  space 
between  two  poles.  Ilie  first  being  "the  grand  internal  relations  of  the  persons  and 
events,  the  powerful  effects  which  arise  from  the  characters  and  proceedings  of  the  main 
figures".  153  This  is  an  acknowledgement  of  the  obvious  -  that  which  is  seen  not  only  by 
the  self,  but  also  evidenced  by  others.  Yet  there  is  a  second  class  of  objects  that  also  play 
a  role  in  one's  Bildung,  those  being  "the  external  relations  of  the  persons,  whereby  they 
are  brought  from  place  to  place,  or  combined  in  various  ways  by  certain  accidental 
incidents".  154  One's  life  cannot  be  planned.  There  are  "accidental  incidents"  that  arise 
and  give  shape  to  one's  identity.  These  are  not  to  be  discounted  nor  dismissed  as 
Wilhelm's  contemporaries  "have  erred"  to  do.  Throughout  Lxbýabre,  characters 
continually  appear  seemingly  "by  chance"  and  offer  necessary  information  and  direction 
for  Wilhelm  as  if  by  mystical  means.  This  comes  to  its  most  grandiose  epoch  with  the 
revealing  of  Wilhelm's  "apprenticeship"  in  Book  VII  by  the  Abbe  and  the  Society  of  the 
Tower.  As  it  is  revealed  to  Wilhelm  that  his  life  has  been  guided,  he  is  told: 
"Perhaps,  "  continued  his  interrogator,  "we  should  now  be  less  at  variance  in 
regard  to  Destiny  and  Charactee'. 
Wilhelm  was  about  to  answer,  when  the  curtain  quickly  flew  together.  "Strangel" 
said  Wilhelm  to  himselfi  "Can  chance  occurrences  have  a  connection?  Is  what  we 
call  Destiny  but  Chance?  "155 
further  commentary. 
152  ibid.,  Book  V,  Chap.  IV,  241. 
153  ibid. 
154  ibid. 
155  ibid.,  Book  VII,  Chap  IX,  60. 
68 Here  Wilhelm  echoes  the  earlier  advice  of  the  "stranger"  in  Book  I,  quoted  earlier,  where 
he  is  advised  that  "the  fabric  of  our  life  is  formed  of  necessity  and  chance;  the  reason  of 
man  takes  its  station  between  them,  and  may  rule  them  both:  it  treats  the  necessary  as  the 
groundwork  of  its  being;  the  accidental  it  can  direct  and  guide  and  employ  for  its  own 
purposes;  and  only  while  this  principle  of  reason  stands  firm  and  inexpugnable  does  man 
deserve  to  be  named  the  god  of  this  lower  world".  156  In  order  to  return  to  this  truth, 
however,  Wilhelm's  "apprenticeship"  is  rendered  descriptively  rather  than  prescriptively. 
He,  Eke  the  reader,  must  discover  that  the  "end"  is  not  necessarily  easy  to  discern  in  an 
orderly  manner.  The  "threads"  of  life  are  indeed  "slack  and  slender;  and  yet  run  through 
the  entire  piece,  and  bind  together  much  that  would  otherwise  fall  asunder".  157 
As  suggested  in  this  chapter,  writers  in  the  wake  of  German  Idealism  such  as 
Schiller,  H61derlin,  and  Goethe  offer  a  tension  in  their  work  between  the  subject  and  the 
Ideal  that  is  an  indeterminate  hermeneutic  relationship  to  be  determined  and  reconciled 
by  and  through  the  act  of  writing  and  being  read.  Form  that  was  introduced  centuries 
before  by  Augustine  as  being  the  clearest  determiner  of  the  necessary  relationship  of 
subject  to  God  was  challenged  through  the  assertion  of  Idealism  after  Kant,  which  takes 
the  next  step  that  Descartes  began  by  holding  that  unity  of  form  regarding  the  subject 
and  the  subject's  world  is  merely  a  synthetic  rendering  of  'spontaneous  moments'.  These 
gspontaneous  moments'  come  from  moments  of  pure  beauty  that  are  not  provoked,  but 
rather  the  very  form  and  unity  of  the  subject  is  self-created  and  self-sustained.  The 
creating  God  is  replaced  with  the  creating  subject  as  primary  source  of  meaning-making. 
Given  the  shift  of  focus  toward  the  subject  as  the  centre  of  meaning-making,  texts  as 
reflections  of  the  subject's  creative  power  now  came  to  take  on  a  new  role.  This  shift  is 
particularly  noteworthy  as  the  role  of  Scripture  becomes  viewed  as  a  product  of  human 
rather  than  divine  formation,  designated  by  Goethe  as  a  part  of  "Weltliteratur".  The 
156  ibid.,  Book  I,  Chapter  XVII,  61. 
69 role  of  literature,  rather  than  providing  a  point  of  ccrtainty  to  gather  questions  of 
meaning  around,  now  becomes  a  space  or  gap  that  is  defined  by  its  abstraction  rather  than 
traditional  modes  of  certainty.  With  regard  to  the  nature  and  person  ofjesus,  these 
paradigm  shifts  in  seeing  scripture  as  a  product  of  human  creativity  as  much  as  a  product 
of  divine  inspiration  is  profound.  The  possibility  of  new  ideas  regarding  Jesus  -  who  he 
was  and  how  we  are  to  figure  him  -  becomes  a  critical  question  of  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries.  Central  to  much  of  this  discussion  is  the  phenomenological 
critique  of  Hegel  and  his  notion  of  Absolute  Spirit  (Geisý  as  Subject. 
157  ibid.,  Book  V,  Chap.  IV,  241. 
70 4.4  Hegel  and  the  Unwriting  of  the  Self 
The  clearest  manifestation  of  the  destabilising  effect  of  the  poetics  announced  in  writers 
such  as  Schiller,  H61derlin,  and  Goethe  is  articulated  in  the  philosophical  project  of 
Hegel  and  Ms  notion  of  Absolute  Spirit  (Geisý  as  Subject.  As  noted  by  Mark  C.  Taylor, 
"Hegel's  account  of  reflexive  subjectivity  forms  a  significant  chapter  in  the  appearance 
and  disappearance  of  the  self  1.158  Hegel's  project  radicalises  the  notion  of  reflexivity 
found  in  Augustine.  According  to  Hegel,  the  notions  of  self-love  and'Self-consciousness 
combine  to  form  the'essence  of  God  or  Geist  (otherwise  Absolute  Spirit): 
God  is  self-consciousness.  He  knows  Himself  in  a  consciousness  which  is 
distinct  from  Him,  which  is  potentiafly  [an  sicb]  the  consciousness  of  God,  but  it 
is  also  this  actuality  [fAirdch]  in  that  it  knows  its  identity  with  God,  an  identity 
which  is,  however,  mediated  by  the  negation  of  finitude.  It  is  this  Begriff  which 
constitutes  the  content  of  religion.  God  is  this:  to  distinguish  Himself  from 
Himself,  to  be  an  object  for  Himself,  but  to  be  in  this  distinguishing  simply 
indentical  with  Himself  -  Spirit.  159 
With  this,  Hegel  points  directly  to  a  central  tenet  of  Christian  doctrine  with  regard  to  the 
identity  of  God  in  tlýs  self-love  of  "Himself  for  Himself":  God  is  love.  Hegel  notes  that 
love  implies  a  differentiation  between  two  who  are,  howevertnot  merely 
different  from  one  another.  Love  is  this  feeling  of  being  outside  of  myself,  the 
feeling  and  consciousness  of  this  identity.  I  have  my  self-consciousness  not  in 
myself,  but  in  another  in  whom  alone  I  am  satisfied  and  am  at  peace  with  myself 
-  and  I  am  only  insofar  as  I  am  at  peace  with  myself,  for  if  I  do  not  have  this,  I 
am  the  contradiction  that  sunders  itself.  160 
158  Mark  C.  Taylor,  op.  cit.  159  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  vol.  2,  trans.  E.  S.  Haldane  (New  York: 
Humanities  Press,  1968)  p.  327. 
"  '0  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  vol.  3,  trans.  E.  S.  Haldane  (New  York: 
71 No  longer  is  there  separation  of  the  subject  and  the  sacred  (God  gives  love  thereby 
denoting  distance  and  hierarchy).  The  boundary  between  what  is  seen  as  subject  and  the 
sacred  is  removed  (God  is  love  rather  than  God  giting  love)  leaving  categories  such  as 
subject  and  sacred  chaRenged.  The  space  opened  by  the  synthesis  of  these  categories  is 
occupied  by  the  subject  alone  as  both  representation  and  concept.  This  opening  is 
central  to  Hegel's  philosophy  -  the  spatial  differentiation  between  representation 
(Vorstellung)  and  concept  (Begriffi.  With  regard  to  Hegel's  notion  of  God's  love,  this  love 
provides  "a  representation  (Vorstellung)  of  God"161  that  points  toward  the  more  complete 
expression  of  divine  subjectivity  disclosed  in  the  structure  of  self-knowledge  which  is 
impossible  apart  from  divine  self-knowledge.  This  divine  self-consciousness  is  for  Hegel 
an  "act  of  distinguishing  or  differentiation  which  at  the  same  time  gives  no  difference 
differentiated;  and  when  in  His  other  He  is  united  only  with  Himself,  He  is  three  with  no 
other  but  Himself,  He  is  in  close  union  only  with  Himself,  He  beholds  Himselfin  His 
other".  162 
In  Sdence  oflo*,  Hegel  further  interprets  divine  subjectivity  as  "self-relating 
negativity  that  remains  internal  to  itself  '.  163  This  subjectivity  of  God  is  therefore  to  be 
understood  "in  terms  of  auto-affection  and  self-consciousness"  that  is  "thoroughly 
rej7bdve')164  Mark  C.  Taylor  outlines  the  Hegelian  conceptualisation  of  reflexivity  by, 
delineating  and  defining  the  interplay  between  cqgnidon,  rejkcdon,  and  reflexion.  "Cognition, 
reflection,  and  reflexion,  "  states  Taylor,  "are  distinguished  by  contrasting  interpretations 
of  objectivity.  In  the  movement  from  cognition  through  reflection  to  reflexion,  subject 
and  object  become  ever  more  closely  united".  165  This  interplay  is  outlined  by  Taylor  as 
Humanities  Press,  1968)  pp.  10  -  11. 
161  Mark  C.  Taylor,  ibid.,  p.  39. 
162  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  vol  3.  ibid.,  p.  11. 
163  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Science  of  Logic,  trans.  AN.  Miller.  (New  York:  Humanities  Press,  1969)  p.  401. 
164  Mark  C.  Taylor,  ibid.,  p.  39. 
165  ibid. 
72 follows: 
The  gaze  of  the  cognitive  object  is  directed  outward,  toward  an  object  that  ' 
appears  to  be  other  than  the  knowing  object  or  the  knowing  self.  The  aim  of 
cognition  is  knowledge  of  the  external  object.  By  contrast,  the  reflective  subject 
turns  inward.  'I'lie  object  of  reflection  is,  in  fact,  cognition.  In  reflection,  the 
subject  thinks  about  itself  thinking  about  an  object  that  seems  to  be  different 
from  itself.  Reflexion  deepens  this  inwardness  by  taking  reflection  as  its  object. 
The  reflexive  subject  thinks  about  thinking  about  thinking.  166 
,g  of  God,  the  reflexive  self  in  Hegel  is  "an  As  noted  by  Robert  Scharlemann  in  The  Bein 
'absolute'  one  inasmuch  as  the  experienced  phenomenon  (reflection)  is  of  the  same  kind 
as  are  the  experiencing  act  (reflecting)  and  the  origin  of  the  experience  (self- 
reflection)  11.167  This  process  continues  until  unity  and  differentiation  is  one  and  the  same. 
It  is  within  what  Hegel  terms  "the  sphere  of  worship"  that  humanity  participates  in  this 
unity  of  Spirit: 
It  is  this  unity,  reconciliation,  restoration  of  the  subject  and  of  its  self-consciousness, 
the  positive  feeling  of  possessing  a  share  in,  of  partaking  in  this  Absolute,  and 
making  unity  with  it  actually  one's  own  -  this  abolition  of  the  dualism,  which 
constitutes  the  sphere  of  worship.  168 
Hegel's  project  of  subjectivity  was  a  reaction  against  the  prevalent  view  framed  through 
the  Enlightenment  which  asserted  both  subject  and  object  be  thoroughly  comprehended 
via  scientific  analysis.  This  philosophical  stance  was  primarily  utilitarian  in  focus  and 
166  Mark  C.  Taylor,  ibid.  The  notion  of  'the  gaze'(le  regard)  is  explored  in  the  twentieth  century  by 
Jacques  Lacan.  Lacan  use  of  le  regard  builds  off  of  his  reflections  of  Jean-Paul  Sarte's 
phenomenological  analysis  of  le  regard.  As  noted  by  Sarte,  what  is 'seen'  is  not  essentially  grounded 
upon  the  physical  act  of  sight:  "Of  course  what  most  often  manifests  a  look  is  the  convergence  of  two 
ocular  globes  in  my  direction.  But  the  look  (le  regard)  will  be  given  just  as  well on  occasion  when 
there  is  a  rustling  of  branches,  or  the  sound  of  a  footstep  followed  by  silence,  or  the  slight  opening  of  a 
shutter,  or  a  light  movement  of  a  curtain.  "  See  Jean-Paul  Sarte,  Being  and  Nothingness:  An  Essay  on 
Phenomenlogical  Ontology,  trans.  Hazel  E.  Barnes  (London:  Methuen,  1958)  p.  257. 
167  Robert  Scharlemann,  The  Being  of  God:  Theology  and  the  Experience  of  Truth  (New  York:  Seabury 
Press,  198  1)  p.  26. 
168  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  vol.  1,  trans.  E.  S.  Haldane  (New  York: 
Humanities  Press,  1968)  pp.  66-67. 
73 ethically  teleological  in  approach  -  the  ends  explained  as  well  as  justified  the  means.  At 
its  heart,  the  Enlightenment  project  that  Hegel  reacted  against  held  a  view  of  the  subject 
that  was  "atomistic  in  its  social  philosophy,  analytic  in  its  science  of  man,  and  which 
looked  to  a  scientific  social  engineering  to  reorganise  man  and  society,  and  bring 
happiness  through  perfect  mutual  adjustmene'.  169 
In  contrast  to  this  Enlightenment  notion  of  the  subject,  Hegel  developed  a 
conception  of  the  subject  which  held  the  dominant  feature  of  an  expressive  object.  170 
Human  existence  for  Hegel  was  seen  as  having  inherent  uniýi  rather  than  a  compilation  of 
isolatedparts,  this  being  analogous  to  a  work  of  art  that  only  finds  meaning  in  its  relation 
to  itself  as  a  whole  and  corn'pleted  work.  Likewise,  the  human  subject  for  Hegel  has  an 
overarching,  guiding  theme  whether  it  is  seen  or  not.  In  this  way,  Hegel  viewed  the 
Enlightenment  subject  as  not  only  in  error,  but  a  "travesty  of  human  self-understanding" 
and  "one  of  the  most  grievous  modes  of  self-distortions".  171Chatles  Taylor  puts  it  this 
way: 
To  see  a  human  being  as  in  some  way  compounded  of  different  elements: 
faculties  of  reason  and  sensibility,  or  soul  and  body,  or  reason  and  feeling,  was 
[for  Hegel]  to  lose  sight  of  the  living,  expressive  unity;  and  in  so  far  as  men  tried 
to  live  according  to  those  dichotomies,  they  must  suppress,  mutilate  or  severely 
distort  that  unified  expression  which  they  have  it  in  them  to  realise.  172 
Hegel's  project  was  ultimately  a  recovery,  in  some  ways,  of  the  unity  of  Aristotelian  form 
of  self  that  came  before  the  analytic,  aton-ýistic  view  of  the  Enlightenment,  and  sought  to 
view  the  subject  as  uni-O  btforepads.  The  subject  therefore  is  not  merely  body  and  thought 
coexisting,  but  a  unity  of  deep  and  abiding  interpenetration  without  limit  or  boundary. 
169  Charles  Taylor,  Hegel  and  Modem  Society  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1979)  p.  1  170  Charles  Taylor  cites  his  utilisation  of  the  term  "expressivisrif  'as  being  in  keeping  with  the  definition 
given  by  Isaiah  Berlin  as  noted  in  Earl  Wasserman's  Aspects  of  the  Eighteenth  Century.  According  to 
Taylor,  Berlin  uses  the  term  to  denote  that  view  of  the  'self  as  art'  found  in  Herder  and  others  of  the 
Sturm  und  Drang  movement. 
171  Charles  Taylor,  op.  cit.,  p.  2. 
74 Yet  how  does  one  deriveform  without  limit  or  boundary)  In  particular,  how 
does  one  speak  of  the  form  of  God  in  relation  to  the  form  of  the  subject  since,  as 
mentioned  in  regard  to  Augustine,  it  is  in  the  form  of  the  subject  in  relation  to  the  sacred 
form  (rather  than  nature)  where  understanding  of  the  sacred  by  the  subject  is  even 
possible? 
For  Hegel  this  dilemma  is  resolved  by  re-assessing  how  one  speaks  of  the  category  of 
form  in  relation  to  subjectivity.  First  of  all,  subjectivity  in  Hegel's  project  is  an  embodied 
subjectivity: 
It  was  a  basic  principle  of  Hegel's  thought  that  the  subject  and  all  his  functions, 
however  'spiritual',  were  inescapably  embodied;  and  this  in  two  related 
dimensions:  as  a  'rational  animal',  that  is,  a  living  being  who  thinks;  and  as  an 
expressive  being,  that  is,  a  being  whose  thinking  always  and  necessarily  expresses 
itself  in  a  medium.  173 
Given  this  essential  embodiment,  the  subject  is  also  organically  understood  in  form 
rather  than  aton-ýistically  divided.  11-iat  is,  subjectivity  is  known  first  in  its  entirety  before 
it  is  known  in  part  or  portion,  as  a  "functioning  unit  and  not  just  a  concatenation  of 
parts".  174  In  this  way,  the  subject  shows  "a  sort  of  proto-purpose,  and  even  a  sort  of 
proto-intelligence  in  adapting  to  novel  circumstances...  in  other  words,  [the  subject  is] 
not  just  a  functioning  unit,  but  also  something  in  the  nature  of  an  agent  ... 
"175 
Uke  Augustine  before  him,  Hegel  transfers  his  insights  with  regard  to  the  subject  to  his 
concerns  regarding  that  of  Geist,  or  the  Absolute  Spirit,  which  Augustine  would  term  as 
God.  In  Hegel's  project,  the  Absolute  is  subject  and  it  is  this  Geist  which  is  the 
foundation  and  wellspring  of  all  that  we  call  "the  Real".  Hegel  as  a  product  of  the  Sturm 
172  ibid. 
173  ibid.,  p.  18. 
174  ibid.,  p.  19. 
175  ibid. 
75 und  Drang  movement  saw  the  Divine  flowing  through  all  things,  not  separate  from  or 
essentially  different  from  reality  both  understood  and  conceived.  This  is  not  unlike 
Spinoza's  notion  of  'substancc'i  As  noted  previously,  Hegel  held  that  the  subject  is 
essentially  embodied.  1herefore,  Geist  (or  God)  for  Hegel  "cannot  exist  separately  from 
the  universe  which  he  sustains  and  in  which  he  manifests  himself.  On  the  contrary  this 
universe  is  his  embodiment,  without  which  he  would  not  be,  any  more  than  [we]  would 
be  without  [ours]".  176 
Hegel  asserts  that  Geist  has  both  embodiment  and  form  that  is  paradoxically 
without  fin-ýt  or  boundary.  This  proves  chaflenging  to  the  key  tenet  of  Christianity  - 
namely  the  Incarnation.  For  Hegel,  the  notion  of  Christ  is  the  mere  example  of  the  unity 
of  the  divine  and  human  nature  which  is  the  Absolute  or  Universal  Spirit.  As  noted  from 
Lectures  on  the  Pbilosopbj  of  Religion,  Hegel  holds  that  "the  history  of  Christ  is  a  history  for 
the  sPiritual  community  because  it  is  absolutely  adequate  to  the  idea"  of  the  synthesis  of 
the  divine  and  human,  and  the  previous  temporal  example  of  a  Christ  is  "only  the  effort 
of  Spirit  to  reach  the  determination  implied  in  the  implicit  unity  of  the  divine  and 
human".  177  In  the  theological  context  of  the  period,  this  becomes  a  great  challenge  to 
christology  after  Hegel  in  the  attempt  to  figure  Jesus  as  particular  within  history.  As  we 
will  see  in  the  next  chapter,  with  the  notion  of  Emit  removed  from  the  concept  of  Christ, 
theologians  such  as  F.  C.  Baur,  Ludwig  Feuetbach.,  and  David  Friederich  Strauss  sought 
to  re-imagine  the  very  form  ofJesus  as  an  enactment  of  the  Hegelian  project  "to  reach 
the  determination  implied  in  the  implicit  unity  of  the  divine  and  human".  178 
176  Charles  Taylor,  ibid.,  p.  23. 
177  G.  W.  F.  Hegel  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion.  Vol.  3  Trans.  E.  B.  Speirs  and  j.  B. 
Sanderson  (London:  K.  Paul,  Trench,  and  Co.,  1895)  p.  113.  178  ibid. 
76 5.0  Theological  poetics  of  Jesus  amidst  nineteenth  century  Higher  Criticism 
Challenging  poetics  of  the  subject  by  the  likes  of  Schiller,  Hbldcrlin,  and  Goethe 
coupled  with  the  limitless  possibilities  of  a  Christ  without  form  added  to  the  growing 
changes  in  nineteenth  century  theological  poetics  surrounding  the  figuring  of  Jesus.  As 
this  chapter  will  discuss,  the  act  of  writing  and  reading  which  had,  prior  to  Higher 
Criticism,  grounded  a  Christian  subjeces  identity  upon  the  "word  of  God"  as  historically 
and  epistemologically  indisputable,  thereby  providing  a  centre  point  and  focus  for 
answers  to  build  an  identity  upon,  were  now  called  into  question.  Key  to  this  shift  was 
the  questioning  of  historicity  in  relation  to  biblical  narratives  by  Strauss  and  other 
Hegehans  which  destabilised  the  once  essential  relationship  that  was  presupposed 
between  'history'  and  'truth'.  As  noted  by  Douglas  Templeton  in  The  New  Testament  as 
True  Fiction,  these  shifts  affected  not  only  the  genre  of  biblical  criticism,  but  also  fiction: 
It  was  with  Strauss  that  fiction  enters  the  New  [era].  A  waiting  world  was  struck 
with  a  dull  thud  ...  In  other  words,  the  writers  of  the  Gospelswere  not  following 
the  necessities  of  bistog,  the  critical  examination  of  evidence,  the  sifting,  the 
winnowing,  the  interrogation,  the  torture  of  witnesses.  They  were  following  the 
necessities  of  the  religious  imaginafion,  as  that  imagination  had  been  trained  by  a 
millennium  of  poetry  to  imagine.  179 
While  the  writers  that  will  be  addressed  come  after  Hegel,  it  will  be  seen  that  much  of  his 
spirit  was  certainly  evident  throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  particularly  in  this  area  of 
Higher  Criticism.  180 
179  Douglas  A.  Templeton,  The  New  Testament  as  True  Fiction  (Sheffield:  Sheffield  Academic  Press, 
1999)  p.  37. 
180  "Lower"  criticism  as  research  in  the  texts  of  the  Old  and  New  Testament  documents;  "Higher" 
criticism  being  research  pertaining  to  the  historical  and  theological  backgrounds  of  the  documents. 
77 5.1  F.  C.  Baur  and  the  "Universal  yet  Particular"  Christ  of  Church  History 
Ferdinand  Christian  Baur  began  his  theological  training  in  TUbingen  and  after  serving  a 
time  as  vicar  at  Rossag  and  MaMhausen  near  Stuttgart,  joined  the  theological  faculty  at 
Blaubeuren  in  1817.  In  1826,  the  theological  faculty  of  Tilbingen  called  Baur  to  the  chair 
of  historical  disciplines  where  he  taught  till  his  death  in  1860.  The  literary  corpus  of  F.  C. 
Baur  can  be  divided  into  three  periods.  His  first  published  work  focused  on  the 
symbolism  and  mythology  of  the  ancient  world  and  its  relation  to  Christianity.  Published 
in  1824,  the  work  dealt  with  the  "natural  religion"  of  antiquity  and  was  followed  by 
studies  of  rationalism,  supernaturalism,  and  Manichaeism  in  1827-1829.  His  second 
period  of  scholarly  production  saw  Baur  focusing  on  the  history  of  dogma,  with 
particular  attention  given  to  preparing  lectures  on  the  chief  tenets  of  Protestantism, 
Roman  Catholicism,  Gnosticism,  the  Trinity,  and  the  history  of  dogma,  which  were 
published  after  his  death  in  1865-1868.  In  his  late  sixties,  Baur  began  his  final  literary 
period  which  saw  the  synthesis  of  the  two  previous  periods  into  what  has  been  termed 
his  scholarly  opus,  namely  the  five  volume  study  of  Christianity  entitled  Gesebiebte  der 
chHstlichen  Iarrhe  (The  Church  Histog  of  the  First  Three  Centuries).  The  first  two  volumes 
appeared  in  1853  and  1859  and  were  published  by  Baur  himselE  The  last  three  volumes 
were  published  in  succession  from  1861  to  1863,  the  last  two  volumes  published 
Posthumously. 
Baur's  project  in  Cburcb  Histog  is  fairly  straightforward.  His  methodology  is  put 
forward  as  seeing- 
...  historical  occurrences  as  the  conjunction  of  the  universal  and  the  particular,  by 
which  the  universal  underlies  the  particular,  makes  itself  known  through  it,  and 
dominates  it.  Specifically,  tl-ýs  task  involves  inquiry  into  the  essence  of 
Christianity  together  with  that  of  the  period  in  which  it  emerged...  The 
78 requirements  for  this  criticism  are  threefold:  first,  to  be  bound  by  no  dogmatic 
assumption  which  might  disturb  the  impartiality  of  judgement;  second,  to 
validate  nothing  as  historical  truth  which  could  not  be  demonstrated  from  the 
extant  sources;  and  finally,  never  to  lose  sight  of  the  universal.  181 
For  Baur.,  of  primary  concern  was  the  notion  of  essence  and  sources  for  the  grounding  of 
Christian  faith  claims  as  they  pertain  to  scripture.  In  Cburcb  Histog,  Baur  directly 
challenges  the  presupposition  that  scripture  yields  an  absolute  doctrine  of  revelation.  In 
his  view,  "such  an  assumption  ...  spells  the  death  of  all  historical  obscrvation".  182  In 
particular,  Baur  stood  against  the  doctrine  of  verbal  inspiration  of  scripture  stating  "what 
kind  of  faith  must  it  be  that  is  eternally  fearful  and  anxious  that  the  foundation  on  which 
it  rests...  might  be  taken  and  forever  removed  from  it,  a  faith  that  encounters...  all 
critical  doubts  and  investigations...  with  the  constant  alarm  and  apprehension  that  they 
might  finally  make  a  sorry  end  of  it?  "183  In  this  regard,  Baur  holds  that  criticism  must  be 
freed  from  seeing  the  Gospel  writers  as  "mere  reporters",  so  that  the  texts  may  gain  "in 
significance  as  sources".  184 
lbree  of  the  main  themes  in  Baur's  project  are  germane  to  this  discussion  and 
relevant  to  our  consideration  of  George  Eliot's  developing  poetics.  First,  the 
resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ  is  seen  as  being  beyond  historical  critique.  In  Cburcb  Histog, 
as  well  as  his  essays  on  New  Testament  theology,  Baur  asserts  that  reading  the  Gospel 
accounts  shows  Jesus  to  be  more  concerned  with  "inward"  faith  as  opposed  to 
"outward"  manifestation,  that  is,  they  show  ajesus  who  disregards  acdon  in  favour  of 
intenfion  as  conferring  moral  value.  With  regard  to  Jesus'  messianic  consciousness,  Baur 
asserts  that  this  is  evident  in  Jesus'  appearance  in  Jerusalem,  even  apart  from  the 
181  F.  C.  Baur  Ausgewahlte  Werke  in  Einzelausgaben,  ed.  Klaus  Scholder,  5  volumes  (Stuttgart: 
Friedrich  Frommann,  1963-1975)  pp-57ff.  182  Cited  by  Roy  A.  Harrisville  and  Walter  Sundberg  The  Bible  in  Modem  Culture:  Theology  and 
Historical-Critical  Methodfrom  Spinoza  to  Kdsentann  (Grand  Rapids:  Eerdmans,  1995)  p.  114. 
183  F.  C.  Baur.  ibid.  pp.  296ff. 
184  Roy  A.  Harrisville,  op.  cit.,  p.  116. 
79 triumphal  entry,  and  gives  unequivocal  proof  of  this.  In  reference  to  the  Resurrection 
accounts,  Baur  asserts  that  historical  criticism  needs  to  hold  only  to  the  fact  thatfor  the 
. 
plesjesus'  resurrection  became  "the  firmest  and  most  irreversible  certaintý'.  185  This  disd 
is  in  important  statement  on  Baur's  behalf,  and  will  align  him  (unwittingly)  with  Strauss 
as  we  shall  see  later.  Here,  Baur  asserts  that  it  is  not  the  fact,  but  the  faith  in  Jesus' 
resurrection  that  should  concern  us  as  an  object  of  research.  The  process  by  which  this 
faith  emerges  lies  beyond  the  reach  of  either  psychological  analysis  or  historical 
verification. 
Secondly,  Baur  implies  that  Christianity  is  nothing  more  than  a  Hegelian 
synthesis  of  Hebraic  and  Hellenistic  ideologies.  After  Jesus'  death,  followers  of  Christ  in 
Jerusalem  formed  the  antitheses  of  Hebrew  and  Hellenistic  understanding.  Baur  argues 
that  Jesus'  disciples  gathered  in  Jerusalem  in  two  groups,  Hebrews  and  Hellenists,  with 
the  latter  group  sympathetic  to  Stephen.  This  latter  group  of  Hellenists  would  make  up 
the  group  later  to  be  associated  with  Paul.  Baur  then  reviews  the  New  Testament  corpus 
through  his  methodology  which  he  terms  Tendenýktidk,  or  "Tendency  Criticism".  186  In 
his  words,  "I  believe  I  can  be  certain  that  no  view  wDl  succeed...  in  gaining  more 
universal  recognition  till  mine...  will  be  refuted".  187  7hrough  Tenden.  Zkridk,  Baur  allgns 
each  of  the  New  Testament  texts  with  its  "tendency"  toward  one  of  three  epochs  of 
conflict  within  early  Christianity.  In  the  first  epoch,  which  is  the  death  of  Christ,  Baur 
notes  that  the  community  in  Jerusalem  directly  following  Chrises  death  became  a  twin 
mission  between  Jewish  and  Gentile  followers  in  outreach  to  the  poor.  This  unified 
mission  dissolved  with  followers  of  Paul  and  followers  of  Peter  becoming  divided  in 
'tendency'.  This  second  epoch  extends  from  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem  to  the  first 
decades  of  the  second  century.  The  third  epoch  is  seen  in  the  next  few  decades  of  the 
185  ibid. 
186  F.  C.  Baur,  op.  cit.  pp.  359,395,397-99. 
197  Roy  A.  Haffisville,  op.  cit.. 
80 second  century  where  the  Christian  community  is  separated  into  'tendencies'  of  "Jewish 
particularism"  and  "Pauline  universalismý'188.  It  is  in  this  third  epoch  that  Baur  notes 
John  the  apostle's  move  to  Ephesus  as  an  act  to  blend  the  principles  of  Jewish 
Christianity  and  the  'tendency'  of  Pauline  Christianity.  It  is  in  John's  Gospel  that  Baur 
sees  the  nexus  point  of  Gospel  'tendency'  conflict.  John's  Gospel,  states  Baur,  rests  on 
no  historical  grounding,  but  is  a  synthesis  of  the  Pauline  and  Petrine  conflict  through  its 
announcing  of  the  universal  "divine  idea"  in  the  notion  of  the  Lvgos.  For  Baur,  it  is  in 
the  Logos  that  "the  relation  between  Judaism  and  paganism  in  Revelation  was  reversed" 
and  both  Pauline  and  Petrine  antitheses  are  subjected  to  the  "divine  idea"  of  the  Logos 
that  goes  beyond  the  particularity  ofJesus'  ministry.  This  point  is  key,  in  that  Baur  is 
arguing  that  an  imagined  space  is  the  point  of  synthesis  which  is  not  an  historically 
rendered  'tendency'  of  either  Pauline  or  Petrine  origin.  This  assertion  will  be  heard  by 
Baur's  student,  D.  F.  Strauss,  but  will  not  be  acted  upon  fully  in  his  work.  It  is  in  Strauss' 
translator  -  Marian  Evans  -  that  such  a  spirit  is  made  flesh,  in  her  poetics. 
Thirdly,  Baur  argues  that  the  identity  of  Christ  is  both  universal  and  particular  or 
specific.  Baur  responded  in  his  essays  on  the  New  Testament  to  the  claims  headed  by 
Heinrich  Ewald  at  the  University  of  G6tdngen,  and  leader  of  the  "G6ttingen  Seven", 
thatJesus  came  to  gradual  consciousness  of  his  messiahship  by  restating  the  assumption 
behind  the  assertion;  that  every  individual  therefore  possessed  the  possibility  of  such  a 
consciousness  and  the  "G6ttingen  Seven"  were  merely  stating  thatJesus  just 
"awakened".  Yet  for  Baur  the  essential  question  remained  unanswered:  if  this  is  a 
universal  possibility,  where  are  the  other  examples?  What  is  not  offered  up  in  the 
underlying  assertion,  for  Baur's  satisfaction,  is  that  "the  highest  in  world  history  is 
never  fulfilled"189  to  the  position  attributed  toiesus.  For  Baur,  the  fact  that  the  question 
remains  unanswerable  weakens  the  question  itself.  Yet,  Baur  makes  this  final  statement: 
188  ibid.,  p.  118. 
81 "But,  so  long  as  this  is  not  proved,  the  other  assumption  is  just  as  possible  ri.  e. 
Universality  of  messiahship]".  190  In  this  regard,  Baur  is  also  open  to  the  aujheben  of  Jesus 
(like  dirempt,  a  term  shared  with  Hegel,  akin  to  draning  into  or  absorbing)  whereby  the 
parficular  ofjesus'  identity  is  absorbed  into  the  universal,  allowing  for  the  expanding 
identity  ofjesus  throughout  a  universal  world  consciousness. 
5.2  Ludwig  Fcuerbach  and  The  Essence  of  CArlstianh), 
Feuerbach  was  born  in  1804  and  was  a  student  of  Hegel  at  the  University  of  Berlin  from 
1824  to  1828  and  taught  Philosophy  at  Erglangen.  Three  of  his  most  important  works 
include  The  Pbilosopb 
_y  of  the  Future  (Die  Pbiloso 
. 
pbe  der  Zukunfit,  1843),  The  Essence  of  Religion 
(Des  Wesen  der  Reli&ion,  1851),  and  his  first  and  most  influential  work  The  Essence  of 
CbHsdani-O  (Des  Wesen  des  Chiistentums,  1841)  translated  in  English  by  Marian  Evans  prior 
to  her  emergence  as  George  Eliot,  the  writer  of  fiction. 
In  the  1957  edition  of  The  Essence  of  Cbrisfianity,  an  introduction  by  Karl  Barth  is 
included.  Barth  extracts  the  kernel  of  Feuerbach's  project  from  his  Heidelberg  lectures 
which  became  The  Essence  of  Rekgýon:  'Meology',  states  Feuerbach,  'is  anthropology,  that 
is,  in  the  object  of  religion  which  we  call  Theos  in  Greek  and  Gott  in  German,  nothing  but 
the  essence  of  man  is  expressed.  '191  As  Barth  notes  in  the  introductory  essay, 
In  Feuerbach's  program  -  the  transformation  and  dissolution  of  theology  into 
anthropology  -  one  may  detect  not  only  the  idea  that  there  must  be  inevitably  an 
end  to  theology,  but  also  the  idea  that  he  always  wished  to  transform  theology 
and  make  it  into  anthropology.  [citing  Feuerbach]  "While  I  do  reduce  theology  to 
anthropology;  very  much  as  Christianity  while  lowering  God  into  man,  made 
man  into  God".  192 
189  ibid.,  p.  127. 
190  ibid. 
191  Ludwig  Feuerbach  The  Essence  of  Christianity,  trans.  George  Eliot.  (New  York:  Harper  and  Row, 
1957)  p.  xv. 
192  Karl  Barth,  Introductory  essay  to  Ludwig  Feuerbach's  The  Essence  of  Christianity  trans.  George 
82 In  Feuerbacb'sproject  God  and  bumani-O  are  not  analogous,  tby  are  gnonymous.  With  regard  to 
the  nature  of  Christ,  Feuerbach  states  the  fbHowing- 
... 
Christ  was  no  miracle  worker,  nor,  in  general,  that  which  he  is  represented  to 
be  in  the  Bible.  I  ... 
do  not  inquire  what  the  real,  natural  Christ  was  or  may  have 
been  in  distinction  from  what  he  has  been  made  or  has  become  in 
Supernaturalism;  on  the  contrary,  I  accept  the  Christ  of  religion,  but  I  show  that 
this  superhuman  being  is  nothing  else  than  a  product  and  reflex  of  the. 
supernatural  mind.  193 
This  truth  has  been  long  evident  according  to  Feuerbach,  but  remains  an  open  secret: 
It  is  not  I  but  religion  that  worships  man,  although  religion,  or  rather  theology, 
denies  this;  it  is  not  I,  an  insignificant  individual,  but  religion  itself  that  says:  God 
is  man,  man  is  God;  it  is  not  I,  but  religion  itself  that  denies  the  God  who  is  not 
man,  but  it  is  only  an  en  rafionis  [being  for  reason],  -  since  it  makes  God  become 
man,  and  only  then  constitues  this  God,  not  distinguished  ftom  man,  having  a 
human  form,  human  feeling  and  human  thoughts,  the  object  of  its  worship  and 
veneration.  I  have  only  found  the  key  to  the  cipher  of  the  Christian  religion,  only 
extricated  its  true  meaning  from  the  web  of  contradictions  and  delusions  called 
theology.  194 
Feuerbach's  criticism  of  theism  is  as  much  a  criticism  of  his  former  teacher,  Georg 
Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel,  as  it  was  a  criticism  of  Christianity.  For  Feucrbach,  Hegel's 
notion  of  Geist  as  the  Absolute  Spirit  that  perpetually  pours  out  its  life  into  the  finite  in 
the  process  of  becoming  its  own  self-revelation  as  Absolute  Subject  was  flawed  by 
presupposing  an  external  causal  agent  that  was  to  have  been  overcome  through  the 
dialectic.  Hegel's  tendency  to  concieve  of  abstract  predicates  as  entities  showed  him  as 
Eliot.  (New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  1957)  pp.  xiv-xv.  Citations  of  Feuerbach  from  The  Essence  of  Christianity  are  from  Ludwig  Feuerbach,  The  Essence  of  Christianity  trans.  George  Eliot  (New  York: 
Prometheus  Books,  1989). 
193  Ludwig  Feuerbach,  The  Essence  of  Christianity  trans.  George  Eliot  (New  York:  Prometheus  Books, 
1989)  p.  xxi. 
194  ibid.,  p.  xvi. 
83 the  culminafion  of  Western  philosophy  since  Plato  rather  than  stepping  beyond  this 
tradition.  Feuerbach  notes  that  Hegel's  framing  of  Absolute  Spirit  in  anthropomorphic 
visages  transfers  this  predicate  into  buman  existence  and  results  in  the  idea  rendered  a 
subject.  In  short,  Feuerbach  creates  a  sustained  argument  throughout  The  Essence  of 
Chrisdani_*  that  the  idea  of  God  in  Christianity  is  the  idea  of  humanity  unconsciously  and 
involuntarily  made  into  an  object  of  thought  and  treated  as  a  separate  agent.  Ultimately, 
knowledge  of  God  is  knowledge  of  humanity  and  knowledge  of  humanity  is  knowledge 
of  God.  In  summary,  Van  Harvey  articulates  Feuerbach's  central  argument  as  follows: 
All  of  these  arguments,  as  well  as  others,  add  up  to  the  conclusion  that  [for 
Feuerbach]  religion  is,  so  to  speak,  an  acoustical  illusion  of  the  consciousness,  the 
means  by  which  the  species  gradually  becomes  aware  of  it  own  essential  nature. 
Although  the  religious  person  is,  of  course,  not  aware  of  tl-ýis,  every  advance  in 
religious  consciousness  is  an  advance  in  self-knowledge,  the  cultnination  of 
which  is,  paradoxically,  athesim.  195 
Feuerbach's  dictum  that  "Man  is  the  beginning,  the  middle,  and  the  end  of  religion"  is 
carried  into  his  conception  of  subjectivity.  The  subject  in  Feuerbach's  project  is  a 
temporal  entity  delimited  by  space  and  through  relations  with  other  entities.  Knowing 
the  real  is  forged  in  the  external  resistence  to  our  own  self-activity  in  the  world  and  not 
through  accessing  some  hidden  metaphysical  realm.  196  Both  sense  data  and  internal 
feelings  received  by  the  subject  (I)  are  referenced  via  relations  with  other  subjects  (Fhou). 
In  this  way,  there  is  no  possible  awareness  of  self  except  as  mediated  through  and  with 
communal  encounter.  Ultimately,  the  human  subject  is  a  communal  subject.  It  is  in  the 
midst  of  humanity,  not  in'the  presense  of  God  as  an  abstracted  and  separate  entity,  that 
subjectivity  is  grounded  and  made  manifest.  The  idea  (idee)  of  God  for  Feuerbach  is  a 
distraction  and  a  self-alienating  'moment'  in  the  process  of  humanity  becoming 
195  Van  A.  Harvey,  "Ludwig  Feuerbach  and  Karl  Marx"  in  Nineteenth  Century  Religious  Thought  in  the 
West:  Volume  I  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1988)  p.  297.  196  See  Ludwig  Feuerbach,  Principles  of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Future,  trans.  Manfred  Vogel 
(Indianapolis:  Bobbs-Merrill,  1966)  pp.  51-73. 
84 authentically  human  -a  moment  that  humanity  is  ready  to  move  beyond.  lbroughout 
The  Essence  of  Cbds,  6aniy  Feuerbach  shows  a  strong  refusal  to  attribute  predicates  to  an 
entity  that  transcends  finite  entities.  As  he  states  in  The  Essence  of  CbrisfianiY,  "as  God  has 
renounced  himself  out  of  love,  so  we,  out  of  love,  should  renounce  God;  for  if  we  do 
not  sacrifice  God  to  love,  we  sacrifice  love  to  God,  and,  in  spite  of  the  predicate  of  love, 
we  have  the  God  -  the  evil  being  -  of  religious  fanaticism.  "197 
What  is  at  the  heart  of  Feuerbach's  first  and  most  notable  work  is  found  in  its 
title  -  The  Essence  of  Cbfisfianiy.  While  many  have  used  Feucrbach's  work  as  a  theory  of 
religion,  it  is  merely  a  critique  and  attempted  theory  of  Cbrisfiani-O.  The  entire  premise  of 
the  work  rests  upon  the  central  argument  that  all  religion  is  merely  a  projection  of  the 
human  will.  Feuerbach  argues  this  point  by  constantly  interchanging  the  concepts  of 
'religion'  and  'Christianity'  utilising  Christianity  as  the  test  case  for  all  religions.  As  a 
critique  of  Christianity  as  a  system  that  is  the  manifestation  of  human  will,  The  Essence  of 
Chrisdaniy  has  had  strong  support.  For  those  who  have  read  Karl  Barth,  it  may  seem 
surprising  that  Barth  goes  on  to  say  that  Fcuerbach's  program  is  indeed  a  worthy  one. 
As  Barth  states  in  his  Introduction  to  The  Essence  of  Cbrirfianitr. 
...  it  is  the  essence  of  man  that  he  [Feuerbach]  emphatically  and  enthusiastically 
affirms,  against  theology  and  idealistic  theology.  When  he  identifies  God  with 
the  essence  of  man,  he  thereby  pays  God  the  highest  honour  that  he  can  confer; 
indeed,  this  is  the  strange  Ma  gnificat  that  Ludwig  Feuerbach  intones  for  "the  good 
Lord".  Man  wants  to  live.  But  he  is  in  his  existence  dependent,  limited, 
threatened.  He  has  needs,  wishes,  and  also  something  a  bit  higher  -  ideals.  He 
loves  and  fears.  He  desires  and  denies  and  abhors.  He  knows  values  and 
disvalues.  He  seeks  for  means  to  possess  the  former  and  to  get  rid  of  the  latter. 
Thus  his  life  is  a  struggle  and  a  tussle.  198 
What  Barth  assesses-in  Feuerbach  is  his  desire  to  free  humanity  from  restrictive  modes  of 
197  Ludwig  Feuerbach,  The  Essence  of  Christianity,  p.  53. 
198  Karl  Barth,  Introduction  to  The  Essence  of  Christianity,  pp.  xv-xvi. 
85 belief,  be  that  naive  religion  or  speculative  theology.  -  that  can  become  a  religion  that 
proffers  salvation  but  ultimately  alienates  the  very  humanity  it  seeks  to  save.  'Mese 
thoughts  are  also  seen  throughout  George  Elioes  work  and  the  influence  of  Feuerbach 
upon  her  fiction  is  certainly  evident.  199  Before  turning  to  the  resonance  of  Feuerbach  in 
the  poetics  of  George  Eliot,  it  is  important  to  review  her  relation  to  David  Friedrich 
Strauss'  Das  Lxbenjesu.  Itis  the  comparison  of  the  two  works,  and  the  relation  between 
The  Essence  of  Cbrisfiani-*  and  Das  Leben  jesu  have  to  each  other,  that  assists  in  such  an 
assessment. 
5.3  David  Friedrich  Strauss  and  Mythi  in  Das  Lebenjesus 
Uke  Kant,  Strauss  spent  the  majority  of  his  life  in  and  around  his  birthplace  of  Stuttgart. 
In  1831  David  Friederich  Strauss  went  to  Berlin  to  study  under  Hegel,  who  died  two 
weeks  after  his  arrival.  Strauss  made  the  following  remark  to  his  friend  Christian  MHrklin 
after  attending  Hegel's  funeral: 
We  buried  him  yesterday.  At  about  three  o'clock  in  the  hall  of  the  university, 
Rector  Marheineke  gave  a  simple  and  heartfelt  speech,  totally  pleasing  to  me.  He 
described  [Hegel]  not  only  as  a  monarch  in  the  realm  of  thought,  but  also  a  true 
disciple  of  Christ  in  his  life.  Then  he  said  what  he  would  not  have  said  at  a 
church  ceremony,  that  just  as  Jesus  Christ,  so  he  too  passed  through  bogy  death 
to  the  resurrection  of  the  spirit,  a  spirit  bequeathed  to  his  own.  'Mere  followed  a 
rather  tumultuous  procession  from  the  house  of  mourning  to  the  cemetery.  200 
Strauss  stayed  on  and  listened  to  lectures  given  by  Schleiermacher  and'noted  that  he  was 
not  radical  enough  in  his  conclusions.  As  Strauss  wrote  during  this  time,  "Schleiermacher 
199  This  will  be  explored  in  chapter  nine  with  regard  to  George  Eliot's  sacramental  use  of  water  in 
relation  to  Feuerbach's  conception  of  the  Sacraments  in  The  Essence  of  Christianity. 
200  From  a  letter  to  Christian  Marklin,  17  November  183  1,  in  Jorg  Sandberger,  David  Friedrich  Strauss 
als  theologischer  Hegelianer  (Gottingen:  Vandenhoeck  und  Ruprecht,  1972)  p.  192.  Cited  by  Roy  A. 
Harrisville,  op.  cit.,  p.  95. 
86 goes  only  half  way...  I  wiU  write  a  fife  of  Jesus  according  to  my  own  idea".  201  Returning 
to  Stuttgart  to  lecture  on  the  Gospels  at  University  of  Tilbingen,  Strauss  published  Das 
I-ebenjesu  in  1835.  Writing  again  to  his  friend  Christian  Mirklin  during  the  writing  of  Das 
Lebenjesu,  he  describes  his  process  as  follows:  "this  way,  I  would  destroy,  in  part  shake 
the  infinite  content  faith  has  in  Uesus]  life  -  indeed,  only  in  order  to  restore  it  in  a  higher 
order".  202 
The  central  thesis  of  Strausswork  is  his  notion  of  the  mytbi,  which  is  an  attempt 
to  separate  out  that  which  is  historica.  Uy  derived  from  that  which  is  nonhistorical  in  the 
biblical  record  though  not  necessarily  untrue  religiously  or  theologically  (mytbi).  Strauss 
begins  to  create  a  contextual  necessity  for  tWs  notion  of  mjtbi  in  discussing  H.  E.  G. 
Paulus'  Commentar  fiber  das  neue  Testament  (Commentag  on  the  New  Testamený  published  in 
1800,  arguing  for  the  necessary  distinction  betweenfact  and  opinion: 
In  the  introduction  to  this  [Paulus]  work  he  states  it  to  be  the  primary  requisite 
of  the  biblical  critic  to  be  able  to  distinguish  between  what  is  fact,  and  what  is 
opinion.  That  which  has  been  actually  experienced,  internally  or  externally,  by 
the  participants  in  an  event,  he  calls  fact.  11-ie  interpretation  of  an  event,  the 
supposed  causes  to  which  it  is  referred  either  by  the  participants  or  by  the 
narrators,  he  calls  opinion.  But,  according  to  Dr.  Paulus,  these  two  elements 
become  so  easily  blended  and  confounded  in  the  minds  both  of  the  original 
sharers  in  an  event,  and  of  the  subsequent  relators  and  historians,  that  fact  and 
opinion  lose  distinction;  so  that  the  one  and  the  other  are  believed  and  recorded 
with  equal  confidence  in  their  historical  truth.  This  intermixture  is  particularly 
apparent  in  the  historical  books  of  the  New  Testament;  since  at  the  time  Jesus 
Eved,  it  was  still  the  prevailing  disposition  to  derive  every  striking  occurrence 
from  an  invisible  and  superhuman  cause.  It  is  consequently  the  chief  task  of  the 
historian  who  desires  to  deal  with  matters  of  fact,  that  is  to  say,  in  reference  to 
the  New  Testament,  to  separate  these  two  constituent  elements  so  closely 
201  Heinrich  Benecke  William  Vatke  in  seinem  Leben  und  seinen  Schriften  (Bonn:  E.  Strauss,  1883)  p. 
75.  Cited  Roy  A  Harrisville,  op.  cit.  202  From  a  letter  to  Christian  Marklin,  6  February  1832,  in  Jorg  Sandberger,  David  Friedrich  Strauss 
als  theologischer  Hegelianer  (Gottingen:  Vandenhoeck  und  Ruprecht,  1972)  p.  193.  Cited  by  Roy  A. 
Harrisville,  op.  cit.,  p.  97. 
87 arnalgarrutcd,  and  yet  in  themselves  so  distinct;  and  to  extricate  the  pure  kernel 
of  f2"  from  the  shell  of  opinion.  In  order  to  do  this,  in  the  absence  of  any  more 
genuine  2ccount  which  would  serve  as  a  correcting  parallel,  he  must  transplant 
himself  in  imagination  upon  the  theatre  of  action,  and  strive  to  the  utmost  to 
contemplate  the  events  by  the  light  of  the  age  in  which  they  occurred.  203 
Paulus  represented  the  'empty  form  of  rationa1ism'  that  was  supposed  to  have  firmly 
grounded  Higher  Criticism  in  Str2uss'day  and,  in  Strauss'  estimation,  failed  to  do  so.  In 
order  to  extricate  "the  pure  kernel  of  fact  from  the  shcH  of  opinion,  "  Strauss  caUed  for 
the  task  of  Higher  Criticism  to  move  forward  the  work  done  by  the  Rationalists 
(Rcimarus,  Paulus,  Ussing.  D-  ichhorn)  but  with  larger  strides  that  fuUy  embrace  a  wider 
Vista: 
Mic  new  point  of  %iew...  is  the  mythical.  This  theory  is  not  brought  to  bear  on 
the  mrangcliml  history  for  the  first  time  in  the  present  work:  it  has  long  been 
21313fied  to  particular  parts  of  that  history,  and  is  here  only  extended  to  its  entire 
tenor.  It  is  not  by  any  means  meant  that  the  whole  history  ofJesus  is  to  be 
represented  as  mythical,  but  only  that  every  part  of  it  is  to  be  subjected  to  a 
critical  examination,  to  ascertain  whether  it  have  not  some  admixture  of  the 
mythical.  The  exegesis  of  the  ancient  church  set  out  from  the  double 
Presupposition:  first,  that  the  gospels  contained  a  history,  and  secondly,  that  this 
history  was  a  supernatural  one.  Rationalism  rejected  the  latter  of  these 
presuppositions,  but  only  to  cling  the  more  tenaciously  to  the  former, 
maintaining  that  these  books  present  unadulterated,  though  only  natural,  history. 
Science  cannot  rest  satisfied  with  the  inquiry  must  first  be  made  whether  in  fact, 
and  to  what  extentý  the  ground  on  which  we  stand  in  the  gospels  is  historical. 
This  is  the  natural  course  of  things,  and  thus  far  the  appearance  of  a  work  like  the 
present  is  not  only  justifiable,  but  even  necessary.  204 
In  this  w2y,  Strauss  seeks  to  place  scripture  under  the  same  scrutiny  as  other  historical 
docurnents.  In  doing  so,  he  intends  to  dissolve  "discrepancies  and  chronological 
20  David  Friedrich  Strauss  The  Life  ofierus.  Critically  ExamineiL  4th  Edition.  trans.  George  Eliot.  (New  York.  Swan  Sonnenschein  and  Co..  1948.1898)  p.  49. 
88 presentafion  (Vorstellmng)  from  the  contradictions"  that  hold  together  what  is  ixge  or  rr 
underlying  fundamental  ronapt  (Bqriffi  which  for  Strauss  is  what  is  csscntiaL  In  this  way, 
the  goal  of  Strauss'  project  is  to  separate  the  husk  of  Vorstellung  in  order  to  offer  the  frccd 
kernel  of  Bqriffand,  as  noted  pmiously,  "destroy,  in  part  shake,  the  infinite  content  faith 
has  in  Ucsusl  life  -  indeed,  only  in  order  to  restore  it  in  a  higher  ordce.  205  As  Strauss 
admits,  "as  CUly  2S  in  my  university  years,  the  most  important  point  of  [Hcgcl's]  system 
appeared  to  me  and  my  friends  to  be  the  distinction  between  Vorstellung  and  Begriffin 
religion".  2% 
Strauss'  project  in  Dar  Lehewftrm  is  fairly  basic  in  its  methodology.  IbeGospel 
namares  arc  org2niscd  and  discussed  in  three  chronological  sections:  "History  of  the 
Birth  and  Childhood  ofjcsus".  "History  of  the  Public  life  ofjcsus",  and  "History  of  the 
Passion,  Death,  and  Resurrection".  Each  section  is  then  broken  into  sub-chapters.  For 
example,  the  section  entitled  "History  of  the  Birth  and  Childhood  ofjcsus"  includes  five 
ch2pters;  "Annunciation  and  Birth  ofjohn  the  Baptise%  "Davidical  Descent  ofjesus 
according  to  the  Genealogical  Tables  of  Afatthew  and  Luke",  "Announcement  of  the 
Conception  ofjesus  and  its  supernatural  character  in  the  visit  of  Mary  and  Elizabeth", 
"Birth  and  Earliest  Events  of  the  life  ofjcsus",  and  'qbc  First  Visit  to  the  Temple  and 
the  Education  ofjcsue.  XXIthin  each  sub-chapter,  Strauss  employs  a  triadic  method  of 
critique.  First,  the  account  in  question  is  addressed  fmm  the  orthodox  theological  view, 
which  Strauss  terms  the  "crude"  or  "supcmaturahse,  understanding.  Nextý  the  same 
account  is  then  seen  through  the  critique  of  the  Rationalists  which  employs  a  natural  and 
historical  rendering  (which  Strauss  terms  as  "empty"  in  its  results).  Finally,  Strauss 
employs  his  critique  of  the  account  as  a  AgtZus.  For  example,  in  chapter  ten  entitled 
Strauss,  ibid,  p.  xxix  in  -Preface  to  the  First  German  Edition". 
letter  to  Christian  MArklin.  cited  by  I  larrisville,  op.  cit.  21*  David  Friedrich  Strauss  Streilichriften  zur  Vertheidigung  meiner  Schrift  fiber  das  Leben  Jesu  und 
zur  CharaAlerilltik  der  gegen  warrigen  Iheologie  (New  York:  0.  Olms.  1930).  Cited  by  flarrisvillc,  op. 
ciL.  p.  103. 
89 "Ibc  Transfiguration  ofjcsus  and  His  Last  joumcy  to  jcrusalcrn,  "  Strauss  organiscs  the 
bcginning  of  this  ch2ptcr  -Aith  the  sub-he2dings  "Ilc  transfiguration  ofjcsus  considcrcd 
as  a  mir2culous  extcm2l  cvcnt:  "47bc  natural  mplanation  of  the  narrativc  in  various 
fonns,  "  and  'Thc  history  of  the  transfiguration  considcrcd  as  a  mythus".  Each  cbaptcr 
foUou-s  the  sunc  mcthod  of  cridguc. 
In  the  introduction  to  the  4th  cdidon  of  Dx  Lebrnjesu,  Otto  Pfleidcrcr  of 
University  of  Berlin  marks  out  the  project  of  Strauss  as  addressing  the  growing  problem 
in  the  Church,  where  "the  sirnplc-n-dndcd  believer  cannot  [separate]  between  the  spiritual 
idea  and  the  outward  form  of  its  representation,  and  to  find  in  the  former  both  the 
productive  power  and  the  permanent  kernel  within  the  outward  husk".  207 
Strauss' 
project  of  separating  the  "kernel"  of  Begriff  from  the  "husle'  of  Vorrfellung 
was  certainly  not  without  its  echoes  from  past  hcrmcncuts  to  which  attention  should  be 
paid.  -'Ds  For  example,  we  see  in  Hegel's  dialectical  proica  a  similar  triadic  methodology 
with  the  intellectual  movement  fmm  thesis  to  the  necessary  antithesis  and  then  on  to 
synthcsis.  This  systematic  triadic  form  is  represented  in  Strauss'  conception  of  history. 
As  mentioned  at  the  end  of  chapter  3,  Hegel  held  the  notion  of  Christ  as  "the  mcre 
example"  of  the  unity  of  the  divinc  and  human  nature  which  is  the  Absolute  or  Universal 
Spirit.  As  noted  from  lxtmrrr  on  tke  Pkil"opýy  of  Wgion,  Hegel  holds  that  "the  history  of 
Christ  is  a  history  for  the  spiritual  community  because  it  is  absolutely  adequate  to  the 
idea"  of  the  synthesis  of  the  divine  and  human,  and  the  previous  temporal  example  of  a 
Christ  is  "only  the  effort  of  Spirit  to  reach  the  determination  implied  in  the  implicit  unity 
207  David  Friedrich  Strauss  The  life  ofietus,  Critically  Examined.  4th  Edition.  Trans.  George  Eliot 
(New  York:  -  Swan  Sonncnschein  and  Co.,  1848,1898)  p.  xvi.  2DI  Christian  Wolff,  one  of  the  more  prolific  of  cighteenth-century  philosophers,  argued  for  a  similar 
separation  and  re-interprctation  in  his  chapters  "On  reading  historical  and  dogmatic  books"  and  'ýOn 
interpreting  the  I  Ioly  Scripturcs7  found  in  Vernatiftige  Gedanken.  As  noted  by  Kurt  Mueller-Vollmer, 
Wolff  divided  all  writings  into  the  categories  of  -historicar-  and  "dogmatic"  works.  I-listorical' 
writings  am  to  be  judged  on  their  completeness  of  the  historical  account  they  report  as  well  as  their 
"truthfulness  And  sincerity.  since  we  no  longer  have  access  to  historical  truth  once  the  events  referred  to 
are  Past"-  'Dogmatic'  writings.  on  the  other  hand,  are  to  bejudged  on  the  "strength  of  their  arguments, 
their  truth  content.  and  the  kno%%  lodge  of  the  subject  matter  displayed.  See  Kurt  Mueller-Vollmer.  ed., 
90 of  the  divine  and  human!  '.  3-19  History  for  Strauss  can  be  viewed  as  thcform  of  this 
Absolute  or  Universal  Spirit  as  articulated  through  time.  With  regard  to  the  idea  of 
Christ,  extricating  the  kernel  of  the  Absolute  Spirit  requires  progressing  from  previously 
primitive  or  "crude"  supcrnaturaHsm,  coming  into  opposition  with  the  "empty"  form  of 
R26onihsm,  and  ultimately  arrhing  at  in  cnUghtencd  or  "true"  Begriff  within  the  mjthi 
where  the  lik  ofjcsus  is  merely  the  consciousness  of  the  church  objectified  by  the 
human  spirit  as  divine. 
Publication  of  Das  Lehenje-cm  caused  something  of  a  firestorm  in  theological 
discourse.  In  the  Preface  to  Dazid  Fried)irh  Strauss  and  Ur  TLeokgv.  Horton  Harris  makes 
this  observ2don:  "Of  all  the  nineteenth-century  theologians,  Strauss  was  the  most 
notorious.  No  single  theological  work  ever  created  such  consternation  in  the  theological 
world  as  Strauss'  Ufe  offtsur.  It  split  the  century  into  two  theological  eras  -  before  and 
after  1835".  210  In  the  conclusion  of  D4s  Lebenjesm,  the  Absolute  Spirit  that  had 
traditionally  been  attributed  as  the  one  God-human  embodiment  in  traditional  orthodox 
christology  was  now  to  be  seen  not  as  an  individual,  but  (in  keeping  with  Hcgeý  as  'Idea' 
within  211  of  humanity  collectively.  In  the  concluding  disscrtation,  Strauss  makes  the 
following  assertion: 
If  reality  is  ascribed  to  the  idea  of  the  unity  of  the  divine  and  human  natures,  is 
this  cquivalent  to  the  admission  that  this  unity  must  actually  have  been  once 
manifested,  as  it  never  had  been,  and  never  more  will  be,  in  one  individual?  This 
is  indeed  not  the  mode  in  which  Idea  realiscs  itself;  it  is  not  wont  to  lavish  all  its 
fullness  on  one  exemplar,  and  be  niggardly  towards  all  others  -  to  express  itself 
perfectly  in  that  one  individual,  and  imperfectly  in  all  the  rest:  it  rather  loves  to 
distribute  its  riches  among  a  multiplicity  of  exemplars  which  reciprocally 
complete  each  other  -  in  the  alternate  2ppearancc  and  suppression  of  a  series  of 
The  Ilermeneutics  Reader  (New  York:  Continuum.  1997)  pp.  54ff. 
2M  G.  W-  Ilegel  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion.  Trans.  F-B.  Speirs  and  J.  B.  Sanderson 
(London:  K.  Paul.  Trench,  and  Co..  1895).  111,  p.  113.  21011ortorillarris  David  Friedrich  Strauss  and  his  7heology  (London:  Cambridge  University  Press, 
1973)  p.  ix. 
91 indhiduals.  And  is  this  no  true  rcalisation  of  the  Idea?  Is  not  the  idea  of  unity  of 
the  di%inc  and  human  naturCS  2  real  one  in  a  far  higher  sense,  when  I  regard  the 
whole  race  of  mankind  as  its  rcalisation,  than  when  I  single  out  one  man  as  such 
2  rcalisition?  Is  not  in  inczmation  of  God  from  eternity,  a  truer  one  thin  an 
incarnation  limited  to  2  particular  point  in  tiMC?  211 
Str2uss  continues  his  thesis  by  sounding  the  replacing  of  traditional  conceptions  of  a 
Christ  with  Humanity  as  the  locus  for  complete  union  of  creator  and  created: 
This  is  the  key  to  the  whole  of  Christology,  that,  as  subject  of  the  predicate  which 
the  church  assigns  to  Christ,  we  place,  instead  of  an  individual,  an  Idea;  but  an 
idea  which  has  an  existence  in  reality,  not  in  the  mind  only,  like  that  of  Kant.  In 
an  indii-rid",  2  God-nun,  the  properties  and  functions  which  the  church  ascribes 
to  Christ  contradict  themselves;  in  the  idea  of  the  race,  they  perfectly  agree. 
Hunut-dry  is  the  union  of  the  two  natures  -  God  become  man,  the  infinite 
manifesting  itsclf  in  the  finite,  and  the  finite  spirit  remembering  its  infinitude  ...  It 
is  Humanity  that  dies,  riscs,  and  ascends  to  heaven,  for  from  the  negation  of  its 
phenomenal  life  there  proceeds  a  higher  spiritual  life...  by  kindling  with  him  of 
the  idea  of  Humanity,  the  individual  nun  participates  in  the  divinely  human  life 
of  the  species...  This  alone  is  the  absolute  sense  of  Christology-  that  it  is  annexed 
to  the  person  and  history  of  one  individual,  is  a  necessary  result  of  the  historical 
form  which  Christology  has  tik-cn.  212 
Strauss  recognizes  that  this  radical  shift  in  christology  poscs  a  challcnge  not  only  to  those 
in  the  academy,  but  those  in  the  pulpit  as  well.  As  he  says,  "how  is  the  continuance  of  a 
ministry  in  the  church  possible  when  theology  has  reached  this  StagýO.  11213  In  short, 
Strauss  acknowledges  the  inevitablity  for  hypocrisy  in  the  pulpitý  although  to  say  this 
would  be  the  demonstration  of  what  Strauss  calls  in  "uncultivated  n-dnd": 
7bc  difference  betureen  the  theologian  and  the  church  is  regarded  as  a  total  one; 
it  is  thought,  that  in  answer  to  the  question,  whether  he  believes  in  the  history  of 
Christ,  he  ought  to  say  cx2ctly,  no;  whereas  he  says,  yes:  and  this  is  a  falsehood... 
David  Friedrich  Strauss,  op.  cit.,  pp.  779-780. 
ibid..  p.  780. 
92 Hencc  it  is  in  evidence  of  in  uncultivated  n-dnd,  to  denounce  as  a  hypocrite  a 
thcologi2n  who  preaches,  for  example,  on  the  resurrection  of  Christ,  since, 
though  he  m2y  not  believe  in  the  reality  of  that  event  as  a  single  sensible  fact,  he 
nuy  neverthclcss,  hold  to  be  ttuc  the  rcprcscntation  of  the  proccss  of  spiritual 
lifc,  which  the  rcsurrcction  of  Christ  affords.  214 
Basil  Willey  notes  Stmuss"'practical  adiicc"  to  clergy  in  this  way.  - 
Wh2t  sluU  the  clcrg)mun  do  when  he  has  seen  the  Ught,  Icamt  the  secret? 
Renounce  his  Orders  2nd  become  a  professor?  ... 
Stay  in  the  church,  then,  and 
preach  the  identity  of  Christianity  andphilosophy:  1  But  no  one  will  understand 
him.  Kccp  his  best  thoughts  for  a  few  inid2tCS,  and  preach  the  old  doctrines  with 
ment;  d  reserv2dons?  But  the  sense  of  his  own  hypocrisy  will  probably  suffocate 
him.  Str2uss  does  not  pretend  to  solve  the  problem  or  to  give  authoritative 
ad%ricc  to  the  Robert  Elsmcrcs.  215 
As  a  result  of  the  protest  surrounding  the  publication  of  Das  Debefljeru,  Strauss  was 
removed  from  his  post  at  TQbingcn  and  became  increasingly  sceptical  of  Christianity. 
Disappointed  with  the  negative  reception  of  Das  lxbenjesu,  Strauss  rewrote  and  restated 
his  argument  for  a  uider  audience  in  1864,  one-year  after  the  publication  of  Ernest 
Renan's  life  ofjesms  in  Francc216.  In  this  restating,  Strauss  restructured  his  hypothesis  into 
assertions,  contending  with  great  strength  that  the  four  Gospel  writers  had  indeed 
fabricated  what  they  wrote  and  thatjesus  was  ultimately  a  deceiver  and  an  impostor.  In 
1872,  Strauss  published  De  Old  and  the  New  Failb  in  which  he  completely  divorced 
himself  from  orthodox  Christian  doctrine  and  remained  "alienated  from  and  out  of 
213  ibid,  p.  78  1. 
214  ibid..  P.  782. 
213  l3asil  Willey  Nineteenth  Century  Studies:  Coleridge  to  Matthew  A  mold.  (London:  Chatto  and  Windus.  1949)  p.  227.  Willey,  of  course,  refers  to  the  Robert  Elsmere  of  MIrs.  Humphrey  Ward's 
novel. 
""  Ernest  Renan  had  stated  in  regard  to  Strauss'  Das  Leben  Jesu  that  'the  historian  finds  it  too  devoid 
of  facts;  the  critic,  too  uniform  in  its  processes;  the  theologian.  founded  upon  a  hypothesis  subversive  to  Christianity.  '  Cited  by  A.  S.  Byatt  in  George  Eliot:  Selected  Essays,  Poenu,  and  Other  Writings.  ed.  A-S.  Byatt.  (London:  Penguin,  1990)  p.  446. 
93 symp2thy  uith  his  associ2tes"  in  the  acadeMy.  217 
Reception  of  Air  Lebrnjesm  in  England  was  also  mixed,  even  within  those  circles 
s)rnp2thcdc  to  Gemun  Higher  Criticism.  In  a  letter  to  Mliam  Coningham  d2tcd  1840, 
John  Sterling  rnakcs  the  f6flowing  positive  assertion  in  regard  to  trends  in  German 
thcologic2l  discourse  in  his  time,  four  years  prior  to  Mary  Ann  Evans'  translation  of  Das 
LebrNjux. 
Afore  thin  half  of  all  German  theology,  for  the  last  fifty  years,  has  turned  upon 
the  controversy  about  the  literal  accuracy  and  plenary  inspiration  of  the  book  we 
call  the  Bible...  No  English  book  gives  a  plausible  share  of  this  kind  of 
information.  After  long  and  very  painful  resistance  of  mind,  I  was  forced  to 
admit,  that  if  I  am  to  follow  honestly  the  best  light  afforded  me,  I  must  own 
there  is  error  in  the  Scriptures,  and  that  the  denial  of  this  is,  in  in  adequately 
gfor  God,  -  one  of  the  most  absurd  and  suicidal  of  all  instructed  min,  a  mcrc  bin 
human  supcrsfidons.  218 
Matthew  Amold  cited  his  criticism  of  Strauss'  project  thus: 
It  is  easy  to  be  too  systematic.  Strauss  had  the  idea,  acute  and  ingenious,  of 
explaining  the  miracles  of  the  New  Testament  as  a  reiteration  of  the  miracles  of 
the  Old.  Of  some  miracles  this  supplies  a  good  explanation.  It  plausibly  explains 
the  story  of  the  Transfiguration,  for  instance.  The  story  of  the  illuminated  face 
ofjCsus,  -Jesus  the  prophet  like  unto  Moses,  whom  Moses  foretold,  -  might 
naturally  owe  its  origin  to  the  illuminated  face  of  Moses  himself.  But  of  other 
miracles  Strauss's  idea  affords  no  admissible  explanation  whatever.  To  employ  it 
for  these  cases  can  only  show  the  imperturbable  resolution  of  a  German 
Professor  in  malcing  all  the  facts  suit  a  theory  which  he  had  adopted.  219 
But  the  qrit  dt  corps  was  ready  to  receive  Strauss  into  the  circle  of  EngHsh  readers  despite 
Arnold's  noteworthy  cridque  In  1841john  Sterling  reflected  to  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson 
217 
ibid. 
21'  John  Sterling  Twelve  Ixtrers  by  John  Sterling  ed.  William  Coningham  (London:  185  1)  p.  3. 
219  Matthew  Arnold  'God  and  the  Bible'  Complete  Prose  D'Orks  ofAfatthew  ArnoU  Cited  by  Rosemary 
Ashton  The  German  Idea:  Four  English  U'riters  and  the  Reception  of  German  Thought  1800-1860. 
(London:  Libris,  1980,1994)  p.  150. 
94 that  it  was  a  time  in  England  where  "Wordsworth  and  Coleridge  were  mystagogues 
lurking  in  caverns,  and  German  literature  was  thought  of  with  a  good  deal  less  favour 
than  we  arc  now  disposed  to  show  towards  that  of  China".  In  a  telling  statement  at  the 
close  of  his  reflections  to  Emerson,  Sterling  notes  almost  prophetically,  "'Mought  is 
leaking  into  this  country,  -  even  Strauss  sells".  220 
As  noted  previously,  Scripture  was  now  placed  alongside  other  works  of  literature  in 
what  Goethe  termed  Weltliteratur  where  scripture  was  not  so  much  devalued  but, 
conversely,  other  literature  was  raised  to  the  status  of  the  meaning-making  agent  that  was 
previously  held  exclusively  by  the  Bible.  As  stated  by  jasper,  "...  it  is  the  Bible  which 
yields  the  historical  canon,  both  particular  and  symbolic,  opening  into  the  second  tier,  the 
'supercanon'  of  the  universal  records  of  Welkliteratur,  of  all  times  and  places"'.  221 
Stephen  Prickett  notes  that  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth-century  brought  a 
complex  and  confused  situation  where  ideas  and  models  are  constantly  being 
taken,  adapted  and  reused  by  biblical  and  literary  critics  with  very  little  sense  of 
the  later  separation  that  was  to  be  imposed  between  the  two  by  their  more 
specialised  descendants:  what  a  German  biblical  critic,  Hermann  Usener,  was  to 
call  in  the  1880's  a  Gletsebenvall  -a  'glacier  wall'  -  of  academic  partition.  2m 
This  Gletscberwall  manifests  itself  by  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth-century  as  a 
pronounced  divide  between  narrative  as  'history'  and  narrative  as  'fiction'  that  had 
become  "much  more  clearly  demarcated".  223  Yet  the  designation  of  what  was  'history' 
and  what  was  'fictive'  became  more  difficult  to  determine.  In  an  article  on  'Ancient  and 
Modem  Poetrý  in  1822,  James  Marsh  makes  clear  tI-ds  distinction: 
220  John  Sterling  A  Correspondence  between  John  Sterling  and  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  ed.  E.  W. 
Emerson.  (Boston:  1897)  pp.  59-60. 
221  David  Jasper,  The  Sacred  and  Secular  Canon  in  Romanticism,  p.  22. 
222  Stephen  Prickett,  "Biblical  Criticism  and  the  Nineteenth-Century  Novel",  The  Critical  Spirit  and 
The  Will  to  Believe  ed.  David  Jasper  and  T.  R.  Wright  (London:  Macmillan  Press,  1989)  p.  11. 
223  ibid. 
95 Poetry  and  history  are  no  longer  one.  Art  and  nature  were  divorced  from  each 
other,  fiction  ceased  to  have  the  power  of  truth,  and  the  boundaries  of  the 
imagination  did  not,  as  of  old,  overpower  the  n-dnd  with  religious  awe  and  dread. 
Reason  and  philosophy  gradually  distinguished  from  each  other  the  worlds  of 
faith  and  imagination  before  so  intimately  blended,  and  as  our  sober  ancestors 
turned  all  their  poetry  into  religion,  so  we  arq  in  danger  of  turning  all  our  religion 
into  poetry.  224 
Marsh's  use  ofpoetg  reflects  the  German  understanding  whereby  all  imaginative  literature 
-  that  which  is  distanced  from  the  claims  of  history  -  is  considered  poetry.  But  without 
historical  grounding,  what  is  the  nature  and  form  of  truth?  The  attempt  to  respond  to 
this  question  took  on  aesthetically  differing  forms  in  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century  between  Germany  and  England.  Hans  Frei  in  The  Eclipse  ofBiblical  Narrative 
notes  that: 
In  England,  where  a  serious  body  of  realistic  narrative  literature  and  a  certain 
amount  of  criticism  of  the  literature  was  building  up,  there  arose  no 
corresponding  cumulative  tradition  of  criticism  of  the  biblical  writings,  and  that 
included  no  narrative  interpretation  of  them.  In  Germany,  on  the  other  hand, 
where  a  body  of  critical  analysis  as  well  as  general  hermeneutics  of  the  biblical 
writings  build  up  rapidly  in  the  later  half  of  the  eighteenth-century,  there  was  no 
simultaneous  development  of  realistic  prose  and  its  critical  appraisal.  225 
In  reflecting  upon  Goethe's  Wilbelm  Meister,  Friedrich  Schlegel  describes  his  work  as 
being  "aU  poetry  -  high,  pure  poetry.  Everything  has  been  thought  and  uttered  as  though 
by  one  who  is  both  a  divine  poet  and  a  perfect  artist...  "226  This  comment  is  not  merely  a 
reflection  on  Goethe's  vocation  of  a  writer  of  prose  and  poetry,  but  rather  Schlegel's 
theory  of  the  novel  that  did  not  set  apart  genres  from  each  other  and  believed  in 
224  James  Marsh,  'Ancient  and  Modem  Poetry',  North  American  Review  XV,  vol.  vi  (1822)  no.  1.  pp. 
130-31.  Cited  by  Stephen  Prickett,  op.  cit.  -  225  Hans  Frei,  The  Eclipse  of  Biblical  Narrative  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  1974)  p.  155 
226  Kathleen  Wheeler,  ed.,  German  Aesthetic  and  Literary  Criticism:  The  Romantic  Ironists  and  Goethe 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1984)  p.  64. 
96 a  theory  of  the  novel  which  could  be  a  theory  in  the  original  sense  of  the  word;  a 
spiritual  viewing  of  the  subject  with  calm  and  serene  feeling,  as  it  is  proper  to 
view  in  solemn  joy  the  meaningful  play  of  divine  images.  Such  a  theory  of  the 
novel  would  have  to  be  in  itself  a  novel  which  would  reflect  imaginatively  every 
tone  of  the  imagination  and  would  again  confound  the  chaos  of  the  world  ...  227 
Ibis  re-reading  of  scripture  alongside  other  texts  left  the  reading  subject  of  the 
eighteenth  and  nineteenth  century  in  a  world  that  was  destabilised  of  its  former 
foundational  claims  of  selfhood  found  in  the  historicity  of  texts.  Ibc  reading  subject 
now  exists  in  a  world  that  forged  H61derlin's  Em 
. 
pedokles  or  Goethe's  Wilbelm  Meister 
where  readers  must  construct  the  foundational  truth  that  is  to  be  found  within  this 
literary  space  as  weU  as  construct  their  own  subjective  identity.  Where  the  form  of  the 
subject  after  Augustine  provided  a  clear  exemplar  of  the  form  of  God,  now  the  shift  to 
the  ultimate  subjectivity  of  self-as-self  after  the  Enlightenment  left  the  notion  of  'form' 
to  be  figured  without  a  god  as  key  image. 
227  Kathleen  Wheeler,  ibid.,  p.  64. 
97 6.0  Victorian  Poetics  and  (re)writing  Jesus 
In  nineteenth  century  Britain,  the  space  of  literature  reached  particular  dynarnism 
in  William  Wordsworth's  The  Prelud?  'g.  lbroughout  The  Prelude,  Wordsworth  seeks  to 
, g#ans  and  res  extensa  reconcile  a  sense  of  selfhood  in  relation  to  the  res  co 
I  looked  for  universal  things;  perused 
The  common  countenance  of  earth  and  sky: 
Earth,  nowhere  unembellished  by  some  trace 
Of  that  first  Paradise  whence  man  was  driven; 
And  sky,  whose  beauty  and  bounty  are  expressed 
By  the  proud  name  she  bears  -  the  name  of  Heaven. 
I  called  on  both  to  teach  me  what  they  might; 
Or  turning  the  mind  in  upon  herself 
Pored,  watched,  expected,  listened,  spread  my  thoughts, 
And  spread  them  with  a  wider  creeping;  felt 
Incumbencies  more  awful,  visitings 
Of  the  Upholder  of  the  tranquil  soul, 
That  tolerates  the  indignities  of  Time, 
And,  from  the  centre  of  Eternity 
All  finite  motions  overruling,  lives 
In  glory  immutable.  229 
Wordsworth  is  searching  the  expanse  of  earth  and  heaven  with  a  "rnind  turned  in  upon 
itself'  to  find  a  sense  of  identity  and,  ultimately,  his  calling.  It  is  in  Book  XI  of  The 
Prelude  that  Wordsworth  sees  that  the  searcb  itselfis  ultimately  his  vocation  -  "She,  in  the 
midst  of  aU,  preserved  me  stiU/  A  Poet,  made  me  seek  beneath  that  name,  /  And  that 
alone,  my  office  upon  earth;  /  And,  lastly,  as  hereafter  will  be  shown".  230  The  traditional 
office  of  poet  is  too  limiting  for  his  task  and  he  is  seeking  "beneath  that  name"  and 
228  1  will  be  keeping  my  remarks  to  the  1850  edition  of  Prelude  which  had  a  much  larger  reading  than 
the  1805  edition. 
229  William  Wordsworth,  The  Prelude  -  The  Four  Texts  1798,1799,1805,1850  ed.  John  Wordsworth 
(London:  Penguin  Classics,  1995)  Book  III,  lines  109-124,  p.  109. 
98 aligning  himself  with  "Poets,  even  as  prophets,  each  with  each/  Connected  in  a  mighty 
scheme  of  truthj  Have  each  for  his  peculiar  facultyj  Heaven's  gift,  a  sense  that  fits  him 
to  perceive/  Objects  unseen  before".  231  Flis  task  is  that  of  a  creator  of  that  which  he  has 
been  given 
...  clear  sight 
Of  a  new  world  -a  world,  too,  that  was  fit 
To  be  transmitted  and  to  other  eyes 
Made  visible;  as  ruled  by  those  fixed  laws 
Whence  spiritual  dignity  originates, 
Which  do  both  gives  it  being  and  maintain 
A  balance,  an  ennobling  interchange 
Of  action  from  without  and  from  within; 
The  excellence,  pure  function,  and  best  power 
Both  of  the  object  seen,  and  eye  that  seeS.  232 
This  universe  of  "the  object  seen  and  the  eye  that  sees"  is  for  Wordsworth  where: 
All  that  breathes  and  is,  was  chastened,  stemmed 
And  balanced  by  pathetic  truth,  by  trust 
In  hopeful  reason,  leaning  on  the  stay 
Of  Providence;  and  in  reverence  for  duty, 
Here,  if  need  be,  struggling  with  storms,  and  there 
Strewing  in  peace  life's  humblest  ground  with  herbs, 
At  every  season  green,  sweet  at  all  hours.  233 
The  unifying  force  of  reason  "in  her  most  exalted  mood"  (XIV,  192)  is  the  imagination 
of  the  poet.  It  is  this  "reason  which  indeed  is  reason"  that  balances  the  world  res  cq&itans 
and  res  extensa.  God  only  animates  this  world  -  theframing  of  this  world  is  in  the  hand  of 
the  writer.  In  Book  XIII  Wordsworth  reflects  to  the  reader  that  this  journey  has  been 
brought  to  a  close  within  the  space  of  The  Pivlude  itself  which  tells  the  tale: 
230  ibid.,  Book  XI,  lines  346  -  349,  p.  455. 
231  ibid.,  Book  XIII,  lines  301-304,  p.  505. 
99 And  now,  0  Friendl  this  history  is  brought 
To  its  appointed  close:  the  discipline 
And  consummation  of  a  Poees  mind, 
In  everything  that  stood  most  prominent, 
Have  faithfully  been  pictured;  we  have  reached 
The  time  (which  was  our  object  from  the  first) 
When  we  may,  not  presumptuously,  I  hope, 
Suppose  my  powers  so  far  confirmed,  and  such 
My  knowledge  as  to  make  me  capable  - 
Of  building  up  a  Work  that  shall  endure.  234 
As  noted  by  M.  H.  Abrams,  The  Prelude  is  "an  involuted  poem  which  is  about  its  own 
genesis  -a  prelude  to  itself.  Its  structural  end  is  its  own  beginning;  and  its  temporal 
beginning...  is  Wordsworth's  entrance  upon  the  stage  of  his  life  at  which  it  ends  ...  [he] 
converts  the  wayfaring  Christian  of  the  Augustinian  spiritual  journey  into  the  self- 
formative  traveller  of  the  Romantic  educational  journey".  235  The  Prelude  represents  a  self- 
forming  universe  where  the  context  within  which  the  writer  is  known  (the  fictive  realm) 
is  also  that  which  he  creates.  Ultimately,  Wordsworth's  journey  in  The  Prelude  is  a  journey 
of  discovery.  This  is  a  discovery  of  self  in  the  act  of  creating  itself  -a  reflectivity  of  the 
writer  as  the  framer  of  subjectivity  and  context  where  subjectivity  resides.  It  is  a  universe 
that  is  framed  and  "history  brought  to  its  appointed  close".  This  universe  is  controlled 
by  the  creating  writer  as  a  sanctuary  for  his  vision  -a  place  where  "a  work  that  shall 
endure"  can  be  maintained.  The  Prelude  begins  by  seeking  throughout  the  lived  world  for 
meaning  and  ends  with  a  framing  of  the  never-ending  search  itself.  Tl-ýs  was  an 
epistemological  shift  that  was  nothing  short  of  a  revolution.  As  put  succinctly  by  Earl 
Wasserman: 
232  ibid.,  Book  XIII,  lines  369  -378,  p.  509. 
233  ibid.,  Book  XIV,  lines  295-  301,  p.  527. 
234  ibid.,  Book  XIV,  lines  302-311,  p.  527. 
235  M.  H.  Abrams,  "The  Design  of  The  Prelude7'Norton  Critical  Edition  of  William  Wordsworth's  The 
Prelude  ed.  John  Wordsworth  (London:  W.  W.  Norton,  1979)  p.  59  1. 
100 Until  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  there  was  sufficient  intellectual 
homogeneity  for  men  to  share  certain  assumptions...  In  varying  degrees...  man 
accepted  ...  the  Christian  interpretation  of  history,  the  sacramentalism  of  nature, 
the  Great  Chain  of  Being,  the  analogy  of  the  various  planes  of  creation,  the 
conception  of  man  as  microcosm...  These  were  cosmic  syntaxes  in  the  public 
domain;  and  the  poet  could  afford  to  think  of  his  art  as  imitative  of  "nature" 
since  these  patterns  were  what  he  meant  by  "nature". 
By  the  nineteenth  century  these  world-pictures  had  passed  from  consciousness... 
7be  change  from  a  mimede  to  a  creative  [poiesis]  conception  of  poetry  is  not  merely 
a  critical  or  philosophic  phenomenon;...  Now,...  an  additional  formulative  act 
was  required  of  the  poet  [artist]...  Within  itself  the  modem  poem  must  both 
formulate  its  own  cosmic  syntax  and  shape  the  autonomous  poetic  reality  that 
the  cosmic  syntax  permits:  "nature",  which  was  once  prior  to  the  poem  and 
available  for  inýitation,  now  shares  with  the  poem  a  common  origin  in  the  poet's 
creativity.  236 
236  Earl  Wasserman,  The  Subtler  Language  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1968)  pp.  10- 
il. 
101 6.1  Figuring  Jesus  in  the  Victorian  novel 
We  are  told  that  God  has  spoken.  Where?  In  a  hook?  We  have  tried  it  and  it 
ppoint.  q  it  disappoints,  that  most  holy  and  blessed  gift,  not  from  fault  of  its  disa 
own,  but  because  it  is  used  for  a  purpose  for  which  it  was  not  given  . 237  (emphasis 
added) 
After  Wordsworth,  the  increasing  rise  in  popularity  of  the  novel  in  the  1800's  can  be 
viewed  in  light  of  Newman's  query  CWhere?  In  a  book?  )  as  to  where  subjective 
meaning  may  be  located.  Paradoxically,  with  the  challenging  claims  levelled  against 
scripture  through  f1igher  Criticism  and  brought  into  line  with  all  Weltliteratur,  the  novel, 
interestingly  enough,  became  a  mirror  of  the  nineteenth  century  subject's  search  for 
meaning  in  vulgar  discourse.  In  many  ways  the  novel  became  the  inheritor  of  sorts  to 
scripture's  role  in  the  making  of  meaning.  The  novel,  as  noted  by  French  critic  Gustave 
Kahn,  "is  perhaps  more  Eke  the  contepbilosophique  than  Eke  the  romance,  in  that  it  records 
a  similar  process  of  disillusionment;  but  while  philosophical  tales  cast  such 
disillusionment  in  ideological  terms,  novels  treat  it  experientially,  in  the  terms  of 
quotidian  reality".  238  Schoder  notes  that  "the  novel  would  then  seem  to  be  an  essentially 
ironic  fictional  form,  occupying  a  middle  position  between,  the  non-ironic  romance  and 
the  philosophical  tale,  which  is  ironic,  but  in  ways  often  different  from  those  of  the 
pes,  figures  of  speech;  but  novel...  This  irony  [of  the  novel]  falls  under  the  heading  of  tro 
the  irony  of  the  novel  is  rather  a  figure  of  thought,  in  the  broadest  sense".  239 
237  John  Henry  Newman,  An  Essay  on  the  Development  of  Christian  Doctrine,  1845  (London:  Penguin, 
1974)  p.  175. 
239  Cited  by  Maurice  Z.  Schoder,  '7he  Novel  as  a  Genre'  The  Theory  of  the  Novel  ed.  Philip  Stevick 
(London:  Collins-Macmillan,  1967)  p.  16. 
239  Schoder,  ibid.,  pp.  20,22. 
102 The  ironic  nature  of  the  Victorian  novel  can  indeed  be  seen  in  its  very  form.  240 
First,  the  world  of  the  novel  is  made  of  words  in  the  historical  realm  that  oPen 
imaginative  dimensions  in  the  fictive  realm  and  are  at  once  unreal  and  imaginary.  I'liere 
are  no  physical  objects,  no  real  people  in  any  novel  in  relation  to  historical  space  and 
timc.  Evcn  an  autobiographical  account  is  not  the  'actual'  account  of  a  life  and  is 
therefore  fictive  to  some  extent.  Yet,  the  novel  speaks  as  though  it  represents  reality  in 
opposition  to  the  context  of  the  reading  subject.  In  a  letter  to  Louise  Colet  dated  1853, 
Gustave  Flaubert  makes  the  following  assertion: 
The  day  before  yesterday,  in  the  woods  of  Le  Touquet,  in  a  charming  spot  beside 
a  spring,  I  found  old  cigar  butts  and  scraps  ofpati.  People  had  been  picnicking. 
I  described  such  a  scene  in  Novembre,  eleven  years  ago;  it  was  entirely  imagined, 
and  the  other  day  it  came  true.  Everything  one  invents  is  true,  you  may  be  sure. 
Poetry  is  as  precise  as  geometry.  Induction  is  as  accurate  as  deduction;  and 
besides,  after  reacl-ýing  a  certain  point  one  no  longer  mI  akes  any  mistake  about  the 
things  of  the  soul.  My  poor  Bovary,  without  a  doubt,  is  suffering  and  weeping  at 
this  very  instant  in  twenty  villages  of  France.  241 
Stendhal.  makes  the  following  assertion  of  the  novel's  claim  of  reality  in  The  Red  and  the 
Black: 
A  novel  is  a  mirror  carried  along  a  high  road.  At  one  moment  it  reflects  the  blue 
skies,  at  another  the  mud  of  the  puddles  at  your  feet.  The  man  who  carries  this 
mirror  in  his  pack  you  will  accuse  of  being  immortall  Blame  instead  that  high 
road  upon  which  the  puddle  lies,  or  even  more  the  inspector  of  roads  who  allows 
the  water  to  gather  and  the  puddle  to  form.  242 
'Mere  is  an  ironic  turn  in  the  supposed  realism  that  characterises  these  nineteenth 
century  comments  on  writing-  there  is  truth  in  fiction  and  what  is  real  is  seemingly 
removed  and  to  be  recovered  through  the  act  of  writing.  As  noted  by  Nlichael  Riffaterrc, 
240  See  Ian  Watt's  The  Rise  of  the  Novel  and  J.  Hillis  Miller's  The  Form  of  Victorian  Fiction. 
241  Gustave  Flaubert,  "Letter  to  Louise  Colet,  1853"  in  The  Victorian  Novel:  Modem  Essays  in 
103 "fiction  establishes  its  truth  status  by  the  way  language  turns  back  upon  itself, 
tautologically,  to  accomplish  the  expectations  it  sets  UP11.243  This  'fictional  truth'  is  for 
Riffaterre  "a  means  of  joining  history,  theory,  and  language  to  describe  the  principle  of 
abstract  conjecturality  as  a  ground  for  representing  the  world-it  is  less  the  factuaEty  of 
the  event  that  matters...  than  its  ability  to  stimulate  reflection  on  the  represented  event,  the 
event  as  text...  which  marks  both  the  connectedness  to  the  world  and  opacity  of  that 
link  -  its  mystery`2.244 
This  "mystery"  is  played  out  at  the  lowest  common  denominator  of  the  novel's 
form  and  structure  -  words.  Words  of/within  a  novel  act  as  structure  for  related  minds 
that  form  interpersonal  relations.  Yet  these  networks  of  relationships  are  synthetic,  a 
condition  understood  by  the  reading  subject,  while  at  the  same  time  established  as  self- 
evidenced  authenticity  by  the  text.  Additionally,  a  pattern  of  related  minds  exists  in  the 
novel's  form  and  structure  as  a  temporal  rhythm  -  beings  exist  in  time  whether  fictive  or 
historical.  As  noted  by  Paul  Ricoeur  in  Time  and  Narrative,  fictive  time  and  historical  time 
exist  as  "counterpoints"  to  one  another,,  each  acknowledging  and  simultaneously  denying 
the  existence  of  the  other  with  the  idea  of  'fictionality'  casting  a  poetic  shadow  upon 
reahty"s  sole  claim  to  temporality: 
Unreal  characters,  we  might  say,  have  an  unreal  experience  of  time.  Unreal,  in 
the  sense  that  the  temporal  marks  of  this  experience  do  not  have  to  be  connected 
to  the  single  spatial-temporal  network  constitutive  of  chronological  time...  In 
this  sense,  from  the  epic  to  the  novel,  by  way  of  tragedy  and  the  ancient  and 
modem  forms  of  comedy,  the  time  of  fictional  narrative  has  been  freed  from  the 
constraints  requiring  it  to  be  referred  back  to  the  time  of  the  universe...  Each 
fictive  temporal  experience  unfolds  its  world,  and  each  of  these  worlds  is 
singular,  incomparable,  unique.  245 
Criticism  ed.  Ian  Watt  (London:  Oxford  University  Press,  197  1),  p.  390. 
242  Stendhal,  "The  Red  and  the  Black,  1830,  Volume  II,  Chapter  49"  in  The  Victorian  Novel,  p.  389. 
243  Michael  Riffaterre,  Fictional  Truth  (London:  John  Hopkins  University  Press,  1990)  p.  viii 
244  ibid.,  pp.  viii-ix. 
245  Paul  Ricoeur,  Time  and  Narrative,  Vol.  3  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1988)  p.  128. 
104 In  addition  to  this  'unreal  reality'  of  time  in.  fiction,  there  is  also  the  real  probability 
offered  in  this  space  that  makes  claims  beyond  that  of  recorded  history.  Additionally, 
M.  H.  Abrams  notes  that  for  Aristotle  in  his  Poefics,  the  writer  does  not  describe  "the 
. 
ppen... 
' 
Hence  poetry  [art]  is  thing  that  has  happened,  but  a  kind  of  Ming  that  migbt  ba 
something  more  philosophic  and  of  graver  import  than  history,  since  its  statements  are 
of  the  nature  rather  of  universals,  whereas  those  of  history  are  singulars.  "246 
These  three  questions  -  the  question  of  realism,  the  question  of  intersubjectivity, 
and  the  question  of  time,  function  as  ironic  turns  that  fracture  the  reading  subjeces 
ability  to  find  'certainty'  in  the  text  by  opening  gaps  or  destabilised  spaces  within  the  poetics. 
To  close  these  gaps  into  dialectic  certainty  was  no  longer  an  option  with  the  challenges 
brought  to  bear  by  I-Egher  Criticism  and  the  revisioning  of  the  role  of  the  text  in  relation 
to  the  construction  of  the  subject.  As  Wordsworth  and  those  who  followed  his  lead 
found  in  their  developing  poetics  as  British  writers  in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth 
century,  meaning  was  to  be  found  in  the  opening  of  destabilised  spaces  or  'gaps'  within 
the  text217,  not  in  their  closing  off  or,  to  use  Luce  Irigarary's  term,  'suturine.  These 
unsutured  spaces  or  'wounds'  resist  resolution  and  draw  the  reading  subject  into  the 
position  of  reconciler  through  'touching  the  wound'  more  than  closing  it.  Itisinthis 
honest  penetration  into  such  wounded  poetics  where  readers  become  the  bridge  between 
the  claims  made  by  the  fictive  world  and  the  world  wid-ýn  wl-dch  they  as  reading  subjects 
'live,  move,  and  have  their  being.  As  I  will  discuss  in  more  depth  in  the  concluding 
chapter,  such  poetics  shows  a  christological.  quest  that  is  ultimately  a/christological  by 
attempting  to  move  beyond  language  tautologically  and  toward  a  poetics  of  Jesus  that  is 
246  Cited  by  M.  H.  Abrams,  The  Mirror  and  the  Lamp  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1953)  p.  36. 
247  Jacques  Lacan  uses  the  term  blance  (gap)  to  figure'ýhe  relation  of  the  subject  to  the  Other  [which 
is]  entirely  produced  in  a  process  of  gap".  For  Lacan,  the  subject  is  constituted  and  defined  by  a  "gap" 
which  leaves  the  subject  divided  or  "splie'.  See  Jacques  Lacan,  The  Seminar.  Book  XI:  77ze  Four 
Fundamental  Concepts  of  Psychoanalysis.  Trans.  Alan  Sheridan  (London:  Hogarth  Press,  1977)  p.  206. 
105 the  authentic  presencing  of  subject  and  the  sacred  within  one  space  and  time.  141 
The  prospect  of  the  text  being  open  and  unsutured  to  the  touch  was  as  terrifying 
to  writers  of  the  period  as  much  as  it  was  a  revelation.  Alfred  Lord  Tennyson,  in  his 
poem  In  Memoriam,  portrays  what  Lance  Butler  calls  "the  face  of  a  seemingly  abandoned 
universe".  2497he  role  of  doubt  is  a  key  theme  within  Victorian  literature  for  those  who 
faced  the  shift  in  poetics  as  a  rupturing  of  meaning  rather  than  a  portal  to  new 
possibiEties: 
Behold,  we  know  not  anything; 
I  can  but  trust  that  good  shaU  faU 
At  last  -  far  off  -  at  last,  to  all, 
And  every  winter  change  to  spring. 
So  runs  my  dream:  but  what  am  I? 
An  infant  crying  in  the  night: 
An  infant  crying  for  the  light: 
And  with  no  language  but  a  cry 
I  falter  where  I  firn-Ay  trod, 
And  Ming  with  my  weight  of  cares 
Upon  the  great  world's  altar-stairs 
That  slope  through  darkness  up  to  God, 
I  stretch  lame  hands  of  faith,  and  grope, 
And  gather  dust  and  chaff,  and  caU 
To  what  I  feel  is  Lord  of  all, 
248  As  I  will  discuss  in  more  depth  in  the  conclusion,  I  see  this  form  of  poetics  as  exemplified  in  George 
Eliot's  early  writing  as  she  attempts  to  find  the  meeting  of  the  subject  and  the  sacred  through  the  space 
of  literature.  An  example  of  this  form  is  figured  in  the  Gospel  of  St.  John  in  the  post-Easter  encounter 
of  Thomas  and  the  risen  Christ  -  "A  week  later  his  disciples  were  again  in  the  house,  and  Thomas  was 
with  them.  Although  the  doors  were  shut,  Jesus  came  and  stood  among  them  and  said,  'Teace  be  with 
yoW'.  Then  he  said  to  Thomas,  "Put  your  finger  here  and  see  my  hands.  Reach  out  your  hand  and  put  it 
in  my  side.  Do  not  doubt  but  believe".  Thomas  answered  him,  "My  Lord  and  My  God!  "  John  20:  26- 
28  NRSV.  This  will  be  expanded  in  my  conclusion. 
249  Lance  St.  John  Butler,  Victorian  Doubt.,  Literary  and  Cultural  Discourses  (London:  Simon  and 
Schuster,  1990)  p.  9. 
106 And  faintly  trust  the  larger  hope. 
250 
The  question  in  the  first  line  of  the  second  stanza  cited  from  In  Memoriam  found  in  lyric 
54  succinctly  frames  the  state  that  Victorian  fiction  found  itself:  "So  runs  my  dream:  but 
what  am  7'  As  noted  by  J.  Hillis  I\Uler,  "the  development  of  Victorian  fiction  is  a 
movement  from  the  assumption  that  society  and  the  self  are  founded  on  some  super- 
human  power  outside  them,  to  a  putting  in  question  of  the  assumption,  to  the  discovery 
that  society  now  appears  to  be  self-creating  and  self-supporting,  resting  on  nothing 
outside  itself.  "  251  The  waking  from  the  "dream"  that  Tennyson  speaks  of  is  the  horrific 
reality  that,  to  paraphrase  Shakespeare,  all  the  world's  a  fiction  and  we  are  merely  its 
writers.  Isobel  Armstrong  states  that  "there  is  a  fundamental  anxiety  in  In  Memoriam 
about  the  dissolution  of  language  altogether.  'Me  breakdown  of  language  is  collateral 
with  the  obliteration  of  the  regulative  'Type'  in  the  external  world'I.  252Words  themselves, 
shattered  seemingly  beyond  repair  in  the  wake  of  Higher  Criticism,  had  left  the  reading 
subject  in  a  world  "with  no  language  but  a  cry"  and  to  "falter  where  I  firmly  trod".  The 
very  hands  that  once  grasped  after  faith  are  now  "lame"  and  groping,  but  only  find  "dust 
and  chaff". 
Speaking  from  his  orthodox  foundation  in  Apologia  Pro  Vita  Sua  of  1864,  John 
Henry  Newman  categorises  this  "lame  gropine'  of  the  Victorian  age: 
To  consider  the  world  in  its  length  and  breath,  its  various  history,  the  many  races 
of  man,  their  starts,  their  fortunes,  their  mutual  alienation,  their  conflicts;  their 
aimless  courses,  their  random  achievements,  and  acquirements,  the  impotent 
conclusion  of  long-standing  facts,  the  tokens  so  faint  and  broken,  of  a 
superintending  design,  the  blind  evolution  of  what  turn  out  to  be  great  powers  or 
250  Alfred  Lord  Tennyson,  "In  Memoriam  -  1849"in  Norton  Anthology  of  English  Literature  6h  edition. 
M.  H.  Abrams,  ed.  (London:  Norton,  1993)  lyric  54,  lines  13  -  20;  lyric  55,  lines  13-20  p.  1104. 
251  J.  Hillis  Miller,  The  Form  of  Victorian  Fiction  (London:  University  of  Notre  Dame  Press,  1968)  p. 
30. 
252  Isobel  Armstrong,  Language  as  Living  Fonn  in  Nineteenth  Century  Poetry  (Sussex:  Harvester  Press, 
1982)p.  173. 
107 truths,  the  progress  of  things  as  if  from  unreasoning  elements,  not  toward  final 
causes,  the  greatness  and  littleness  of  man,  his  far-reaching  aims,  his  short 
duration,  the  curtain  over  his  futurity,  the  disappointments  of  life,  the  defeat  of 
good,  the  success  of  evil,  physical  pain,  mental  anguish,  the  prevalence  and 
intensity  of  sin,  the  pervading  idolatries,  the  corruptions,  the  dreary  hopeless 
irreligion,  that  condition  of  the  whole  race,  so  fearfully  yet  exactly  described  in 
the  Apostle's  words,  'having  no  hope  and  without  God  in  the  world',  -  all  this  is  a 
vision  to  dizzy  and  appal;  and  inflicts  upon  the  mind  the  sense  of  a  profound 
mystery,  which  is  absolutely  beyond  human  solution.  253 
Newman  himself  acknowledges  that  the  foundation  for  "making  meaning"  that  was 
previously  located  in  the  Bible  is  gone  and  leaves  an  age  "having  no  hope  and  without 
God  in  the  world".  As  noted  earlier,  Newman  frames  the  key  question  in  this  regard  in 
An  Essaly  on  the  Develobment  of  Cbrisdan  Doctrine,  "We  are  told  that  God  has  spoken.  Wbere? 
.. 
points,  it  disappoints,  that  most  holy  and  blessed  In  a  book?  We  have  tried  it  and  it  disap 
gift,  not  from  fault  of  its  own,  but  because  it  is  used  for  a  purpose  for  which  it  was  not 
given7.254  (emphasis  added) 
While  Newman's  concern  that  the  Bible  "disappoints"  because  it  is  used  "for  a  purpose 
for  which  it  was  not  given",  the  fundamental  query  remains:  what  is  the  Bible  to  be  used 
for  then?  What  has  been  left  for  it  to  do  if  it  is  stripped  of  its  sacredness  and  must  stand 
alongside  all  other  WleltliteratuP  In  the  nineteenth  century,  one  response  to  this  question 
is  seen  in  the  proliferation  of  fictional  accounts  of  Jesus  -  Incarnation  as  derivative  genre 
that  is  to  exist  only  in  and  through  the  act  of  (re)writing.  Here  one  recaUs  Derrida's 
statement  with  regard  to  Hegel  as  one  who  announced  that 
the  horizon  of  absolute  knowledge  is  the  effacement  of  writing  in  the  logos,  the 
retrieval  of  the  trace  inparousia,  the  reappropriation  of  difference,  the 
253  John  Henry  Newman,  Apologia  Pro  Vita  Sua,  1864  (London:  Fount  Press,  1977)  p.  278. 
254  John  Henry  Newman,  An  Essay  on  the  Development  of  Christian  Doctrine,  1845  (London:  Penguin, 
1974)  p.  175. 
108 accomplishment  of  what  I  have  elsewhere  called  the  metaphysics  of  the  proper. 
Yet  all  that  Hegel  thought...  may  be  reread  as  a  meditation  on  writing.  Hegel  is 
also  the  thinker  of  irreducible  difference...  the  last  philosopher  of  the  book  and 
the  first  fl-dnker  of  writing.  255 
The  actualisation  of  Derrida's  claim  with  regard  to  the  "end  of  the  book  and  the 
beginning  of  writing"  can  be  seen  in  the  Victorian  attempts  to  (re)write  Jesus  within  the 
space  of  the  novel  at  the  time  that  George  Eliot  was  beginning  her  fictional  output. 
Attempts  to  figure  Jesus  within  the  Victorian  novel  are  numerous.  Examples  of 
poetic  forms  attempted  in  the  Victorian  period  include  these  by  contemporaries  of 
George  Eliot  -  J.  A.  Froude's  The  Nemesis  ofFaitb  (1849),  Walter  Pater's  Marius  the 
Epicurean  (1885),  and  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward's  Robert  Elsmere  (1888).  Each  exemplifies 
differing  approaches  attempting  the  same  goal  within  the  nineteenth  century  -  to  frame  a 
poetics  that  evokes  (to  cite  Marius  the  Epicurean)  that  "'one  only  way  which  leads  to  a  true 
philosophy"25  6which  the  Bible  once  claimed  to  be.  Each  contributes  a  significant 
attempt  to  reach  this  end.  The  Nemesis  ofFaitb  situates  the  'condition  of  things'  in  the 
form  of  fictional  epistolary  correspondence,  thus  conferring  upon  the  crisis  of  Victorian 
'doubt'  a  news-worthy  quality.  Marius  is  striving  to  re-stabilise  the  Christian  faith  as  pure 
aesthetic  source  from  which  to  draw  upon  merely  for  ares  sake.  Robert  Elsmere  re- 
imagines  Jesus  as  a  reluctant  clergyman  who,  in  the  words  of  Anthony  Trollope,  has  a 
"heart  that  still  loves  the  old  teachings  which  the  mind  win  no  longer  accepe%257  Each  is 
a  representative  attempt  to  fix  a  static  concept  of  Jesus  -  an  incarnational  poetics  - 
within  the  fictional  space.  In  contrast,  I  will  argue  that  George  Eliot  offers  a  different 
conception  of  such  a  poetics  of  Jesus  -  one  that  is  not  formed,  fixed,  nor  exposed,  but  is 
255  Jacques  Derrida,  Of  Grammatology,  trans.  G.  C.  Spivak  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press, 
1976)  p.  26.  Also  cited  in  Mark  C.  Taylor,  Deconstruction  in  Context,  op.  cit.  p.  2. 
256  Walter  Pater,  Marius  the  Epicurean  1885  (London:  Penguin  Classics,  1985)  p.  256. 
257  Anthony  Trollope,  The  Clergyman  who  subscribesfor  Colenso,  from  The  Clergymen  of  the  Church 
of  England  (Leicester:  Leicester  University  Press,  1974)  p.  128. 
109 constantly  forming,  transient,  and  strangely  veiled  witbin  the  poetic  space.  258 
258  Delimiting  texts  which  represent  this  period  of  literary  output  is  extremely  difficult.  As  noted,  I  will 
use  these  as  representative,  not  exhaustive,  of  various  poetic  attempts  to  capture  the  issues  surrounding 
Victorian  'doubt'  and  the  figuring  of  Jesus  within  fiction. 
110 6.2  J.  A.  Froude's  Tbc  Nemesis  ofFaith 
In  J.  A.  Froude's  The  Nemesis  ofFaitb  (1849),  the  absence  of  faith  in  Jesus  takes  on  a 
confessional  quality  as  the  novel  protrays  the  failed  cleric  Markham  Sutherland  through 
letters  and  journal  entries  in  a  manner  similar  in  poetics  to  Goethe's  Somws  of  Young 
Wertber.  More  than  a  life,  this  is  to  be  a  "history  of  Markham  Sutherland"  which  is 
"painted"  for  the  reader  to  see  as  well  as  to  read.  259  As  Froude  writes  in  his  Preface, 
The  moral  of  human  life  is  never  simple,  and  the  moral  of  a  story  which  aims 
only  at  being  true  to  human  life  cannot  be  expected  to  be  any  more  so.  I  do  not 
think  this  book  would  have  seemed  so  obscure  as  it  seemed,  if  it  had  not  been 
overly  readily  assumed  that  religious  fiction  must  be  didactic.  Religion  of  late 
years  has  been  so  much  a  matter  of  word  controversy,  it  has  suffered  so  complete 
a  divorce  from  life,  that  life  is  the  last  place  in  which  we  look  forit.  260 
Froude  begins  his  novel  by  asserting  that  this  is  a  "history"  and  yet  goes  on  to  speak  of  a 
"life".  This  is  indicative  of  the  tension  arising  from  the  publications  of  Strauss'  Das  Leben 
Jesu  as  well  as  Ernst  Renan's  Vie  dejisus  published  in  1863.  As  mentioned  previously  in 
chapter  4,  Biblical  Higher  Criticism,  in  keeping  with  Hegel's  project,  challenged  the 
exclusive  borders  surrounding  the  person  of  Jesus  as  a  figure  outside  the  realm  of  inquiry 
and  placed  him  alongside  all  figures  whose  being  is  grounded  within  a  poetics.  'History' 
no  longer  had  a  privileged  place  in  such  discussions.  Yet  the  form  that  was  to  replace 
'history'was  often  wanting  in  the  rendering  of  a  'fife  ofJesus.  '  As  stated  by  Ernst  Renan 
in  his  critique  of  Strauss'  rendering  of  Jesus  in  Das  Ixben  Jesu: 
The  criticism  of  the  details  of  the  Gospel  texts  especially...  done  by  Strauss  [in]  a 
manner  which  leaves  little  to  be  desired. 
...  Strauss  may  be  mistaken  in  his  theory 
of  the  compilation  of  the  Gospels; 
...  his  book  has,  in  my  opinion,  the  fault  of 
259  J.  A.  Froude,  The  Nemesis  of  Faith  (London:  George  Woodfall  and  Son,  1849)  p.  v.  260  ibid.,  p.  iii. 
III taking  up  the  theological  ground  too  much,  the  historical  ground  too  little 
...  261 
In  order  to  speak  of,  let  alone  'conceive'  (to  use  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward's  term)  of  Jesus, 
the  use  of  "Life"  became  synonymous  widi  "History"  as  a  means  of  escaping  the  rupture 
of  FEstory  as  a  stable  ground  of  being.  As  I  have  noted,  this  shift  was  an  opening  akin  to 
H61derlin's  Empedokles  where  an  opening  rather  than  a  closure  was  created  regarding  the 
ability  of  poetics  to  form  Jesus.  This  'tumbling  of  terms'  in  the  use  of  'history'  and  'life' 
where  one  is  synonymous  yet  veils  the  other  is  evidenced  in  Eliza  Lynn  Unton's  novel 
The  True  Histog  ofjosbua  Daddson,  Communist,  one  of  the  novels  written  during  the  later 
nineteenth  century  as  a  fictional  Efe  ofjesus  in  'modern  facing'.  262  Joshua  Davidson  is 
the  son  of  a  carpenter  whose  very  name  bears  obvious  resemblance  to  the  Biblical  Jesus 
-  "Joshua  David's  son".  ,  As  the  story  unfolds,  Joshua  comes  to  realise  his  'calling'  and 
sees  the  hope  of  humanity  framed  in  a  contemporary  re-framing  of  Marxist  philosophy. 
The  notion  ofjesus  as  a  Communist  stirred  enough  of  a  reaction  to  see  the  title  later 
changed  to  The  Life  ofjosbua  Davidson;  or  the  Modern  Imitadon  of  Cbrist.  ý  A  Tbeorefical  Novel. 
Now  the  character  is  more  closely  aligned  with  the  Jesus  of  Thomas  a  Kempis  as 
opposed  to  Karl  Marx  and  this  tale  is  a  possible  "life"  rather  than  a  "true  historý'.  263 
This  interchange  of  meaning  between  what  was  "True  Historý'  as  opposed  to  a  "Life" 
within  the  space  of  fiction  is  one  of  the  concerns  addressed  in  Froude's  The  Nemesis  of 
Faitb. 
From  the  start,  Froude  acknowledges  that  the  fundamental  problem  with  regard  to 
religion  and  religious  writing  is  that  it  "must  be  didactic".  He  goes  on  to  state  that  his 
hope  for  The  Nemesis  ofFaith  was  to  show  "a  human  soul  [that]  was  suffering  and 
261  Ernest  Renan,  The  Life  of  Jesus,  1863  (Amherst:  Prometheus  Books,  199  1)  p.  3. 
262  Eliza  Lynn  Linton,  The  True  History  ofJoshua  Davidson  (London,  1872). 
263  See  also  "Weltliteratur  and  the  Bible  Critics"  in  David  Jasper,  The  Sacred  and  Secular  Canon  in 
Romanticism  and  Rosa  Luxemburg,  Socialism  and  the  Churches  (1905). 
112 struggling",  not  a  history  that  is  removed  from  such  things,  but  a  human  soul  readers  felt 
was  "making  a  direct  statement  of  [his]  own  opinions".  As  he  states, 
I  wrote  a  Tragedy;  I  have  been  supposed  to  have  written  a  Confession  of  Faith; 
and  in  the  shiffing  and  changing,  the  vacillation,  uncertainty,  and  self- 
contradiction  of  an  honest  mind,  in  which  the  energy  of  character  is 
disproportionate  to  the  intellect,  men  have  only  seen  either  that  I  did  not 
understand  myself,  or  that  I  was  afraid  of  my  own  conclusions,  or  that  I  wished 
to  avoid  the  responsibility  of  maintaining  them.  264 
Froude  comes  to  this  semi-autobiographical  project  in  1849  as  one  of  the  "foremost 
historians  of  the  nineteenth  centurý'.  265  As  a  great  admirer  of  Carlyle,  he  shared  with 
Carlyle  a  notion  of  a  'rightness'  that  permeated  all  things,  or  as  AN.  Wilson  states,  "a 
moral  fittingness  in  historical  events".  266  But  Christianity,  as  it  was  shown  to  Froude 
through  the  institutionalisation  of  the  Church  in  the  nineteenth  century,  did  not  disclose 
this  fundamental  belief.  Quite  the  contrary.  As  is  indicated  throughout  Nemesis,  Froudc 
was  greatly  disheartened  by  the  lack  of  intellectual  integrity  and  the  "sheer  silliness" 
exhibited  by  the  great  Victorian  champions  of  the  faith.  As  a  student  of  John  Henry 
Newman  while  at  Oriel.  College  Oxford,  Froude  became  disillusioned  with  the  lengths  to 
which  Newman  sought  to  protect  Christianity  from  reason: 
Newman  talked  much  to  us  of  the  surrender  of  reason.  Reason,  first  of  every 
thing,  must  be  swept  away,  so  daily  more  and  more  unreasonable  appeared  to 
modern  eyes  so  many  of  the  doctrines  to  which  the  Church  was  committed.  As  I 
began  to  look  into  what  he  said  about  it,  the  more  difficult  it  seemed  to  me. 
What  did  it  mean?  Reason  could  only  be  surrendered  by  an  act  of  reason.  Even 
the  Church's  infallible  judgements  could  only  be  received  through  the  senses,  and 
apprehended  by  reason;  why,  if  reason  was  a  false  guide,  should  we  trust  one  act 
of  it  more  than  another?  267 
264  J.  A.  Froude,  77ze  Nemesis  of  Faith,  p.  iv 
265  A.  N.  Wilson,  God's  Funeral  (London:  Abacus  Press,  1999)  p.  127. 
266  ibid. 
267  J.  A.  Froude,  op.  cit.  p.  157. 
113 In  his  Sbort  Stories  on  Great  Subjects,  Froude  recounts  an  occasion  when  he  heard  Newman 
preach  in  the  University  Church  at  Oxford  in  the  1830's.  The  subject  of  Newman's 
sermon  was  the  Passion  of  Christ  and,  according  to  Froude,  was  delivered  in  a  manner 
that  was  "calm  and  passionless  as  marble"  with  regard  to  the  torture  of  the  Cross  and  the 
agony  of  Golgotha.  As  Froude  notes,  no  one  listening  could  discount  the  emotional 
impact  of  the  sermon: 
For  a  few  moments  there  was  a  breathless  silence.  Then,  in  a  low,  clear  voice,  of 
which  the  faintest  vibration  was  audible  in  the  farthest  corner  of  St.  Mary's,  he 
said,  'Now  I  bid  you  recollect  that  He  to  whom  these  things  were  done  was 
Almighty  God!  It  was  as  if  an  electric  shock  had  gone  through  the  church,  as  if 
every  person  present  understood  for  the  first  time  the  meaning  of  what  he  had  all 
his  fife  been  saying.  268 
In  many  ways,  this  summation  of  Newman's  sermon  is  the  heart  of  the  concern  for 
Newman's  alter  ego  Markham  Sutherland  in  The  Nemesis  ofFaitb.  As  Sutherland 
chronicles  his  discomfort  and  eventual  near-death  at  the  hands  of  doubt,  the  reader  is 
led,  with  the  protagonist,  on  a  search  for  such  an  'electric  shock  of  meaning'  that  will 
prove  convicting  not  only  of  heart,  but  also  of  reason.  This  'shock'  we  all  seek  after, 
according  to  the  narrator  in  Nemesis,  is  God:  "We  seek  for  God,  and  we  are  sent  to  find 
Him  in  the  words  and  thoughts  of  other  nations  and  other  ages  about  Him  -  which  are 
no  longer  His  glorious  garment,  but  a  curtain  which  conceals  Him!  '.  269  Yet  like  Froude 
himself,  the,  narrator  of  Nemesis  asserts  that  the  present  age  is  an  age  of  existential  facts  - 
and  only  'facts'  will  satisfy  the  need  of  those  who  seek: 
Times  are  changed.  This  age  is  an  age  of  fact  -  it  believes  only  in  experience  -  it 
is  jealous  and  inquiring.  It  has  rejected  all  these  preternatural  stories,  and  now 
clings  only  to  the  Bible.  It  halts  here,  for  it  is  afraid  of  its  conclusions.  ... 
And 
269  J.  A.  Froude,  Short  Stories  on  Great  Subjects.  (London:  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1894)  iv,  p.  286. 
269  J.  A.  Froude,  The  Nemesis  of  Faith.,  ibid.,  pp.  ix,  x. 
114 men  feel  this,  and  yet  they  dare  not  act  upon  it.  Tbg  cling  to  the  o1djorm,  altbouzb 
y  uitbdraixin  rom  their  minds  tbepower  ofprofifing  He  God  bas  abolisbed  tbatform  b  gf  by  it 
has  given  them  a  new  covenant  into  which  they  will  not  enter,  and  therefore 
religion  is  dead.  270 
The  clearest  manifestation  of  this  'old  form'  that  the  narrator  speaks  of  is  found  in  the 
Church  and  its  desire  to  ignore  "the  one  great  Bible  which  cannot  lie"  which  is  "the 
history  of  the  human  race"  which  tells  us,  if  we  are  to  read  it  well,  that 
when  in  any  nation  religion  is  left  corrupting  in  the  form  in  which  it  is  now  with 
ourselves,  that  nation  is  near  its  end.  The  very  same  symptoms  meet  us  steadily 
in  the  decline  of  every  great  people  -  an  old  faith,  withered  in  its  shell,  yet  which 
is  preserved  in  false  show  of  reverence,  either  from  cowardice,  or  indolence,  or 
miserable  social  convenience.  271 
Sutherland's  crisis  of  subjectivity  comes  about  in  his  realisation  that  as  a  cleric,  he  is  a 
-man  of  a  particular  sore'  who  sees  the  end  of  the  old  "form",  but  is  "unfortunately, 
something  not  more  but  less  than  men  -  men  who  have  sacrificed  their  own  selves  to 
become  the  paid  instruments  of  a  SyStCM".  272  'I'lic  borders  of  the  "form"he 
acknowledges  as  dying  are  what  he  himself  is  formed  by.  We  all,  states  Sutherland,  must 
come  to  realise  that  our  subjectivity  is  self-generating  in  that  we  "cannot  dream 
[ourselves]  into  a  character;  [we]  must  hammer  and  forge"273  our  identities  as  a  win  to 
being.  As  the  foundation  of  orthodox  Christianity  begins  to  crumble  amidst  the 
challenges  of  the  nineteenth  century  in  Higher  Criticism  and  the  emerging  claims  of 
scientific  inquiry,  the  place  of  the  subject  seems  to  be  without  a  context  within  which 
and  upon  which  to  reside.  The  exclusive  place  the  Bible  held  which  placed  it  above 
inquiry  had  been  removed.  Once  the  question  is  raised,  akin  to  pulling  a  thread  on  a 
jumper,  the  unravelling  seems  unending: 
270 
ibid.,  p.  xi. 
271  ibid.,  p.  xii. 
115 But  why  do  they  believe  it  [the  Bible]  at  all?  They  must  say  'because  it  is  in  the 
Bible'.  Yes,  here  it  is.  Other  books  we  may  sit  in  judgement  upon,  but  not  upon 
the  Bible.  That  is  the  exception,  the  one  book  which  is  wholly  and  entirely  true. 
And  we  are  to  believe  whatever  is  there,  no  matter  how  monstrous,  on  the 
authority  of  God.  He  has  told  us,  and  that  is  enough.  But  how  do  they  know  He 
has  told  us?  The  Church  say  so.  Why  does  the  Church  say  so?  Because  the  Jews 
said  so.  And  how  do  we  know  the  Jews  could  not  be  mistaken?  Because  they 
said  they  were  God's  people,  and  God  guided  theM.  Z74 
What  the  subject  is  left  with  is  a  never-ending  series  of  questions  after  authority  where 
each  level  of  investiture  is  only  provided  by  another  questionable  source,  each  question 
peels  back  another  layer  that  will  peel  back  upon  inquiry  like  a  proverbial  onion  that 
when  peeled  layer  by  layer  will  eventually  render  nothing  but  tears.  As  Sutherland  later 
concludes  ,  noting  what  would  be  described  today  as  a  hermeneutic  circle,  all  (the 
subject)  is  left  with  is  a  whirlwind  where  "the  Church  proves  the  Bible,  and  the  Bible 
proves  the  Church  -  cloudy  pillars  rotating  upon  air  -  round  and  round  the  theory  goes, 
whirling  Eke  the  summer  wind-gusts"275  akin  to  the  ever-turning,  widening  gyre  of  W.  B. 
Yeats'  "Second  Coming". 
At  times,  Sutherland  attempts  to  articulate  his  insecure  place  amidst  this  search 
for  his  own  character  in  the  dying  of  nineteenth  century  Christianity,  but  language  itself 
seems  to  fA,  degenerating  into  a  stuttering  call  to  being  that  becomes  a  fading  echo 
waiting  for  a  response.  Without  the  'walls'  of  faith  provided  by  the  Bible,  individuals 
such  as  Markham  Sutherland  no  longer  possess  the  'structure'  to  refract  their  calling  out 
after  their  own  subjectivity.  As  Markham  states 
I  know,  too,  there  are  some  excellent,  oh,  most  excellent  people,  deep  and 
serious  people,  who  do  not  find  the  difficulties  there  at  all  which  I  find,  and 
272  ibid.,  p.  3. 
273  ibid.,  p.  4. 
274  ibid.,  pp.  20,21. 
275  ibid.,  p.  27. 
116 accept  it  aU  with  awe  and  fear,  perhaps,  but  stifl  with  a  real,  serious  conviction 
that  it  is  aU  true.  Perhaps  it  is.  And  then  I...  I...  am...  am  ...  276 
But  where  does  humanity  turn  when  history,  the  "one  great  Bible"  left  to  us  after  all 
other  sources  (such  as  religious  faith,  tradition,  dogma),  is  exhausted?  As  suggested  by 
Markham  Sutherland  in  Letter  1  of  Nemesis,  we  are  left  only  with  ourSelves  and  the  ability 
to  write: 
I  bave  notbing  but  myseyto  write  about,  no  facts,  no  theories,  no  opinions,  no 
adventures,  no  sentiments,  nothing  but  my  own  poor  barren  individualism,  of 
considerable  interest  to  me,  but  I  do  not  know  why  I  should  presume  it  will  be  so 
for  you.  Tn 
This  act  of  writing  is  realised  as  a  dangerous  one  given  that  the  act  itself  is  an  act  of 
madness: 
Suppose  I  was  to  write  a  book,  Arthur,  and  say  I  was  inspired  to  write  it  -a 
madhouse  vould  be  the  bestplacefor  me,  because  common  sense  would  at  once  pass 
sentence  on  the  pretension,  and,  if  it  did  not,  the  poor  book  would  be  its  own 
sentence.  278 
Yet  without  the  book 
,  Markham  realises  that  we  are  still  left  with  'Writing'  or  in  a  more 
general  sense,  thepokiis  that  manifests  itself  as  a  poetics. 
It  is  with  this  realisation  that  Sutherland  merely  retreats  as  The  Nemesis  ofFaitb 
continues.  While  he  acknowledges  to  Arthur  that  "I  can  do  nothing  but  write  to  you"-279, 
he  turns  away  from  true  writing  -  wifing  aspoiesis  -  to  merely  critique  and  review.  He  is 
locked  into  a  spiral  where  all  that  he  can  do  through  his  writing  is  reframe  what  has  been. 
'Ibe  posAility  of  a  new  world  is  silent.  As  Sutherland  compares  the  lack  of  mythological 
resources  that  have  given  form  to  the  great  works  of  the  past  and  the  silence  of  the 
276  ibid.,  p.  14. 
277  ibid.,  p.  2. 
278  ibid.,  p.  26. 
279  ibid.,  p.  29. 
117 church,  he  is  taught  between  the  clashing  of  the  Scylla  of  the  possible  and  Charybdis  of  a 
dead  past  and  is  unwilling  to  move:  "'Mere  are  no  faeries  and  no  ghosts  there  any  more; 
only  the  church  bells  and  the  church  music  have  anything  of  the  old  tones,  and  they  are 
silent,  too,  except  at  rare,  mournful,  gusty  intervals".  280  Caught  within  this  space-, 
Sutherland  sees  not  an  opening  but  a  desert  where  nothing  is  taking  root  and  all  is 
passing  away: 
Yet  is  not  that,  too,  all  passing  away,  away  beyond  recall?  The  old  monks  are 
dead.  The  hern-iit-saints  and  hallowed  relics  are  dust  and  ashes  now.  The  facries 
dance  no  more  around  the  charmed  forest  ring.  They  are  gone,  gone  even  here. 
The  creed  stiU  seems  to  stand;  but  the  creed  is  dead  in  the  thoughts  of  mankind. 
Its  roots  are  cut  away,  down  wbere  alone  it  cangatber  strengtbjor  life...  the  aged  faith  of 
aged  centuries  will  be  exiled  as  the  old  was  to  the  simple  inhabitants  of  these 
simple  places.  281 
Sutherland  sees  himself  as  a  statue,  akin  to  those  venerated  out  of  habit  in  worship,  that 
is  merely  a  symbol  of  stone  unable  to  respond: 
The  statues  were  sanctified  and  made  the  images  of  saints,  the  augur's  colleges 
were  rudely  violated,  and  they  who  were  still  faithful  were  offered  up  as  martyrs, 
or  scattered  as  wanderers  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  and  the  old  gods  were 
expelled  from  the  old  dominion  -  the  divinity  of  nature  before  the  divinity  of 
man...  Change  is  strong,  but  habit  is  strong,  too;  and  you  cannot  change  the  old 
for  new,  like  a  garment.  282 
Sutherland  does  acknowledge  that  there  are  questions  that  need  to  be  addressed, 
'garments'  that  need  changing  -  but  no  writer,  himself  included,  is  willing  to  risk  such  a 
task.  As  he  states  in  Letter  V:  "Books  nauseate  me;  I  seem  to  have  learnt  all  that  I  can 
learn  from  books,  or  else  to  have  lost  the  power  of  learning  anything  from  them;  and  of 
all  these  modem  writers  there  is  not  one  who  will  come  boldly  up  and  meet  the  question 
280  ibid.,  p.  28. 
281  ibid.,  p.  33. 
118 which  lies  the  nearest,  or  ought  to  lie  the  nearest,  to  our  heare2.283  while  he  goes  on  to 
say  that  Carlyle  is  willing  to  "raise  questions  he  cannot  answer",  Sutherland  finds  even 
his  example  "very  helpless,  I  know  it  is;  but  there  is  no  mending  it,,  it  must  be.  I  wait  for 
guidance,;  and  my  soul  must  have  it,  if  I  give  it  time".  284 
What  Froude  sees  in  The  Nemejis  offaitb  is  that  "Life  is  change,  to  cease  to 
change  is  to  cease  to  live...  let  not  your  heart  be  silent  on  the  dissolving  of  a  faith"'.  285 
Sutherland  is  trapped  in  a  poetic  spiral  where  he  acknowledges  the  need  to  give  voice  to 
"the  question  which  lies  nearest...  to  our  hearts,  "  yet  does  not  do  so.  The  critique  is 
reframed  in  numerous  ways  for  the  'Iacký  that  is  nineteenth  century  Christendom  yet  no 
alternative  is  offere8,  no  re-imagining  of  a  possibility.  This  ultimately  results  in  an 
embrace  of  futility  and  a  resignation  to  despair.  He  acknowledges  that  it  is  only  inpoiesis 
that  he  can  approach  that  which  he  hungers  for,  yet  cannot  make  a  'real  living  Enk'  with 
that  which  will  transform  his  critique  into  something  beyond  remarks: 
Ohl  how  1  wish  I  could  write.  I  try  sometimes;  for  I  seem  to  feel  myself 
overflowing  with  thoughts,  and  I  cry  out  to  be  relieved  of  them.  But  it  is  so  stiff 
and  miserable  when  I  get  anything  done.  What  seemed  so  clear  and  liquid, 
comes  out  so  thick,  stupid,  and  frost-bitten,  that  I  myself,  who  put  the  idea  there, 
can  hardly  find  it  for  shame,  if  I  go  look  for  it  a  few  days  after  ...  to  form  a  link, 
however  humble,  a  real  living  link,  in  the  electric  chain  which  conducts  the  light 
of  the  agesl  Ohl  how  my  heart  burns  at  the  very  hope.  286 
Christianity  itself  was  fuelled  by  this  'real  living  link'  according  to  Froude  and  it  is  the 
severing  of  this  link  that  is  at  the  heart  of  much  of  doubt.  'When  Christianity  was  first 
published,  "  notes  Sutherland  in  Letter  X  of  The  Nemesis  ofFaitb,  "the  imaginafion  of 
mankind  presented  the  relation  of  heaven  to  earth  very  differently  from  what  it  does 
282  ibid.,  p.  3  1. 
2*83  ibid.,  p.  35. 
284  ibid.,  p.  36. 
285  ibid.,  p.  34. 
286  ibid.,  p.  45. 
119 now".  287 
Where  The  Nemesis  ofFaitb  ultimately  fails  is  in  its  unwillingness  to  move  beyond 
this  critique  -  acknowledgement  of  the  problem  and  the  reluctance  to  put  forward  an 
alternative.  It  is  the  unwillingness  to  "write"  beyond  this  place  and  into  a  new  "writing" 
that  is  also  the  undoing  of  Markham  Sutherland  in  his  illicit  relationship  with  Helen 
Leonard.  Mrs.  Leonard  attempts  to  break  off  the  relationship  she  knows  is  damaging  but 
is  unable  to  change  what  has  been  set  in  motion.  She  sees  writing  as  a  means  of  change 
yet  is  unwiRing- 
Twice  she  moved  towards  her  writing-table:  a  note  should  go  to  Markham,  and 
tell  him,  pray  him,  for  both  their  sakes,  to  go  away  and  leave  her.  Twice  her 
heart  failed.  The  third  time  the  emotion  rose  it  was  strong  enough  to  move  her 
from  her  seat.  And  then  insidious  reason  pressed  up  to  urge  a  thousand 
arguments  that  it  was  far  better  he  should  stay.  ...  So  sad,  too,  so  lonely  as  he  had 
been;  and  now  his  health  so  delicate...  How  could  she?  why  should  she,  send 
him  from 
her?  288 
Markham  also  sees  the  dilemma  yet  is  silent,  unable  to  write  and  therefore  to  move 
beyond  the  growing  crisis  that  is  this  relationship:  "When  they  met  again  at  the  tea  table, 
all  was  not  as  it  had  been;  such  as  that  it  never  could  be  again.  ...  He  had  long  left  off 
writing,  even  thinking,  that  was  over  when  he  had  ceased  to  be  alone".  289  As  the  climax 
of  Annie  Leonard's  deathm  comes  as  a  result  of  fever  caught  while  remaining  "quite 
wee'  for  too  long,  it  is  only  here  that  Markham  returns  to  writing.  For  Markham, 
writing  has  come  to  be  an  act  of  extinction  in  that  it  does  not  offer  new  possibilities  and 
is  too  late  to  serve  as  a  salvific  act: 
287  ibid.,  p.  69. 
288  ibid.,  p.  177. 
289  ibid.,  pp.  17  8,179. 
290  Froude  recalls  Goethe's  Elective  Affinities  when  the  negligence  of  those  who  have  abilities  yet  do 
not  exercise  them  become  culpable  in  the  loss  of  the  future.  The  drowning  of  the  child  in  Elective 
Affinities  is  symbolic  of  this  loss,  whilst  in  Nemesis  of  Faith,  Froude  chooses  a  more  subtle  loss  with 
the  child  catching  a  fever  . 
120 Markham  sat  down  and  wrote  three  notes;  one  to  his  banker  with  directions  for 
the  payment  of  a  few  bills  left  unsettled  in  the  town,  and  desiring  them  to  make 
over  what  remained  of  his  money  in  their  hands  to  some  public  charity.  The 
second  was  to  the  people  of  his  old  lodging.  His  clothes,  and  anything  else  they 
had  of  his,  they  were  to  keep...  He  himself,  he  said,  was  going  away,  and  it  was 
uncertain  when  he  might  return.  The  last  was  to  Helen:  brief  and  scrawled  with  a 
shaking  hand,  and  blotted  with  tears.  It  was  only  to  say  that  he  was  gone  ...  291 
As  the  novel  closes,  we  find  that  Markham  is  written  out  of  existence  not  only  by  his 
own  hand,  but  by  those  of  his  fictional  world  and  ultimately  by  Froude  himselfi 
...  amidst  the  wasted  ruins  of  his  fife,  where  the  bare  bleak  soil  was  strewed  with 
wrecked  purposes  and  shattered  creeds,  with  no  hope  to  stay  him,  with  no  fear  to 
raise  the  most  dreary  phantom  beyond  the  grave,  he  sank  down  in  the  barren 
waste,  and  the  dry  sands  rolled  over  him  where  he  lay;  and  no  living  being  was 
left  behind  him  upon  earth,  who  would  mourn  the  day  which  brought  life  to 
Markham  Sutherland.  292 
291  ibid.,  pp.  207-208. 
292  ibid.,  pp.  226-227. 
121 6.3  Walter  Pater  -  Madus  the  Epicurean, 
Where  JA.  Froudc's  Nemesis  ofFaitb  attempts  to  form  a  poetics  that  engages 
questions  of  Christianity  yet  only  remains  at  the  level  of  critique,  Walter  Pater's  MaHus  the 
Epicurean  represents  the  attempt  to  figure  a  poetics  that  seeks  the  answer  to  the  Zeitgeist  of 
Victorian  doubt  through  a  return  to  the  Keatsian  tautological  edict  -  "Truth  is  Beauty, 
Beauty  Truth"  -  in  a  framing  of  Christianity  as  source  of  pure  art. 
In  her  critique  of  Marius  the  Epicurean,  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  found  the  novel  to 
be  of  "great  psychological  interese'.  Yet  its  treatment  of  Christianity  was,  in  her 
estimation,  merely  "an  almost  aestbefic  acquiescence"  of  the  Christian  faith  and  provided 
mere  94exquisite  moments"  rather  than  any  strong  or  sustained  belief  in  Christianity  itself 
and  the  source  of  its  truth  and  reality.  293  This  distinction  regarding  the  teleological  nature 
of  Christianity  (what  is  the  end  purpose  of  Christianity)  is  key  to  reading  Walter  Patcr's 
only  completed 
noVel.  294Where 
much  of  the  discussion  surrounding  the  ultimate 
concern  of  Christianity  in  the  nineteenth  century  by  Higher  Criticism  and  novelists  such 
as  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  and  J.  A.  Froude  centred  upon  historidty  as  concern  regarding  the 
'truth'  Jesus  and  the  Bible,  Pater  attempted  to  look  bgond  the  bistorido  of  Christianity  for 
a  reservoir  of  pure  aestheticism  -  an  aesthetic  end  in  itself. 
As  Pater  was  writing  Marius  the  Epicurean,  he  wrote  to  Violet  Paget  (the  author 
Vernon  Lee)  injuly  of  1883  that  1-ýs  intention  was  "an  Imaginary  Portrait  of  a  peculiar 
type  of  mind  in  the  time  of  Marcus  Aurelius...  I  regard  this  present  matter  as  a  sort  of 
duty...  I  think  that  there  is  afouitb  sort  of  religiouspbase  possible  for  the  modern  mind  over 
293  Michael  Levey,  "Introduction  to  Marius  the  Epicureaný'  in  Walter  Pater,  Marius  the  Epicurean 
(London:  Penguin  Classics,  1985)  p.  12. 
294  As  Michael  Levey  notes  regarding  Marius:  "Among  the  modest  five  volumes  of  writing  which 
represent  his  output  during  his  lifetime,  it  is  outstanding  not  only  for  its  scale  and  its  highly  complex 
aims  but  also  for  the  fact  that  it  is  the  only  work  of  his  conceived  and  executed  as  a  whole.  Normally  he 
made  up  his  books  from  essays,  lectures  and  articles  often  printed  previously  in  some  form!  '.  ibid.,  p.  8. 
122 porag,  the  condition  of  which  phase  and  above  those  presented...  [by  you]  in  the  Contem 
it  is  the  main  object  of  my  design  to  convey".  In  1887  Patcr  had  published  his  coRection 
of  fictional  studies  entitled  Imaginag  Ponraits,  and  Marius  was  to  stand  as  a  more  fully 
actualised  'portrait'  whose  central  character's  bildung  was  to  move  through  the  phases  of 
unbelief  that  Vernon  Lee  had  outlined  in  the  article  "Ibe  Responsibilities  of  Unbelief', 
porag.  In  the  article,  Lee  creates  a  dialogue  between  týree  published  in  the  Contem 
speakers  who  are  the  embodiments  of  Voltairean  optimism,  aesthetic  pessimism,  and 
what  Nfichael  Levey  has  termed  "militant,  humanitarian  atheism".  295  In  essence,  Pater  is 
arguing  for  yet  another  phase  of  the  modem  mind  that  goes  beyond  Lee's  three 
categories.  For  Pater,  this  'fourth  phase'  is  both  an  acquiescence  of  the  previous  three  in 
temperament  and  belief  that  is  ultimately  drawn  together  in  an  appreciation  of  the  'form' 
of  Christianity  as  a  lived  aesthetic.  As  he  writes  in  Marius.  "For  what  Christianity  did 
many  centuries  afterwards  in  the  way  of  informing  an  art,  a  poetry,  of  graver  and  higher 
beauty,  we  may  think,  than  that  of  Greek  art  and  poetry  at  their  best,  was  in  truth 
conformable  to  the  original  tendency  of  its  genius".  296  This  lived  aesthetic  was  a  "unique 
power  of  Christianitý'  for  Pater  that  could  stir  "some  wonderful  new  hope"  through  its 
unique  vision  of  Efe  'behind  the  veil'  of  fife  "as  it  has  been  exercised...  in  spite  of  many 
hindrances,  and  under  the  most  inopportune  circumstances".  297While  in  1866,  Gerard 
Manley  Hopkins,  who  was  then  a  student  of  Pater's,  notes  that  Pater  had  spoken  to  him 
in  private  'taking  two  hours  against  Christianity'299,  by  1886  this  was  not  the  case.  Mrs. 
Humphrey  Ward  notes  that  before  the  publication  of  Marius,  his  views  regarding 
Christianity  had  shifted  and  he  had  grown  conscious  of  the  'mystery  of  Christianity'.  He 
was  haunted,  she  wrote,  'by  the  something  in  it.  '299 
295  ibid.,  p.  16. 
296  ibid.,  p.  239. 
297  ibid.,  p.  235. 
298  Cited  by  Michael  Levey,  ibid.,  p.  16. 
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123 In  his  'blending  of  all  religions'  in  a  search  for  meaning  rather  than  merely  a 
fictional  reaction  against  the  institutionalisation  of  the  Church  and  Higher  Criticism  in 
the  nineteenth  century,  Pater  seeks  a  different  path  through  his  poetic  project.  As 
NEchad  Levey  notes: 
Instead  of  having  to  depict  that  fashionable  nineteenth-century  figure  of  fact  and 
fiction  (such  as  An-ýiel  and  Robert  Elsmere)  -  the  doubter  of  Christianity  -  Pater 
could  have  his  figure's  doubts  directed  at  a  variety  of  pagan  beliefs.  Ihe  Rome  of 
his  chosen  date  was  where,  as  he  was  to  write,  'A  blending  of  all  the  religions  of 
the  ancient  world  had  been  accomplished!  In  none  would  Marius  find  what  he 
was  seeking.  That  was  romantically  modem  of  him:  disillusioned,  alienated,  'un 
autre,  floating,  detached  from  the  society  that  bred  him,  yearning  for  something 
he  fOed  to  find  in  the  old-fashioned  religion  of  his  childhood,  in  epicureanism  or 
in  stoicism.  just  then,  in  that  old,  jaded  civilisation  a  new  hope  had  arisen.  300 
For  Marius,  the  central  character  of  Pater's  novel  set  in  Rome  in  the  time  following  the 
death  of  Emperor  Antoninus  Pius  in  AD  161,  the  journey  toward  his  own  bildung  is  itself 
a  journey  of  unveiling.  As  the  narrator  of  Marius  the  Epicurean  notes: 
Tis  art's  function  to  conceal  itself.  ars  est  celare  artem-  -  is  a  saying,  which, 
exaggerated  by  inexact,  quotation,  has  perhaps  been  oftenest  and  most 
confidently  quoted  by  those  who  have  had  little  literary  or  other  art  to  conceal; 
and  from  the  very  beginning  of  professional  literature,  the  'labour  of  the  file'  -a 
labour  in  the  case  of  Plato,  for  instance,  or  Virgil,  like  that  of  the  oldest 
goldsmiths  as  described  by  Apuleius,  enriching  the  work  by  far  more  than  the 
weight  of  the  precious  metal  it  removed  -  has  always  had  its  function.  301 
But  this  is  an  unveiling  that  is  a  unique  occurrence  within  a  lifetime  for  which  all  of  one's 
endeavours  are  merely  preparations: 
We  wait  for  the  great  crisis  which  is  to  try  what  is  in  us:  we  can  hardly  bear  the 
pressure  of  our  hearts,  as  we  think  of  it:  the  lonely  wrestler,  or  victim,  which 
imagination  foreshadows  to  us,  can  hardly  be  one's  self;  it  seems  an  outrage  of 
our  destiny  that  we  should  be  led  along  so  gently  and  imperceptibly,  to  so  terrible 
300  Michael  Levey,  ibid.,  p.  17. 
124 a  leaping-place  in  the  dark,  for  more  perhaps  than  life  or  death.  At  last,  the  great 
act,  the  critical  moment  itself  comes,  easily,  almost  unconsciously.  Another 
motion  of  the  clock,  and  our  fatal  line  -  thegreat  climacteric  poine  -  has  been 
passed,  which  changes  ourselves  or  our  lives.  302 
It  is  this  'great  climacteric  poine  that  Marius  searches  for  throughout  the  novel.  lbrough 
his  various  philosophical  gestations  played  out  through  the  narrative,  it  is  a  hope  to  see 
beyond  the  veil  of  the  'real'  world  and  to  see  the  "original  premise  or  starting  poine'  that 
remains  central.  As  Marius  muses  upon  coming  to  Cornelius'  house  in  the  chapter  "Two 
Curious  Houses"  in  Part  Fourth  of  the  novel: 
For  himself,  it  was  clear,  he  must  still  hold  by  what  his  eyes  really  saw.  Only,  he 
had  to  concede  also,  that  the  very  boldness  of  such  theory  bore  witness,  at  least, 
to  a  variety  of  human  disposition  and  a  consequent  variety  of  mental  view,  which 
might  -  who  can  tell?  -  be  correspondent  to,  be  dcfined  by  and  define,  varieties  of 
facts,  of  truths,  just  'bebind  the  veif,  regarding  the  world  all  alike  had  actually 
before  them  as  their  original  premises  or  starting  point;  a  world,  wider,  perhaps, 
in  its  possibilities  than  all  possible  fancies  concerningit.  303 
As  Marius  moves  toward  his  'great  climacteric  poine  at  the  end  of  the  novel,  Pater 
utilises  images  of  death  and  earthquakes  as  means  of  'opening'  the  text  and  puffing  back 
the  veil  of  certainty  in  order  to  show  what  fies  beyond.  Marius  notes  the  growth  in  a 
family  burial  plot  of  CeciIH  and  rcflects  on  the  encroaching  presence  of  death  among  the 
land  of  the  living 
A  narrow  opening  cut  its  steep  side,  like  a  solid  blackness  there,  admitted  Marius 
and  his  gleaming  leader  into  a  hoHow  cavern  or  crypt,  neither  more  or  less  in  fact 
than  the  family  burial-place  of  Cecihi,  to  whom  this  residence  belonged...  Here, 
in  truth,  was  the  centre  of  the  pecuEar  reNgious  expressiveness,  of  the  sanctity,  of 
the  entire  scene.  ...  Yet  this  was  certainly  unlike  any  cemetery  Marius  had  ever 
before  seen;  most  obviously  in  this,  that  these  people  returned  to  the  older 
301  Walter  Pater,  Marius  the  Epicurean  1885  (London:  Penguin  Classics,  1985)  p.  90. 
302  ibid.,  pp.  290-291. 
125 fashion  of  disposing  of  their  dead  by  burial  instead  of  burning.  Originally  a 
family  sepulchre,  it  was  growing  to  a  vast  necropolis,  a  whole  township  of  the 
deceased,  by  means  of  some  free  expansion.  304 
lt  isl  in  this  place  that  Marius  comes  to  see  the  Christian  society  that  he  has  found  himself 
a  part  of  as  a  "strange  new  societý'  that  existed  as  a  "garden  enclosed"  and  was  the 
"fulfilment  of  aU  the  preferences".  Noting  that  the  Christian  society  is  willing  to  Eve 
among  its  dead  by  "disposing  of  their  dead  by  burial  rather  than  by  burnine',  the  veil 
between  life  and  death  remains  thin  -  one  always  in  repose  to  the  other  -  the  city  of  God 
among  the  city  of  the  dead.  As  Marius  concludes: 
Here,  it  might  be,  was,  if  not  the  cure,  yet  the  solace  or  anodyne  of  his  great 
sorrows  -  of  that  constitutional  sorrowfulness,  not  peculiar  to  himself  perhaps, 
but  which  had  made  his  Efe  Eke  one  long'disease  of  the  spirie...  Might  this  new 
vision,  Eke  the  malignant  beauty  of  pagan  Medusa,  be  exclusive  of  any  admiring 
gaze  upon  anything  but  itself?  At  least  he  suspected  that,  after  beholding  it,  he 
could  never  again  be  altogether  as  he  had  been  before.  305 
For  Marius  (as  weR  as  Pater),  the  vision  of  Christianity  which  comes  after  aH  searching  is 
one  that  is  "exclusive  of  any  admiring  gaze  upon  anything  but  itself'.  This  is  a 
'transforn-dng'  vision  of  'a  reality  of  experience'  that  is  regenerative  for  humanity  yet 
ultimately  closed  off  in  its  purest  realisation.  As  Marius  reflects: 
And  what  he  found,  thus  looking,  literally,  for  the  dead  among  the  living,  was  the 
vision  of  a  natural,  a  scrupulously  natural,  love,  transforming,  by  some  new  gift 
of  insight  into  the  truth  of  human  relationships,  and  under  the  urgency  of  some 
new  motive  by  him  so  far  unfathomable,  all  the  conditions  of  fife.  He  saw,  in  all 
its  primitive  freshness  and  amid  the  lively  facts  of  its  actual  coming  into  the 
world,  as  a  reality  of  experience,  that  regenerate  type  of  humanity,  which, 
centuries  later,  Giotto  and  his  successors,  down  to  the  best  and  purest  days  of  the 
303  ibid.,  p.  225. 
304  ibid.,  p.  229. 
305  ibid.,  p.  234. 
126 young  Raphael,  working  under  conditions  very  friendly  to  the  imagination,  were 
to  conceive  as  an  artistic  ideal.  306 
At  the  end,  Marius  sees  the  pure  vision  of  Christianity  as  the  pure  art  which  is  at  the 
heart  of  all  great  art.  As  mentioned  previously,  this  is  not  a  "cure"  for  his  longing,  but  it 
is  "the  solace  or  anodyne  of  his  great  sorrows".  Marius  experiences  peace  in  this  solace, 
but  is  never  to  know  the  cure  which  he  had  longed  for,  possibly  due  to  the  fact  that  one 
was  never  available  in  Pater's  conception. 
It  is  at  this  point  of  having  found  this  all-consurning  and  transforming  vision  of  beauty  as 
an  end  in  itself  that  the  world  around  him  becomes  unsettled  (literally  and  figuratively) 
through  a  deconstructing  earthquake: 
And  it  was  no  ordinary  morning  into  which  Marius  stepped  forth.  There  was  a 
menace  in  the  dark  masses  of  hill,  and  motion-less  wood,  against  the  gray, 
although  apparently  unclouded  sky...  The  Christian  people  of  the  town,  hardly 
less  terrified  and  overwrought  by  the  haunting  sickness  about  them  than  their 
pagan  neighbours,  were  at  prayer  before  the  tomb  of  the  martyr;  and  even  as 
Marius  pressed  among  them  to  a  place  beside  Cornelius,  on  a  sudden  the  hill 
seemed  to  roll  Eke  a  sea  in  motion,  around  the  whole  compass  of  the  horizon. 
For  a  moment  Marius  supposed  himself  attacked  with  some  sudden  sickness  of 
brain,  till  the  fall  of  a  great  mass  of  building  convinced  him  that  not  himself  but 
the  earth  under  his  feet  was  giddy.  307 
Pater  attempts  to  open  his  poetics  up  at  this  point  to  'look  beyond  the  veil'  which  is  key 
to  his  protagonist's  search  for  meaning.  The  close  proximity  of  death  to  life,  the  sickness 
that  surrounds  all,  and  the  instability  of  the  very  earth  beneath  their  feet  shows  a  universe 
that  Pater  holds  to  be  on  the  verge  of  opening  to  some  new  possibility  amidst  its  fragility, 
revelation  con-drig  to  light  as  the  veil  of  life  and  death  becomes  thin.  Yet  the  failure  of 
306  ibid.,  p.  235. 
127 Pater's  poetics  in  this  vein  is  that  he  retreats  into  a  closed  stylistics  that  does  not  allow  for 
anything  beyond  the  very  veil  he  wishes  to  lift.  The  novel  ends  with  Marius'  passing  into 
a  Christian  martyrdom  that  is  bestowed  upon  him  by  mere  happenstance  and  any  search 
for  what  lies  behind  the  veil  that  has  been  sought  for  through  the  narrative  is  abandoned. 
The  reader  is  left  with  merely  a  portrait  that  is  controlled  and  ultimately  dics  at  the  hand 
of  the  author  -a  "slim  philosophical  parable  ends  abruptly  with  a  Sebastian  martyrized 
by  the  Zeitgeist'.  308  In  this  way,  as  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher  notes  in  Religious  Humanism  and  the 
Victorian  Novel,  "the  quality  of  Pater's  fiction  is  nondramatic,  derivative,  almost  static.  It 
is  a  fiction  of  an  art  critic.  ...  Pater's  imaginary  portraits  are  as  stationary  and  immobile  as 
pictures  in  a  gallery".  309  Not  all  saw  Pater's  attempt  as  a  failure  however.  As  W.  B.  Yeats 
reflected  upon  Matius  in  his  letters: 
Ibree  or  four  years  ago  I  re-read  Marius  the  Epicurean,  expecting  to  find  I  cared 
for  it  no  longer,  but  it  still  seemed  to  me,  as  I  think  it  seemed  to  us  all,  the  only 
great  prose  in  modem  English,  and  yet  I  began  to  wonder  if  it,  or  the  attitude  of 
mind  which  it  was  the  noblest  expression,  had  not  caused  the  disaster  of  my 
friends.  It  taught  us  to  walk  upon  a  rope,  tightly  stretched  through  serene  air, 
and  we  were  left  to  keep  our  feet  upon  a  swaying  rope  in  a  storm.  311 
Pater's  former  student,  Oscar  Wilde,  wrote  in  his  letter  De  Profundis  to  Alfred  Douglas 
from  prison  that  Marius  was  a  reconciliation  of  "the  artistic  life  with  a  life  of  religion  in 
the  deep,  sweet,  and  austere  sense  of  the  worX.  31,  As  Yeats  and  Wilde  clearly 
acknowledge,  Marius  is  truly  a  masterful  work.  Yet  in  the  end,  Patcr's  only  novel  remains 
an  end  in  itself  -  an  example  of  the  reverence  of  aesthetics  that  is  incapable  of  moving 
beyond  its  own  space  and  resistant  toward  allowing  for  any  fracture  that  could  call 
beyond  itself.  Its  attempt  at  a  self-sustained  artistic  vision  that  is  sealed  into  its  own 
307  ibid.,  p.  290. 
308  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher,  Religious  Humanism  and  the  Victorian  Novel:  George  Eliot,  Walter  Pater, 
and  Samuel  Butler  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1965)  p.  163. 
309  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher,  ibid.,  p.  159. 
310  W.  B.  Yeats,  cited  by  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher,  op.  cit.,  p.  189. 
128 perfection  in  the  end  results  in  a  closed  tomb  rather  than  a  living  tome.  George  Eliot, 
reacting  to  Pater's  poetics,  wrote  that  Pater  "seems  to  me  quite  poisonous  in...  principles 
of  criticism  and  false  conceptions  of  life".  312just  as  Marius'  ashes  are  buried  wifl-ýn  a 
closed  tomb  -a  pagan  buried  as  a  Christian  martyr  -  so  does  Pater  close  off  the  very 
questions  of  ultimate  concern,  meaning,  the  possible  nexus  of  the  self  and  the  sacred  just 
as  he  seems  to  be  beginning  to  utter  them. 
311  Oscar  Wilde,  "De  Profundis  and  Other  Essays",  cited  by  Michael  Levey,  op.  cit.,  p.  9. 
312  George  Eliot,  The  George  Eliot  Letters,  ed.  Gordon  S.  Haight  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press, 
1954,1955),  V,  p.  455.  Cited  also  in  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher,  Religious  Humanism  and  the  Victorian 
Novel,  op.  cit.,  p.  150  and  Levey,  op.  cit.,  p.  20. 
129 6.4  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  -  Robert  Elsmere 
In  turning  to  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward's  Robert  Elsmere,  it  is  important  to  note  that,  as  U.  C. 
Knoepflmacher  states,  "the  controversy  over  Robert  Elswere  was  symptomatic:  the  book's 
historic  significance  exceeded  by  far  its  intrinsic  merits".  313  As  a  novel,  Robert  Elsmere  is 
more  Tictionalised  criticism'  or  a  roman  a  Wse  that  is  content  to  utilise  the  genre  of  the 
novel  to  argue  issues  rather  than  create  a  work  of  "true"  fiction  -  (albeit  it  was  the  best- 
selling  novel  of  the  nineteenth  century).  A  decade  before  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward 
published  Robert  Elsmerr,  George  Eliot  argued  that  her  own  writing,  having  turned  from 
criticism  to  fiction  at  this  point,  was  of  the  function  that  is  "the  aesthefic,  not  the  doctrinal 
teacher  -  the  rousing  of  nobler  emotions,  which  make  mankind  desire  the  social  right, 
not  the  prescribing  of  special  measures".  314  Robert  Elsmere,  while  not  of  the  measure  of 
the  higher  aesthetic  that  would  "rouse  the  nobler  emotions"  George  Eliot  sought  after 
through  her  poetics,  is  an  important  novel  in  comparison  to  George  Eliot's  works  in  a 
negadve  fashion  -  in  what  it  does  not  achieve  given  the  questions  it  raises  with  respect  to 
what  it  attempts. 
On  one  level,  Robert  Elsmeres  failure  as  a  novel  can  be  argued  from  to  its  form 
exhibiting  mere  Bunyan-esque  allegory.  This  is  due  to  the  relative  ease  with  which  critics 
saw  through  the  veil  of  the  thin  characters  of  Robert,  Catherine,  Rose  Leyburn,  Edward 
Langham,  Henry  Gray,  Mr.  Newcome,  and  the  infidel  Squire  Wendover.  In  his  review 
of  the  novel  in  The  Fortni  gbdy  Retiew  in  May  1892,  entitled  "Amateur  Christianity",  W.  H. 
Mallock  points  out  the  reasons  for  the  success  of  the  novel  with  the  reading  public  but 
that)  in  the  end,  the  novel  itself  is  merely  a  vehicle  for  ideas: 
313  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher,  Religious  Humanism  and  the  Victorian  Novel:  George  Eliot,  Walter  Pater, 
and  Samuel  Butler  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1965)  p.  4. 
314  George  Eliot,  The  George  Eliot  Letters,  VIL  44.  Cited  by  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher,  op.  cit.,  p.  14. 
130 First,  the  amount  of  unformulated  scepticism  prevalent  amongst  the  Christian 
public;  secondly,  the  eagerness  of  this  public  to  understand  its  own  scepticism 
more  clearly;  and  lastly,  its  eagerness  to  discover  that,  whatever  its  scepticism 
might  take  from  it,  something  would  still  be  left  it,  which  was  really  the  essence 
of  Christianity.  In  other  words,  the  popularity  of  Robert  Elsmere  is  mainly  the 
expression  of  the  devout  idea  that  the  essence  of  Christianity  will  somehow 
survive  its  doctrines.  315 
Mallock  argues  primarily  against  the  way  in  which  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  attempts  to 
recast  Christianity  in  what  Knoepflmacher  caRs  "drab  Christian  socialism"  in  the  guise  of 
the  young  Robert  Elsmere,  the  clever  Oxford-educated  rector  who  embodies  the 
questions  raised  against  traditional  Christian  doctrine  through  Higher  Criticism.  He  is 
'foretold'  before  his  character  enters  Book  1  as  one  who  "belonged  to  another  race  -a 
race  sprung  from  the  soil  and  content  to  spend  the  whole  of  life  in  very  close  contact  and 
very  homely  intercourse  with  their  mother  earth".  316  As  the  reader  is  informed, 
within  the  last  twenty  years,  however,  the  few  remaining  survivors  of  the 
primitive  clerical  order  ...  have  dropped  into  their  quiet  unremembered  graves, 
and  new  men  of  other  ways  and  other  modes  of  speech  reign  in  their  stead...  And 
naturally  the  churches  too  have  shared  in  the  process  of  transformation.  The 
ecclesiastical  revival  of  the  half-century  has  worked  its  will  even  in  the  remotest 
comers  of  the  Cumbrian  country,  and  soon  not  a  vestige  of  the  homely 
worsl-ýipping-places  of  an  earlier  day  will  remain.  317 
It  is  this  "other  order"  of  cleric  that  is  foretold  as  the  reader  is  introduced  to  Robert 
Elsmere.  I-Es  physical  description  is  "Eke  a  vigorous  unfinished  sketch"318-  one  who  is 
'drawn'  but  is  not  'finished';  something  created  but  not  necessarily  creative.  This  is 
exemplified  in  the  description  of  Robert  as  he  walks  through  the  countryside  reciting  the 
poetry  of  Wordsworth  to  himself- 
315  W.  H.  Mallock,  "Amateur  Christianity"  The  Fortnightly  Review,  LVII  (May  1892)  p.  678. 
316  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward,  Robert  Elsmere  9h  Edition  (London:  Smith,  Elder,  &  Co.,  1888)  p.  16. 
131 He  stood  there  bathed  in  silent  enchantment,  an  eager  nature  going  out  to  meet 
and  absorb  into  itself  the  beauty  and  peace  of  the  scene.  lines  of 
, 
Wordsworth 
were  on  his  lips;  the  little  well-worn  volume  was  in  his  pocket,  but  he  did  not 
need  to  bring  it  out;  and  his  voice  had  all  a  poet's  intensity  of  emphasis  as  he 
strolled  along,  reciting  Under  his  breath  -'It  is  a  beauteous  evening,  calm  and 
free,  /  The  holy  time  is  quiet  as  a  nun/  Breathless  with  adorationl'319 
While  having  a  "poet's  intensitý'  he  is  not  a  poet,  someone  who  recites  rather  than 
composes.  This  extends  even  to  his  speech  made  in  Book  VI  on  "Me  Claim  ofjesus 
Upon  Modem  life"  at  the  North  R-  Club,  in  which  his  aim  is  to  be  the  "reconceiving 
of  Christ".  320 
'MS  is 
ultimately  a  re-conjidering  rather  than  a  "re-conccivine'.  Amidst 
Elsmere's  efforts  to  "reconceive  the  Chrise',  Jesus  remains  merely  a  re-considered  cleric 
who  reminds  the  reader  of  a  distant  Christ  in  a  distant  era  whose  role  in  culture  is  not  to 
be  creative  and  therefore  remains  forever  trapped  in  the  context  of  society.  The  reality 
that  Robert  should  not  be  a  cleric  is  apparent  to  Robert's  mother  as  she  reflects  on  the 
nature  of  the  cleric  in  nineteenth  century  England.  She  understands  that  the  cleric  is 
bound  to  exist  only  in  relation  to  his  essential  context  of  society  which  devours 
"individuals"  who  "came  and  went,  but  the  type  [the  cleric  of  tradition]...  was  always 
the  same  ...  Mrs.  Elsmere  had  no  yearning  for  a  cleHcal 
son".  321 
It  is  when  Robert  is  at  Oxford  that  he  becomes  enamoured  first  with  the  scholastic  life 
yet  still  considers  becoming  a  cleric.  In  listening  to  Henry  Gray's  lay  sermons,  Robert 
begins  to  identify  with  larger  questions  of  meaning.  Yet  what  draws  Robert  into 
admiration  of  the  speaker  was  Mr.  Gray's  ability  to  embody  the  pragmatic  an-ýidst  the 
317  ibid.,  p.  17. 
318  ibid.,  p.  22. 
319  ibid.,  p.  28. 
320  ibid.,  p.  496. 
321  ibid.,  p.  46.  In  contrast,  this  symbiotic  relationship  between  the  cleric  and  the  society  is  clearly  seen  by  George  Eliot  as  will  be  seen  in  the  next  chapter. 
132 scholastic: 
Mr.  Grey's  treatment  of  these  questions  was  clothed,  throughout  a  large  portion 
of  the  lecture,  in  metaphysical  language,  which  no  boy  fresh  from  school, 
however  intellectually  quick,  could  be  expected  to  follow  with  any  precision.  It 
was  not,  therefore,  the  argument,  or  the  logical  structure  of  the  sermon,  which 
profoundly  affected  young  Elsmere.  It  was  the  speaker  himself,  and  the 
occasional  passages  in  which,  addressing  himself  to  the  practical  needs  of  his 
hearers,  he  put  before  them  the  claims  and  conditions  of  the  higher  life  with  a 
pregnant  simplicity  and  rugged  beauty  of  phraSe.  322 
It  was  here  that  Robert  "recognised  with  a  great  burst  of  enthusiasm  and  astonishment, 
that,  after  all,  NO  and  Herbert  Spencer  had  not  said  the  last  word  on  all  things  in  heaven 
and  earth".  It  is  in  listening  to  Mr.  Grey  that  Robert's  "imagination"  becomes  possessed 
"more  and  more...  the  system  behind  the  sight  took  stronger  and  stronger  hold  upon 
him;  he  began  to  wish  ardently  and  continuously  to  become  a  part  of  it,  to  cast  in  his  lot 
defu-ýtely  withie2.323 
What  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  attempts  throughout  the  remainder  of  Robert  Elsmere  is  to 
show  what  this  "system  behind  the  sight"  is  in  relation  to  the  fundamental  claims  of 
Christianity,  and  in  particular,  the  nature  of  Christ  in  relation  to  "Christianity"  in  its 
nineteenth  century  manifestation.  In  a  discussion  with  his  tutor  Edward  Langham,  311 
Robert  comes  against  the  possibility  that  the  "system  behind  the  sighe'  of  Christianity 
may  indeed  be  nothing  more  than  a  myth: 
'Well,  after  all,  '  he  said  at  last,  very  slowly,  'the  difficulty  lies  in  preaching 
anything.  One  may  as  well  preach  a  respectable  mythology  as  anything  else.  ' 
Vhat  do  you  mean  by  a  mytholoe.  '  cried  Robert  hotly. 
322  ibid.,  pp.  58,59. 
323  ibid.,  pp.  62,63. 
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backwards"  in  Religious  Humanism  and  the  Victorian  Novel,  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press, 
1965)  pp.  ME 
133 'Simple  ideas,  or  experiences,  personified.  '  said  Langham,  puffing  away.  'I  take  it 
they  are  the  subject-matter  of  all  theologies! 
'I  don't  understand  you,  '  said  Robert,  flushing.  To  the  Christian,  facts  have  been 
the  medium  by  wl-dch  ideas  the  world  could  not  otherwise  have  come  at  have 
been  communicated  to  man.  Christian  theology  is  a  system  of  ideas  indeed,  but 
of  ideas  realised,  made  manifest  in  facts.  '325 
As  Edward  Langham  reflects  during  this  discussion,  "the  inteflect  had  precious  little  to 
do  with  Elsmere's  Christianity.  He  had  got  hold  of  all  the  stock  apologetic  arguments, 
and  used  them,  his  companion  admitted,  with  ability  and  ingenuity.  But  they  were 
merely  outworks  of  the  citadel.  The  inmost  fortress  was  held  something  wholly  distinct 
from  intellectual  conviction  -  by  moral  passion-,  by  love,  by  feeling,  by  that  mysticism,  in 
short,  which  no  healthy  youth  should  be  withoue2.326 
By  the  beginning  of  Book  II  (Surrey)  where  Robert,  now  married  to  Catherine,  takes  his 
first  charge,  we  see  the  beginning  of  his  eventual  fal  lbroughout  Book  II  Robert 
wrestles  with  the  notion  brought  forward  by  Langham  that  history  is  not  created  in  a 
neutral  medium,  but  through  the  recording  of  subjective  testimony  given  by  individuals 
such  as  Robert  himself.  As  Langharn  challenges  him  to  consider: 
History  depands  on  testimony.,  What  is  the  nature  and  the  value  of  testimony  at 
given  times?  In  other  words,  did  the  man  of  the  third  century  understand,  or 
report,  or  interpret  facts  in  the  same  way  as  the  man  of  the  sixteenth  or  the 
nineteenth?  And  if  not,  what  are  the  differences,  and  what  are  the  deductions  to 
be  made  from  them,  if  any?  ...  Mhe  whole  of  orthodox  Christianity  is 
(dependent  on  testimony)1327 
Having  spent  numerous  hours  in  Squire  Wendover's  library  (which  is  later  called  "an 
325  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward,  Robert  Elsmere,  p.  66. 
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134 Institute"  showing  the  changing  nature  of  such  a  collection  -  moving  from  a  place  of 
mere  reading  to  that  of  criticism)  Robert  looks  over  the  key  works  of  the  period  that 
were  chaRenging  his  orthodox  views: 
Here  were  most  of  the  early  editions  of  the  Lebenjesu,  with  some  corrections 
from  Strauss's  hand,  and  similar  records  of  Baur,  Ewald,  and  other  members  or 
opponents  of  the  Tilbingen  school.  And  so  on,  through  the  whole  bookcase. 
Something  of  everything  was  there  -  Philosophy,  I'heology,  History,  Philology... 
A  history  of  modem  thinking  Germany,  of  that  'unextinguished  hearth'whence 
the  mind  of  Europe  had  been  kindled  for  three  generations,  might  almost  have 
been  evolved  from  that  bookcase  and  its  contents  alone.  328 
In  Book  III  (Me  Squire),  we  find  the  final  blow  to  Roberes  faith  coming  in  the  form  of 
a  book  defivered  to  his  home  by  Squire  Wendover.  Upon  reading  Wendover's  The  Idols  of 
the  Markeplace  (an  omnibus  of  Strauss-Eke  critique  of  sorts),  Robert  sees  his  faith 
slipping  away,  exemplified  in  The  Idols  oftbe  Markeplace  which  falls  closed  from  his  grasp: 
It  was  the  first  volume  of  The  Idols  of  the  Markeýplace. 
...  11-ie  Pentateuch,  the  Prophets,  the  Gospels,  St.  Paul,  Tradition,  the  Fathers, 
Protestantism  and  justification  by  Faith,  the  Eighteenth  Century,  the  Broad 
Church  Movement,  Anglican  Theology  -  the  squire  had  his  say  about  them  all. 
And  while  the  coolness  and  frankness  of  the  method  sent  a  shock  of  indignation 
and  horror  through  the  religious  public,  the  subtle  and  caustic  style,  and  the 
epigrams  with  which  the  book  was  strewn,  forced  both  the  religious  and 
irreligious  public  to  read,  whether  they  would  or  no.  A  storm  of  controversy  rose 
round  the  volumes,  and  some  of  the  keenest  observers  of  English  life  had  said  at 
the  time,  and  maintained  since,  that  the  publication  of  the  book  had  made  or 
marked  an  epoch... 
Not  a  sound  in  the  house.  Outside,  the  tossing  moaning  December  night;  inside, 
the  faintly  crackling  fire,  the  standing  figure.  Suddenly  it  was  to  Robert  as  though 
a  cruel  torturing  hand  were  laid  upon  his  inmost  being.  His  breath  failed  him; 
the  book  slipped  out  of  his  grasp;  he  sank  down  upon  his  chair,  his  head  in  his 
hands.  Oh,  what  a  desolate  intolerable  momend  Over  the  young  idealist  soul 
135 there  swept  a  dry destroying  whirlwind  of  thought.  Elements  gathered  from  all 
sources  -  from  his  own  historical  work,  from  the  squire's  book,  from  the  secret 
half-conscious  recesses  of  the  mind  -  entered  into  it,  and  as  it  passed  it  seemed  to 
scorch  his  heart.  329 
Exemplified  in  the  "story  within  a  story"  told  at  the  beginning  of  Book  II  by  the 
'Ritualist  clergyman'Mr.  Newcome,  the  reader  sees  Robert  come  undone: 
Stroke  by  stroke,  as  the  words  and  facts  were  beguiled  from  him,  all  that  was 
futile  and  quarrelsome  in  the  sharp-featured  priest  sank  out  of  sight;  the  face 
glowed  with  inward  light;  the  stature  of  the  man  seemed  to  rise;  the  angel  in  him 
unsheathed  its  wings.  Suddenly  a  story...  -a  story  of  the  purest  Christian 
heroism  told  in  the  simplest  way  -  came  to  an  end  ... 
330 
Ukewise,  the  tale  of  Robert  Elsmere  is  to  be  a  "story  of  the  purest  Christian  heroism  told 
in  the  simplest  way"  where  the  reader  is  to  be  left  with  "a  face  glowing  with  inward  lighe, 
but  fails  to  do  so.  As  an  exercise  in  poetics,  the  characters  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  creates 
remain  caricatures  -  living  in  constant  relation  to  the  issues  they  represent  and  embody 
but  never  truly  allve.  Ever  tied  to  the  context  of  society,  the  characters  she  writes  into 
being  acknowledge  this  limitation  as  seen  in  discourse  surrounding  fictional  characters 
within  Robert  Elsmere  and  their  attempts  to  write.  In  Book  II,  Robert  speaks  to  Langharn 
about  writing  a  book- 
'Perhaps  you  don!  t  know  that  I  too  am  engaged  upon  a  great  work! 
'A  great  work  -  you? 
Langham  looked  at  his  companion  as  though  to  find  out  whether  his  remark  was 
meant  seriously  or  whether  he  might  venture  to  be  cynical.  Elsmerr  wridng!  Why 
sbould  evegbody  write  books?  It  was  absurd!  The  scholar  who  knows  what  toll 
scholarship  takes  of  life  is  always  apt  to  resent  the  intrusion  of  the  man  of  action 
into  his  domains.  It  looks  to  him  Eke  a  kind  of  ridiculous  assumption  that  any 
328  ibid.,  p.  196. 
329  ibid.,  p.  280. 
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136 one  An  coeur  liger  can  do  what  has  cost  him  his  heart's  blood.  331  (emphasis  added) 
Later,  in  Book  III.,  Robert  suggests  to  Langham  in  relation  to  his  'great  work,  that  he  has 
discovered  a  key  issue  with  regard  to  the  act  of  writing- 
Ibeform  taken  by  this  training  of  his  own  mind  he  had  been  thus  encouraged  not 
to  abandon,  was)  as  we  know,  the  study  of  history...  As  he  told  Langham,  he  just 
got  below  the  surface  of  a  great  subject  and  was  beginning  to  dig  into  the  roots 
of  it.  Hitherto  he  had  been  under  the  guidance  of  men  of  his  own  day,  of  the 
nineteenth  century  historian,  who  refashions  the  past  on  the  lines  of  his  own 
mind,  who  gives  it  rationality,  coherence,  and,  as  it  were,  modemess,  so  that  the 
main  impression  he  produces  on  us,  so  long  as  we  look  at  that  past  through  him 
only,  is  on  the  whole  an  im  pression  of  confinui.  0,  of  resemblance. 
Whereas.,  on  the  contrary,  the  first  impression  left  on  a  man  by  the  attempt  to 
plunge  into  the  materials  of  history  for  himself  is  almost  always  an  extraordinary 
sharp  im  pression  of  difference,  of  contrast.  Ultimately,  of  course,  he  sees  that  these 
men  and  women  whose  letters  and  biographies,  whose  creeds  and  general 
conceptions  he  is  investigating,  are  in  truth  his  ancestors,  bone  of  his  bone,  flesh 
of  his  flesh... 
Then  he  sees  what  it  is  makes  the  difference,  digs  the  gulf.  'Science,  '  the  mind 
cries,  'ordered  knowledge.  332 
Yet  what  Robert  Elsmere  the  protagonist  perceives,  Robert  Elsmere  the  novel  fails  to  do. 
Robert  is  not  a  character  who  is  aflowed  sharp  'contrase  or  'impression  of  difference! 
Rather,  he  merely  'resembles'  the  manifestations  of  the  Zeitgeist. 
In  the  important  chapter  XL  in  Book  VI  entitled  (ironically)  "New  Openings",  we  see 
Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  come  closest  to  realising  her  aims  of  "reconceiving  the  Chrise,,  yet 
331  ibid.,  p.  197. 
137 ultimately  'closing  off'  any  'new  opening'  she  had  hoped  to  introduce.  Inthischapter, 
Robert  has  been  invited  to  present  a  lecture  to  the  North  R-  Club  (also  called  "the 
Workman's  Club')  entitled  "Me  Claims  ofjesus  on  Modem  Life".  This  is  a  society  that 
is  made  up  of  'dock  workers  and  gas  fitters'  whom  Robert  sees  as  the  base  from  which 
"the  religious  movement  of  the  future"  will  arise  "in  sufficient  volume  among  the 
masses,  where  the  vested  interests  of  all  kinds  are  less  tremeridous".  333  This  club  has 
been  circulating  handbills  and  pamphlets  that  satirise  the  Established  Church  and  the 
notion  of  Christ  as  figured  by  the  status  quo,  bearing  such  titles  as  Faitb  and  Fools  and  The 
Comic  Life  of  Cbrist  that  "contained  a  caricature  of  the  Crucifixion  [and]  a  scroll  emanating 
from  Mary  Magdalene's  mouth,  in  particular,  containing  obscenities  which  cannot  be 
quoted  here".  3M  In  his  outrage,  Robert  accepts  an  invitation  to  speak  and  hopefully  put 
forth  his  re-visioned  'claims  of  Jesus  to  Modern  Ufe'  on  Good  Friday.  OnWcdnesday 
of  Passion  week,  Robert  reflects  upon  how  the  shape  of  humanity  has  misshapen  the 
image  of  Christ: 
He  had  seen  them  with  the  bodily  eye,  and  the  fact  had  enormously  quickened 
his  historical  perception.  The  child  of  Nazareth,  the  moralist  and  teacher  of 
Capernaum  and  Gennesaret,  the  strenuous  seer  and  martyr  of  the  later  Jerusalem 
preaching  -  all  these  various  images  sprang  into  throbbing  poetic  fife  within  him. 
That  anything  in  human  shape  should  be  capable  of  dragging  this  fife  and  this 
death  through  the  mire  of  a  hideous  and  befouling  laughterl  Who  was 
responsible?  335 
As  Robert  states  to  Catherine  before  giving  his  lecture,  it  is  his  hope  to  reverse  this  trend: 
'I  want  simply,  if  I  can,  to  transfer  to  their  minds  that  image  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth 
which  thought,  and  love,  and  reading  have  left  upon  my  own.  I  want  to  make 
them  realise  for  themselves  the  historical  character,  so  far  as  it  can  be  realised  -  to 
332  ibid.,  p.  276. 
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138 make  them  seefor  tbemselves  the  realfigure,  as  it  went  in  and  out  amongst  men  -  so  far 
as  our  eyes  can  now  discern  it.  '  (emphasis  added)336 
What  is  key  here  is  this  notion  of  re-casting  an  image  of  the  'real  figure'  -a  re-forming 
christology  and  a  re-visioning  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth  apart  from  the  current  'form',  or  to 
use  John  McIntyre's  terminology,  "shape  of  ChristologY".  It  is  this  notion  that 
permeates  Robert's  concern  -a  concern  not  so  much  of  doctrine,  but  rather  of  form  and 
shape.  As  Catherine  Elsmcrc  notes,  the  "FEstorical  Christ...  will  never  win  souls.  If  he 
was  God,  every  word...  would  insult  him.  If  he  was  man,  he  was  not  a  good  manl"337 
Robert  understands  this  in  part,  choosing  instead  to  conform  what  he  sees  as  the  central 
challenge  -  the  'imaging'  of  Christ  in  the  Modem  World. 
Part  of  this  challenge  is  shown  as  Robert  enters  the  lecture  hall  of  the  Workman's 
Club  on  Good  Friday.  As  he  enters,  it  is  noted  that  the  walls  of  the  hall  are  covered  "at 
intervals  with  political  portraits  and  a  few  cheap  engravings  of  famous  men,  Jesus  of 
Nazareth  taking  his  turn  with  Buddha,  Socrates,  Moses,  Shakespeare,  and  Paul  of 
Tarsus".  338  These  pictures  serve  as  a  verbal-visual  key  to  what  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  in 
Robett  Elsmere.  asserts  as  the  core  issue  regarding  Christianity's  poor  state  in  the  later 
nineteenth  century.  What  arc  the  images  before  us?  What  are  the  'pictures'  by  which 
those  of  'human  shape'  begin  to  'shape'  an  image  of  Christ?  As  Robert  states  at  the 
beginning  of  his  lecture  on  "The  Claims  ofJesus  on  Modem  Life",  it  is  a  claim  of  form 
that  is  made  -a  picture  as  opposed  to  words  that  needs  to  be  re-cast  with  regard  to 
Jesus: 
I  shall  aim  at  rousing  in  him  such  a  state  of  feeling  as  may  suddenly  convince  him 
that  what  is  injured  by  writing  of  this  sort  is  not  the  orthodox  Christian,  or  the 
Church,  orJesus  of  Nazareth,  but  always  and  inevitably  the  man  who  writes  it 
336  ibid.,  p.  480. 
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139 and  the  man  who  loves  id  His  mind  is  possessed  of  an  inflaming  and  hateful 
image,  which  drives  him  to  mockery  and  violence.  I  want  to  replace  it,  if  I  can,  by 
one  of  calm,  of  beauty  and  tenderness,  which  may  drive  him  to  humility  and 
sympathy.  And  tbis,  indeed,  is  the  only  way  in  ivbicb  opinion  is  ever  really  altered  -  by  the 
substitudon  of  one  mentalpicturefor  anotber.  339  (emphasis  added) 
As  Robert  goes  on  to  note  that  as  we  "go  back  to  the  root  of  things",  we  are  caUed  "to 
reconceive  the  Christ,  to  bring  him  afresh  into  our  lives,  to  make  life  so  freely  given  for 
man  minister  again  in  new  ways  to  man's  new  needs".  This  is  the  task  of  "every  great 
religion...  in  truth,  a  concentration  of  great  ideas,  capable,  as  all  ideas  are,  of  infinite 
expansion  and  adaptation...  To  reconceive  the  Christ!  It  is  the  special  task  of  our  age, 
though  in  some  sort  and  degree  it  has  been  the  ever-recurring  task  of  Europe  since  the 
. 
mo  T  beginning" 
. 
hroughout  the  lecture,  iconographic  language  is  used  to  'reconceive  the 
Chrise  as  a  visual-verbal  re-imagining.  Images  of  both  painting  and  sculpting  are  utifised 
as  opposed  to  traditional  language  of  dogmatic  apologetics.  In  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward's 
narrative,  it  is  a  compelling  picture  or  image  that  must  emerge  with  regard  to  Jesus  rather 
than  a  strong  logocentric  argument.  As  noted  in  the  thoughts  of  Hugh  Flaxman  as  he 
listened  to  the  lecture:  "and  bit  by  bit,  as  the  quick  nervous  sentences  issued  and  struck, 
eacb  like  the  toucb  of  a  cbisel,  the  majesticfigure  emerged,  set  against  its  natural  background, 
instinct  with  some  fraction  at  least  of  the  magic  of  reality,  most  human,  most  persuasive, 
most  tragiC".  341  In  recounting  his  hopes  for  the  lasting  impact  of  his  lecture,  Robert  later 
teRs  Catherine 
Tou  ask  me,  '  he  would  say  in  effect,  'to  prove  to  you  that  men  can  love,  can 
make  a  new  and  fruitful  use,  for  daily  life  and  conduct,  of  a  merely  human  Christ. 
Go  amongst  our  men,  talk  to  our  children,  and  satisfy  yourself.  A  little  while  ago 
scores  of  these  men  either  hated  the  very  name  of  Christianity  or  were  entirely 
339  ibid.,  p.  492. 
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140 indifferent  to  it.  To  scores  of  them  now  the  name  of  the  teacher  of  Nazareth,  the 
victim  ofjerusalem,  is  dear  and  sacred;  his  life,  his  death,  his  words,  are 
becoming  once  more  a  constant  source  of  moral  effort  and  spiritual  hope.  Seefor 
joUrSeP342  (emphasis  added) 
As  with  its  chapter  title  "New  Openings",  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  is  also  advocating  a 
"new  opening"  that  is  a  place  not  defined  by  the  "very  name  of  Christianity"  but  rather 
re-imagined  around  "the  name  of  the  teacher  of  Nazareth".  Yet  there  is  no  opening  to  be 
found. The  Jesus  that  is  advocated  throughout  Robeit  Elsmere  as  the  "reconceived  Chrise, 
is  one  trapped  as  well.  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  has  merely  traded  doctrinal  and 
ecclesiastical  systematic  constrictions  for  a  static  Christ  that  is  more  contextualized  than 
the  product  of  "true"  fiction.  As  Robert  asks  his  audience  to  consider  the  "reconceivcd 
Chrise,,  it  isaregressiveact  that  does  not  fully  return  to  a  realistic  present: 
'Let  me  try,  however  feebly,  and  draw  it  aj&esb  for  you,  that  fife  of  lives,  that  story 
of  stories,  as  the  labour  of  our  own  age  in  particular  has  patiently  revealed  it  to 
us.  Come  back  with  me  through  the  centuries;  let  us  hy  and  see  the  Otist  of  GaAlee 
and  the  Chiist  oflerusalem  as  he  was,  before  a  credulous  love  and  Jewish  tradition 
and  Greek  subtlety  had  at  once  dimmed  and  glorified  the  trUth.  '343 
Robert  notes  that  "the  world  has  grown  sincejesus  preached  in  Galilee  andjudea.  We 
cannot  learn  the  wbole  of  God's  lesson  from  him  now  -  nay,  we  could  not  theni"344Yet 
the  Jesus  that  is  presented  in  Robert  Elsmere  is  not  one  that  has  "grown"  with  the  world. 
As  Robert  Elsmere  is  presented  in  Robert  Elsmere  as  a  "form"  ofjesus  reimagincd,  the 
reader  is  left  with  a  figuring  ofjesus  that  is  strangely  familiar  to  the  very  one  being 
argued  against.  What  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  offers  is  merely  an  isolated  clergyman 
trained  in  the  established  church  who,  in  appealing  to  a  Historical  Jesus  of  the  first 
342  ibid.,  p.  505. 
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141 century  that  contemporary  Anglo-German  scholarship  of  the  period  was  acknowledging 
as  impossible  to  fully  capture,  advocates  one  doctrinal  system  over  another.  While  the 
compelling  "picture"  of  Robert  Elsmere  shows  an  active  "Social  Gospel"  alternative  to 
static  scholasticism  in  regard  to  the  figuring  of  Jesus,  it  remains  a  derivative  of  the  very 
system  accused  of  being  misguided  and  false.  While  claims  that  his  "reconceived  Chrise' 
is  one  that  is  "risen"  as  the  Easter  Christ  "in  a  wiser  reverence  and  more  reasonable  love; 
risen  in  newforms  of  social  help  inspired  by  his  memory,  called  afresh  by  his  namel  Rlýen  - 
if  you  and  your  children  will  it  -  in  a  church  or  company  of  the  faithful...  "345,  it  is  this 
proposed  'new  form'  that  lacks  the  'new  openings'  promised.  In  contrast  to  the  poetics 
of  George  Eliot,  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  (as  with  other  writers  of  her  period)  made  critical 
assessment  of  the  doubt  within  the  Victorian  age  and,  through  fiction,  sought  to  put  a 
face  to  this  assessment.  Yet  it  was  the  very  act  of  writing  that,  while  freeing  the 
questions  of  doubt  from  dialectics  and  systematic  constraints,  ultimately  confined  the 
very  Jesus  these  writers  sought  to  free  or  at  least,  in  the  words  of  Robert  Elsmere, 
'conceive'.  In  the  case  of  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward,  it  is  merely  trading  an  unimaginative 
dogma  for  an  unimaginative  failed  cleric  -  both  closed  forms  that  encase  rather  than 
liberate.  It  is  this  factor  that  differentiated  George  Elioespoetics  from  that  of  the  other 
discussed  in  the  Victorian  era.  As  we  shall  see,  hers  is  a  poetics  of  open  space  and 
organicism  that  is  more  akin  to  Goethe  and  H61derlin  than  to  the  writing  of  her  own 
society.  It  is  a  poetics  that  in  its  very  'a/structuring'  comes  closer  to  writing  the 
'reconceived  Christ'  than  Mrs.  Humphrey  Ward  could  achieve  in  her  project. 
345  ibid.,  p.  499. 
142 7.0  Scenes  of  CladcalLife-  Images  under  Erasure 
lbey've  gotten  rid  of  the  Christian  God,  and  now  they  think  they  have  to  hold 
onto  Christian  morality  all  the  more:  that's  Englisb  logic,  we  don't  want  to  blame 
it  on  little  moral  females  j  la  Eliot.  In  England,  for  every  little  emancipation 
from  theology,  you  have  to  make  yourself  respectable  again  as  a  moral  fanatic  in 
the  most  frightening  way.  Over  there,  that's  thepenance  one  pays... 
Things  are  different  for  the  rest  of  us.  If  you  give  up  Christian  faith,  you  pull  the 
riý.  bt  to  Christian  morality  out  from  under  your  feet.  This  morality  is  simply  not 
self-evident:  one  has  to  bring  this  point  home  again  and  again,  despite  the 
English  dimwits.  Christianity  is  a  system,  a  view  of  things  that  is  conceived  as  a 
connected  wbole.  If  you  break  off  a  major  concept  from  it,  faith  in  God,  you 
break  up  the  whole  world  as  well:  there  are  no  necessities  left  to  hold  onto 
anymore.  Christianity  presupposes  that  human  beings  do  not  know,  cannot  know, 
what  is  good  and  evil  for  them:  they  believe  in  God,  who  is  the  only  one  who 
knows  it.  Christian  morality  is  a  commandment;  its  origin  is  transcendent;  it  is 
beyond  A  criticism,  aU  right  to  criticism;  it  is  true  only  if  God  is  truth  -  it  stands 
and  falls  with  faith  in  God.  346 
In  his  1889  collection  of  sermonic  indictments  of  the  state  of  the  Western  world  entitled 
Tmiligbt  of  the  Idols  (subtided  "How  to  Philosophise  with  a  Hammej?  D,  Friedrich  Nietzsche 
fists  those  he  deems  'responsible'  for  the  fall  of  Western  culture  by  name,  and  levels  what 
he  sees  as  the  appropriate  charges  against  them.  Interestingly,  George  Eliot  is  included 
alongside  Rousseau,  Schiller,  Dante,  Kant,  and  John  Stuart  Mill.  Nietzsche's  charge 
against  her,  as  cited  in  the  above  quotation,  is  to  have  forgotten  that  'Christianity  is  a 
system,  a  view  of  things  that  is  conceived  as  a  connected  wbole.  If  you  break  off  a  major 
concept  from  it,  faith  in  God,  you  break  up  the  whole  world  as  well:  there  are  no 
necessities  left  to  hold  onto  anymore!  In  one  respect,  Nietzsche's  charge  against  Eliot  is 
143 well  deserved.  Eliot  is  indeed  unwilling  to  see  the  essence  of  Christianity  grounded  in  a 
systematic  rendering.  As  I  have  argued  in  the  opening  of  this  thesis,  Eliot  was  indeed 
concerned  with  the  task  of  seeing  the  'possible'  of  Christianity  (to  use  a  phrase  of  Elioes) 
that  was  not  to  be  found  in  a  system  and  is  not,  as  argued  by  Nietzsche,  'beyond  all 
criticism!  As  Nietzsche  correctly  assets,  Eliot  is  challenging  the  notion  that  Christianity 
was  a  system  while  at  the  same  time  maintaining  a  sense  of  the  whole.  How  this  'whole' 
is  presented  is  key  to  Elioes  re-imagining  of  the  'mystery  beneath  the  real'.  Tbroughout 
her  critical  writing  for  the  Westmihster  Retiew  this  is  apparent.  But  it  is  in  her  turn  toward 
fiction  that  this  challenge  reaches  new  and  more  profound  dimensions. 
-  David  Carroll  begins  his  discussion  of  George  ElioesScenes  of  Clerical  life  by 
stating  that  the  so-called  protagonists  of  the  nairatives  are  "at  risk,  "  not  because  of  lack 
of  coherence  of  character,  but  because  of  the  destabilised  context  within  which  they 
ground  their  identity  -  "If  stable  character  is  based  upon  a  coherent  view  of  the  world, 
then  the  clergyman  protagonists  of  Scenes  of  Clerical  Life,  living  in  English  provincial 
society  during  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  are  at  risk!  1.347  The  'world'  in  which 
these  clergy  exist  is  in  a  constant  state  of  erosion  throughout  the  three  stories  that  make 
up  Scenes.  With  this  context-  under-erasure,  the  rules  that  had  governed  the  construction 
of  self  and  the  sacred  erode  as  well.  Ehoes  three  tales  are  a  truth-tcHing  of  sorts  - 
announcing  through  fiction  the  fracturing  of  assumptions  that  govern,  to  use  Ricocur's 
term,  the  'world  of  the  texe  and  by  association,  the  world  of  the  reader.  As  Carroll 
notes,  Scenes  of  Clericallife  show  "radical  discontinuities  in  communities  which  are 
themselves  Seriouslý  divided".  348  Eliot's  Scenes,  ironically,  do  not  show  forth  a  coherent 
csceneý  or  image  of  a  truth  systematically  realised.  The  'scene'  that  is  exposed  through 
Elioespoetics  is  not  one  of  solidity,  but  a  reality  largely  'filled'  byga  -fissures  that  are  ps 
346  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  Twilight  of  the  Idols  (Cambridge:  Hackett  Publishing  Company,  1997)  p.  53. 
347  David  Carroll,  George  Eliot  and  the  Conflict  of  Interpretations  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press,  1992)  p.  38. 
144 the  true  context  of  life  and  living  such  as  those  between  the  idealised  church  and  real 
community,  between  the  cleric  and  his  true  vocation,  between  the  identity  of  women  in 
truth  and  perception,  and  ultimately,  between  the  reader  and  the  narrator.  In  this 
destabilised  world,  what  had  been  seen  as  stable  is  fractured  and  that  which  may  be 
'hidden'  or  'veiled'  is  finally  seen,  albeit  at  times  only  in  absence  or  'lack',  as  with  Milly 
Barton  and  Tina  Sarti,  or  notably  the  last  story  of  the  trilogy,  "Janees  Repentance",  in  the 
mystery  of  the  bruised  and  broken  figure.  The  challenge  that  Eliot  puts  forward  is  a 
hermeneutic  challenge  -  to  read  differently  not  only  'the  world  of  the  text'  but  the  world 
of  the  reader  as  well.  Ilke  H61derlin's  Expedokles,  all  tumble  into  a  fire  'divinely  gleaming' 
where  all  is  fracture  and  gaps  are  not  the  space  between  solidity,  but  the  context  itself 
With  an  ironic  turn,  it  is  only  in  this  destabilised  world  that  Eliot  can  bring  forward  what 
she  terms  'the  possible  clothed  in  human  form.  'As  noted  by  Peter  C.  Hodgson, 
the  fictional  world  of  George  Eliot...  projects  a  new  way  of  being  that  is 
poetically  distanced  from  everyday  reality  even  as  it  makes  its  way  through  the 
world  of  ordinary  experience.  The  latter  is  not  negated  but  opened  up  and 
transformed  by  the  power  of  projection,  which  is  able  to  make  a  break,  a  new 
beginning,  in  the  midst  of  the  old  and  familiar.  The  reality  status  of  what  is 
poetically  envisioned  is  that  of  thepossible.  The  possible  is  not  the  illusory,  a 
product  of  wishful  thinking,  nor  is  it  the  merely  ideal  in  the  sense  of  a  mental 
fantasy;  rather  it  is  the  real  transfigured,  fulfilled  as  to  its  possibilities.  349 
It  is  in  the  space  of  fiction  and  not  in  her  previous  work  in  criticism  that  Eliot  is  able  to 
begin  'poetically  envisioning  the  possible.  '  This  'possible'  for  Eliot  is  not  to  be 
accomplished  within  the  confmes  of  a  comprehensive  synthetic  theory,  which  was  in 
David  Carroll's  phrase,  the  Tictorian  Holy  Grail'350.  Elioes  oft  quoted  remarks  to 
positivist  Frederic  Harrison  in  a  letter  dating  1876  affirms  her  reticence  in  this  regard. 
349  ibid. 
349  Peter  C.  Hodgson,  Theology  in  the  Fiction  of  George  Eliot  (London:  SCM  Press,  2001)  p.  149.  350  David  Carroll,  ibid.  p.  16. 
145 She  describes  her  fictional  writing  to  Harrison  as  simply  "a  set  of  experiments  in  life  -  an 
endeavour  to  see  what  our  thought  and  cmotion  may  be  capable  of  -  what  stores  of 
motive,  actual  or  hinted  as  possible,  give  promise  of  a  better  life  after  which  we  may 
strive  to  keep  hold  of  something  more  than  shifting  theory".  351  She  asserts  t1-iis  further 
to  Harrison  by  stating  that  she  will  not  "adopt  any  formula  which  does  not  get  itself 
clothed  for  me  in  some  human  figure  and  individual  experience,  and  perhaps  that  is  a 
sign  that  if  I  help  others  to  see  at  all  it  must  be  through  that  medium  of  art".  352  This 
path  was  evident  during  her  period  of  critical  writing  prior  to  her  fictional  work  as  editor 
of  the  Westminster  Retiew.  In  her  praise  of  the  philosopher  Gruppe  in  her  essay  "Ibe 
Future  of  German  Philosophy,  "  Eliot  notes  Gruppe's  desire  to  join  together  the  abstract 
and  concrete,  analytical  and  synthetic  in  order  to  fulfil  the  true  task  of  philosophy  in  the 
future:  "it  must  renounce  metaphysics:  it  must  renounce  the  ambitious  attempt  to  form  a 
theory  of  the  universe,  to  know  things  in  their  causes  and  first  principles  ... 
[taking  not] 
the  high  apriori  road...  [but  the  humble]  aposteriori  path".  353  This  is  her  desire  as  well  - 
to  announce  a  way  of  seeing  and  ultimately  Ating  that  is  more  than  mere  understanding 
through  her  offering  an  aesthetic  'clothed  in  human  figure  and  individual  experience'  to 
'help  others  to  see  through  the  medium  of  art.  '  Scenes  of  Clericallife  is  the  beginning  of 
Elioes  attempt  to  present  the  gaps  and  discontinuity  of  an  organic  fictional  world 
'clothed  in  human  figures'.  Through  her  use  of  paradox  and  discontinuity  that  creates  a 
coherent  yet  continuously  deconstructing  world,  Eliot  allows  the  face  of  the  sacred  to  be 
seen  in  human  form  that  is  deeply  incarnational  and  takes  on  a  very  christological  bent. 
Where  other  writers  might  opt  to  hold  this  incarnational  nexus  static,  Eliot's  poetics 
continues  to  unveil  and  remember,  deconstructing  and  creating  anew.  Peter  Hodgson 
puts  Eliot  into  a  hermeneutic  tradition  that  seeks  such  a  recovery- 
351  George  Eliot,  The  George  Eliot  Letters,  ed.  Gordon  S.  Haight,  9  vols.  (New  Haven:  Yale  University 
Press,  1954-78)  IV,  p.  300. 
352  ibid. 
146 The  whole  of  post-Enlightenment  theology,  from  Schleiermacher  and  Hegel 
through  Troeltsch,  was  a  sustained  effort  to  reconstruct  the  central  convictions 
of  Christian  faith  about  God,  world,  humanity,  Christ,  sin  and  redemption  in 
forms  appropriate  to  modem  philosophy,  science,  and  culture.  In  her  own  way 
George  Eliot  was  engaging  in  a  similar  demythologising  effort.  354 
But  the  difference  for  Eliot  that  was  'her  own  way'  was  in  putting  forth  'central 
convictions'  in  a  form  'clothed  in  human  figure'  and  not  merely  dogmatic  or  credal 
rendering.  What  Schleiermacher  and  Hegel  sought  in  the  genre  of  philosophy,  Eliot 
sought  in  the  act  of  fiction.  While  I  agree  with  Hodgson's  suggestion  that  Eliot  was 
indeed  engaging  in  a  reconstruction  of  essential  convictions  common  and  in  some  ways 
similar  to  the  Christian  faith  (albeit  not  orthodox,  but  more  akin  to  the  Ilberation 
theologians  such  as  Gustavo  Gutierrez  and  Rosemary  Ruether),  she  was  not  striving 
merely  to  replace  the  former  theologies  with  a  new  one.  This  would  have  been  merely 
"the  dismantling  of  orthodoxy"  only  to  lead  to  "new  forms  of 
hubriS"'.  355  In  a  letter  to 
her  friend  the  phrenologist  Charles  Bray  in  1857  in  which  she  objects  to  his  The  Pbiloso 
. 
pby 
qfNecessiý,  as  an  attempt  to  provide  an  overtly  systematic  rendering  of  God,  she  states 
that  we  are  "totally  [unable]  to  find  in  our  own  nature  a  key  to  the  Divine  Mystery  I 
could  more  readily  turn  Christian  ...  than  embrace  a  Ibeism  which  professes  to  explain 
the  proceedings  of  God".  356 
Her  wridngs  were  indeed  concerned  with  the  same  things  that  concern 
theologians,  although  her  form  and  ultimate  aims  were  noticeably  different.  As  Hodgson 
notes, 
Mhcology  itself  is  a  kind  of  fiction  that  creates  imaginative  variations  on  what 
history  offers  as  real  in  order  to  bespeak  the  mystery  beneath  the  real,  and  ...  it 
approaches  this  mystery  in  terms  of  how  redemptive  transformations  come  about 
353  ibid.,  p.  11. 
354  Peter  C.  Hodgson,  Theology  in  the  Fiction  of  George  Eliot,  pp.  148  -149.  355  David  Carroll,  op.  cit.  p.  14. 
356  ibid. 
147 in  ordinary  human  life...  rMeology  and  Art]  'make  up  things,  '  but  they  do  so  for 
purposes  of  illuminating  reality,  not  escaping  from  it  into  a  fantasy  world.  They 
are  constrained  but  not  constricted  by  empirical  fact  since  they  draw  upon  the 
full.  range  of  human  experience  and  potentiality  (emotional,  psychological,  ethical, 
aesthetic,  religious);  what  they  produce  must  be  congruent  with  history  but  not 
necessarily  derived  fromit.  357 
This  comparison  is  concurrent  with  Eliot's  move  into  fiction.  Yet  unlike  most  theology 
which  tends  to  begin  with  the  universal  in  the  search  for  a  systematic  approach  to  the 
ultimate,  her  writing  continued  to  begin  with  the  particular.  I  suggest  that  her  task  is  a 
search  for  a  new  a/christology  and  her  writing  more  a  new  'gospel'  than  a  new  'theology'. 
Eliot's  quest  for  the  sacred  or  divine  was  a  seeking  after  the  particular  nexus  of  the 
sacred  in  and  throughout  humanity  -  which  is  something  more  akin  to  Strauss'  intended 
aims  in  Das  Lebenjesu  than  Feuerbach's  The  Essence  of  GHslianity.  Feuerbach's  aim  was  to 
show  that  the  antithesis  of  divine  and  human  is  altogether  illusory.  For  Feuerbach,  it  is 
nothing  else  than  the  antithesis  between  the  human  nature  in  general  and  the  human 
individual  specifically,  and  'all  religious  cosmogonies  are  products  of  the  imagination' 
with  the  Incarnation  merely  being  a  symbol  of  the  dialectical  meeting  of  the  abstract  and 
concrete.  Strauss,  on  the  other  hand,  was  attempting  to  hold  on  to  and  ultimately  re- 
cover  the  actual  and  particular  meeting  of  the  divine  and  humanity.  This  was  also  Eliot's 
desire  -  the  recovery  of  the  real  and  particular  'Divine  Mystery'  that  was  not  to  be 
unlocked  merely  with  a  'key'  of  a  system,  but  that  which  must  be  described  and  displayed 
as  one  recounts  a  life  in  the  fullness  of  time,  which  is  also  the  task  of  gospel.  In  this  way 
I  argue  that  Eliot,  in  Scenes  of  Clericallife,  is  announcing  an  incamational  poetics  that 
requires  "a  phenomenological  hermeneutic"358  similar  to  that  found  in  Martin  Heidegger, 
Paul  Ricoeur,  and  Jacques  Derrida.  In  a  phenomenological  hermeneutic,  interpretation 
337  Peter  C.  Hodgson,  op.  cit.  p.  149. 
358  Mario  J.  Valdes,  Reflection  and  Imagination:  A  Ricoeur  Reader  (Toronto:  University  of  Toronto 
148 must  be  focused  at  the  intersection  of  the  two  directions  of  language,  that  is,  neither 
exclusively  with  the  writer's  text  nor  with  the  reader,  but  in  the  encounter  between  the 
two.  Secondly,  any  attempt  to  reduce  or  remove  the  tensional  aspect  of  poetic  discourse 
will  impose  an  arbitrary  closure  on  it.  Interpretation  must  maintain  the  tensional 
character  of  the  text.  Additionally,  the  act  of  interpretation  must  bring  forth  the 
historicity  of  the  writer's  text,  and  the  historicity  of  the  reader,  so  that  the  interpretative 
encounter  can  engage  two  spheres  of  discourse.  In  this  way,  the  act  of  interpretation 
itself  must  be  dialectical  and  take  onto  a  higher  level  of  conceptual  meaning  the  meaning 
of  the  reader.  At  its  core,  this  mode  of  interpretation  is  never  completed,  for  the  aim 
cannot  be  to  deplete  the  text  (or  life  for  that  matter)  of  its  dynamism.  The  aim  must  be 
to  arrive  at  a  temporary  statement  that  participates  in  a  tradition  of  commentary  on 
textS.  359 
As  Ricoeur  states  in  Hemeneufics  and  the  Human  Sdences,  the  hermcncutic  act  is 
ultimately  an  act  of  'depth  semantics'  whereby  the  text 
seeks  to  place  us  in  its  meaning,  that  is  -  according  to  another  acceptation  of  the 
word  sens  -  in  the  same  direction.  So  if  the  intention  is  that  of  the  text  and  if  this 
intention  is  the  direction  which  it  q 
. 
pens  u 
. 
pfor  tbougbt,  then  depth  semantics  must 
be  understood  in  a  fundamentally  dynamic  way.  I  shall  therefore  say:  to  explain 
is  to  bring  out  the  structure,  that  is,  the  internal  relations  of  dependence  which 
constitute  the  situation  of  the  text;  to  interpret  is  to  follow  the  path  of  thought 
opened  up  by  the  text,  to  place  oneself  en  route  towards  the  orient  of  the  text. 
(emphasis  added)  360 
Press,  199  1)  p.  15. 
359  ibid.,  pp.  15,16. 
360  Paul  Ricoeur,  Hermeneutics  and  the  Human  Sciences:  Essays  on  Language,  Action  and 
Interpretation.  Ed.,  trans.,  and  introd.  J.  B.  Thompson.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  198  1) 
pp.  161-162. 
149 7.1  Heidegger  reads  Eliot  -  the  'possible'  of  poetics 
George  Eliot's  wariness  of  any  comprehensive  synthetic  theory  that  seeks  to  apprehend 
the  'mystery  beneath  the  processes'  is  in  line  with  the  phenomenological  approach  of 
Martin  Heidegger,  particularly  his  reflections  on  the  nature  of  literature  and  its  role  in  the 
disclosure  of  the  sacred.  Both  Heidegger  and  Eliot  argue  for  an  overturning  of 
traditional  modes  of  criticism  by  announcing  a  profound  reversal  -  theory  must  be  read 
tbrougb  the  lens  of  poetics  and  not  the  other  way  around.  Additionally,  both  Heidegger 
and  Eliot  are  profoundly  concerned  with  the  role  literature  plays  in  the  veiling  and 
exposing  of  the  sacred.  In  this  way,  a  discussion  of  Heidegger's  concerns  are  worthy  to 
note  in  looking  at  Ehoes  poetics. 
As  noted  by  Martin  Schifer,  Heidegger's  discussion  of  literature  and  the  sacred 
appear  together  when  he  begins  to  discuss  each  of  them  with  great  significance.  361 
Heidegger's  lectures  in  the  winter  of  1934/35  consists  of  a  close  reading  of  the  poet 
Friedrich  H61derfin  pub1ished  as  Wbat  is  called  Tbinkin 
362  For  Heidegger,  reading 
Hblderlin  means  experiencing  something  completely  'other'  in  relation  to  the  then 
modern  traditions  of  Western  thought.  In  his  view,  H61derlin  takes  the  risk  of 
journeying  beyond  the  domain  of  Western  systematic  thought  and,  as  Heidegger  puts  it, 
to  ask  through  his  act  of  writing  'the  question  that  has  yet  to  be  asked!  This  of  course  is 
the  famous  Heideggerian  notion  of  Darein  as  opposed  to  beings,  which  -  although 
indicated  in  pre-Socratic  thinking  -  begins  to  disappear  in  Plato's  philosophy  and 
ultimately  throughout  the  history  of  Western  philosophy.  According  to  Hcideggcr,  this 
loss  of  the  question  of  Dasein  prevents  humanity  from  being  in  the  world  as  being-in-tbe- 
361  Martin  Schafer,  "The  Sacred:  A  Figureless  Figure:  On  Heidegger"Paper  presented  at  the 
Conference  on  Theology  and  Criticism  at  Johns  Hopkins  University,  March  4-7,1999. 
362  Martin  Heidegger,  What  is  Called  7hinking?  trans.  J.  Glenn  Gray,  1958  (New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  1968). 
150 world,  the  "being  there"  that  is  Dasein.  As  a  consequence,  humanity  not  only  merely 
inhabits  'world',  but  views  'world'  as  a  thing  which  can  be  used  and  controlled  -a  'toor. 
What  Heidegger  is  arguing  throughout  his  philosophical  project  is  toward  that  which 
results  not  in  the  location  of  being,  but  results  merely  in  the  proliferation  of  theories  that 
have  led  to  alienation  and  dislocation  within  civilisation.  This  is  in  keeping  with  Ehoes 
remarks  to  her  friend  Sara  Hennell  in  a  letter  dated  1857  where  she  states  "I  feel  every 
day  a  greater  disinclination  for  theories  and  arguments  about  the  origin  of  things  in  the 
presence  of  all  this  mystery  and  beauty  and  pain  and  ugliness,  that  flood  one  with 
conflicting  emotions".  363  Poetics,  in  a  sense,  provides  a  lens  rather  than  a  grid  through 
which  we  may  once  again  recover  what  Ricoeur  termed  'the  internal  relations  of 
dependence'364  without  the  screen  of  'theories  and  arguments',  allowing  for  a  'telling  of 
the  simple  story'  and  also  the  recasting  of  the  world  into  a  transformed  'possible!  ýt  is 
interesting  to  note  the  symbolism  in  Eliot's  journal  where  she  notes,  "Tuesday,  Sep.  22. 
Began  to  write  'Me  Sad  Fortunes  of  the  Reverend  Amos  Barton,  which  I  hope  to  make 
one  of  a  series  called  'Scenes  of  Clerical  Ufe'.  Wednesday  -  Went  into  the  city  and 
bought  a  microscope".  365) 
Western  thinkers,  as  Heidegger  puts  it,  have  attempted  to  overcome  the  oblivion 
of  Being  by  retracing  the  tbougbt  of  Being  in  the  forgetful  world  in  which  we  "five  and 
move  and  have  our  being".  366  H61derlin,  however,  seeks  to  name  the  space  of  the 
, gbt  of  being  sacred  which  is  apoedcalnaming  that  opens  up  the  sphere  in  which  the  thou 
ýe).  367 
, gt  das  Sein.  Der  Diebter  nennt  das  Heik,  can  ultimately  take  place  (Der  Denker  sa 
Heidegger  considers  this  sphere  that  H61derlin  seeks,  the  sphere  of  the  sacred,  to  be  that 
363  George  Eliot,  The  George  Eliot  Letters,  ed.  Gordon  S.  Haight,  9  vols.  (New  Haven:  Yale  University 
Press,  1954-78)  11,  p.  341. 
364  See  Paul  Ricoeur,  Hermeneutics  and  the  Human  Sciences  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press, 
198  1)  pp.  182ff. 
365  George  Eliot,  The  Journals  of  George  Eliot  -  ed.  Margaret  Harris  and  Judith  Johnston  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1998)  p.  63. 
366  Acts  17:  28  in  which  the  Apostle  Paul  cites  Epimenides  in  his  Cretica. 
367  Martin  Schffer,  op.  cit. 
151 gn  R4  very  sphere  in  which  Being  is  regained  from  its  oblivion.  It  is  a  space  of  Unei  en  gkeit 
or  ccunselfishness"368,  where  the  things  named  by  poetics  are  let  be  what  thg  are  without 
being  placed  within  a  synthetic  matrix  of  what  Eliot  calls  'theories  and  arguments'.  The 
sacred  resides  in  the  sphere  in  which  one  is  posited  beyond  one's  own  control.  Here  the 
possibility  of  Dasein's  authenticity  can  be  experienced:  the  positing  of  the  simple  fact 
that  there  is  sometbing  rather  than  notbing  allows  for  the  possibility  of  being.  The  sacred  is 
then  the  realm  where  things  have  come  wholly  back  into  their  Being  in  a  form  of  self- 
possessedness,  ins  Heile.  Ultimately,  poetics  then  becomes  the  foundry  for  being,  and  the 
gr*n  e  es  Unr  .  36  writer/poet  -  in  naming  the  space  -  is  the  founder  (Der  Dicbter  ist  der  Be  drd  S59 
.P 
Heidegger  recognises  this  in  H61derlin's  poetics  as  exemplified  in  EM  edokles  and  other 
works. 
In  this  way,  form  dissolves  into  negativity  where  that  which  was  embodied  is 
dispersed  into  and  throughout  the  conceptual.  This  progression  resembles  the  stages  of 
knowing  argued  by  Spinoza  whom  Eliot  had  translated.  In  his  Etbics,  Spinoza  puts  forth 
a  three-fold  theory  of  knowing  which  begins  with  fragmentary,  particular  perceptions, 
moving  to  a  level  of  adequate  ideas  and  generalisations,  and  if  followed  to  its  ends,  will 
ultimately  achieve  a  mystical,  intuitive  knowledge  of  particular  things  in  relations  to  their 
place  and  purpose  within  the  cosmic  order.  Neither  boundary  nor  form  are  found  for 
the  locating  of  the  subject  or  the  sacred  but  a  complete  dissolving  of  categories  in  this 
H61derlin-like  "flame",  which  is  not  extinguished  nor  is  the  fissure  through  which  it 
came  upon  the  subject  closed. 
For  Heidegger,  reading  H61derlin  means  being  confronted  with  the  sacred  space 
of  a  possible  "gathering  togcthee'  to  come  amidst  the  gap.  But  Heidegger  was  not 
attracted  to  H61derlin  because  of  the  literary  possibilities.  To  Heidegger,  literature  as  such 
has  nothing  in  common  with  the  sacred  -  i.  e.  the  realm  of  Being  -  but  it  has  far  more  in 
368  ibid. 
152 common  with  theology.  For  Heidegger,  theology  is  the  very  expression  of  the  oblivion 
of  Being.  As  Heidegger  aptly  stated,  Das  Heilige  läXt  sich  überhaupt  nicht  'theologisch' 
ausmachen,  denn  [..  ]  immer  doti,  wo  die  Theolqgie  aufkommt,  [hat]  der  Gott  schon  die  Flucht  begonnen 
C'Wherever  theology  comes  up,  the  god  has  been  on  the  run  for  quite  a  while'ý.  370  In 
this  way,  Heidegger  is  arguing  that  Being  and  the  sacred  have  vanished  when  a  figured 
god,  a  highest  being,  is  delimited  into  text  and  considered  to  be  the  most  powerful  thing 
in  a  great  chain  of  beings.  It  is  the  questioning  after  the  Being  of  A  these  beings  (das  Sein  des 
Seienden)  that  is  the  task  of  poetic  writing.  371When  a  text  is  made,  the  most  one  can  hope 
for  is  theology  -  talking  about  that  which  one  has  ceased  to  seek.  Heidegger  goes  on  to 
note  that  the  history  of  Beines  oblivion  thus  accumulates  in  the  act  of  ontotheology,  an 
ontology  that  is  entirely  theological.  This  is  where  literature  is  theology  and  theology  is 
literature  and  both  ultimately  fail  in  choosing  to  figure  Being  and  the  sacred  an-ddst 
images,  metaphors,  and  tropes  -  which  to  Heidegger's  mind  is  language  that  belongs  to 
the  realm  of  ontotheology  and  thus  to  the  oblivion  of  Being  and  the  sacred. 
In  The  Sad  Fortunes  of  Rev.  Amos  Barton,  Ehot's  narrator  makes  reference  to  the 
over-importance  placed  upon  'text'  in  reference  to  preaching: 
"Rather  a  low-bred  fellow,  I  think,  Barton,  '  said  Mr.  Pilgrim,  who  hated  the 
Reverend  Amos...  "I'hey  said  his  father  was  a  Dissenting  shoemaker;  and  he's 
half  a  Dissenter  himself.  Why,  doesn't  he  preach  extempore  in  that  cottage  up 
here,  of  a  Sundaýs  evening?  " 
"Tchawl"  -  this  was  Mr.  Hackies  favourite  interjection  -'that  preaching  without 
book!  s  no  good,  only  when  a  man  has  a  gift,  and  has  the  Bible  at  his  fingers' 
ends...  But  our  parson's  no  gift  at  all  that  way;  he  can  preach  as  good  a  sermon  as 
need  be  heard  when  he  writes  it  down.  But  when  he  tries  to  preach  wi'out  book, 
he  rambles  about,  and  doesn't  stick  to  the  text;  and  every  now  and  then  he 
flounders  about  Eke  a  sheep  as  has  cast  itself,  and  can't  get  on5ts  legs  again.  You 
369  ibid. 
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153 wouldn't  Eke  that,  Mrs.  Patten,  if  you  was  to  go  to  church  now?  "372 
In  Mr.  Hackit's  pronouncement  regarding  Amos  Barton's  failings  as  a  preacher,  his 
attempts  to  "preach  wi'out  book...  and  doesn't  stick  to  the  texe'  are  considered 
noteworthy,  even  for  Mrs.  Patten,  although  she  is  known  not  to  attend  church  at  all. 
That  the  text  is  adhered  to  is  the  important  question,  above  even  that  of  attendance 
where  such  deviations  would  actually  be  heard.  In  the  concerned  minds  of  the 
Shepperton  community,  Eliot  figures  within  the  text  of  Sad  Fortunes  of  Rev.  Amos  Barton  a 
fear  of  the  loss  of  'text'  as  a  key  with  which  one  can  divine  the  Divine.  As  noted  in  Amos 
Barton,  a  desire  to  hold  onto  a  tradition  of  systems,  "finished  by  keeping  'terms'  at 
Cambridge,  where  there  are  able  mathematicians,  and  butter  sold  by  the  yard,  is  not 
apparently  the  medium  through  which  Christian  doctrine  will  distil  as  welcome  dew  on 
withered  SOUIS11.373  There  is  a  need  to  have  "a  flexible  imagination  that  can  take  a 
leap"374beyond  such  restrictions  of  a  closed  system  in  order  to  begin  approacWng  the 
true  nature  of  Being  and  ultimately  the  face  of  the  sacred. 
Turning  to  the  role  of  literature  and  poetics,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in  the 
end,  Heidegger  considers  literature  more  a  problem  than  a  solution.  This  is  pointed  out 
in  the  Heideggerian  lectures  on  Nietzsche,  which  accompany  his  readings  of  H61derlin  in 
1934.  Nietzsche's  saying'God  is  dead'  is  the  key-word  of  Heidegger's  analysis  of  the 
disease  of  humanity  and  it  is  this  saying  which  restructures  both  Heidcggcr's 
interpretation  of  H61derlin  and  his  call  for  a  return  to  seeking  for  the  sacred.  For 
Heidegger,  the  literary  aspects  in  Nietzsche's  writing  actually  distorts  rather  than  clarifies 
its  pHosophical  content.  By  way  of  contrastý  as  noted  by  Martin  Schifer,  Heidegger 
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154 ultimately  sees  Nietzsche  as  a  dicbtender  Denker,  "a  poeticising  tl-ýinker'1375  whereas  -, 
H61derlin  is  a  denkender  Dicbter,  "a  thinking  poeel.  376 
Heidegger  accepts  Nietzsche  as  a  writer  of  literature,  but  he  finds  problems  in  his 
conclusions.  In  reference  to  Nietzsche's  statement  that  God  is  dead,  Heidegger  argues 
that  merely  stating  the  death  of  God  is  not  enough  to  rid  us  of  the  now-remaining 
ontotheological  schema.  On  the  contrary,  Heidegger's  opinion  is  that  this  schema  still 
exists  in  Nietzsche  and  it  does  so  more  powerfully  than  ever  before  in  the  entire  history 
of  Being.  The  Nietzschean  Cbermenscb  merely  takes  over  the  vacant  seat  of  the  newly 
killed  god.  In  the  Dbermensch!  s  'will  to  power',  Heidegger  finds  a  mill  of  ailh  a  will  that 
only  wills  itself  and  that  accomplishes  its  self-will  in  that  it  finds  its  own  power  mirrored 
in  the  'imprints'  it  leaves  in  the  world.  This  'will  to  will'  or  'will  ofwilP  is  always  on  the 
move,  will  always  outdo  itself,  and  will  return  in  new  forms,  new  stamps,  new  imprints 
and,  ironically,  new  fiterature.  3n 
The  only  thing  that  is  constant  in  this  steady  flow  of  forms  is  the  sclf-positing 
fact  that  there  is  a  form  that  keeps  attempting  to  master  chaos.  Or  -  to  use  a  term 
Heidegger  himself  comes  up  with  to  describe  this  movement  -  what  masters  the  eternal 
fiow  is  the  "Freibeit  der  Gestalt",  the  freedom  of  something  which  should  find  a  translation 
between  figure  and  statue.  378  In  this  way,  the  freedom  of  form,  or  rather  the  freedom  to 
form,  does  not  free  from  the  ontotheological  -  the  nevcr-ending  invention  of  new  forms 
will  rather  repeat  the  ontotheological  endlessly  as  Coleridge's  Ancient  Marincr  tells  his 
tale,  renewed  evermore  "like  night,  from  land  to  land"  in  some  ever  new  "strange  power 
of  speech".  379 
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155 In  light  of  this  eternal  return  of  forms  of  language,  there  is  to  be  no  resolution  to 
what  Nietzsche  set  out  to  overturn  -  merely  another  book  among  others.  We  are  back 
where  we  began.  Heidegger  readily  identifies  Nietzsche's  Zarathustra,  the  Gestalt  in  the 
centre  of  this  piece  of  literature,  with  his  creator.  The  figure  of  Zarathustra  would  then 
be  the  very  expression  of  the  philosopher's  figurative  power  that  distorts  the  potential  of 
his  thought.  Eliot  is  also  very conscious  of  this  possibility  and  the  'will  to  powee  that 
can  distort  the  'telling  the  simple  story.  '  As  the  narrator  is  quick  to  note  in  Sad  Fortunes  of 
Rev.  Amos  Batton: 
...  you  will  say  [reader]  ...  Surely  you  are  misrepresenting  the  facts.  //  Heaven 
forbidl  For  not  having  a  fertile  imagination,  as  you  perceive,  and  being  unable  to 
invent  thrilling  incidence  for  your  amusement,  my  only  merit  must  he  in  the 
faithfulness  with  which  I  represent  to  you  the  humble  experience  of  an  ordinary 
fellow-mortal.  I  wish  to  stir  your  sympathy  with  commonplace  troubles  -  to  win 
your  tears  for  real  sorrow-.  sorrow  such  as  may  Eve  next  door  to  you  -  such  as 
walks  neither  in  rags  nor  in  velvet,  but  in  very  ordinary  decent  apparel.  380 
Here  Eliot  strikes  the  key  issue  that  is  to  be  the  ultimate  task  of  writing  -  not  the  forming 
of  forms  -  but  Dicbtung,  the  telling  of  'truth.  This  is  what  Heidegger  sees  in  H61derlin 
apart  from  Nietzsche.  What  Heidegger  distinguishes  from  literature  as  Dicbtung,  first  of 
all  H61derlin's  Dicbtun  g,  has  nothing  to  do  with  writing  and  it  is  not  ultimately-  as 
Heidegger  asserts  throughout  The  Origin  oftbe  Work  ofArt-  aesthetics  itself.  Diebtungisa 
gift  of  truth  or,  as  Heidegger  puts  it,  authenticity  in,  for,  and  beyond  itself.  Diebtung  takes 
place  as  the  event  which  brings  Ricoeur's  'the  world  of  the  texe  and  'the  world  of  the 
reader',  which  is  opened  up  by  it,  into  Being.  Dicbtung  or  rruth'is  the  shock  of  being  in 
the  world.  And  if  language  is  the  "house  of  Being",  as  Heidegger  puts  it,  it  is  Dicbtung  or 
'Truth'  that  gives  form  to  this  home,  yet  also  displaces  it  at  the  same  time.  Butthcsort 
of  poetics  Heidegger  has  in  mind  does  not  display  the  artises  figurative  skills.  For 
380  George  Eliot,  Scenes  of  Clerical  Life,  p.  59 
156 Heidegger,  H61derlins  poetic  language  is  a  language  of  the  name.  The  world  named  in 
this  language  is  thus  opened  up  to  what  Heidegger  calls  a  'people'.  And  at  the  same  time 
this  language  immediately  falls  prey  to  the  oblivion  of  Being  when  being  used  in  daily 
intercourse.  But  the  autonomy  of  the  aesthetic  sphere  keeps  it  from  definite  decline.  For 
Heidegger  poetic  language  is  a  language  spoken  only  for  the  sake  of  language  itself. 
Poetic  language  is  not  instrumentalized  as  a  sign  for  the  purpose  of  communication  in 
the  way  it  happens  to  language  in  everyday  life.  Although  according  to  Heidegger's 
history  of  Being  the  world  of  ancient  Greece  begins  with  the  stories  told  by  Homer, 
Heidegger  does  not  consider  the  Homeric  myths  to  be  the  origin  of  this  world.  A 
people's  language  and  a  people's  world  do  not  originate  in  mythology  but  rather  it  is 
poetics  that  arise  nitbin  language  as  a  necessary  event,  because  it  is  only  when  poetics  as 
self-sufficient  language  arises  that  Being  -  and  thus  the  sacred  -  can  be  announced  and 
thereby'be'.  The'poetic  dwc1ling'  on  earth,  which  Heidegger's  lectures  on  H61derlin  in 
What  is  called  Tbinking?  reveal,  does  not  mean  a  return  to  a  life  sheltered  by  myth.  This 
'poetic  dwelling'  is  the  shock  of  the  emptiness  left  by  the  lack  of  the  sacred. 
This  is  not)  however,  a  return  to  a  Romantic  notion  of  the  power  of  mythology. 
This  is  an  affirmation  of  what  modernity  has  termed  the  autonomy  of  the  aesthetic 
sphere.  The  realm  of  the  aesthetic  secularises  the  enclosed  space  of  the  ýncicnt  sacred  in 
which  the  gods  used  to  appear.  The  sacred  can  be  experienced  when  language  is  spoken 
for  its  own  sake.  According  to  Heidegger,  H61derlin's  poetry  manages  to  catch  a  trace  of 
the  sacred  because  it  actually  reflects  the  impossibility  of  forcing  an  epiphany  into  Being. 
H61derlin  constantly  seeks  after  the  very  lack  of  sacred  names  in  modem  humanity.  For 
Heidegger  the  trace  of  the  sacred  is  thus  to  be  found  in  the  very  fragility  of  the 
H61derlinian  word.  Tl-ýs  word  is  deprived  of  the  only  function  it  has  in  the  modern 
world:  its  employment  of  a  communicative  sign.  What  retraces  the  sacred  in  H61derlin 
would  be  nothing  but  the  silence  that  comes  into  Being  by  his  words.  Heidegger  finds  in 
157 this  silence  of  the  sacred  (or  rather  'sacred  silence)  a  mouming  of  language,  which  is  also 
the  mouming  of  the  sacred  in  the  double  sense  of  the  genitive  through  H61derlin's 
mourning  for  the  vanished  gods  of  ancient  Greece  and  Christianity.  According  to 
Heidegger,  this  act  of  mourning  wiU  never  be  accomplished  as  a  Freudian  work  of 
mourning  which  overcomes  its  lost  object.  Neither  will  this  mourning  lose  itself  by 
clinging  to  this  object  in  a  melancholic  fashion.  Heidegger  presents  the  act  of  sacred 
mourning,  as  the  act  of  letting  the  vanished  gods  be  what  they  are:  vanished.  With  the 
absence  of  epiphany  andparmia,  H61derlin's  poetry  keeps  a  sacred  space  open  in  which 
a  god  could  show  up,  to  use  George  Eliot's  phrase,  as  'the  possible'.  Heidegger's  sacred  is 
the  transcendental  spacing  in  which  epiphany  could  happen  without  being  produced  by 
human  wifl.  Ilie  sacred  therefore  signifies  the  absence  of  religion  without  offering  a  new 
one.  The  sacred  is  the  absence  or  failure  of  the  name,  never  a  metapbor  or  a  trope, 
which  a  writer  would  be  able  to  create,  let  alone  master. 
Eliot  shows  this  sense  of  mourning  throughout  Scenes  of  ClericalLife.  Ibc  loss  of 
Nfilly  Barton  proves  to  be  the  salvation  of  Amos.  As  she  begins  to  fade  under  "the 
heaviness  of  trouble...  gentle;  uncomplaining  Millie  -  whose  delicate  body  was 
becoming  less  fit  for  all  that  had  to  be  done  between  rising  up  and  lying  down"381 
awakened  in  Amos  and  the  community  around  him  the  'possible'  of  true  community.  At 
her  death,  mourning  evokes  true  empathy: 
...  Amos,  for  the  first  time,  felt  that  he  was  alone  -  that  day  after  day,  month 
after  month,  year  after  year,  would  have  to  be  lived  through  without  Mlly's  love. 
Spring  would  come,  and  she  would  not  be  there;  summer,  and  she  would  not  be 
there;  and  he  would  never  have  her  again  with  him  by  the  fireside  in  the  long 
evenings.  'Me  seasons  all  seemed  irksome  to  his  thoughts;  and  how  dreary  the 
sunshiny  day  that  would  be  sure  to  comcl  She  was  gone  from  him;  and  he  could 
never  show  her  his  love  any  more,  never  make  up  for  on-ýissions  in  the  past  by 
filling  future  days  with  tenderness. 
381  George  Eliot,  Scenes  of  Clerical  Life,  p.  60. 
158 0  the  anguish  of  that  thought,  that  we  can  never  atone  to  our  dead  for 
the  stinted  affection  we  gave  them,  for  the  light  answers  we  returned  to  their 
plaints  or  their  pleadings,  for  the  EttIc  reverence  we  showed  to  that  sacred  human 
soul  that  lived  so  close  to  us,  and  was  the  divinest  thing  God  had  given  us  to 
knoW.  382 
This  sense  of  mourning,  carried  over  into  "Mr.  Giffil's  Love  Story"  which  begins  with 
Mr.  Gilfil's  sense  of  loss,  embodied  as  a  locked  room  to  which  he  had  the  key  -a  room 
that  is  the  Vicarage  now  inherited  from  Amos  Barton: 
But  there  was  a  chamber  in  Shepperton  Vicarage  which  told  a  different  story 
from  that  bare  and  cheerless  dining  room  -a  chamber  never  entered  by  any  one 
besides  Mr.  Gilfil  and  old  Martha  the  housekeeper...  the  blinds  of  this  chamber 
were  always  down,  except  one-quarter,  when  Martha  entered  that  she  might  air 
and  clean  it.  She  always  asked  Mr.  Gilfil  for  the  key,  which  he  kept  locked  up  in 
his  bureau...  Such  was  the  locked-up  chamber  in  Mr.  Gilfil's  house:  a  sort  of 
visible  symbol  of  the  secret  chamber  in  his  heart,  where  he  had  long  turned  the 
key  on  early  hopes  and  early  sorrows,  shutting  up  for  ever  all  the  passion  and  the 
poetry  of  his  Efe.  383 
This  sense  of  mourning  and  emptiness  is  passed  down  through  the  stories  as  a  constant. 
In  the  end  of  each  talc  ,  we  are  met  with  death  and  loss  -a  space  is  opened  and  mourning 
is  present.  As  the  narrator  of  "Mr.  Gilfll's  Love  Story"  notes,  humanity  is  in  a  state  of 
constant  erosion  as  "poor  mortals  [who]  are  often  little  better  than  wood-ashes": 
...  there  is  small  sign  of  the  sap,  and  the  leafy  freshness,  and  the  bursting  buds 
that  were  once  there;  but  wherever  we  see  wood-ashes,  we  know  that  all  that 
early  fullness  of  life  must  have  been.  I,  at  least,  hardly  ever  look  at  a  bent  old 
man,  or  a  wizened  old  woman,  but  I  see  also,  with  my  mind's  eye,  that  Past  of 
which  they  are  the  shrunken  remnant,  and  the  unfinished  romance  of  rosy  cheeks 
and  bright  eyes  seems  sometimes  of  feeble  interest  and  significance,  compared 
with  that  drama  of  hope  and  love  which  has  long  ago  reached  its  catastrophe, 
382  ibid.,  p.  7  1. 
383  ibid.,  p.  88. 
159 and  left  the  poor  soul,  like  a  dim  and  dusty  stage,  with  all  its  sweet  garden-scenes 
and  fair  perspectives  overturned  and  thrust  out  of 
sight.  384 
This  opening  left  by  death  and  later  remembered  in  mourning  is  not  filled  -  whether  it  is 
sorrow  for  the  death  of  MiUy  Barton,  the  sad  turns  of  fate  upon  Tina  Sarti  and  Maynard 
Gilfil's  love,  or  the  injustice  in  the  life  ofJanet  Dempster  at  the  hands  of  her  husband  - 
the  reader  is  left  without  true  closure.  Gaps  and  fracture  have  been  exposed,  but  where 
is  wholeness  then  to  come  from?  For  Heidegger,  this  is  the  space  that  awaits  the  coming 
of  the  sacred  and  the  coming  of  the  subject.  This  is  what  I  believe  Eliot  means  by 
(repentance'  within  the  context  of  her  third  story,  entitled  "Janet's  Repentance". 
Repentance  is  the  return  to  authentic  being  (metanda)  through  a  waiting  amidst  the  fissure 
opened  for  and  through  the  sacred.  It  is  a  place  of  destabilising  of  context  and  character 
as  a  turning  toward  the  'possible'.  It  is  a  place  where  language  fails  to  fix  certainty  and  its 
power  to  name  is  lost.  At  the  end  of  chapter  NXIV  of  "Janet's  Repentance",  we  see  this 
in  janees  sitting  beside  the  bed  of  her  husband,  Robert,  as  he  fades  into  death,  thus 
ending  this  relationship  of  abuse  which  she  has  been  veiled  behind: 
Suddenly  a  slight  movement,  Eke  the  passing  away  of  a  shadow,  visible  in  his 
face,  and  he  opened  his  eyes  full  on  Janet. 
It  was  almost  Eke  meeting  him  again  on  the  resurrection  morning,  after  the  night 
of  the  grave. 
'Robert,  do  you  know  me?  ' 
He  kept  his  eyes  fixed  on  her,  and  there  was  a  faintly  perceptible  motion  of  the 
Ups,  as  if  he  wanted  to  speak. 
But  the  moment  of  speech  was  for  ever  gone...  the  thick  veil  of  death  fell 
between  them,  and  her  Ups  touched  a  corpse.  385 
After  the  passing  of  her  husband,  Janet  seeks  confession  for  wrongs  she  has  done 
(indulging  in  drink,  slandering  Mr.  Tryan's  name)  and  confides  in  Mr.  Tryan  whom  she 
384  ibid.,  p.  87. 
160 sees  to  be  a  truly  kind  and  understanding  person.  As  she  goes  out  into  the  night,  she 
experiences  an  opening  into  the  place  of  the  sacred: 
So  she  went  out  into  the  dewy  starlight...  walked  on  quickly  till  she  turned  into 
the  fields;  then  she  slackened  her  pace  a  little,  enjoying  the  sense  of  solitude 
which  a  few  hours  before  had  been  intolerable  for  her.  The  Divine  Presence  did 
not  now  seem  far  off,  where  she  had  not  wings  to  reach  it;  prayer  itself  seemed 
superfluous  in  those  moments  of  calm  trust.  The  temptation  which  had  so  lately 
made  her  shudder  before  the  possibilities  of  the  future,  was  now  a  source  of 
confidence;  for  had  she  not  been  delivered  from  it?  Had  not  rescue  come  in  the 
extremity  of  danger?  Yes;  Infinite  Love  was  caring  for  her.  She  felt  like  a  little 
child  whose  hand  is  firn-dy  grasped  by  its  father,  as  its  frail  limbs  make  their  way 
over  the  rough  ground;  if  it  should  stumble,  the  father  will  not  let  it  go.  386 
As  the  narrator  describes  janees  awakening  at  this  point,  she  describes  entering 
into  the  sacred  as  one  whose  soul  is  baptised: 
That  walk  in  the  dewy  starlight  remained  for  ever  in  Jances  memory  as  one  of 
those  baptismal  epochs,  when  the  soul,  dipped  in  the  sacred  waters  of  joy  and 
peace,  rises  from  them  with  new  energies,  with  unalterable  longings.  387 
Yet  this  is  not  something  to  be  named,  only  marked  by  'unalterable  longings'.  Like  the 
sacred  name  as  put  forward  by  H61derUn,  nan-dng  of  the  sacred  wiU  fail  to  dominate. 
Heidegger's  reading  of  H61derlin  can  be  read  to  aim  at  nothing  less  than  an  attempt  at 
repeating  this  failure  or  at  least  experiencing  its  'shock'  in  mourning  and  'unalterable 
longing'.  It  is  the  writer  who  stands  in  this  troubling  gap,  as  Empedokles  forever  falling 
into  the  fire  'divinely  gleaming,  stands  between  his  people  and  the  absent  god.  But 
rather  than  close  this  fissure  by  trying  to  dominate  or  control,  the  writer's  true  vocation  is 
to  prevent  such  closure  by  continually  reopening  this  sacred  space  in-between  them  -  das 
Zuischen  des  Heiligen  as  Heidegger  calls  it;  in-between  the  lost  gods  and  the  possibility  of 
385  ibid.,  p.  328. 
386  ibid.,  p.  337. 
161 the  gods  to  come;  388  in-between  the  withdrawing  gods  and  remaining  humanity,  and  in- 
between  all  singular  human  beings.  Each  of  these  human  beings  falls  back  onto  his  or 
her  fragile  Being-unto-deatb.  Being-unto-death  undermines  an  instrumentalization  of  the 
world  and  thus  opens  up  the  possibility  of  being  with  others.  The  world  of  the  sacred 
spacing  of  in-between  thus  closely  resembles  the  world  Heidegger  has  outlined  in  Being 
per  being.  Since  the  poetic  act  has  and  Time  as  the  world  of  Eigentlicbkeit,  as  the  world  ofpro 
to  open  up  this  ever-fracturing  space  of  the  in-between,  it  is  first  of  aH  the  poet  who  is 
threatened  by  the  failure  of  this  act.  The  uncontrollable  turning  of  the  name  turns 
against  the  poet  as  poet.  In  the  first  lecture  on  H61derlin,  Heidegger  talks  about  a  pain  of 
Being  which  is  also  a  pain  of  the  sacred  and  moreover  it  is  the  writet's  pain:  the  pain 
which  keeps  the  fissure  open,  ultimately  given  the  vocation  of  'writing  thepain  of  naming 
the  failure'  instead  of  failing  to  name.  In  The  Origin  of  the  Work  ofArt,  written  at  the  same 
time  as  his  lectures  on  H61derlin  ,  Heidegger  uses  a  word  for  this  openness  of  the  fissure 
-  this  sacred  space  opened  up  by  the  shock  of  Dicbtung  or  'Truth'  is  caUcd  Gestalt  - 
'figuring'. 
Figuring  serves  as  borderline  to  the  safcty-zone  in  which  the  failure  of  the  name 
is  turned  into  the  name  of  fallure  and  in  which  at  the  same  time  one  can  get  rid  of  the 
figurative  language  of  the  ontotheological.  The  keeping  of  the  name  and  the  deletion  of 
figural  speech  in  H61derlin's  Diebtung  are  accomplished  by  enclosing  this  Diebtung  in  the 
figure  as  such:  the  Gestalt.  It  is  a  form  of  poetic  madness  that  breaks  in  when  this 
figurative  borderline  dividing  the  metaphors  from  the  names,  and  the  names  from 
destruction,  is  transgressed. 
The  Gestalt  of  the  sacred  is  never  there  but  always  a  trace  to  withdraw  and  at  the 
same  time  a  shock  to  come.  It  is  the  gfFt  ofform  rather  than  the  Nietzscheanpoxer  toform. 
The  Heideggerian  figuring  of  the  sacred  brings  -  though  hidden  -  is  an  imprint  or  type 
387  ibid. 
162 that  draws  the  line  separating  that  which  remains  whole  -  the  holy  -  from  that  which 
becomes  scattered  in  every  day  life  -  the  profane.  A  withdrawal  and  retreat  of  the 
figurative  in  language,  of  its  metaphors  and  tropes,  is  sign  of  the  sacred,  and  at  the  same 
time  this  withdrawal  retraces  the  original  figure  as  the  Gestalt.  The  stability  of  the  Gestalt 
keeps  the  don-ýination  of  the  failure  of  the  name  from  failing.  The  imprint  of  the  Gestalt  is 
never  there  but  always  yet  to  come  and  already  gone.  This  is  analogous  to  what,  in  the 
graphical  sense,  Derrida  means  by  'writing'  in  his  earlier  work,  particularly  Of 
Grammatolqgv.  Heidegger  is  acutely  aware  of  the  problem  of  Gestalt.  He  defines  the  sacred 
spacing  as  a  'trace'  instead  -  i.  e.  the  very  word  Deffida  win  later  take  up  as  a  synonym  for 
writing  and  the  term  used  by  Levinas.  What  safeguards  the  purity  of  language  in  poetry 
is  now  madness  itself-  Not  the  H61derlinian  madness  transgressing  the  borderline  of 
Gestalt,  but  -  Heidegger  uses  Trakrs  poetic  term,  which  is  of  course  not  to  be  taken 
metaphorically  -a  sanfter  Wabnsihn,  a  "gentle  madness"389.  This  madness  is  madness 
because  it  sweeps  language  away  by  its  own  destructive  power  of  naming.  This  madness 
is  gentle  because  in  sweeping  language  away  it  also  effects  the  gathering  of  language  in 
poetic  naming.  Heidegger  tries  to  think  this  sweeping  away  and  this  gathering  of  speech 
in  one,  at  once,  as  gentle  madness.  Thus  he  tries  to  get  rid  of  the  last  ontothcological 
figure  haunting  his  own  discourse:  the  Gestalt,  which  was  to  keep  open  the  sacred  in- 
between.  'Gentle  madness'  can  be  seen  as  an  alternate,  catastrophic  name  for  the  sacred: 
a  madness  which  loses  the  sacred  at  the  very  point  it  gains  it,  and  vice  versa.  But  if  one 
wants  to  call  the  sacred  in-between  held  open  by  Gestalt  a  gathering  of  a  people  amidst 
poiesis,  one  would  have  to  describe  this  gathering  primarily  as  a  fragile  network  opened  up 
by  failed  readings.  To  Heidegger,  H61derlin's  Dicbtung  conveys  notWng  but  the 
incommensurable  shock  of  the  'un-understandable',  and  it  conveys  the  sacred  only  in 
that  it  does  so.  The  people's  community  Heidegger  has  in  mind  would  be  held  together 
388  Schafer,  ibid. 
163 by  nothing  but  everybody's  failure  to  read.  11iis  theme  is  carried  forward  by  Eliot  as  she 
challenges  the  reader  in  her  next  novel,  Adam  Bede  and  its  now-famous  chapter  XVII 
"Where  the  Story  Pauses  A  Iltdc".  Here,  the  reader  is  asked  to  'see'  rather  than  merely 
read,  marking  her  acknowledgement  of  the  failure  of  reading  alone  to  provoke  and 
awaken  the  'possible,  that  is  'clothed  in  human  form.  ' 
389  Schafer,  ibid.  See  also  lecture  IX  in  Martin  Heidegger,  What  is  Called  7hinking?.  pp.  88ff. 
164 8.0  Adam  Bede  -  Poetics  of  the  Possible  and  learning  to  'see' 
8.1  Iconographic  Rcading  and  Chaptcr  XVII 
So  that  ye  may  have 
Clear  images  beforejourgladden  W  ges 
Of  nature's  unambitious  underwood 
And  flowers  that  prosper  in  the  shade.  And  when 
I  speak  of  such  among  the  flock  as  swerved 
Or  fell,  those  only  shall  be  singled  out 
Upon  whose  lapse,  or  error,  something  more 
Than  brotherly  forgiveness  may  attend.  390 
Adam  Bede  is  an  exercise  in  bringing  "clear  images"  before  the  reader's  "gladden'd 
eyes".  George  Eliot  opens  her  story  by  citing  this  passage  from  Wordsworth's  The 
Excursion,  of  which  Adam  Bede  can  be  seen  as'a  prose  echo.  In  the  poem  by  Wordsworth, 
a  pastor  mourns  his  dead  parishioner  Ellen,  who  is  buried  next  to  her  dead  baby  and  is 
described  as  "a  virtuous  women,  in  pure  youth',  'delivered  to  distress  and  shame'  by  a 
lover  who  breaks  his  promise  of  fidelity  and  leaves  her  alone  when  she  becomes 
pregnant.  It  is  interesting  that  of  aU  the  portions  of  The  Excursion,  this  is  the  stanza  which 
George  Eliot  chooses  to  reference,  one  that  is  an  admonition  to  see  clearjl  images  that  are 
before  the  reader.  Given  this  agenda  by  George  Eliot  from  the  outset,  I  would  like  to 
propose  a  reading  of  Adam  Bede  that  observes  the  iconographic  signifiers  of  her  narrative 
and  sees  them  for  what  they  are.  In  this  regard,  I  will  be  utilising  NEeke  Bal's  definition  of 
'iconographic  signifier'  as  that  which  the  artist  utilises  to 
help  the  reader  recognise  the  preceding  visual  tradition,  which  in  turn  refers  to 
the  verbal  text;  in  the  second  case  the  recognition  is  directly  related  to  the  text 
and  works  with  the  texes  verbal  devices.  [We  utilise]  the  term  "iconograpl-dc 
390  William  Wordsworth,  The  Excursion  (1814),  book  VI,  lines  651-658.  Cited  on  the  title  page  of  the 
original  printing  of  Adam  Bede  by  William  Blackwood  and  Sons  in  1859.  Reprinted  in  Adam  Bede 
(Oxford:  Oxford  Classics,  1996)  p.  2. 
165 sign"  for  the  sign  that  travels  the  visual-verbal  route.  The  sign  based  upon  the 
solely  verbal  reference  then  falls  under  the  more  encompassing  concept  of 
intertexuality  and  exemplifies  the  subcategory  of  pre-textual  thematic 
reference.  391 
As  noted  by  Valentine  Cunningham,  "the  distinction  of  Adam  Bede  is  to  tell  a  story,  and 
also  tell  about  telling  a  story.  This  is  a  novel  about  obscure  lives,  and  also  about  Low  to 
be  a  novel  about  obscure  JiVeSII.  392  More  than  'reading'  in  a  traditional  sense,  George 
Eliot  wants  the  reader  to  'see'  the  world  by  'viewing'  well.  Inthiswaythereis  more  to 
'reading'Adam  Bede  than  merely  acknowledging  the  words  on  the  page.  11iis  is  an 
attempt  at  creating  a  bridge  between  the  visual  and  the  verbal  accounts  of  reality  to  bring 
forward  that  which  is  without  language  and  yet  has  meaning. 
Adam  Bede  is  a  sentient  novel,  fully  aware  of  the  story  it  is  portraying  and  equally 
aware  that  it  is  being'read'by  the  reading  subject.  Akin  to  SamuelJohnson's  statement 
in  "Preface  to  Shakespeare",  Eliot  takes  seriously  the  edict  that  "the  end  of  writing  is  to 
instruct".  393  Additionally,  this  is  a  narrative  that  finds  part  of  its  genesis  as  a  reported 
history,  told  to  Eliot  by  her  Aunt.  Eliot's  choice  not  to  record  her  Aunes  tale,  but  to  tell 
it  herself  moves  this  narrative  to  a  form  that  is  neither  fiction  nor  fact,  yet  is  more  than 
both.  As  noted  by  Cunningham: 
It's  M  y  Aunes  Story  -a  narration  of  George  Elioesown,  her  own  design,  her 
particular  narrative  blend,  the  product  of  a  real,  five  author,  one  who  is  neither 
dead  nor  disappeared  Cin  those  curious  formulas  of  Roland  Barthes  and  Michel 
Foucault),  the  written  sum  of  all  her  intentions,  beliefs,  philosophies,  her  various 
discourses  (as  they  say),  her  assumptions  about  how  lives  and  stories  should  go. 
It's  also  My  Aunt's  Story  -a  historically  rooted  narration,  a  story  steeped  in  the 
real,  datable,  historical  world  of  real  lives,  actual  lo&les,  living  persons  and 
391  Mieke  Bal.  Reading  "Rembrandt":  Beyond  the  Word-Iinage  Opposition.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  199  1)  p.  184. 
392  Valentine  Cunningham,  'Introduction  to  Adam  Bede.  '  in  George  Eliot's  Adam  Bede  (Oxford:  Oxford 
Classics,  1996)  p.  viii. 
393  Samuel  Johnson,  "Preface  to  Shakespeare'  cited  in  M.  H.  Abrams,  op.  cit.,  p.  19. 
166 tractable  bits  of  religious  history  and  social  circumstance.  Again,  it's  also  My 
AunesStog  -a  story,  emphatically  a  story;  a  poeticization,  a  rhetoricization,  a 
fictionalising  of  a  history  and  a  philosophy.  This  is  a  text  obedient  and 
susceptible  to  the  constraints  and  conventions  of  numerous  available  narrative 
forms  past  and  present.  394 
Eliot  strives  in  her  poetics  to  show  that  there  are  certain  laws  that  apply  in  both  the 
fictive  and  historical  realities,  utilising  the  alignment  of  the  two  worlds  as  a  reciprocal 
testimonial  to  the  truth  of  each  -  each  'world'backs  up  the  claims  of  the  other.  For 
example,  life  has  cause  and  effect  in  both  the  world  of  Adam  Bede  and  the  world  of  the 
reader  and  actions  do  have  their  consequences,  albeit  the  difference  between  choice  and 
determinism  is  often  blurred.  In  Chapter  XVI  "links",  the  Rector,  Mr.  Irwine,  speaks  to 
Arthur  Donnithome  of  the  'Nemesis'  that  is  the  'unpitying'  nature  of  consequences  due 
to  one's  'deeds': 
'A  man  can  never  do  anything  at  variance  with  his  own  nature.  He  carries  within 
him  the  germ  of  his  most  exceptional  action:  and  if  we  wise  people  make 
eminent  fools  of  ourselves  on  any  particular  occasion,  we  must  endure  the 
legitimate  conclusion  that  we  carry  a  few  grains  of  folly  to  our  one  ounce  of 
wisdom...  'Our  deeds  carry  their  terrible  consequences...  consequences  that  are 
hardly  ever  confined  to  ourselves.  And  it  is  best  to  fix  our  minds  on  that 
certainty,  instead  of  considering  what  may  be  the  elements  of  excuse  for  US.  '395 
Eliot  shifts  from  the  fictive  realm  of  her  created  characters  to  address  the  reading  subject 
directly  in  Chapter  =  'qbe  Next  Morning".  These  actions  or  'deeds'  reflected  upon 
in  the  fictive  dimension  in  Chapter  XVI  "links"  that  determine  one's  subjectivity  and  arc 
"hammered  home  in  narrative  reflections"396  by  the  narrator  to  the  reader  amidst  the 
narrative: 
Our  deeds  determine  us,  as  much  as  we  determine  our  deeds;  and  until  we  know 
394  Valentine  Cunningham,  op.  cit.,  p.  xxxvi.  395  George  Eliot,  Adam  Bede,  pp.  172  -  173. 
167 what  has  been  or  will  be  the  particular  combination  of  outward  with  inward  facts, 
which  constitutes  a  man's  critical  actions,  it  will  be  better  not  to  think  ourselves 
wise  about  his  character.  397 
The  nature  of  determinism  and  causality  is  questioned  in  both  the  fictive  and  historical 
reality  and  this  synchronicity  gives  a  testimony  to  the  truth  of  each  realm's  claim:  the 
fictive  supports  the  historical  and  the  historical  supports  the  fictive. 
Ilie  claims  of  subjectivity  are  also  supported  in  such  a  manner.  In  the  case  of 
Dinah  Morris,  her  identity  is  self-creating  and  self-sustaining  as  evidenced  in  her  resolute 
assertion:  'I  am  Dinah  Morris!  As  Cunningham  notes, 
this  is  clearly  an  T  worth  attending  to,  whatever  we  might  have  thought  before 
of  mill-girls,  rural  eloquence,  provincial  intelligence,  and  Nonconformist  religious 
sincerity.  The  banished,  muted,  disregarded  selfhood  of  the  Victorian  margin 
crowds  thus  on  to  the  centre-stage,  in  an  arranged  renovation  of  sympathy  and 
imagination  that  has  the  male,  scathing,  educated  and  uneducated  Anglican 
audience  awed  into  silence.  398 
The  query  in  the  opening  sentence  of  The  Im  pressions  of  Tbeopbrastus  Sucb,  "it  is  my  habit  to 
give  an  account  to  myself  of  the  characters  I  meet  with:  can  I  give  any  true  account  of 
My  oWn?  "399,  is  responded  to  in  Dinah  Morris'  declaration  of  identity:  we  can  make  an 
account  of  ourselves  and  in  many  respects  are  the  only  ones  who  can.  The  first  person 
singular  of  Dinah  Morris  stands  against  any  other  characterisation  of  her  -  she  is  who 
she  is  because  she  says  so.  (Ms  has  particular  resonance  in  Dinah  Morris  as  the 
incarnate  "I  am"  who  is  the  new  Adam,  as  shall  be  discussed  in  further  depth.  )  In  this 
way,  George  Eliot  through  the  narrative  of  Adam  Bede 
...  exactly  mirrors,  and  thus  mightily  animates  and  cnergises,  the  struggle  by 
whole  segments  of  English  society  and  geography  to  be  heard  and  seen  in 
396  Valentine  Cunningham,  p.  xxx.  397  George  Eliot,  op.  cit.,  p.  313.  398  Valentine  Cunningham,  op.  cit.,  p.  xix.  399  GeorgeEliot,  7he  Impressions  of  7heophratus  Such  (1879)  (London:  Everyman  Press,  1995)  p.  3. 
168 Victorian  England,  to  be  taken  seriously,  to  be  known  for  themselves,  and  to 
have  their  selfhood,  their  identity,  their  name  recognised,  in  the  pages  of  the 
English  Novel...  For  George  Eliot,  being  realistic  and  true  to  fife  will  result  in  a 
fiction  whose  plot  exemplifies,  inexorably,  some  such  laws  of  the  material  and 
human  world.  400 
Identity  and  the  'selfing'  of  the  subject  are  central  to  Eliot's  textuality.  In  Chapter  XVII 
of  Adam  Bede,  Eliot  repeatedly  refers  to  the  'reader'  directly  -  acknowledging  that  the  one 
who  reads  the  story  is  to  be  identified  and  to  be  identifying  oneselE  While  H61derlin  in 
Empedokles  only  longed  for  the  readcr  to  complete  the  hero's  journey,  Eliot  calls  out 
specificaUy  through  direct  discourse  to  the  reader,  binding  one  to  the  fictive  encounter  as 
a  member  in  the  cast  of  characters  and  expanding  the  identity  of  the  reading  subject  to  a 
mvthic  level.  As  noted  by  Cunningham: 
j -- 
...  it  is  also  the  case  that  George  Eliot  had,  and  just  as  foundadonauy,  been 
influenced  by  the  argument  that  for  a  narrative  to  have  any  force  of  a  religious  or 
sacred  nature  -  for  it  to  be  great  in  the  way  she  wanted  -  it  would  have  to 
amalgamate  the  historical  and  the  philosophical  with  the  poetic  so  as  to  comprise 
the  myd-dc.  This  was  the  line  of  argument  adopted  by  David  Friedrich  Strauss 
about  the  Bible.  401 
Yet  while  it  was  an  argument  adopted  by  Strauss,  it  was  not  truly  actualised.  In  this  way 
Eliot  picks  up  where  the  'Concluding  Dissertation!  of  Strauss  failed  -  to  realisc  a  "true 
fiction"  of  the  fife  ofjesus  that  serves  as  apoedcframe  through  which  to  view  life. 
Addressing  the  reader,  Eliot  makes  this  note: 
But  you  must  have  perceived  long  ago  that  I  have  no  lofty  vocation,  and  that  I 
aspire  to  give  no  more  than  a  faithful  account  of  men  and  things  as  they  have 
miirored  themselves  in  my  mind.  The  mirror  is  doubtless  defective;  the  outlines 
will  sometimes  be  disturbed;  the  reflection  faint  or  confused;  but  I  feel  as  much 
bound  to  tell  you,  as  precisely  as  I  can,  what  that  reflection  is,  as  if  I  were  in  the 
400  Valentine  Cunningham,  ibid.,  pp.  viii,  xxx. 
401  ibid.,  P.  xxxv. 
169 witness-box  narrating  my  experience  on  oath.  402 
M.  H.  Abram  states  that  "as  late  as  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  important  critics 
continued  to  illustrate  the  concept  of  imitation  by  the  nature  of  a  looking  glass".  403  In 
, gen  Weitbers,  this  "mirror"  is  located  within  the  artist  reflec  ng  Goethe's  Die  Leiden  desjun  ti 
the  Ideal  onto  the  blank  page: 
...  I  feel  the  presence  of  the  Almighty  Who  created  us  in  His  own  image,  and  the 
breath  of  that  universal  love  which  sustains  us,,  as  we  float  in  an  eternity  of 
bliss  ...  I  often  think  with  longing,  Oh,  If  only  I  could  express  it,  could  breathe 
onto  paper  all  that  lives  so  warm  and  full  within  me,  that  it  might  become  the 
mirror  of  my  soul,  as  my  soul  is  the  mirror  of  the  infinite  God!  404 
In  this  dimension  of  Goethe's  rendering,  the  reading  subject  is  invited  into  a  house  of 
mirrors  -  the  writer's  soul  mirroring  the  Ideal  mirrored  from  God  which  is  mirrored 
onto  the  page  to  be  mirrored  onto  the  reader.  Yet  Elioes  poetic  mirror  "is  doubtless 
defective;  the  outlines  will  sometimes  be  disturbed;  the  reflection  faint  or  confused". 
She  is  aware  that  what  is  being  offered  before  the  reader  is  not  a  mimesis  , 
but  a  disturbed 
outline  which  frames  and  focuses  the  reader's  attention  for  viewing  reality.  Given  the 
scope  of  her  project  as  suggested  by  the  choice  of  title  Adam  Bede405,  George  Eliot  utilises 
her  narrative  project  to  suggest  a  Mewing'  of  humanity  and  history  via  this  narrative 
frame.  With  regard  to  'framing,  I  refer  to  Jonathan  Culler's  assertion  that 
since  the  phenomena  criticism  deals  with  are  signs,  forms  with  socially- 
constituated  meanings,  one  might  try  to  think  not  of  context  but  of  tbeframin 
,g  of 
sign.  r  how  are  signs  constituted  (frameý  by  various  discursive  practices, 
institutional  arrangements,  systems  of  value,  serniotic  mechanisms...  The 
402  George  Eliot,  Adam  Bede  -  1859  (Oxford:  Oxford  Classics,  1996)  p.  175. 
403  M.  H.  Abrams,  The  Mirror  and  the  Lamp  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1953)  p.  32. 
404  Johann  Wolfgang  Von  Goethe,  "The  Sorrows  of  Young  Werther"  from  Goethe:  7he  Collected 
Works  Volume  11,  ed.  David  E.  Wellbury  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1988)  p.  6.  (entry  of 
1  O'h  May  177  1). 
405  "Adam  Bede'  brings  together  the  references  to  'Adam',  who  in  the  biblical  account  of  Genesis  is  the 
first  created  human,  and  Venerable  'Bede'  whose  Ecclesiastical  History  of  the  Church  is  an  ancient 
accounting  of  the  'history'  of  the  church. 
170 expressionframing  the  sign  has  several  advantages  over  context:  it  reminds  us  that 
framing  is  something  we  do;  it  hints  of  the  framing  up  Ofalsifying  evidence 
beforehand  in  order  to  make  someone  appear  guiltyý...  and  it  eludes  the 
incipient  positivism  of  'contexe  by  aHuding  to  the  serniotic  function  of  framing  in 
art,  where  the  frame  is  determining,  setting  off  the  object  or  event  as  art,  and  yet 
the  frame  itself  may  be  nothing  tangible,  pure  articulation.  406 
By  the  creation  of  visual-verbal  signs,  George  Eliot  recovers  that  which  can  be  lost  and 
submerged  andframes  it  for  the  reader,  both  undoing  institutional  arrangements  that 
hinder  a  proper  'reading'  and,  at  the  same  time,  offering  a  re-imagined  poetics  through 
which  to  view  life.  In  Chapter  XVII,  "In  Which  the  Story  Pauses  A  little,  "  George  Eliot 
states  that  her  thesis  is  "to  teR  my  simple  story,  without  trying  to  make  things  seem  better 
than  they  were;  dread  nothing,  indeed,  but  falsity,  which,  in  spite  of  one's  best  efforts, 
there  is  reason  to  dread.  Falsehood  is  so  easy,  truth  so  difficult".  407 
To  illustrate  this  thesis,  George  Eliot  goes  on  to  use  an  illustration  ofillustration: 
The  pencil  is  conscious  of  a  delightful  facility  in  drawing  a  griffin  -  the  longer  the 
claws,  and  the  larger  the  wings,  the  better;  but  the  marvellous  facility  which  we 
n-ýistook  for  genius,  is  apt  to  forsake  us  when  we  want  to  draw  a  real 
unexaggerated  lion.  408 
In  this  way  George  Eliot  'draws'  an  iconographic  sign  that  travels  the  visual-verbal 
route.  'Falsehood'  is  not  explained  by  Eliot  as  much  as  it  isponrayed  through  the  act  of 
visual  poetics  which  subvert  written  language  and  thereby  frees  text  through  this  act  of 
intertexuality  in  grafting  the  verbal  to  the  visual  -  in  order  to  understand  'falsehood',  one 
must  see  as  well  as  understand  it.  Visual  poetics  forces  the  reader  to  ask  what  the  visual 
counterpart  of  a  word  is.  'Falsehood'  in  this  instance  is  tethered  with  an  image  -a 
mythical  griffin  -  which  creates  a  sense  of  "density'  through  the  verbal-visual  tethering. 
406  Jonathan  Culler,  Framing  the  Sign:  Criticism  and  Its  Institutions.  (Oxford:  Blackwell,  1988)  p.  ix. 
407  George  Eliot,  Adam  Bede,  p.  177. 
408  ibid. 
171 'Density'  in  this  instance  refers  to  that  which  is  defined  by  Nelson  Goodman  as 
conveying  a  bridged  intertexuality  of  visual  and  verbal: 
[Densi6i  is]  the  fundamental  inseparability  of  individual  signs,  as  opposed  to 
discreteness.  This  view  eliminates  at  once  difference  between  discourse  and 
image...  the  same  density  that  characterises  visual  texts  obstructs  the 
propositional  clarity  of  verbal  texts...  This  recognition  means  that  the  difference 
between  verbal  and  visual  texts  is  no  longer  one  of  the  status  and  delimitation  of 
the  signs  that  constitute  them.  And  the  visual  model,  apparently  predominant, 
overwhelms  the  concrete  particularity  of  the  signifier,  giving  rise  to  the 
"cloudiness"  in  each  medium...  language  is  as  dense  as  pictures.  409 
The  use  of  visual  poetics  allows  for  an  expansion  of  meaning  and  ultimately  a  density 
that  makes  visible  that  which  can  (and  often  does)  get  overlooked.  What  is  possible  is 
the  framing  of  that  which  language  cannot  display.  The  sign  based  upon  the  solely 
verbal  reference  then  falls  under  the  more  encompassing  concept  of  intertexuality  and 
exemplifies  the  subcategory  of  pre-textual  thematic  reference. 
As  a  reference  to  this  act  of  intertexuality  between  the  verbal  and  visual,  George 
Eliot  proceeds  to  refer  the  reader  in  Chapter  XVII  to  the  works  of  the  sixteenth  century 
Dutch  Realists: 
It  is  for  this  rare,  precious  quality  of  truthfulness  that  I  delight  in  many  Dutch 
paintings,  which  lofty-minded  people  despise.  I  find  a  source  of  delicious 
sympathy  in  these  faithful  pictures  of  a  mon6tonous  homely  existence,  which  has 
been  the  fate  of  so  many  more  among  my  fellow-mortals  than  a  life  of  pomp  or 
of  absolute  indigence,  of  tragic  suffering'or  of  world-stirring  actions...  'Fohl'  says 
my  idealistic  friend,  'what  vulgar  detailsi"  410 
Dutch  Realism  created  a  remarkable  shift  in  sixteenth-century  art  through  its  seeming 
409  Mieke  Bal,  op.  cit.,  pp.  13-14.  Citing  the  notion  of  "density"  in  reference  to  Nelson  Goodman's 
Languages  ofArt.  An  Approach  to  a  Theory  of  Symbols  (Indianapolis:  Hackett,  1976). 
410  George  Eliot,  Adam  Bede,  p.  177. 
172 lack  of  discrimination  regarding  the  detail  considered  germane  to  a  given  work.  41,  No 
detail  could  be  considered  irrelevant  -a  stray  dog,  a  fallen  tree  branch,  an  overturned 
water  bucket.  Each  item  must  be  considered  if  the  whole  is  to  be  truly  framed.  No  sign 
is  therefore  neutral  and  is  valued  to  the  sense  of  wholeness  for  the  composition. 
Furthermore,  as  the  verbal  calls  to  the  visual,  a  desire  in  illustration  is  provoked  into  a 
tension  between  verbal  and  visual.  This  provoked  moment,  where  sign  is  now  the  event 
of  the  visual  and  verbal  exchange,  creates  'framing.  Moving  this  notion  to  reading  and 
writing  text,  one  can  engage  is  what  Bal  terms  "iconographic  readine': 
[Iconographic  reading]  is  a  discursive  mode  of  reading  because  it  subordinates 
the  visually  represented  element  to  something  else,  thus  privileging  the  symbol  at 
the  expense  of  the  icon,  while  displacing  the  indexicality  that  allowed  this 
. 
pby  means,  literally,  writing  by  means  of  images.  It  is  serniosis  in  the  first  place.  1conogra 
this  challenge  to  the  unwarranted  assumption  that  visual  art  is  iconic  and  verbal 
art  symbolic  that  turns  the  iconographic  mode  of  reading  into  a  powerful  critical 
tool,  a  tool  that  can  be  used  to  undermine  the  opposition  between  word  and 
image.  412 
Bal  is  referring  to  a  'reading'  of  paintings  in  tl-ds  instance,  yet  the  principle  remains  the 
same  for  the  'reading'  of  text.  Iconographic  reading  allows  for  a  powerful  release  from 
both  language  and  image  and  approach  a  reclaiming  of  what  is  lost  when  each  (language 
and  image)  are  isolated  into  distinction  from  the  other. 
In  the  case  of  Adam  Bede,  the  reader  is  prompted  to  view/read  the  narrative  and 
recognise  the  'density'  of  the  underlying  story  that  can  so  easily  be  overlooked  -  the  role 
of  women,  the  question  of  class,  the  forgotten  rural  life,  the  face  of  God.  In  this  way, 
George  Eliot  juxtaposes  the  evoked  against  the  narrated  story  (for  example,  the  image  of 
41  1  Hugh  Whitemeyer  makes  an  extensive  study  of  George  Eliot's  knowledge  of  the  visual  composition 
in  George  Eliot  and  the  Visual  Arts  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  1979).  In  speaking  of  her  use 
of  portraiture  in  relation  to  her  character  development,  Whiterneyer  holds  that  Eliot  in  Scenes  of 
Clerical  Life  and  Adam  Bede  was  "primarily  concerned  to  show  that  looks  do  mirror  personality.  that 
there  are,  as  G.  H.  Lewes  put  it,  "subtle  connections  between  physical  and  mental  organisatiorf',  p.  45. 
412  Mieke  Bal,  op.  cit.,  p.  178. 
173 humanity's  Fall  from  Grace  against  the  image  of  Hetty  Sorrel's  fall  in  the  garden  of 
Hayslope,  the  image  ofjesus  against  the  image  of  Dinah  Morris)  in  order  to  let  them 
interact  and  to  let  the  tensions  between  the  stories  produce  new  meanings.  As  Bal  notes, 
"Iconographic  reading  tends  to  obliterate  the  other  story  because  stories  are  sometimes 
so  generally  known  that  rcadcr/viewcrs  have  difficulty  realising  to  what  extent  the  visual 
work  responding  to  the  story  signifies  its  own  story".  413  This  is  similar  to  John  Ruskin's 
use  of  utpicturapoiesis  throughout  Modern  Painters  where  painting  and  writing  are  used 
together  as  hermeneutic  lens  for  the  interpretation  of  true  'poetry'.  According  to  Ruskin, 
"Painting  is  properly  to  be  opposed  to  speaking  and  wrifing,  but  not  to  poetg.  Both 
painting  and  speaking  are  methods  of  expression.  Poetry  is  the  employment  of  either  for 
the  noblest  pUrpoSeS.  "414  For  Ruskin,  it  is  in  bringing  works  of  art  together  -  the  visual 
and  the  textual  -  that  allows  for  "Great  art...  produced  by  men  who  feel  acutely  and 
nobly  ...  some  sort  of  expression.  "415  As  George  Landow  notes,  "It  is  thus  particularly 
appropriate  that  a  work  [Modern  Painters]  which  had  been  undertaken  to  defend  the  value 
of  painting  should  have  referred  to  the  principle  of  utpidura.  Poiesix,  for  throughout  the 
Renaissance  and  eighteenth  century,  poetry  and  painting  had  been  juxtaposed  as  a  means 
of  defending  the  prestige  of  the  visual  art.  "416 
8.2  (Wo)men  in  the  Garden 
George  Eliot  offers  an  interesting  (rc)reading  of  the  Genesis  account  of  humanity's  Fall 
in  the  Garden  of  Eden.  As  opposed  to  offering  a  dualism  between  the  sexes  that  results 
in  a  view  of  women  as  a  gender  of  weaker  flesh  that  bending  to  Satan's  lure,  and  in 
humanity's  expulsion  from  the  Garden  of  Eden,  Eliot  disturbs  this  rendering  by  showing 
413  ibid.,  p.  207. 
414  John  Ruskin,  The  Works  ofJohn  Ruskin  ed.  E.  T.  Cook  and  Alexander  Wedderburn 
(London,  1903-1912)  Vol.  5,  p.  31 
415  ibid.,  p.  32 
`6  George  P.  Landow,  The  Aesthetic  and  Critical  Theories  of  John  Ruskin  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  197  1)  p.  43. 
174 two  women  in  the  Garden  of  Hayslope-Hetty  Sorrel  and  Dinah  Morris.  They  are 
portrayed  as  humanity  in  the  first  and  second  Adam,  respectively,  yet  embodied  in  the 
female.  Gender  guilt  is  further  overturned  in  this  action  through  the  secondary  'Eves'  of 
Arthur  Donnithorne  and  Adam  Bede  who  also  show  the  extremes  of  damnation  and 
grace.  In  this  way  fallen  and  obedient  characters  represent  humanio  rather  than  gender  so 
that  neither  male  nor  female  holds  exclusive  claim  to  sin  or  salvation.  But  it  is  a  story 
told  primarily  through  Hetty  and  Dinah  -  for  it  is  their  story  which  is  most  'visible'  in  this 
accounting.  While  the  novel  is  entitled  Adam  Bede,  it  is  that  which  is  veiled  beneath  this 
title,  namely  the  female  characters,  who  are  ultimately  the  centre  of  the  reader's  concern. 
In  this  new  accounting  of  the  narrative  of  the  Fall,  we  are  asked  to  'see'  a  side  that  had 
no  language  to  be  told  -  namely  the  choice,  and  lack  of  choice,  of  women. 
Dinah  and  Hetty  are  mirrors  of  each  other  and  humanity  itself  throughout  the 
unfolding  narrative  of  Adam  Bede.  Hetty  wants  to  cast  her  past  life  behind  her;  but  her 
"narrow  bit  of  an  imagination"  only  leads  her  to  make  "ill-defined  pictures"  of  the 
future.  417  Dinah's  sympathetic  intuition,  on  the  other  hand,  is  based  on  her  awareness  of 
biblical  history,  and  yet  Hetty  "for  any  practical  result  of  strength  in  life,  or  trust  in  death, 
(had)  never  appropriated  a  single  Christian  idea  or  Christian  feeline'.  418  She  is  guided 
only  by  her  current  sensual  responses.  As  noted  by  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher,  parallels  can 
be  drawn  between  Milton's  Eve  in  Paradise  LosI419  and  the  portrait  we  are  offered  of  Hetty 
Sorrel  in  Adam  Bede.  In  Paradise  Lost,  Eve's  appetite  is  aroused  "by  the  smell/  So  savoury 
of  that  Fruie'  as  she  approaches  the  Tree  of  Knowledge.  420  Similarly,  Hetty  is  stimulated 
by  the  "sweet  languid  odours  of  the  garden  at  the  Chase"  where  she  will  lose  her 
417  ibid.,  p.  154. 
418  ibid.,  p.  384. 
419  John  Milton,  Taradise  Lost'  '  1667  in  Norton  Anthology  of  English  Literature  6h  edition.  Vol.  2 
M.  H.  Abrams,  ed.  (London:  Norton,  1993). 
420  John  Milton,  ibid.,  Book  IX,  lines  740-741,  p.  1583. 
175 innocence.  421  Milton's  Eve  wants  to  be  immortal,  to  rise  in  station.  She  fancies  herself 
heightened  "through  expectation  high/  Of  knowledge,  nor  was  God-head  from  her 
thought".  422  Hetty,  later,  "without  knowing  what  she  should  do  with  her  life,...  craved 
the  means  of  living  as  long  as  possible;  and  when  we  desire  eagerly  to  find  something,  we 
are  apt  to  search  for  it  in  hopeless  places"423,  flutters  between  "memory  and  dubious 
expectation"  as  she  passes  the  gates  of  the  forbidden  Fir-Tree  Grove: 
That  was  the  foreground  of  Hatys  picture;  behind  it  lay  a  bright  hazy  something 
-  days  that  were  not  to  be  as  the  other  days  of  her  life  had  been.  It  was  as  if  she 
had  been  wooed  by  a  river-god,  who  might  at  any  time  take  her  to  his  wondrous 
halls  below  a  watery  heaven.  424 
Milton's  Eve  indulges  in  a  pagan  worship  of  the  tree  from  which  she  has  eaten.  Arthur 
mythologizes  the  wood  in  which  he  seduces  Hctty  as  a  "sacred  grove"  immune  to  time: 
His  arm  is  stealing  round  the  waist  again,  it  is  tightening  its  clasp;  he  is  bending 
his  face  nearer  and  nearer  to  the  round  cheek,  his  Ups  are  meeting  those  pouting 
child-Ups,  and  for  a  long  moment  time  has  vanished.  He  may  be  a  shepherd  in 
Arcadia  for  aught  he  knows,  he  may  be  the  first  youth  kissing  the  first  maiden,  he 
may  be  Eros  himself,  sipping  the  lips  of  Psyche  -  it  is  all  one.  425 
Yet  this  'garden'  is  not  fashioned  by  Keats.  George  Eliot  is  quick  to  show  the  reader  that 
this  sublime  moment  is  but  a  figment  of  Arthur's  imagination.  The  novelist's 
mythological  references  are  every  bit  as  ironic  as  those  Iýfilton  uses  to  describe  Adam  and 
Eve's  lovemaking  after  the  Fall.  If  Adam  and  Eve  soon  feel  ashamed  in  their  nakedness, 
Arthur,  too,  becomes  uncomfortable,  suddenly  conscious  that  "something  bitter  had 
begun  to  mingle  itself  with  the  fountain  of  sweets"'.  426  Adam  and  Eve  are  reminded  of 
God's  rule;  Arthur  is  reminded  of  time.  As  Knoepflmacher  notes,  Arthur  "puUs  out  his 
421  Adam  Bede,  p.  136. 
422  John  Milton,  op.  cit.,  Book  IX,  lines  789-790,  p.  1584. 
423  Adam  Bede,  p.  380. 
424  ibid.,  p.  136. 
425  ibid.,  p.  137. 
176 watch  and  wonders  'how  late  it  is'.  He  hopes  that  his  watch  is  too  fast.  It  is  later  than  he 
thinks".  427 
Hetty  and  Arthur  stand  and  fall  together  in  symbiosis  through  the  choices  they 
make.  With  the  evoking  of  visual  poetics,  George  Eliot  calls  to  mind  in  the  fir  grove  of 
Hayslope  a  mythical  place  outside  the  normal  order  of  things  -a  fantasy  akin  to  that  of 
Keats,  fiUed  with  wondrous  haUs  found  in  Arcadia  and  rivers  teeming  with  river-gods. 
These  images  are  clear  and  vivid.  So  much  so  that  the  reader  who  passes  out  of  the 
world  of  Hayslope  and  into  the  mythical  land  of  Hetty  and  Arthur's  creation  clearly  note 
that  this  is  not  Eden,  but  an  imagined  fantasy  that  evaporates  under  the  density  of  the 
more  compelling  reality  of  Hayslope,  the  'true  fiction'  of  time  and  place.  This  is  where 
Eden  is  to  be  -  amidst  the  dairy  maids,  real  shepherds,  and  common  people  of  the  land. 
This  is  not  an  Eden  populated  by  idealised  Greek  shepherds  who  are  known  only 
through  poetry,  but  is  a  realist  composition  in  the  midst  of  real  fife.  In  this  way,  fiction 
gives  way  to  a  'truer'  fiction. 
Arthur  notes  in  the  realisation  of  time  C'how  late  it  is"),  in  his  attempt  to  create 
sublimity,  that  this  Arcadian  grove  is  a  fiction  that  will  not  last  and  "something  bitter" 
has  indeed  entered  into  his  fantasy.  But  there  are  no  serpents  in  this  garden  nor  is  evil 
mediated  by  a  third  party  -  the  bitterness  that  arises  is  found  between  the  two 
momentary  lovers  and  they  alone.  Humanity  is  to  own  its  destiny  and  its  choices.  But 
the  traditional  narrative  of  the  Fall  is  further  overturned.  The  tempter  of  the  garden, 
Arthur  Donnithome,  freely  escapes  and  lives  seemingly  above  moral  law.  Where  the 
Adam  of  Milton's  Paradise  Lost  leaves  the  garden  to  head  toward  the  hope  of  salvation, 
Hetty  Sorrel  as  the  fallen  'Eve'  of  Hayslope  leaves  her  encounter  in  the  garden  as  a 
character  under  erasure.  Hetty  is  left  to  her  "objectless  wandering,  apart  from  all  love 
426  ibid.,  p.  138. 
427  U.  C.  Knoepflmacher  "On  Adam  Bede"  in  Ian  Watt  The  Victorian  Novel:  Modem  Essays  in  Criticism 
(London:  Oxford  University  Press,  197  1)  pp.  274-275. 
177 clinging  to  Efe  only  as  the  hunted  wounded  brute  Clings  to  ie3.428  She  wishes  to 
disappear,  vanish,  to  "wander  out  of  sight,  and  drown  herself  where  her  body  would 
never  be  found,  and  no  one  should  know  what  became  of  her"'429which  stirs  an  image 
that  compels  one  to  'see'  Goethe's  Ekcjive  Affinifies  played  out  anew.  Tbroughout  the 
narrative  of  Adam  Bede,  the  reader  is  aware  that  Hetty  is  not  truly  alone  in  her  Fall  and 
that  Arthur  is  living  beyond  the  moral  code  by  denying  his  relationship  with  her.  In  this 
way  George  Eliot  puts  before  the  reader  the  claim  that  guilt  is  never  black  and  white,  and 
that  one  person's  fall  from  grace  is  surely  tied  to  a  larger  circle.  Arthur  is  exposed  in  the 
end,  but  remains  to  live  another  life.  Hetty's  fate  does  not  contain  this  option.  It  is 
shown  that  Hetty  is  not  fully  to  blame  for  the  events  that  lead  to  her  den-ýise,  yet  neither 
is  she  fully  absolved  from  them.  In  the  end  justice  is  tendered  more  to  some  than  to 
others  and  with  differing  consequences.  In  the  garden  of  good  and  evil  there  are  no  pure 
victims  nor  are  there  pure  villains.  For  Eliot,  choices  that  are  made  are  always  part  of  a 
community,  never  in  isolation.  The  plight  or  salvation  of  humanity  is  not  to  be  found  in 
finding  one  at  fault,  be  it  a  gender  or  a  class,  but  in  acknowledging  the  interwoven  nature 
of  all  people  who  ultimately  share  triumphs  and  defeats  together  in  seen  and  unseen 
ways.  'It  is  the  unseen  that  concerns  Eliot  and  it  is  that  which  she  not  only  describes  but 
displays  through  the  frame  of  Adam  Bede. 
428  Adam  Bede,  P.  389. 
429  ibid.,  p.  383. 
178 8.3  The  poetics  of  Jesus  in  Adam  Bede 
Another  compelling  overturning  of  narrative  in  Adam  Bede  is  with  regard  to  the 
image  ofJesus,  the  'new  Adam'.  As  I  have  noted  in  previous  chapters  of  this  thesis, 
George  Eliot  felt  distraught  during  her  translation  of  Strauss'  Das  Leben  Jesu.  She  felt  that 
Strauss  had  lost  "the  beautiful  story"  in  his  attempt  to  re-imagine  the  life  of  Jesus 
through  his  treatise.  Fiction  was  a  primary  space  where  "the  beautiful  story"  was  re- 
imagined  outside  of  nineteenth  century  higher  criticism.  Multiple  attempts  had  been 
made  to  re-write  a'life  ofJesus'within  the  Victorian  Zeitgeist.  As  mentioned  in  chapter  5, 
poetics  arising  in  novels  such,  as  Mrs.  Ward's  Robert  Elsmere,  Froude's  The  Nemesis  ofFaitb, 
Pater's  Marius  the  Epicurean  and  others  strove  to  place  this  'story  of  stories'  in  a  context 
germane  to  the  day.  For  George  Eliot,  the  issue  was  not  to  re-write  the  old  Gospel  tale  as  rrpeddon 
as  mucb  as  it  was  a  returning  of  the  narrative  to  its  bumani-O  in  the  refiguring  act  of  "truefiction  "  That  is 
Go.  pel  as  wrifing.  The  humility,  grace,  and  mercy  ofJesus  that  Strauss  blithely  dismantled 
in  his  Hegelian  project  was  to  be  returned  by  George  Eliot  with  a  fusing  of  image  and 
word  that  gave  a  greater  density  to  d-ds  'beautiful  story'  than  Strauss  was  capable  of. 
Also,  by  creating  a  tension  between  the  orthodox  understanding  ofJesus  within 
Victorian  England  and  the  "true  fiction"  that  was  "the  beautiful  story"  that  was  lost  to 
Higher  Criticism,  George  Eliot  not  only  challenged  the  traditional  images,  but  framed  the 
tradition  itself  in  a  viewing  within  the  framing  of  her  poetics.  To  exemplify  this  in  the 
case  of  visual  poetics,  we  must  look  at  the  iconographic  images  that  Eliot  figures  in 
Adam  Bede  employed  from  Dutch  Realism,  and  specifically,  the  rendering  ofJesus  by 
Rembrandt. 
In  1635  Rembrandt  completed  a  sketch  entitled  Last  Supper,  after  Leonardo  da 
Vind.  The  copy  looks  Eke  a  simple  sketch,  most  likely  to  help  the  copyist  memorise  the 
work  and  reflect  on  the  possibilities  its  composition  offered.  This  sketch  serves  as  a 
179 representative  work  of  the  painter's  renderings  of  Jesus.  As  noted  by  Mieke  Bal: 
What  the  sketch  has  in  common  with  the  composition  of  da  Vinci's  fresco  is  in 
the  first  place  the  isolation  of  the  Christ  figure,  surrounded  by  the  disciples  who 
are  ostensibly  busy  doing  other  things.  In  this  respect,  the  "Rembrandt"  sketch  is 
closer  to  the  fresco  than  to  the  Birago,  copy  through  which  presumably 
"Rembrandt"  read  it.  The  static  character  of  Christ  is  opposed  to  the  down-to- 
earth  commerce  of  the  others.  If  the  disciples  of  the  left  can  be  interpreted  as 
listening  and  responding  to  the  master  with  the  exception  of  the  figure  next  to 
Christ,  those  at  the  far  right  are  definitely  not  attending  to  him.  They  are  arguing 
among  themselves,  maybe  plotting,  maybe  responding  in  their  own  way;  Christ, 
in  contrast,  is  not  engaged  with  any  of  them.  Christ  is  thus  suspended  from  the 
narrative  of  talk,  of  worldly  futility.  He  is  absorbed...  He  is  also  emphatically 
alone.  His  hands,  from  a  narrative  standpoint,  are  engaged  in  the  gestures  of 
teaching;  but  his  absorption  undermines  the  teaching.  It  separates  him  from  the 
others  (who  are  clearly  not  listening  anyway),  as  does  the  halo  around  his  head.  430 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Rembrandt  never  went  to  Italy  and  therefore  never  saw  the 
original  da  Vinci  fresco  which  his  sketch  emulates.  What  is  evident  here  is  that  in-&ation 
or  mimesis  was  not  the  most  important  goal  for  Rembrandt.  Instead,  sharing  the 
framework  of  da  Vinci's  fresco  rather  than  work  itself  provided  Rembrandt  with  a 
language  of  signs  that  the  'reader'  will  acknowledge  even  if  not  overtly.  Rembrandt's 
sketch  although  'written'  in  da  Vinci's  language,  is  not  identical  to  the  work  ftom  which 
language  was  borrowed,  nor  was  it  trying  to  be.  This  exem  lifies  "the  difference 
Ip 
between  language  and  utterance,  between  system  and  actual  signs"431  which  underscore 
the  framing  project  of  the  iconographic. 
Referring  back  to  the  Rembrandt  sketch  of  Last  A 
. 
pper,  after  Leonardo  da  Vind, 
one  can  observe  that  behind  Christ's  head  is  anotber  head  -  that  of  a  woman,  leaning 
toward  Christ  with  attentiveness.  This  is  a  clear  shift  from  the  'narrative'  of  da  Vinci 
430  Mieke  Bal,  Reading  "Rembrandt".,  p.  201. 
431  ibid.,  pp.  431-432. 
180 pojidom  is  strangely  coherent  in  Rembrandt's  sketch,  as  if  this  "person"  although  the  com 
has  been  there  all  along.  Bal  makes  the  following  remarks: 
Since  this  is  merely  a  sketch,  nothing  would  be  easier  than  to  ignore  it.  For 
example,  it  can  be  easily  dispensed  with  as  an  earlier  but  rejected  attempt  at 
drawing  Chrises  head.  The  pointed  finger  of  the  bald  man  next  to  Jesus  can  be 
directed  toward  Jesus  or  toward  one  of  the  figures  on  the  other  side,  and  the 
strangely  unreal  second  head  does  not  need  to  be  a  women!  s  head,  although  it 
alone  has  long,  curly  hair.  Moreover,  that  second  head  can  be  taken  as  a 
proleptic  allusion  to  Judas,  who  will  later  come  up  to  kiss  Jesus,  thus  identifying 
himself  as  the  traitor.  So  one  would  think  we  need  not  worry  about  this  second 
head,  although  the  depiction  of  this  Judas  as  a  woman  is  remarkable.  432 
It  is  noted  by  Bal  that  women-in-excess  are,  as  she  states,  "quite  'Rembrandtesque':  They 
are  readable,  never  mind  how  enigmatic  they  may  otherwise  be".  433  Here,  this  shadow 
woman  seems  to  be  uninvited  as  one  only  able  to  listen  and  not  partake.  To  the  'reader', 
this  figure  is  compeffing  in  that  she  is  the  only  one  who  seems  to  be  attending  to  what 
Christ  is  saying.  In  this  way,  the  'reader'  is  led  to  wonder  what  she  hears  as  one  who  is 
so  close,  what  she  feels  as  one  who  listens  but  only  from  outside  the  circle.  Moreover, 
the  'readee  is  taken  to  ber  place  at  the  table,  which  is  what  Bal.  terms  'excurse'-  that 
figuring  within  compositional  form  which  leads  the  reader/viewer  out  of  the  story 
entirely.  In  this  case,  the  'reader'  is  drawn  away  from  the  distracted  table,  and  into  the 
space  where  the  absorptive  Christ  figure  has  gone.  As  Bal  surmises,  Rembrandes  sketch 
Last  Su 
. 
pper,  after  da  Vind  "tells  us  no  more;  it  just  suggests  the  sheer  possibility  of  an 
'elsewhere'.  434 
Rembrandt  utilises  da  Vinci's  compositional  template  of  The  Last  Su  pper  fresco  in 
a  1638  painting  entitled  Samsonposing  the  Riddle  to  the  Wedding  Guests.  Painted  three  years 
after  the  sketch  Last  Supper,  after  da  Vind,  here  is  a  work  of  strikingly  similar  composition 
432  ibid.,  p.  201. 
433  ibid. 
181 with  a  completely  different  subject:  the  episode  of  Samson's  wedding  in  which  Samson 
proposed  the  riddle  to  the  wedding  gu  ests  taken  from  judges  14:  12-20.  Bal  notes  that 
Since  the  subject  [of  Samsonposing  the  Riddle  to  the  Wedding  Guests]  is  so  different 
from  the  sketch,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  use  the  iconographic  mode  of  reading  to 
identify  the  subject  matter  itself.  Yet,  in  spite  of  the  tradition  of  wedding 
painting,  it  is  compelling  to  relate  the  Samson  to  the  Leonardo  rather  than  to 
works,  say,  Eke  Brueghel's  Peasants'  Wedding  (ca.  1560),  which  is  closer  in  subject 
but  different  in  composition.  435 
This  is  an  important  difference  between  composidonalandfigural  iconography:  we  cannot 
use  the  iconographic  mode  of  reading  to  identify  theme,  but  we  can  use  it  to  identify  a 
very  relevant  meaning,  to  make  the  two  subjects  speak  to  each  other,  and  to  see  how,  for 
example,  Rembrandt  through  the  Samson  painting  appropriates  unseen  pre-texts  -  both 
Leonardo  and  the  Gospel  narrative  -  for  its  own  ends.  This  approach  for  Bal  "requires  a 
serniotic  attitude  that  abhors  meaninglessness.  Not  all  viewers  will  share  this  attitude,  but 
those  who  do  cannot  leave  the  similarity  of  composition  to  accident".  436  Putting  the 
sketch  Last  Su 
. 
p,  ber,  after  Leonardo  da  Vind  into  play  with  Samsonpofing  the  Riddle  to  the 
Wedding  Guests  shows  a  heritage  that  is  truly  striking  and  provocative.  The  compositional 
structure  of  the  Leonardo  frescofirames  both  works.  Yet  the  shift  that  has  taken  place  in 
the  three  years  between  the  sketch  Last  Sup 
.. 
per  to  the  painting  of  the  Samson  is  even  more 
striking.  Where  the  women  in  the  Last  Supper  sketch  is  in  excurse,  she  is  now  portrayed 
as  fiffing  the  space  of  Christ  in  the  Samson.  Bal  makes  the  foUowing  comparisons: 
The  women  is  as  isolated  as  Christ.  She  is  not,  as  he  was,  engaged  in  a  stillness 
outside  of  time  and  of  the  world,  for  she  is  not  the  son  of  God.  But  she,  too,  is 
lonely  and  about  to  die.  Chrises  inward  gaze  was  directed  to  no  one  in  particular; 
the  bride's  gaze  is  also  directed  outside  of  the  story  that  the  others  are  busy  acting 
out;  but  whereas  Christ's  gaze  is  inward,  the  bride's  is  outward,  toward  the 
434  ibid. 
435  ibid.,  p.  202. 
436  ibid. 
182 viewer.  1hus  she  steps  out  of  a  diegetic  situation  that  is  as  frightening  and  as 
threatening  as  Susanna's  situation  when  she  is  trapped  by  the  Elders.  437 
Other  textual  similarities  are  also  evident  between  these  works  of  Rembrandt  as  we  put 
them  into  play.  The  woman's  head  in  the  Samson  is  adorned  with  the  curls  of  the  head 
behind  Christ  in  the  Last  Su 
, 
pper  sketch,  as  if  the  woman,  stiU  hidden  there,  has  stepped 
forward  to  tell  her  story  of  sacrificial  death.  Of  course,  no  halo  surrounds  her  head,  but 
the  figure  in  the  background  tapestry  is  just  a  little  bit  fighter  around  her  head  than 
elsewhere.  This  shows  a  truly  ironic  turn  in  Rembrandt's  compositional  choice: 
The  irony  here  is  one  of  slffting,  of  displacement,  of  turning  the  highest  subject 
into  a  low  one  -  the  genre  scene.  But  the  displacement  does  not  effect  the 
women,  at  the  centre.  She  remains  separated  from  the  promiscuous  scene, 
isolated  in  this  way  just  as  she  is  diegetically  and  pictorially  isolated.  In  addition, 
there  is  no  confusion,  no  extension  of  the  reference  to  "the  Biblical"  in  general. 
The  sign  is  compositional,  but  no  less  precise  and  delimited...  In  Samson's  Wedding, 
a  specific  moment  of  the  one  pre-text  -  of  the  Leonardo  and,  through  it,  of  the 
Gospel  -  is  seen  to  be  used  to  compose  the  framework  of  the  painting  in  which 
otýer  pre-text  -  the  judges  episode  -  is  then  made  to  fit.  The  context,  the 
contemporary  habit  of  typological  interpretation,  is  used  in  a  way  that  makes  a 
highly  sympathetic  representation  plausible.  438 
This  compositional  shape  that  is  iconographically  implied  between  the  works  brings 
about  a  tension  between  narratives.  This  provokes  what  Bal  terms  as  a  "double, 
differential  reading,  which  juxtaposes  the  evoked  against  the  narrated  story,  in  order  to 
let  them  interact  and  to  let  the  tensions  between  the  stories  produce  new  meanings".  439 
This  reading  radically  challenges  assumed  foundational  narratives  by  allowing  differing 
subjects  to  occupy  identical  compositional  reality.  This  goes  to  the  heart  of  the  reading 
event,  where  signs  and  signifiers  are  replaced  by  the  item  that  is  absent  and  only  alluded 
437  ibid.,  p.  203. 
438  ibid.,  pp.  205-206. 
183 to  by  language. 
In  Adam  Bede,  George  Eliot  evokes  a  similar  compositional  form  through  a  visual 
poetics  of  Dinah  Morris.  In  chapter  II  entitled  "The  Preaching"  (note  the  definite 
article),  Eliot  calls  to  mind  the  biblical  accounting  ofjesus'  Sermon  on  the  Mount.  Yet  it 
is  not  Adam  to  which  the  title  refers,  but  Dinah  Morris  who  is  central  to  the 
compositional  structure  of  the  scene  and  the  Adam  upon  whom  George  Eliot  bestows 
the  'title'  of  new  Adam.  Like  Jesus,  she  too  is  marginalized  despite  her  prophetic  gifts 
due  to  her  common  heritage  as  merely  the  "niece  to  Poyer's  wife",  one  who  is  a 
"Methodisses"  -  those  who  are  prone  to  go  "stark  starin'  mad  wi'  their  religion".  4Q  She  is 
a  compelling  figure,  at  odds  with  tradition  as  a  woman  in  "quaker-Eke  costume"  and 
draws  a  crowd  of  "stronger  curiosity"  to  the  viHage  Green.  As  noted  by  a  stranger  in  the 
crowd,  she  is  merely  a  "sweet  woman...  but  surely  nature  never  meant  her  for  a 
preacher".  441  She  is  described  as  one  of  "no  particular  beauty,  beyond  that  of  expression" 
whose  eyes  "looked  so  simple,  so  candid,  so  gravely  loving..  ".  442  Her  hand  is  stretched 
out  "towards  the  descending  sun"  and  her  head  is  covered  with  a 
"neel.  443  She  is  placed 
in  the  centre  of  the  crowd  by  the  composition  of  the  narrative  who  gather  around, 
listening  but  distracted  throughout  her  sermon.  In  the  sermon  itself,  Eliot  gives  visual 
cues  that  are  to  'see'  a  portrait  of  Christ  as  one  reads  the  sermon  voiced  through  the 
compositional  centre  of  Dinah  Morris: 
'Seel'  she  exclaimed,  turning  to  the  left,  with  her  eyes  fixed  on  a  point  above  the 
heads  of  the  people  -  'see  where  our  blessed  Lord  stands  and  weeps,  and  stretches 
out  his  arms  towards  you.  '  ....  In  a  pleading  reproach,  turning  her  eyes  on  the 
people  again.  'See  the  print  of  the  nails  on  his  dear  hands  and  feet.  It  is  your  sins 
that  made  them!  Ah,  how  pale  and  worn  he  looksl  He  has  gone  through  all  that 
great  agony  in  the  garden...  And  he  is  upon  this  earth  too;  he  is  among  us;  he  is 
439  ibid.,  p.  207. 
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184 there  close  to  you  now;  I  see  his  wounded  body  and  his  look  of  love.  '444(cmphascs 
added). 
With  these  visual  cues  George  Eliot  evokes  the  following  image:  a  crowd  that  is  gathered 
around  a  central  figure  whose  gaze  is  turned  outward.  The  central  figure  is  set  apart  even 
though  placed  compositionally  in  the  centre.  This  central  figure  has  their  arms  extended 
to  show  the  palms  of  hands  where  one  is  to  'see'  "the  print  of  nails"  that  can  be  imagined 
and  a  covering  about  the  head.  The  crowd  is  present  yet  not  attentive  to  the  one  they 
gather  around.  7hrough  her  evoking  of  visual  images  tethered  to  verbal  description, 
George  Eliot  has  given  density  to  fl-ds  scene  that  is  compositionally  compatible  with 
Rembrandes  works  that  utilise  the  compositional  language  of  various  pre-texts  -  namely 
da  Vinci  and  ultimately  the  Gospel  accounts.  As  noted  with  Rembrandt,  who  stands 
central  to  the  tradition  of  Dutch  realism  which  George  Eliot  addresses  in  chapter  XVII, 
this  compositional  iconography  allows  for  a  double,  differential  reading  that  juxtaposes 
the  evoked  image  of  Jesus  figured  by  da  Vinci's  compositional  template  against  the 
narrated  story  of  Adam  Bede,  in  order  to  let  them  interact  and  to  let  the  tensions  between 
the  stories  produce  new  meanings.  With  this  compositional  iconography  framing  the 
text,  both  imago  and  verbum  are  challenged.  This  tension  challenges  assumed  foundational 
narratives  and  allows  for  differing  subjects  to  occupy  identical  compositional  reality.  As 
mentioned  before,  this  goes  to  the  heart  of  the  reading  event,  where  signs  and  significrs 
are  replaced  by  the  item  that  is  absent  and  only  alluded  to  by  language.  So  compelling  is 
this  image  presented  in  chapter  II  that  upon  reading  Adam  Bede,  Queen  Victoria  had  this 
scene  commissioned  in  1861  as  a  painting  by  Edward  Henry  Corbould  entitled  "Dinah 
Morris  preaching  on  Hayslope  Green"I.  In  looking  at  the  painting,  the  compositional 
form  of  the  scene  transcends  the  visual  poetics  into  an  image  true  to  da  Vinci  and 
443  ibid. 
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185 Rembrandt's  compositional  heritage  and  calls  back  to  both  the  narrative  of  Adam  Bede 
and  ultimately,  the  deeper  narrative  ofjesus.  Ilie  words  indeed  become  flesh  in  this 
vivid  rendering  of  image  which  gives  further  density  to  the  verbal.  The  compositional 
iconography  in  Adam  Bede  aHows  for  an  image  made  word  that  aHows  images  to  speak 
beyond  the  limits  of  language.  It  is  this  possibility  that  is  central  to  Eliots'  poetics  and 
key  to  a  poetics  ofjesus.  As  demonstrated  in  Adam  Bede,  Eliot  evokes  a'new  Adam!  that 
is  neither  'new'  nor  'Adam',  yet  an  visual-verbal  paradox  arises  that  overturns 
assumptions  through  an  intertexuality  of  the  visual  and  the  verbal.  In  a  poetics  ofjesus, 
narrative  overturns  narrative  and  allows  for  possibilities  of  new  subjects,  formerly 
unseen,  to  inhabit  traditional  compositional  forms. 
186 9.0  The  Miff  on  the  Ross  -  Transfigurational  Writing  as  Incarnation 
9.1  The  Bildung  of  Organicism  and  a  poetics  of  Jesus 
In  his  book,  Fact  and  Feeling:  Baconian  Science  and  the  Nineteenth-Centug  Literag  Ima&adon, 
Jonathan  Smith  summarises  the  state  of  affairs  regarding  the  interplay  between  scientific 
and  aesthetic  discourse  in  the  nineteenth-century  as  follows: 
The  nineteenth-century  debate  over  scientific  method  included  much  more  than 
a  discussion  of  the  logical  process  of  scientific  discovery.  It  could  not  avoid  basic 
epistemological  questions  about  reality  and  the  relationship  between  observer 
and  observed;  it  evaluated  the  nature  and  value  of  scientific  knowledge  vis-a-vis 
other  forms  of  knowledge,  including  supposedly  more  intuitive  form  like  religion 
and  poetry.  445 
Sn-ýith  exemplifies  the  growing  nineteenth-century  split  between  science  and  aesthetics  in 
cidng  the  foHowing  passage  from  cridc  Edward  Dowden  (1877): 
Any  inquiry  at  the  present  day  into  the  relations  of  modern  scientific  thought 
with  literature  must  in  great  part  be  guided  by  hints,  signs,  and  presages.  The 
time  has  not  yet  come  when  it  may  be  possible  to  perceive  in  complete  outline 
the  significance  of  science  for  the  imagination  and  emotions  of  men,  but  that 
significance  is  large  and  deep  we  cannot  doubt.  Literature  proper,  indeed,  the 
literature  ofpotver,  as  DeQuincey  named  it,  in  distinction  from  the  literature  of 
knowledge,  may,  from  point  of  view,  be  described  as  essentially  non-scientific,  or 
even  antiscientific.  To  ascertain  and  communicate  facts  is  the  object  of  science; 
to  quicken  our  fife  into  a  higher  consciousness  through  the  feelings  is  the 
function  of  art.  But  the  knowing  and  feelings  are  not  identical,  and  a  fact 
expressed  in  terms  of  feelings  affects  us  as  other  than  the  same  fact  expressed  in 
terms  of  knowing,  yet  our  emotions  rest  on  and  are  controlled  by  our 
knowledge.  446 
445  Jonathan  Smith,  Fact  and  Feeling:  Baconian  Science  and  the  Nineteenth-Century  Literary 
Imagination.  (Madison:  University  of  Wisconsin  Press,  1994)  p.  5. 
446  Edward  Dowden,  "rhe  Scientific  Movement  and  Literature,  "  Studies  in  Literature:  1789-1877,64 
187 In  contrast  to  Dowden's  attempts  to  define  and  thereby  differentiate  scientific  and 
aesthetic  discourse  are  the  words  ofjohn  T)  ndall.  A  contcmpor2ry  of  Huxley,  Tyndall's 
1868  address  entitled  -Scientific  Use  of  the  Imaginatiow'  proclaims  the  need  for  both  the 
scicntific  axJ  aesthcdc  %icw  of  life  for  a  united  %icw  of  fife: 
...  the  world  cmbr2ces  not  only  a  Newton,  but  a  Shakespeare  -  not  only  a  Boyle, 
but  a  R2plud  -  not  only  a  Kant.  but  a  Becthoven  -  not  only  a  Darwin,  but  a 
Carlyle.  Not  in  c2ch  of  these,  but  in  A  is  hunun  nature:  whole.  They  are  not 
opposcd,  but  supplemcntity  -  not  mutually  exclusive,  but  reconcilable.  447 
Mýs  was  a  Period  when  scientific  discourse  had  3-ct  to  become  so  spccialised  in 
nomenchture  as  to  prohibit  gencral  recognition.  Recent  scientific  discoveries  and 
theories  were  alongside  the  novel  in  public  discourse.  W4  as  evidenced  by  the  previous 
statements,  the  tension  was  growing  more  intense,  and  scientific  and  aesthetic  discourse 
were  quickly  bccoming  polzriscd  options,  rather  than  necessary  companions,  in 
providing  a  Ltngwgc  of  meaning  in  Western  culture.  In  the  introduction  to  The 
F04114,6041  Ofa  CrreJ,  Gli.  Lzwes  nukes  the  prophetic  commen4  "the  great  desire  of  this 
age  is  for  a  Doctrine  which  nuy  serve  to  condense  our  knowlcdge,  guide  our  researches, 
and  shape  out  fives,  so  that  Conduct  rruy  rcaUy  be  the  consequence  of  Bclicf  '.  448 
Of  those  who  heard  these  words  and  responded  to  the  challenge,  none  was  so  close  in 
ideological  prozirnity  than  lx%%-cs'  partner,  Alarian  D.  -ans,  knownviddy  by  this  tinýe 
through  her  mom  de.  Plmme  as  George  Mot.  E-  Not  is  well  documented  as  reading  widely 
2niong  the  scicritific  theories  of  the  d.  2y.  She  refcrs  in  her  letters  to  Herbert  Spencer, 
whose  1857  css2y,  -progress:  Its  Uw  and  its  C2usc:  'argucd.  that  "the  law  of  organic 
Id-  (LOndIon:  Kegan  Paul.  1892)  P.  95.  '"7  John  TyndalL  "Scientiric  Use  of  lnugination:  '  Fragments  OfScience,  64  ed.,  2  vols.  (New  York: 
Burt.  ad.  )  vol.  I.  P.  494.  As  noted  by  Smith  in  Facts  and  Feelings.  this  particular  passage  does  not 
! T*"u  in  the  carlicsl  %Trsions  of  the  &jjrcL  G.  11.  LeAcs.  proU~  of  L4fe  anj  AtinL  First  Series:  Ile  Foundations  of  a  Cree44  2  vols.  (I-Ondon.  1.  p.  2. 
iss development  from  homogeneity  to  heterogeneity  governed  all  the  spheres  of  natural  and 
social  science  fmm  physiology  through  to  astronomy,  anthropology,  and  philology".  449 
, 
ples  of  Geology  (1830-3),  Geologist  Sir  Charles  LycU,  mentor  to  Mrwin  and  author  of  Prind 
proved  intriguing  to  E  Lot  uith  his  theory  of  Uniformitarianism  which  is  an  attempt  to 
explain  the  former  changes  of  the  earth's  surfAcc  by  reference  to  causes  present  to 
Observation.  As  Lycll  states,  "the  history  of  the  carths  surface  can  be  accounted  for 
using  the  same  forces  we  see  around  us  now  -  erosion,  uplif4  sedimentation,  volcanic 
phenomena,  etc.  Operating  at  sinf&r  rates  and  intcnSideS".  4-10  In  short,  one  need  only 
obscrve  the  here  and  now  of  a  rivcr's  course,  a  lAc's  stillness,  a  trec's  seasonal  changes, 
or  even  the  form  of  the  smallest  pebble  and  one  can  see  the  same  forces  at  work  that 
have  been  at  work  since  the  beginning  of  the  world.  This  age  is  the  same  that  has  been 
and  the  SlInc  that  uill  be  to  come.  Essentially,  things  throughout  nature  arc  as  Mg  arr 
and  in  the  PrOcesi,  ever  so  Moaiy,  of  further  beconiing  that  which  they  will  always  be.  In 
essence,  LYCIJ  '%-as  utilising  a  much  older  languigc  than  the  seemingly  new  vocabulary  of 
, gurafion  rather  a  evolu  on.  evolutionary  thought  -  he  was  employing  a  view  of  trangi  th  n  ti 
UnifOrrnit2rilnism.  as  noted  by  Shuttlcworth,  "undcrmined  ideas  of  natural  fixity  and 
theories  Of  c2tIstr2ophism,  which  had  sought  to  reconcile  evidence  of  the  earth's 
changes,  aith  ideas  of  an  unchanging  natural  ordee'.  4sl  I'his  influence  of  LycjI  is 
cx'Phficd  in  Ehoes  article.  "Ibc  Progress  of  the  IntcUc&',  where  Eliot  utilises  a 
gcolo&al  analogy  to  explain  her  idea  of  the  laws  of  uniform  development  that  govern 
human  development 
-  "A  correct  gcncr2lisation  gives  significance  to  the  smallest  dctad, 
just  as  the  9rc2t  inductions  of  geology  demonstrate  in  every  pebble  the  working  of  laws 
by'uýhich  the  earth  has  become  adapted  for  the  habitation  of  MaMI1452 
""  SaIlY  Shuttlc%urth.  George  Eliot  and  Nineteenth-Century  Science.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
Un'vers'ty  PMW6  1994)  P.  13.  4*  Jo"Uha4  SrIflith.  CVý  CiL  p.  95.  4'1  SAY  Shuttlc%%wtjl.  InL  cit,  p.  1.4.  4U  ibid,  P.  13. 
189 As  one  looks  at  the  growing  interest  in  evolutionary  thinking  during  the  nineteenth 
pedesthat  s  form  of  century,  it  uras  with  the  publishing  of  Charles  Darwin's  Oriý,  ýn  vfS  thi 
dialectic  was  given  its  lirgest  audience.  Having  been  published  during  her  writing  of  The 
Millox  the  Fl",  r,  as  noted  by  Smith,  "within  a  month  Of  its  2PPCa=CC  she  and  Lcwcs  had 
read  it".  4"  Darwin's  theory  of  natural  selection  expressed  a  new  dimension  to  the 
notions  of  organic  functional  interdependence.  Unlike  ideas  espousing  the)Bci4  of 
species,  Dim-in  continued  the  thinking  of  I-w=ck  and  others  by  showing  species 
development  as  well  as  that  of  the  individual  organism  itself  occurring  through  a  process 
pedes,  Darwin  observes:  Of  ordered  differentiation.  In  his  closing  lines  from  OriSFm  vfS 
It  is  interesting  to  contemplate  an  entangled  bank,  clothed  with  many  plants  of 
nuny  kinds,  with  birds  singing  on  the  bushcs,  'With  various  insects  flitting  about, 
2nd  with  worms  cr2wling  through  the  damp  earth,  and  to  reflect  that  these 
cl2bor2tely  constructed  forms,  so  different  from  each  other,  and  dependent  on 
each  other  in  so  complex  a  manner,  have  A  been  produced  by  laws  acting 
aroundUS.  4S4 
It  is  known  that  neither  Lcwcs  nor  Mot  saw  Darwin's  treatise  as  a  particularly  new 
direction  in  thoughtý  rather  a  mere  extension  of  current  thinking  in  the  doctrine  of 
development  expressed  through  other  theorists.  In  a  letter  written  to  Barbara  Bodichon, 
Eliot  notes  upon  reading  Spedes  that  the  book  lcft  "a  fccblc  impression  compared  with 
the  mystery  that  lies  underneath  the  proccsSCS11.45s  As  noted  by  Lcwcs  in  a  review  of 
Darwin's  theories  in  Fanwi  qb  tural  ghtly  Rnirs,  (April  1868):  'c  laws  of  Na  Selection  may 
indccd  be  said  to  be  only  a  larger  and  philosophic  view  of  the  law  of  Adaptation  which 
Lamarck  had  iinpcrfccdy  conceh-cX'.  456  7bus,  in  a  review  of  the  harmony  of  scientific 
:  ',  'Jonathan  s  -j  op.  cit.  p.  122.  truth.  4M  Ch2rlc3  Damin.  On  the  Origin  ofSpecies  by  Afeanj  ofNatural  Selection,  ed.  John  Burrow  from  the 
1"  ed't'OrL  (lAm'don.  1959;  1  larmonds%wrth.  1968)  p.  459. 
443%1 
Cited  by  ROscmuy  ALhton.  George  Viov  A  We.  (London:  Penguin,  1996)  p.  239. 
Cited  by  Sally  Shuttle-aulh.  op.  cit..  p,  16. 
190 and  aesthetic  discourse  during  Eliot's  period,  Shuttleworth  remarks  that: 
the  natural  and  social  sciences  formed  an  inter-relatcd  network.  Ibus  Buckle, 
rniming  the  science  of  his  oum  period,  observed  that  "the  followers  of  Bichat 
arc  associ2tcd  in  geologyaith  the  doctrine  of  uniformity,  in  zoology  with  that  of 
the  transmutation  of  the  species;  and  in  astronomy,  with  the  nebular  hypothesis". 
Each  of  these  scicndfic  theories  challenged  conceptions  of  a  fixed  order,  offering 
in  their  place  an  historical  cxplanation  of  development.  All  demanded  a  similar 
st.  2ncc  to  the  world.  This  fict  w2s  well  understood,  not  only  by  members  of  the 
scicntific  community,  but  also  by  the  general  public  ... 
457 
Accessing  a  need,  as  noted  calier,  for  "a  Doctrine  which  may  serve  to  condense  our 
knowledge,  guide  our  rcsc=hcs,  and  sh2pc  our  lives,  "  Lcwcs  puts  forward  his  own 
conception  -  Org=*ism.  As  the  underlying  principle  of  his  Pmbkmr  OfLife  andMind, 
LCwCs  defines  orginicism  in  the  Fvrtxiý 
, 
kbtl 
., 
y  Rttiew  as  being 
distinguistublc  by  its  consistent  carrying  out  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  organdc 
phenomcru  grouped  under  the  terms  Ijfi:  and  Mind  arc  activities  not  of  any 
single  eJcment,  in  or  out  of  the  organism,  but  activities  of  the  whole  organism  in 
correspondence  with  a  physical  and  social  mediUM458 
In  essence,  life  is  dcfincd  in  organicism  as  the  intcr2ction  between  an  organism  and  its 
TnCdium-  Questions  %vith  regard  to  the  essence  of  a  being  (in  the  case  of  organicism  ,  the 
organism)  are  to  be  resolved,  not  through  a  subsequent  systematic  dcconstruction  of  the 
Organism  into  component  elements.  Rather,  one  must  look  instead  at  the  organism  as  a 
xhok  bdq  9  in  the  context  of  the  cn-vironment  (or  medium)  that  the  organism  exists  within; 
observation  in  roxtex-t  rather  exp1mation  through  systematic  dcconstruction  is  at  the  heart 
Of  OrPnicism 
. 
As  an  orginising  theory,  Lm-cs  proposed  an  approach  that  went  beyond 
binity  oppositions  of  subject  and  object,  n-dnd  and  body,  body  and  soul.  For  Lewes, 
2tOnlistic  and  overtly  s)  stcmic  -vim-s  tended  to  dividc  and  categorisc  rather  than  explain 
437  ibid. 
4SI  (311-  Lelhrs-  'Spiritualiun  and  Materialisai.  7  Fortnisialy  Review.  19  (1876)  p.  479. 
191 and  observe.  In  addressing  the  lack  of  unified  theory  for  mind  and  body,  Lewes  asserted 
that  "if  the  upholders  of  Org2nicism  have  not  extended  to  the  Mind  the  principles 
adopted  uith  respect  to  Life,  the  stream  of  tendency  in  modern  psychological  research 
his,  I  think,  all  pointed  in  this  dircction'%459  Alind,  for  Lcu-cs,  was  the  collected  functions 
"of  the  whole  orgutism  in  correspondence  with  a  physical  and  social  mcdium,  "460  not 
merely  those  hidden  segmented  acthities  of  the  internal  life  proposed  by  German 
thinkers  such  as  Freud  and  Schopenhatier. 
It  is  well  documented  th.  2t  George  Eliot  cmbr2ced  her  partnc?  s  views  and  held  them  in 
high  rcg2r&- 
George  Eliot  found  in  1,  ewcswork  a  model  of  organic  life  that  could  encompass 
her  chariging  assessment  of  the  real  foundations  of  organic  unity.  Lewes'  theory 
suggested  dut  both  social  and  psychological  life  might  be  don-dnated  less  by 
harmony  and  control  dun  by  contradiction  and  disorder,  for  functional 
interdependence  does  not  necessarily  imply  harmonious  union.  While  Lewes 
only  stated  Ns  theoretical  assumptions,  however,  George  Eliot  explored  fully  in 
her  novels  their  social  and  psychological  impEcations.  461 
For  EL04  while  orgwiicism  pro-dded  a  theory,  she  was  searching  for  something  more  - 
a  Ian 
, gua&.  M-ýs  was  also  the  case  throughout  nineteenth-century  thought  where 
the  status  of  organic  theory  itself..  should  be  seen  less  as  a  single  idea  than  as  a 
language.  XVithin  the  confines  of  one  structural  framework,  it  offered  multiple 
ossi  cl,  an  p  ibilitics  of  interpretation.  As  a  general  conceptual  mod  however,  it  c  be 
IssOci2tcd  v6ith  the  changes  that  occurred  in  social  and  scientific  philosophy  once 
the  eightcenth-century  mechanistic  cosmology  was  displaced.  In  all  fields  and 
from  all  pcrspccti%v.  %  organic  theory  was  linked  to  an  increasing  interest  in 
ibid..  p.  481. 
ibid..  P.  716. 
SAIIY  Shuttle-Awth.  op.  cit..  p.  22. 
192 history  as  a  dcvclopmcntal  proccss,  and  in  notions  of  intcraction  and 
intcrdcpcndcncc.  'w4 
It  u-is  in  her  developing  a  transfer  of  I.,  cwes'vicws  on  org2nicism  and  her  wide  reading 
of  various  theorists  into  the  aesthetic  realm  that  u-c  begin  to  see  Mot's  reactions  to  an 
overly  s)-stmudc  cpistcmolog  as  that  being  offered  by  Daminism.  In  an  article 
pubhshcd  in  TLe  Ltjjrr  (1855)  cnddcd  "'Me  Funirc  of  Gemun  Philosophy",  George 
Mot  %Totc.  -  "the  age  of  systems  is  p2sscd...  System  is  the  rkildhoodof  philosophy,  the 
m2nhood  of  philosophy  is  invcstigation.  "463 
More  spccifically,  Eliot  opposed  any  system  of  philosophy  that  was  purely  systemic  and 
supposcdly  groundcd  upon  apriod  clz7t=.  In  rc2ction  to  Lcibnitz  and  Kant,  shc  statcs 
the  foUowing.  - 
Ile  chief  argument  in  favour  of  apriod  ideas,  as  insisted  on  by  Leibnitz  and  Kant 
is  dut  they  can  ncvcr  be  arrived  at  by  induction;  that  induction  may  lead  to  the 
general  but  nc%-cr  to  the  universal,  and  that,  nevertheless,  this  idea  of  universality 
is  found  in  speech  and  in  thought  with  the  mark  of  necessity.  But  this  argument 
will  not  bear  a  rigid  exunination.  Ibc  language  of  all  peoples  soon  attains  to  the 
cxpressions  4  jothrru4  jrrrr=g,  but  these  expressions  have  their  origin  purely  in 
the  obsm-ations  of  the  senses;  they  are  simply  a  practical  expedient,  and  are 
V21ued  only  under  ccruin  well-known  and  presupposed  conditions.  To  isolate 
such  expressions.  to  opcr2tc  with  them  apart  from  experience,  to  exalt  their 
relitivC  %-Alue  into  an  absolutc,  %-alue,  to  deduce  knowledge  from  them  alone,  and 
to  nuke  them  a  stuufing  point  higher  than  all  experience  -  this,  which  is  what 
Parmenidcs  and  all  speculative  philosophers  since  him  have  done,  is  an  attempt 
to  Poise  the  unh-crsc:  on  one's  bc2d.  and  no  wonder  if  dizziness  and  delusion  arc 
the  consoqucnccý44 
UOt  had  read  the  key  Gcmun  scholars  of  the  nineteenth  cenniry  and  uras  conversant  in 
'*'  ibid,  p.  23.  461  c 
ltod  bY  Rwnury  Ashtom  Tle  Ger7wn  Mea.  (  Libris:  London.  1994)  pp.  150-15  1. 
t93 current  thought  surrounding  Higher  Criticism.  As  previously  mentioned,  having 
transbted  Str2uss'Du  LibeirJesm  and  Fcuerbach's  Esrenre  of  Chiidani*,  Eliot  had 
cst2bUshed  herself,  along  uith  Thomas  Carlyle  and  Samuel  Taylor  Coleridge,  as  one  of 
the  key  ambiss2dors  of  Gcrman  thinking  in  England.  Yet  her  strong  tendency  toward 
org2nicism  rrudc  it  difficult  to  embrace  the  rigid  systernaticians  of  German  Idealism, 
not2bly  Icibnitz  and  Kant. 
Yet  it  u-as  more  in  Gemuny  than  England  that  Eliot  would  find  writers  that 
exemplified  her  desire  to  integrate  her  scientific  and2csthetic  temperaments  and 
ultimately  provide  the  utalyst  for  her  style  as  a  novelist.  As  noted  previously,  one  key 
figure  was  Johann  Wolfg2ng  von  Gocthc.  Unlike  the  "German  systcm-mongcrs"  she 
criticises,  Eliot  repeatedly  praises  Gocthc  for  not  being  "led  by  Schiller  into  embracing 
the  Kantian  [or  any  aprion]  philosophical  systeffý'.  465  In  this  regard,  Eliot  held  Goethe  as 
"eminently  the  man  who  helps  us  to  rise  to  a  lofty  point  of  observation,  so  that  we  may 
see  things  in  relative  proportions'%466  In  contrast  to  Kant's  mathematical  theory  of 
natum'  GocthC  attempted  to  ft-amc  in  understanding  of  nature  that  was  differentiated 
from  an  understandingb2sed  upon  systematics.  InMaxixtnvndRý4ýonenhc  states  that 
"physics  must  be  divorced  from  =thematics.  It  must  be  completely  independent,  and 
try  to  Penetrate  with  a  its  Iming,  m-crent,  pious  force  into  nature  and  its  holy  Efc,  quite 
regardless  of  what  truthcmatics  accomplishes  and  docs".  468 
As  noted  in  clupter  3,  Gocthc  drew  a  conception  of  morphology  (a  phrase  which 
4"  George  Eliot.  Essays  of  Groqre  Eliot,  ed.  Thomas  Pinney.  New  YorL  1963.  Cited  by  Rosemary 
Ashton.  OP.  Cit.  p.  15  1. 
463  Rosemmy  Ashton.  The  German  Idea.  p.  167. 
4"  George  Eliot.  -17he  Natural  I  listory  of  German  IjW,  Westminster  Review  (July  1856). 
467  ul  assert  that  in  any  particular  theory  of  naturcwc  can  find  only  so  much  of  real  science  as  we  can 
find  mathematics...  A  purc  theory  of  determinate  natural  objects  is  possible  only  through  mathematics, 
"***  hence  Any  theory  of  nature  uill  contain  only  so  much  of  real  science  as  it  permits  the  application 
Of  m3thImatics".  From  Kam's  1786  Preface  to  his  Aletaphysische  Anfangsgrunde  der 
Nat"r"islMschaft.  Cited  in  Ernst  Cassircr.  Rousseaj4,  Kant,  Goethe.  (Princeton:  Princeton  University 
Press.  1945)  p.  61- 
194 Goethe  himself  coined)  that  was  a  move  beyond  the  rigidity  of  classification  of  type469 
toward  a  conception  of  nature  as  process.  In  this  regard, 
For  Goethe  such  an  enterprise  [merely  labelling  natural  cause  and  effect]  was  not 
enough.  According  to  him,  what  we  grasp  in  this  way  are  only  the  products,  not 
theprocess  of  life.  And  into  this  life  process  he  wanted,  not  only  as  a  poet  but  also 
as  scientist,  to  win  insight;  in  it  he  saw  what  was  greatest  and  highCSt.  470 
Eliot  agreed  with  Goethe  in  asserting  that  one  must  look  beyond  the  cataloguing  of  type 
in  order  to  gain  an  appreciation  of  the  whole.  As  previously  stated,  Goethe  held  that 
"...  Classes,  genera,  species  and  individuals  are  related  as  instances  to  a  law;  they  are 
contained  in  it,  but  they  do  not  contain  or  revealie'.  471  In  the  chapter  entitled,  'The 
Purpose  Set  Forth'  from  On  Moipbology,  Goethe  writes  the  following. 
In  observing  objects  of  nature,  especially  those  that  arc  alive,  we  often  think  the 
best  way  of  gaining  an  insight  into  the  relationship  between  their  inner  nature 
and  the  effects  they  produce  is  to  divide  them  into  their  constituent  parts...  these 
attempts  at  division  also  produce  many  adverse  effects  when  carried  to  an 
extreme.  To  be  sure,  what  is  alive  can  be  dissected  into  its  component  parts,  but 
ftom  these  parts  it  will  be  impossible  to  restore  it  and  bring  it  back  to  life.  Ibis  is 
true  even  in  inorganic  substances,  to  say  nothing  of  things  organic  in  nature... 
The  Germans  have  a  word  for  the  complex  of  existence  presented  by  a  physical 
organism:  Gestalt  [structured  form].  With  this  expression  they  exclude  what  is 
changeable  and  assume  that  an  interrelated  whole  is  identified,  dcfined,  and  fixed 
in  character.  /  But  if  we  look  at  all  these  Gestalten,  especially  the  organic  ones,  we 
will  discover  that  nothing  in  them  is  permanent,  nothing  is  at  rest  or  dcfincd  - 
everything  is  in  a  flux  of  continual  motion.  This  is  why  Germans  frequently  and 
fittingly  makes  use  of  the  word  Bildung  (formation)  to  describe  the  end  product 
and  what  is  in  process  of  production  as  Well.  472 
468  ibid.,  p.  63. 
469  Goethe  had  read  Linnaeus'  system  of  nature  whereby  understanding  of  nature  is  achieved  when  "we 
have  succeeded  in  arranging  it  (nature)  in  the  pigeonholes  of  our  concepts,  dividing  it  into  species  and 
genera,  into  families,  classes,  and  ordere'.  ibid.,  P.  69. 
470  ibid. 
471  ibid.,  p.  93. 
472  Goethe,  Scientific  Studies,  Vol.  12,  Die  Collected  Works.  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press, 
1988)  pp.  63-64. 
195 As  Prc%iously  mentioned,  organicism  for  Mot  pro-tided  more  than  a  unified  theory  of 
dcvclopmcn4  it  pro%idcd  a  language  of  sorts  with  which  to  describe  observations  in  an 
aesthetic  medium  th2t  had  scientific  weighL  Yet  it  was  in  Gocthc's  writing  that  this 
theory  and  langingc  of  organicism,  found  its  possible  form  in  apoe&s  where  scientific 
obscr%ration  c2tal3  sed  into  aesthetic  genesis.  In  Mot's  journals  and  letters,  it  is  well 
documented  that  she  and  Ixwcs  spent  considerable  time  reading  Gocthe's  work, 
. 
fe  of  Goetke.  In  her  essay  "nc  Morality  of  Wilhelm  particularly  during  Lcurcs'work  on  U 
Meister,  "  Eliot  cxcmphfics  the  truthfulness  of  Goethc's  approach  to  writing  in  response 
to  concerns  that  Gocthc  was  immoral  in  his  writing  of  Lekýahrr. 
But  is  Ui&bxMdsfrr  in  immoral  book'>  We  think  not,  on  the  contrary,  we  think 
that  it  appears  immoral  to  some  minds  because  its  morality  has  a  grander  orbit 
than  any  which  can  be  measured  by  the  calculations  of  the  pulpit  and  of  ordinary 
litervurc.  fn 
This  "grander  orbie,  vmsforE]iot  a  willingness  in  Gocthc's  poetics  toward  the 
morphological  rather  dun  systematic  -a  forn-iing  poetics  that  would  never  truly  'form'. 
This  Was  a  poetics  of  sp.  2ccs  and  gaps  where  what  was  not  seen  "in  the  pulpit  and 
ordinary  literature"  is  s=  by  both  the  loss  of  context  and  the  absence  of  presence.  Her 
Poetics,  as  previously  asserted,  sought  to  open  gaps  before  the  reader  which  allowed  for 
both  the  'possible'  of  the  sacred  and  the  framing  anew  of  that  which  traditionally  is  lost 
through  the  act  of  writing  rather  thin  free&  As  seen  in  Adam  Bede,  Eliot  sought  to 
overcome  the  dividc  of  the  Nisual/vcrbal  dichotomy  by  provoking  to  the  'reader'  to  'see' 
and  OvCrtum  nirratives  that  may  be  closed  to  interpretation  through  provoking  a 
continuous  dillogue  between  word-imigc  signs,  provoking  a  double,  differential  reading 
th"t  iultIPOscs  the  evoked  im.  2gc  against  the  narrated  story,  in  order  to  let  them  (both 
"'  Goorte  Eli0t.  "Tbe  h1ccality  of  Wilhelm  Meister'.  The  Leader  (21  July  1855).  Essays,  pp.  144-5. 
196 image  and  word)  interact  and  to  let  the  tensions  between  the  stories  produce  new 
possibilities.  As  we  look  at  The  Mill  on  the  Floss,  Eliot  utilises  her  poetics  as  a  means  of 
framing  the  transfigurational  and  displaying  the  depth  of  subjectivity  that  is  unchanging 
yet  always  transfiguting.  474 
474  In  using  the  term  'tranfigurational'  I  am  recalling  the  'figuring'  of  'transfiguration'  in  the  account  of 
Jesus'  transfiguration  in  the  Gospel  of  St.  Matthew:  "After  six  days  Jesus  took  with  him  Peter,  James, 
and  John  the  brother  of  James,  and  led  them  up  a  high  mountain  by  themselves.  Here  he  was 
transfigured  before  them.  His  face  shone  like  the  sun,  and  his  clothes  became  as  white  as  the  light... 
while  he  was  speaking,  a  bright  cloud  enveloped  them,  and  a  voice  from  the  cloud  said,  '7his  is  my 
Son,  whom  I  love;  with  him  I  am  well  pleased.  Listen  to  hinf'.  Matthew  17:  1-3,5  NRSV. 
197 9.2  Imitatio  Jesus  /Imitatio  Maggie  -  Writing  into  Tranfigurational,  Flowing 
A  wide  plain,  where  the  broadening  Floss  hurries  on  between  its  green  banks  to 
the  sea,  and  the  loving  tide,  rushing  to  meet  it,  checks  its  passage  with  an 
impetuous  embrace...  How  lovely  the  little  river  is,  with  its  dark,  changing 
wavelets!  It  seems  to  me  like  a  living  companion  while  I  wander  along  the  bank 
and  listen  to  its  low,  placid  voice,  as  to  the  voice  of  one  who  is  deaf  and  loving.  475 
In  the  beginning  of  Mill  on  the  Floss,  Eliot  introduces  one  of  the  key  figures  in  the  novel  - 
that  of  the  "contexe'  that  exists  before  the  "characters".  Ultimately,  it  is  the  'true 
context'  of  those  things  that  are  timeless  and  ever-changing  that  Eliot  reveals  to  the 
reader.  As  the  reader  enters  the  narrative,  the  narrator  (akin  to  Riehl)  gives  a  present- 
time  rendering  of  the  surroundings.  The  Floss  is  introduced  as  "a  living  companionI9, 
personified  and  thus  set  out  as  the  first  "character"  in  the  narrative.  It  has  a  "low,  placid 
voice,  as  the  one  who  is  dcaf  and  lovine'.  With  the  context  presented  as  living  it  is  fully 
present  unlike  the  systems  that  writers  such  as  Darwin  sought  to  explain  and  delimit  such 
a  context.  These  static  systems  will  never  be  present  and  alive  and  be  forever  past. 
Martin  Buber  makes  such  a  distinction  in  I  and  Thou: 
The  I  of  the  primary  world-I-It,  that  is,  the  I  faced  with  no  lbou,  but  surrounded 
by  a  multitude  of  "contents"  has  no  present,  only  the  past.  Put  in  another  way,  in 
so  far  as  man  rests  satisfied  with  the  things  that  he  experiences  and  uses,  he  fivcs 
in  the  past,  and  his  moment  has  no  present  content.  He  has  nothing  but 
objects....  true  beings  are  Eved  in  the  present,  the  fife  of  objects  is  in  the  paSt.  476 
In  a  later  portion  of  Mill,  the  narrator  attributes  similar  anthropomorphic  qualities  to  the 
surroundings,  noting  how  "the  awful  Eagre,  come  up  Eke  a  hungry  monster,  or  to  see  the 
475  George  Eliot,  The  Mill  on  the  Floss.  (London:  Penguin,  1860)  p.  3. 
476  Martin  Buber,  I  and  Thou.  trans.  Ronald  Gregor  Smith  (Edinburgh:  T&T  Clark,  1959)  p.  13. 
198 Great  Ash,  which  had  once  wailed  and  groaned  like  a  man  -  these  things  would  always 
be  just  the  same...  "4771be  reader  notes  early  in  the  novel  that  there  is  an  unchanging, 
timeless  quality  to  certain  things  such  as  the  Floss  Cthese  things  would  always  be  the 
same'ý: 
The  rush  of  the  water  and  the  booming  of  the  Mill  bring  a  dreamy  deafness 
which  seems  to  heighten  the  peacefulness  of  the  scene.  They  are  like  a  great 
curtain  of  sound  shutting  one  out  from  the  world  beyond.  ... 
/Now  I  turn  my 
eyes  towards  the  Mill  again  and  watch  the  unresting  wheel  sending  out  its 
diamond  jets  of  water.  That  little  girl  is  watching  too;  she  is  standing  on  just  the 
same  spot  at  the  edge  of  the  water  ever  since  I  paused  on  the  bridge.  478 
In  this  introduction  to  Maggie  Tulliver,  the  space  of  temporality  is  coUapscd  in  reference 
to  the  Floss  -  past  and  present  seem  to  co-exist.  What  is  also  evident  in  this 
introduction  of  the  timelessness  of  the  Floss  is  its  function  as  a  temporal  bridge  that 
extends  beyond  past  and  present  -  always  flowing  and  moving  with  no  beginning  and  no 
end.  Here  we  see  the  influence  of  Eliot's  readings  of  LyeR's  Uniformitarianism  in  this 
personification  of  the  unchanging  quality  of  things.  The  narrator  makes  mention  that  the 
sound  of  the  Floss  and  the  booming  of  the  Mill  "are  Eke  a  great  curtain  of  sound 
shutting  one  out  from  the  world  beyond"..  This  is  seen  in  Maggie's  love  of  the  Mill  as  a 
place  apart  from  existence  in  the  world  of  "everyday  life": 
Maggie  loved  to  linger  in  the  great  spaces  of  the  mill,  and  often  came  out  with 
her  black  hair  powdered  to  a  soft  whiteness  that  made  her  dark  eyes  flash  out 
with  new  fire.  The  resolute  din,  the  unresting  motion  of  the  great  stones,  giving 
her  a  dim  delicious  awe  as  at  the  presence  of  an  uncontrollable  force  -  the  meal 
forever  pouring,  pouring  -  the  fine  white  powder  softening  all  surfaces  and 
making  the  very  spider-nets  look  Eke  a  fairy  lacework  -  the  sweet  pure  scent  of 
477 
The  Mill  on  the  Floss,  P.  37. 
478  ibid.,  p.  4. 
199 the  meal  -  all  helped  to  make  Maggie  fccl  that  the  mill  was  a  little  world  apart 
from  her  outside  everyday  life.  479 
The  quality  of  the  Floss  in  its  timeless  presence  creates  an  "other-worldliness"  about  it 
and  in  this  way  we  begin  to  have  the  Floss  presented  as  Other  -  one  that  is  unchanging 
yet  moving,  present  yet  timeless.  When  Maggie  and  Tom  venture  out  to  the  Round 
Pool,  aspects  of  Eliot's  Uniformitarianism  are  shown  as  well: 
They  were  on  their  way  to  the  Round  Pool  -  that  wonderful  pool  which  the 
floods  had  made  a  long  while  ago;  no  one  knew  how  deep  it  was,  and  it  was 
mysterious  too  that  it  should  be  almost  a  perfect  round,  framed  in  with  willows 
and  tall  reeds  so  that  the  water  was  only  to  be  seen  when  you  got  close  to  the 
brink.  480 
Maggie  Tulliver  is  portrayed  in  many  respects  as  a  mimelis  of  these  qualities.  Mrs.  TuUivcr 
comments  on  her  being  "out  of  time"  and  akin  to  the  Floss  when  she  is  looking  for 
Maggie  early  in  the  novel: 
... 
Mrs.  Tulliver,  rising  and  going  to  the  window,  'I  don!  t  know  where  she  is  now, 
an'  ies  pretty  nigh  tca-time.  Ah,  I  thought  so  -  wanderin'  up  an!  down  by  the 
water,  Eke  a  wild  thing  ... 
1481 
Mrs.  Tulliver  makes  continual  references  to  Maggie  as  "this  small  mistake  of  nature"482 
that  in  some  regards  must  be  tamed.  The  narrator  reflects  on  the  fact  that  Maggie  and 
Tom  were  "still  very  much  like  young  animals"  who  must  eventually  learn  to  grow  out  of 
their  "impulsiveness  of  the  lower  animals,  but  conduct  [themselves]  in  every  respect  Eke 
members  of  a  highly  civilised  society".  483  In  this  regard,  Maggie  personifies  the  theory  of 
Organicism  in  that  she  is  to  be  observed  more  than  she  is  to  be  understood.  Mirroring 
Eliot's  value  of  the  whole  over  the  atomistic  view  of  parts  before  the  whole  as  a  path  for 
479  ibid.,  p.  26. 
480  ibid.,  p.  37. 
481  ibid.,  p.  9. 
482  ibid.,  p.  9. 
200 the  ascertaining  of  meaning,  Maggie  describes  her  disgust  with  the  notion  of  making  a 
patchwork  quilt: 
'Oh,  mother,  '  said  Maggie  in  a  vehemently  cross  tone,  'I  don't  want  to  do 
patchwork.  '  /  Whatt  Not  your  pretty  patchwork,  to  make  a  counterpoint  for 
your  aunt  Glegg?  '  /  'It's  foolish  work,  '  said  Maggie  with  a  toss  of  her  mane,  ' 
tearing  things  to  pieces  to  sew  'em.  together  again.  1484 
Maggie's  nature  as  nature  is  shown.  She  is  seen  as  having  a  "mane"  Eke  the  "wild  thing", 
and  in  this,  finds  foolishness  in  "tearing  things  to  pieces  to  sew  'ern  together  again".  We 
see  the  organicism  of  Maggie  further  fflustrated  in  comparison  to  Yap,  the  Tuffiver's 
family  dog- 
Maggie's  phiz.  which  nature  had  seemed  to  have  moulded  and  colourcd  with  the 
most  decided  intention.  But  that  same  nature  has  the  deep  cunning  which  hides 
itself  under  the  appearance  of  openness,  so  that  simple  people  think  they  can  see 
through  her  quite  well,  and  all  the  while  she  is  secretly  preparing  a  refutation  of 
their  confident  prophecies.  485 
As  with  the  Bildungsroman  of  Goethe's  Wilbelm  Meister,  George  Eliot  through  Mill  on  the 
Floss  challenges  the  very  form  of  writing  itselfi 
The  "contene,  of  the  Bildungsroman  instantly  becomes  a  question  of  form, 
precisely  because  the  content  is  the  forn-dng-of-content,  "Bildunf-  the 
formation  of  the  human  as  the  producer  of  itself  as  form.  486 
Ibroughout  Mill  on  the  Floss,  Maggie's  development  is  one  of  transfiguradon  rather  than 
one  of  evolution  -  she  becomes  more  and  more  illuminated  as  to  who  she  always  was. 
She  is  one  who  is  "moulded  and  coloured"  rather  thin  seen  as  added  to  and  thereby 
essentially  changed.  As  opposed  to  the  Hegehan-ladcn  theory  of  Natural  Selection  that 
Darwin  puts  forth  in  Origin  ofS  pecies,  the  Bildung  of  Maggie  is  one,  not  of  drastic  changes, 
493  ibid.,  pp.  35-36. 
484  ibid.,  p.  10. 
201 but  of  gradual  and  persistent  definition  akin  to  Lamarck.  Again,  as  with  Lyell,  Eliot  is 
seeing  the  gradual  progress  of  figuration  more  as  an  act  of  clarification  of  essential  and 
base  essence  rather  than  one  of  explosive  and  radical  changes.  Unlike  Darwin,  who 
pedes  what  Eliot  saw  as  "the  mystery  that  lies  under  the  processcS"'487,  neglected  in  S  the 
organicism  of  St.  Oggs  on  the  Floss  is  one  that  displays  these  mysterious  processes 
through  the  gradual  formations  of  form,  content,  and  import  together  into  wbat  tby  are 
rather  than  a  synthesis  of  thesis  and  antithesis  that  is  abstracted  and  without  spiritus. 
Key  to  tI-ds  understanding  is  Thomas  a  Kempis'  classic,  Imitado  Chrisd  -  The 
Imitafion  of  Chtist.  Eliot  had  read  and  re-read  this  devotional  classic  and  given  copies  of  it 
to  friends  during  the  writing  of  Mill  on  the  Floss.  In  book  3  of  Mill  on  the  Floss  entitled 
'q'he  Valley  of  Humiliation,  "  which  begins  with  the  downfall  of  the  TuUivcr  family, 
Maggie  is  shown  turning  to  religious  writing  for  strength  and  moral  guidance: 
The  old  books,  Virgil,  Euclid,  and  Aldrich  -  that  wrinkled  fruit  of  the  tree  of 
knowledge  -  had  been  laid  by,  for  Maggie  had  turned  her  back  on  the  vain 
ambition  to  share  the  thoughts  of  the  wise...  She  read  so  eagerly  and  constantly 
in  her  three  books,  the  Bible,  Tbomas  a  Kem  )i  Ii  n  Pis,  and  the  Cb  sa  Year  (no  longer 
rejected  as  a'hymnbook)... 
488 
At  the  end  of  the  novel  in  the  portion  which  follows  her  confession  to  Dr.  Kenn  in  book 
6  entitled  "The  Final  Rescue",  Maggie  draws  upon  her  earlier  reading  of  a  particular 
portion  of  Imitafion  of  Cbrist  which  is  on  facing  life  as  one  preparing  to  die  found  in 
chapter  23  of  book  1-  "Of  Meditation  on  Death".  As  a  Kempis  writes,  "Each  morning 
remember  that  you  may  not  live  until  evening;  and  in  the  evening,  do  not  presume  to 
485  ibid.,  pp.  29-30. 
486  Marc  Redfield,  op.  cit.,  p.  42. 
487  Cited  by  Rosemary  Ashton,  George  Eliot.  *  A  Life.  (London:  Penguin,  1996)  p.  239.  488  George  Eliot,  7he  Mill  on  the  Floss.  (London:  Penguin,  1860)  p.  298. 
202 promise  yourself  another  day.  Be  ready  at  all  times,  and  so  live  that  death  may  never  find 
you  unprepared"489and 
Prepare  yourself  to  endure  many  trials  and  obstacles  in  this  vale  of  tears;  for  such 
will  be  your  lot  wherever  you  are,  and  you  will  encounter  them  wherever  you 
conceal  yourself.  It  must  needs  be  so;  nor  is  there  any  remedy  or  means  of  escape 
from  iUs  and  Oefs;  you  must  endure  them.  490 
She  recalls  these  mediations  as  she  seeks  to  gain  her  strength  to  face  God  -'the  Unseen 
Pity'-  in  the  disgrace  stemming  from  her  being  carried  away  in  the  Floss  with  Stephen 
Guest.  Recalling  Imitadon  of  Cbrist,  Maggie  resolves  the  following- 
I  will  bear  it,  and  bear  it  till  death...  But  how  long  it  will  be  before  death  comesl 
I  am  so  young,  so  healthy.  How  shall  I  have  the  patience  and  strength?  Am  I  to 
struggle  and  fall  and  repent  again?  Has  life  other  trials  as  hard  for  me  still?  ' 
With  that  cry  of  self-despair  Maggie  fell  on  her  knees  against  the  table  and  buried 
her  sorrow-strickcn  face.  Her  soul  went  out  to  the  Unseen  Pity  that  would  be 
with  her  to  the  end.  Surely  there  was  something  being  taught  her  by  this 
experience  of  great  need;  and  she  must  be  learning  a  secret  of  human  tenderness 
and  long  suffering  that  the  less  erring  could  hardly  know?  Oh  God,  if  my  life  is 
to  be  long,  let  me  live  to  bless  and  comfort  -'  49, 
Tlýs  statement  -'Oh  God,  if  my  life  is  to  be  long,  let  me  live  to  bless  and  comfort'-  are 
the  last  words  of  Maggie  prior  to  the  realisation  of  the  flooding  of  the  Floss.  Ibcy  also 
are  a  profound  summary  of  George  EHot's  lebenphilosopbie  and  the  central  theme  of  i 
Kernpis'ImitafionqfCbrist.  In  contrast  to  the  reaching  after  scientific  thought,  Eliot 
recovers  tl-ýs  15tII  century  devotional  theme  of  lbomas  a  Kempis  that  makes  such 
statements  as: 
489  Thomas  ý  Kempis,  The  Imitation  of  Christ.  Trans.  and  introd.  Leo  Sherley-Price  (London:  Penguin 
Books,  1952)  1.23.  pp.  53ff. 
490  ibid.,  H.  12.  p.  87. 
491  77ze  Mill  on  the  Floss,  p.  528. 
203 A  humble  knowledge  of  oneself  is  a  surer  road  to  God  than  a  deep  searching  of 
the  sciences.  Yet  learning  itself  is  not  to  be  blamed,  nor  is  the  simple  knowledge 
of  anything  whatsoever  to  be  despised,  for  true  learning  is  good  in  itself  and 
ordained  by  God;  but  a  good  conscience  and  a  holy  life  are  always  to  be 
preferred.  492 
In  this  way  Eliot  seeks  to  recover  that  which  has  been  neglected  amidst  evolutionary 
theory  and  return  to  what  John  FEck  termed  as  the  'language  of  love'  that  comes  before 
theory  -  more  than  the  progress  and  the  scientific,  Maggie  wifl  choose  to  embrace  the 
timeless  and  humane.  -  In  the  end,  as  noted  by  i  Kempis,  "a  good  conscience  and  a  holy 
life  are  always  to  be  preferred". 
Ibroughout  Mill  on  the  Floss,  Eliot  evokes  the  timeless  nature  of  things  through 
the  figuring  of  sacramental  imagery.  Maggie's  life,  likened  to  the  Floss,  is  Eke  water  itself 
as  observed  by  Mrs.  Tulliver:  'Mey're  such  children  for  the  water,  mine  are,  '  she  said 
aloud,  without  reflecting  that  there  was  no  one  to  hear  her.  '493  In  certain  respects,  one 
can  here  the  echoes  of  Feuerbach's  discussion  of  Baptism  in  Essence  of  Cbrisfianily  which 
Eliot  translated  only  5  years  prior  to  her  work  on  Mill  on  the  Flosr 
Baptism  should  represent  to  us  the  wonderful  but  natural  effect  of  water  on  man. 
Water  has,  in  fact,  not  merely  physical  effects,  but  also,  and  as  a  result  of  these, 
moral  and  intellectual  effects  on  man...  What  was  denied  by  Grace  has  been 
granted  by  Nature...  In  the  stream  of  water  the  fever  of  selfishness  is  allaycd. 
Water  is  the  readiest  means  of  making  friends  with  Nature.  The  bath  is  a  sort  of 
chemical  process,  in  which  our  individuality  is  resolved  into  the  objective  life  of 
Nature...  water  is  the  element  of  natural  equality  and  freedom,  the  mirror  of  the 
golden  age.  ...  in  water  we  declare:  Man  can  do  nothing  without  Nature...  It 
needs  only  that  the  ordinary  course  of  things  be  interrupted  in  order  to  vindicate 
to  common  things  an  uncommon  significance,  to  1ý'e,  as  sucb,  a  religious  iMpolt.  494 
492  Thomas  h  Kempis,  op.  cit.,  1.23,  p.  3  1. 
493  The  Mill  on  the  Floss,  p.  102. 
494  See  chapter  XXV7he  Contradiction  in  the  Sacraments"  in  Ludwig  Feuerbach,  The  Essence  of  Christianity  trans.  George  Eliot  (New  York:  Prometheus  Books,  1989)  pp.  236ff.  See  also  Rosemary 
Ashton,  George  Eliot.  ý  A  Life.  (London:  Penguin,  1996)  pp.  162-163. 
204 The  qualities  of  water  exemplify  Eliot's  "otherness"  of  nature  in  regard  to  the  Floss. 
When  Mr.  Tulliver  is  speaking  with  Mr.  Moss  regarding  Wakem's  damming  up  the  Floss, 
Mr.  Tuffiver  reflects: 
...  waterýs  a  very  particular  thing  -  you  can't  pick  it  up  with  a  pitchfork.  lbaes 
why  ies  been  nuts  to  Old  Harry  and  the  lawyers.  It's  plain  enough  whaes  the 
rights  and  the  wrongs  of  water,  if  you  look  at  it  straightforward;  for  a  river's  a 
river,  and  if  you've  got  a  mill,  you  must  have  water  to  turn  it;  and  ies  no  use 
telling  me,  Pivart's  erigation  and  nonsense  won't  stop  my  wheel;  I  know  what 
belongs  to  water  better  than  that.  495 
Regarding  the  NEU  changing  ownership,  Mr.  Tufliver  remarks  to  Luke:  'qbere's  a  story  as 
when  the  miH  changes  hands,  the  rivees  angry;  I've  heard  my  father  say  it  many  a  time. 
There's  no  teUing  whether  there  mayn't  be  surnmat  in  the  story,  for  this  is  a  puzzling 
world".  496  The  "otherness"  of  the  Floss  demands  to  maintain  its  altcrity,  becoming 
"angrý'  when  not  consulted  regarding  changes  and  not  submitting  to  attempts  to  shapc 
it,  even  to  the  point  of  resisting  material  formality  so  that  one  "can't  pick  it  up  with  a 
pitchfork!  '.  With  regard  to  the  Other,  Levinas  makes  this  observation: 
Western  philosophy  coincides  with  the  disclosure  of  the  other  where  the  other,  in 
manifesting  itself  as  a  being,  loses  its  alterity.  From  its  infancy  philosophy  has 
been  with  a  horror  of  the  other  remains  other  -  with  an  insurmountable  allergy. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  it  is  essentially  a  philosophy  of  being,  that  the 
comprehension  of  being  is  its  last  word,  and  the  fundamental  structure  of  man. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  it  becomes  philosophy  of  immanence  and  of  autonomy, 
or  atheiSM.  497 
Throughout  the  novel,  one  of  the  sub-plots  is  the  legal  battle  between  Mr.  TuUivcr  and 
Mr.  Wakem  for  possession  of  the  Floss.  Assuming  that  the  Floss  is  something  that  can 
be  owned,  the  batde  wages  on  tiU  Mr.  TuMver,  consumed  with  a  hungcr  for  revenge 
495  The  Mill  on  the  Floss,  p.  156. 
496  ibid.  p.  268. 
205 regarding  his  rights  to  the  Floss,  dies  with  a  curse  on  his  lips  for  Wakem.  At  the  other 
extreme,  Nft.  Deane  remarks  to  Tom  the  growing  irrelevancy  of  the  Floss  given  the 
progress  of  industrialisation.  through  the  use  of  steam: 
'You  see,  Tom,  '  said  Mr.  Deane  at  last,  throwing  himself  backward,  'the  world 
goes  on  at  a  smarter  pace  now  than  it  did  when  I  was  a  young  f6flow...  Ibc 
looms  went  slowish,  and  fashions  di&t  alter  quite  so  fast...  Everything  was  on  a 
lower  scale,  sir  -  in  point  of  expenditure,  I  mean.  Ies  the  steam,  you  see,  that  has 
made  the  difference;  it  drives  on  every  wheel  double  pace,  and  the  wheel  of 
fortune  along  with  'em!  498 
The  Floss  is  neither  something  to  own,  nor  something  that  is  irrelevant.  As  noted  by 
Levinas,  these  polar  oppositions  have  lead  to  a  philosophy  in  our  age  that  is  primarily 
immanent  and  ultimately  devoid  of  altcrity.  In  Mill  on  the  Floss,  these  options,  while 
voiced,  are  not  those  of  the  Floss  itself,  but  those  who  seek  to  control  and  ultimately 
delimit  the  'possible'. 
This  notion  is  reflected  in  insights  of  Heidcgger  with  regard  to  his  reading  of 
H61derlin's  poetry  regarding  rivers  in  contrast  to  the  technological  domination  of 
German  rivers  and  streams  -  not  only  through  the  construction  of  dams  and  canals  -  but 
those  who  are  sought  to  be  controlled  through  the  very  act  of  'naming'.  As  Hcidcggcr 
notes  in  Wbat  is  called  Tbinking?,  what  makes  H61derlin's  poetry  different  ftom  the  work 
of  other  poets  is  his  willingness  to  name  so  as  to  'unname  in  the  act  of  naming! 
According  to  Heidegger,  naming  for  H61derlin  seems  to  pinpoint  the  rivers  as  that 
natural  phenomenon  which  makes  dwelling  on  earth  possible  for  man  in  a  world  without 
gods.  But  these  rivers  (Heidegger  uses  the  Rhine  as  an  example)  are  not  only  named  as 
the  natural  phenomena  that  they  are,  but  also  as  the  stnams  of  languqe.  Calling  rivers 
tstreams  of  language'  does  not  make  a  metaphorical  use  of  the  named  river,  but  it  rather 
497  Emmanuel  Levinas,  "La  Trace  de  L'Autre'  trans.  A  Lingis  in  Deconstruction  in  Context:  Literature 
and  Philosophy.  ed.  by  Mark  C.  Taylor  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1986)  p.  346. 
206 names  the  nature  of  nan-dng-  Naming  the  nature  of  naming  is  'naming  nature'  instead  of 
naming.  Naming  nature  instead  of  naming  naming  is  naming  the  im  possibihýy  of  naming  - 
both  in  nature  and  naming.  It  names  the  in-between  of  nature  and  language:  the  opening 
up  of  a  world  which  is  only  there  tbmu 
, gb  language  but  which  is  not  effected  by  language. 
This  would  be  the  event  of  creating  or  acknowledging  a  ipace  in  language,  in  which  it 
would  no  longer  (or  not  yet)  be  possible  to  distinguish  between  nature  and  culture.  It  is 
the  gift  of  opening  whereby  that  which  is  a  'home-founding  world'  and  a  'home- 
founding  language'  can,  at  the  same  time,  find  one  (world-languagc)  opened  up  by  the 
other.  As  Heideggcr  notes,  this  turning  of  the  sacred  name  (the  act  of  unnaming  naming) 
is  not  a  trope  in  the  rhetorical  sense.  This  evoking  of  that  which  unnamcs  naming  it  is 
not  a  trope  that  can  be  controlled  and  thus  be  employed  by  an  artist.  It  is  what  it  is, 
In  the  end,  Hcidcggcr  is  arguing  that  it  is  a  necessi.  0  of  language  (and  of  nature) 
which  is  at  stake  here.  This  necessity  can  never  be  controlled  (as  Eliot  shows'with  the 
action  of  the  Floss)  and  is  thus  always  on  the  brink  of  failure,  that  is,  on  the  brink  of 
breaking  down  and  opening  one  to  the  brink  of  madness.  Naming  nature  as  the  failure  of 
the  name  always  threatens  to  take  over  the  naming  of  the  failure  itsclE 
This  fragile  state  is  exemplified  in  and  through  the  unknown  moods  of  the  Floss 
that  arc  rcflcctcd  in  the  life  of  Maggic.  It  too  has  a  course  that  will  eventually  be  shown 
in  M,  but  is  often  hidden  before  the  present  observer.  As  pointed  out  by  the  narrator 
towards  the  end  of  the  novel: 
But  you  havc  known  Maggic  a  long  whilc  and  nccd  to  bc  told,  not  hcr 
charactcristics,  but  hcr  history,  which  is  a  thing  hardly  to  bc  prcdictcd  cvcn  from 
the  compictcst  knowlcdgc  of  charactcristics.  For  the  tragcdy  of  our  livcs  is  not 
crcatcd  cndrcly  from  within.  'Charactcr,  '  says  Novalis  in  onc  of  his  qucsdonablc 
aphorisms  '-charactcr  is  dcsfiny.  '  But  not  the  wholc  of  dcsdny...  Maggic's 
dcstiny,  thcn,  is  at  prcscnt  hiddcn,  and  wc  must  wait  for  it  to  rcvcal  itsclf  hkc  the 
498  The  Mill  on  the  Floss,  p.  405. 
207 course  of  an  umnapped  river;  we  only  know  that  the  river  is  M  and  rapid,  and 
that  for  all  rivers  there  is  the  same  final 
hoMC.  499 
Strains  of  Wlilbelm  Meister's  Lebýabrr  can  be  heard  in  this  observation  of  1ýfaggic.  As  in  his 
rcflection  at  the  end  of  his  apprenticeship,  Wilhelm  hears  from  his  "interrogator"  that 
"Perhaps...  we  should  now  be  less  at  variance  in  regard  to  Destiny  and  Charactcr".  5W 
It  is  in  the  end  that  we  see  both  the  culmination  and  circularity  of  Eliot's  world  of  St. 
Oggs  on  the  Floss.  "Oh  God,  where  am  I?  Which  is  the  way  homc?  "-501  is  the  cry  that 
marks  the  beginning  of  the  end  for  TNIagoc  as  she  is  taken  away  by  the  flooding  of  the 
Floss.  -502  She  rcaliscs  that  in  this  encounter  with  the  flood  that  "more  and  more  strongly 
the  energies  seemed  to  come  and  put  themselves  forth  as  if  her  life  were  a  storcd-up 
force  that  had  been  spent  in  this  hour,  unneeded  for  any  futurc".  503  In  contrast  to  the 
ain-Acss  drifting  that  she  and  Stephen  Guest  engaged  in  upon  the  Floss,  here  the  Floss 
and  Maggic  forge  a  ncxui  and  act  as  one.  In  this  way,  the  Floss,  as  a  manifestation  of 
poetic  madness,  illuminates  and  gives  context  to  Maggic  in  its  swelling  and  consumption, 
something  not  owned  nor  ignored.  What  can  be  seen  here  is  u7idng  115at  wiles  buond  its 
own  abik4  lofigure.  -  a  poetics  that  riscs  and  recedes  of  its  own  unnamed  accord  -a  poetics 
that  ultimately  transfigurcs  and  is  no  more,  yet  is  what  it  is  at  last  and  always  shall  be. 
This  is  a  poetic  altcrity  where  writing  itself  is  Other.  As  noted  by  Uvinas: 
7be  manifestation  of  the  other  is,  to  be  sure,  first  produced  in  conformity  with 
the  way  every  signification  is  produced.  7bc  other  is  prcscnt  in  a  cultural  whole 
and  is  illuminated  by  this  whole,  hkc  a  text  by  its  context.  The  manifestation  of 
the  whole  ensures  this  presence  and  this  present;  they  arc  illun-iinatcd  by  the  light 
of  the  world.  Ibc  comprehension  of  the  other  is  thus  a  hermcncutics  and  an 
exegesis.  The  other  is  given  in  the  concept  of  the  totality  to  which  it  is 
499  ibid.,  p.  411. 
Johann  Wolfgang  von  Goethe,  lVilhelin  Meister's  Apprenticeship  Vol.  1,  p.  60. 
501  The  Mill  on  the  Floss,  p.  530. 
502  In  the  milieu  of  the  flood,  it  is  an  interesting  order  of  questions:  other  ("Oh  God"),  self  C'where  am 
n,  and  place  ("Which  is  the  way  home"). 
503  ibid.,  p.  531. 
208 immanent,  and  which...  our  own  cultural  initiative,  the  corporeal  linguistic,  or 
artistic  gesture,  expresses  and  discloses...  the  other  does  not  only  come  to  us  out 
of  a  context,  but  comes  without  mediation;  he  signifies  by  himself..  His 
presence  consists  in  cotrýing  unto  us,  makhýrg  an  entg.  504 
Ilds  "entry" is  reflected  in  the  response  to  the  sweDing  flood  as  a  poiesis. 
In  the  first  moments  Maggie  felt  nothing,  thought  of  nothing,  but  that  she  had 
suddenly  passed  away  from  that  life  which  she  had  been  dreading;  it  was  the 
transition  of  death,  without  its  agony  -  and  she  was  alone  in  the  darkness  with 
God.  505 
Yet  even  in  the  midst  of  "the  huge  mass"  of  the  Floss  "hurrying  on  in  hideous 
triumph"506,  Maggie  does  not  dissolve  nor  lose  her  identity  through  being  drowned. 
Rather,  it  is  in  this  process  that  she  experiences  a  Acbtung,  a  Heideggarian 
opening/clearing  of  authenticity  in  poetics  -a  'lighting'  that  is  transfiguration.  Her 
'clarity'  brings  forth  the  final  reconciliation  of  her  life,  namely  the  reunion  with  Tom. 
After  St.  Oggs  begins  life  anew  after  the  flood,  Maggie  is  not  lost,  rather  she  becomes 
timeless  as  her  name  being  etched  into  stone  on  her  grave  -a  name  that  is  now  as 
timeless  as  the  Floss  itself.  She  has  been  'unnamed'  as  Maggie  and  is  freed  from  her 
,g 
is  name  yet  her  memory  stiU  embodies  that  sign/signifier.  In  this  regard,  Maggie's  bildun 
completed  and  she  is  herself,  no  longer  merely  a  mimesis  of  nature,  but  one  who  has  been 
transfigured  and  thereby  represented  (bildung)  with  and  alongside  the  Other. 
In  the  Conclusion,  the  narrator  makes  the  following  summation: 
Nature  repairs  her  ravages  -  repairs  them  with  her  sunshine  and  with  human 
labour.  The  desolation  wrought  by  the  flood  had  left  little  visible  trace  on  the 
face  of  the  earth  five  years  after  ... 
/  And  every  man  and  women  mentioned  in 
this  history  was  still  living,  except  those  whose  end  we  know.  /  Nature  repairs 
her  ravages  -  but  not  all.  The  up-tom  trees  are  not  rooted  again;  the  parted  hills 
504  Emmanuel  Levinas,  "La  Trace  de  L'Autre",  p.  35  1. 
505  The  Mill  on  the  Floss,  p.  529. 
209 are  left  scarred;  if  there  is  a  new  growth,  the  trees  are  not  the  same  as  the  old,  and 
the  hiRs  underneath  their  green  vesture  bear  the  marks  of  the  past  rending.  To 
the  eyes  that  have  dwelt  on  the  past,  there  is  no  thorough  repair.  507 
As  previously  mentioned,  Derrida  has  stated  in  a  recent  interview  that  "what  [ultimately] 
interests  me...  is  not  strictly  called  either  literature  or  philosophy,  but  something  for 
wl-dch  'autobiography'  is  perhaps  the  least  adequate  name"508.  In  Mill  on  the  Floss,  Efiots' 
poetics  are  indeed  something  that  'is  not  strictly  called  either  literature  or  philosophy'  but 
resides  in  a  place  between.  As  a  fiction  that  is  more  'autobiographical'  than  any  other 
piece  of  her  fictional  work,  it  is  closer  to  that  which  is  called  'Gospel'  in  its  way  of  telling 
its  timeless  story  through  the  particular  life  of  one  whose  story  mirrors  that  of  the  author 
yet  is  profoundly  unique.  As  a  protagonist  whose  transfiguration  provokes  both 
beginnings  and  endings  simultaneously  (the  town  is  rebuilt  as  her  death  is  remembered), 
Eliot  has  figured  a  poetics  ofjesus  in  Maggie  TuHiver  as  a  coinddenlia  o ,p  . 
positorum,  which  is 
at  the  very  centre  of  the  Christian  epic.  As  noted  in  the  Introduction,  Thomas  Altizer 
states  that  the  true  christian  story  is 
a  calling  forth  and  voyage  into  an  apocalyptic  totality,  and  [the  Christian]  epic 
totality  is  an  apocalyptic  totality  if  only  because  it  embodies  such  a  radical  and 
total  transformation.  Here,  this  transformation  is  deepest  in  envisioning  the 
depths  of  the  Godhead  itself,  depths  that  are  apocalyptic  depths,  and  hence 
depths  unveiling  a  new  Godhead  only  by  bringing  a  new  Godhead  to  an  end".  sO9 
Elioeswriting  provokes  such  apocalyptic  depths  in  subjectivity  and  figuring  of  the 
sacred.  As  in  Scenes  of  ClericalLife,  these  apocalyptic  depths  arc  seen  in  the  dissolving  of 
stable  society  where  those  who  represent  Christianity  (clerics,  the  pious)  collapse  once 
506  ibid.,  p.  534. 
507  ibid.,  p.  535. 
508  Jacques  Derrida,  "'This  Strange  Institution  Called  Literature,  p.  34. 
509  Thomas  J.  J.  Altizer,  The  Contemporary  Jesus.  (New  York:  State  University  of  New  York  Press, 
1997)  pp.  xiv,  xv,  xxiii. 
210 the  mariginalized  and  rejected  (Milly  Barton,  Janet  Dempster)  are  no  longer  present.  As 
in  Adam  Bede,  this  'envisioning  the  depths  of  the  Godhead  itself'  is  provoked  in  Eliot's 
recasting  of  word-image  relationships  and  putting  them  into  play  to  allow  recovered 
meaning  to  arise  and  'the  possible'  not  only  to  be  read,  but  'seen'.  In  Mill  on  the  Floss, 
Eliot  has  called  forth  a  'voyage  into  an  apocalyptic  totality'  where  the  timeless  and  fully 
present  'floods'  that  which  is  systemic  and  seemingly  progressive,  leaving  behind  an 
absence  that  is  ironically  more  present  than  the  perceived  presence  had  been  (Maggie 
Tulliver)  prior  to  the  apocalyptic  finality.  These  elements  show  a  poetics  that  recovers, 
remembers,  and  refigures  that  which  Eliot  saw  as  being  "the  beautiful  story".  As  I  win 
note  in  the  Conclusion,  this  one  who  is  recovered,  remembered,  and  refigured  within  her 
poetics  acts  as  a  'mapping  of  meaning'  for  the  reader,  what  I  am  calling  a  'poetic 
cartography  of  grace',  which  is  the  heart  of  'true  fiction'. 
211 10.0 
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pe  of  the  central  doctrine  of  the  Christian  faith  -Jesus  as  the  The  search  for  the  basic  sba 
Christ  -  goes  back  to  the  very  foundations  of  the  Church  itself.  Given  the  literary  basis 
of  Christianity,  this  shaping  activity  is  manifested  in  much  writing  as  apoefics  -  "a 
declaration  of  principle  with  regard  to  the  ideas  about  literature  [and  writing]  that  have 
been  embodied  in  the  events  [of  a  given]  text  [or  work]".  510  With  Christ  representing  the 
ultimate  nexus  of  subject  and  sacred  in  place  and  temporality,  such  a  declaration  of 
principle  regarding  how  literature  functions  in  relation  to  and  as  the  incarnation  of  this 
coming  together,  as  well  as  what  this  embodiment  within  literary  space  ultimately 
concerns,  is  what  I  have  termed  apoefics  ofjesus.  As  discussed  in  the  Introduction,  the 
question  of  form  has  been  central  to  Christianity  and  its  attempt  to  give  voice  to  the 
nature  of  the  subject,  the  figuring  of  the  sacred,  and  incarnation  as  nexus  of  subject  and 
sacred  in  Christ.  From  the  New  Testament  to  writings  of  the  church  such  as  the  Creeds 
and  works  of  St.  Augustine,  this  favouring  of  structure  to  the  point  of  delimiting  the 
'possible'  is  evident.  Yet  prior  to  the  Council  of  Nicaea  of  325  CE  and  the  forming  of 
the  Symbol  of  Chalcedon  in  451  CE,  language  used  to  figure  Jesus,  as  noted  by  John 
Hick,  "seems  generally  to  have  been  devotional,  or  ecstatic,  or  liturgical  (or  all  three), 
rather  than  an  exercise  in  precise  theological  formulation.  It  was  analogous  to  the  language  of 
love,  in  which  all  manner  of  extravagances  and  exaggerations  are  entirely  appropriate...  "511 
What  I  have  sought  throughout  this  thesis  is  to  assert  that  this  'language  of  love'  -  that 
which  comes  btfore  theological  form  -  is  what  George  Eliot  sought  to  recover,  remember, 
and  refigure  in  her  poetics.  For  George  Eliot,  that  which  has  become  the  concern  of 
most  quests  for  Jesus  is  not  the  'ultimate  concern'  for  the  very  figure  that  has  been 
510  Mieke  Bal,  Narratology.  2"d  edition  (Toronto:  University  of  Toronto  Press,  1997)  p.  59. 
511  John  Hick,  The  Metaphor  of  God  Incarnate  (London:  SCM  Press,  1993)  p.  10  1. 
212 searched  for.  As  ones  who  stood  on  the  top  of  Pisgab.  512-  Baur,  Fcuerbach,  and  Strauss 
-saw  in  their  different  ways  where  the  promise  was  in  stepping  free  from  the  forms  they 
had  inherited  and  announcing  the  challenge  to  move  beyond  them.  Yet  they  remained 
tied  to  the  very  structures  they  perceived  as  deathly.  George  Eliot  became  one  of  the  key 
inheritors  of  this  perception. 
Gotthold  Killer,  reflecting  on  those  theologians  who  espoused  an  a/theological 
approach  such  as  David  Friedrich  Strauss'  attempt  in  Das  Leben  jesu,  made  the  following 
insight: 
In  them,  the  dubiety  is  not  so  much  about  marginal  doctrine  as  about  the  essence 
of  faith  itself:  the  existence  of  God.  What  makes  this  new  phenomenon 
especially  interesting  is  that  these  professional  theologians  do  not  leave  the 
Christian  community  or  give  up  theology.  They  are  still  preoccupied  with  the 
significance  of  Jesus  Christ  for  human  life,  and  they  read  and  comment  on  the 
work  of  other  more  orthodox  theologians.  Nevertheless,  they  are  deeply 
estranged  from  the  faith  and  their  work  reflects  this  estrangement.  They  arc 
"unhappy  lovers"  of  Christian  theology.  513 
As  seen  in  this  thesis,  George  Eliot  exemplifies  one  who  would  certainly  be  counted 
among  those  'unhappy  lovers'.  As  one  whose  creative  journey  as  both  critic  and  writer 
of  fiction  shows  the  imprint  of  the  key  minds  of  nineteenth  century  Anglo-German 
thought,  hers  was  an  'unhappy  love'  with  the  systematic  renderings  of  many  thinkers  of 
the  age  such  as  Kant,  Baur,  Feuerbach,  and  Strauss  while  finding  the  questions  raised  by 
such  thinkers  nonetheless  compelling.  Yet  unlike  these  writers,  she  did  not  remain  at  the 
512  Reference  to  the  Pisgah  view  of  Deuteronomy  3:  27,28  where  Moses  is  allowed  to  view  the 
Promised  Land  but  not  allowed  to  cross  the  River  Jordan,  being  told  by  God  that  his  descendants  will 
eventually  enter  the  land:  "Go  to  the  top  of  Pisgah  and  look  west  and  north  and  south  and  east.  Look  at 
the  land  with  your  own  eyes,  since  you  are  not  going  to  cross  this  Jordan.  But  commission  Joshua,  and 
encourage  and  strengthen  him,  for  he  will  lead  his  people  across  and  will  cause  them  to  inherit  the  land 
'ou  see!  '. 
13 
ZI 
13  Gotthold  MUller,  Identitat  und  Immanenz:  Zur  Genese  der  Theologie  von  David  Friedrich  Strauss 
(Zurich:  EVZ-Verlag,  1968)  pp.  252-59.  Trans.  and  cited  by  Peter  C.  Hodgson,  "Editor's  Introduction 
to  Strauss'  Theological  Development  from  1825  to  1840"  in  The  Life  of  Jesus  Critically  Examined 
213 top  of  Pisgah.  In  a  unique  way,  George  Eliot  entered  into  the  land  that  was  seen  but 
untouched  by  Kant,  Baur,  Feuerbach,  and  Strauss.  Hers  was  a  poetics  that  not  only 
mapped  the  history  of  these  writer's  search  and  the  Christ  they  sought  for,  but  was  a 
mapping  as  the  very  figure  of  Jesus  as  the  Christ.  In  particular,  as  one  sees  her 
developing  poetics  in  her  early  works  such  as  Scenes  of  Clerical  life,  Adam  Bede,  and  The 
Mill  on  the  Floss,  it  is  notable  the  degree  to  which  the  question  of  christology-  how  we 
'figure'  the  person  of  Christ  and  the  rarnifications  of  this  person  upon  the  lives  of  others 
-  continued  to  manifest  itself  in  both  veiled  and  overt  ways.  In  Scenes  of  Clerical  Life,  Eliot 
disturbs  the  context  of  seen-ýingly  stable  society  by  provoking  'gaps"  of  apocalyptic  depths 
in  her  poetics  that  unveil  a  new  figuring  of  'Jesus'  by  bringing  present  figurings  to  an  end 
-  from  Milly  Barton,  whose  death  made  possible  the  liberation  of  her  preacher  husband 
to  'be'  the  Gospel  he'weekly  prochimed  and,  subsequently,  liberate  an  entire  village,  to 
Janet  Dempster  who  upon  finding  that  "Infinite  Love  was  caring  for  hcr"514reaUses  the 
limitless  depths  of  true  repentance  and  forgiveness.  In  Adam  Bede,  Eliot  overturns  the 
traditional  images  of  the  Incarnation  of  this  'Infinite  Love'  held  by  her  culture  through 
visual  artists  such  as  Rembrandt  and  Da  Vinci.  With  her  utilisation  of  a  rich 
iconographic  poetics  that  recalls  the  visual  density  of  compositional  structures,  figures 
such  as  Dinah  Morris  and  Hetty  Sorrel  move  continually  between  the  word-image 
opposition  and  provoke  a  double,  differential  reading,  which  juxtaposes  the  evoked 
image  against  the  narrated  story,  in  order  to  let  them  (both  image  and  word)  interact.  The 
tensions  between  the  stories  then  produce  a  recovery  ofjesus  as  a  poetics  that  is, 
recalling  11-iomas  Altizer,  "an  apocalyptic  totality  if  only  because  it  embodies  such  a 
radical  and  total  transformation"  in  both  evoked  image  and  the  'simple  story'.  In  The 
Mill  on  the  Floss,  George  Eliot's  developing  poetics  move  from  looking  at  the  'context'  for 
(Rwmey:  Sigler  Press,  1994)  p.  xv. 
514  George  Eliot,  Scenes  of  Clerical  Life,  1857  ed.  Jennifer  Gribble  (London:  Penguin  Books,  1998)  p. 
337. 
214 the  coming  together  of  the  self  and  sacred  (Scenes  of  Clericallife)  and  the  figuring  of  the 
incarnation  of  the  sacred  (Adam  Bede),  to  the  ultimate  release  of  the  subject  into  and 
throughout  the  sacred  as  figured  in  the  autobiographical  character  of  Maggie  Tulliver. 
As  Maggie  grows  and  develops  alongside  the  Floss  (a  figuring  of  the  sacred),  her 
encounter  with  the  flooding  waters  of  the  Floss  where  "more  and  more  strongly  the 
energies  seemed  to  come  and  put  themselves  forth  as  if  her  life  were  a  stored-up  force 
that  had  been  spent  in  this  hour,  unneeded  for  any  future"  becomes  her  release.  Where 
many  writers  of  her  time  were  employing  the  evolutionay  poetics  of  Darwin  which  are 
Hegelian  in  its  philosophy,  Eliot  rests  upon  the  traný6gurafional  poetics  of  Tbomas  i 
Kempis  as  a  source  for  what  humanity  is  truly  seeking  for.  Ultimately,  as  one  looks  to 
the  characters  framed  through  her  poetics  -  differing  though  they  are  -  there  are 
embodied  within  the  lives  of  these  female  characters  similar  questions  of  meaning  that 
show  different  expressions  of  a  common  face  that  troubled  Eliot  from  the  beginning  of 
her  fictional  output.  This  'face'  that  had  troubled  her  and  gave  form  to  her  resulting 
fiction,  was  found  to  be  central  to  what  she  termed  'the  beautiful  story'  -  the  face  and 
person  of  Jesus.  It  was  this  face  that  she  kept  before  her  whilst  translating  Das  Leben  jesu 
and  it  was  "only  the  sight  of  her  Christ-image  and  picture  [a  cast  of  lborwaldsen's  figure 
of  the  risen  Christ]  that  made  her  endure  it".  515  It  was  'seeing'  a  re-figuring  of 
lborwaldsen's  figure  of  Christ  -  the  copy  of  an  artist's  work  based  on  the  figure  of 
Christ  -  which  provided  Eliot  with  the  focus  to  'endure'  the  mistakes  of  Strauss.  As  a 
writer,  she  did  not  attempt  to  render  an  idealised  Christ  that  was  beyond  the  reach  of 
common  humanity,  nor  did  she  seek  to  entrap  the  figure  of  Christ  within  a  systematic 
poetics  that,  as  Matthew  Arnold  noted  regarding  Strauss,  was  an  "imperturbable 
resolution  of  a  ...  professor  in  making  all  the  facts  suit  a  theory  which  he  had 
515  Cited  by  Rosemary  Ashton  from  a  1846  letter  to  Sara  Hennell  in  George  Eliot:  A  Life,  p.  52. 
215 adopted'I.  516As  one  who  was  an  "unhappy  lover"  of  the  Christianity  of  her  era,  Eliot  saw 
the  reality  of  Christ  as  that  particular  manifestation  of  the  sacred  which  is  constantly 
appearing  and  disappearing  at  the  same  time,  a  veiled  character  whose  very  absence 
makes  evident  a  sense  of  presence  desired  for,  longed  for,  and  always  sought  for.  It  was 
those  "German  System  Mongers"  who  sought  to  fashion  a  system  to  frame  a  static  and 
dead  Christ  that  sickened  Eliot  for  their  lack  of  understanding  of  what  they  presumed  to 
show  forth  in  their  projeCtS.  517 
In  this  regard,  I  argue  that  Eliot  as  an  "unhappy  lover"  of  the  theology  of  her 
time  due  to  the  unacceptable  gstems  that  cloud  the  face  of  Christ  from  view,  still  found  a 
compelling  drive  to  re-tell  through  her  poetics  something  more  akin  to  Gospel  as 
showing  forth  Jesus  and  telling  this  'simple  story'  in  both  content  and  form  of  her 
fiction.  As  she  stated  in  The  Leader  prior  to  her  move  into  writing  fiction,  she  saw  the 
priority  of  "System"  as  the  "spinning  of  elaborate  cocoons"  by  those  she  termed 
"German  system-mongers".  518As  Valerie  Dodd  notes  in  George  Eliot:  An  Intellectual  life, 
Eliot  affirmed  deep  and  meaningful  belief  as  "an  integral  part  of  character,  a  prerequisite 
of  [a  person's]  vitality"  and  was  therefore  unwilling  to  "up  root  tares  where  we  must 
inevitably  gather  all  wheat  with  them.  "519  In  short,  Eliot  desired  that  which  lived  outside 
the  'cocoon'  of  systems  to  be  seen  through  her  poetics  -  that  which  was  alive  and  which 
animated  life. 
In  her  act  of  writing  throughout  Scenes  of  Clerical  Life,  Adam  Bede,  and  Mill  on  the 
516  Matthew  Arnold  'God  and  the  Bible'  Complete  Prose  Works  of  Matthew  Arnold.  Cited  by  Rosemary 
Ashton  The  German  Idea:  Four  English  Writers  and  the  Reception  of  German  Thought  1800-1860. 
(London:  Libris,  1980,1994)  p.  150. 
517  This  loss  of  the  extravagant  exaggeration  of  a  language  of  love  and  the  reinforcement  of  a 
employment  of  mere  systems  of  belief  is  noted  by  Martin  Heidegger  to  Engelbert  Krebs,  the  priest  who 
married  Heidegger  and  performed  the  baptism  of  his  first  child.  He  wrote  that  his  reason  for  leaving  the 
Catholic  Church  was  due  to  "epistemological  insights,  extending  as  far  as  the  theory  of  historical 
knowledge,  that  have  made  the  system  of  Catholicism  problematic  and  unacceptable  to  me  -  but  not 
Christianity  and  metaphysics".  Cited  by  John  Caputo,  "Heidegger  and  Theology"  in  The  Cambridge 
Companion  to  Heidegger  ed.  Charles  Guignon  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1993)  p.  272. 
518  Cited  by  Rosemary  Ashton.  7he  German  Idea,  pp.  150-15  1. 
519  Valerie  Dodd,  George  Eliot:  An  Intellectual  Life  (New  York:  Macmillian  Press,  1990)  p.  98. 
216 Floss,  George  Eliot's-  search  to  tell  the  simple  story  was  a  radical  departure  from  the 
forms  of  Baur,  Feuerbach,  and  Strauss.  Yet  her  writing  remains  profoundly  centred  on 
questions  germane  and  foundational  to  much  of  what  these  writers  sought  for:  the  nature 
of  the  subject,  the  figuring  of  the  sacred,  and  the  point  of  nexus  between  the  two.  As 
noted  by  Felicia  Bonaparte  in  her  introduction  to  Middlemarcb,  Eliot  was  a  writer  who  saw 
all  too  well  the  demise  of  delimited  poetics  employed  by  Theologians  of  her  age: 
[For  Eliot]  Theology  ...  causes  us  to  ignore  the  needs  of  human  beings  here  on 
earth;  diverting  our  attention  too  much  to  tbefotmakfies  of  the  creed,  it  causes  us  to 
forget  its  spirit.  For  a  period  of  time,  religion  had  made  its  home  in  theology. 
But  that  had  been  a  historical  accident,  not  a  necessary  connection.  Theology  in 
the  modern  world  must  be  discarded  as  a  dead  creed.  520 
Writing  for  Eliot  was  a  means  and  exercise  in  framing  afigura  of  the  subject  and 
the  sacred  which  "assures  the  unity  of  the  kerygmatic  and  the  cventlike  by  giving  the 
figure  another  kind  of  depth.  "521  With  regard  to  Tran-ýng,  I  refer  back  to  Jonathan 
CuUer's  understanding  of  'framing'  as  "determining,  setting  off  the  object  or  evene,  in 
such  a  way  that  alludes  the  positivism  of  'contexe.  As  seen  in  chapter  8,  exemplified  in 
Scenes  of  Clericallife,  context  for  Eliot  wiH  not  sustain  subjectivity  nor  provide  an 
adequate  foundation  for  figuring  the  sacred.  Rather,  Eliot  utilises  the  poetic  space  to 
show  how  the  subject  and  sacred  are  'framed'  rather  than  grounded,  showing  "discursive 
practices,  institutional  arrangements,  systems  of  value,  serniotic  mechanisms"522  that  we 
as  readers  employ  in  the  figuring  of  the  subject  and  sacred.  In  the  framing  of  her  poetics, 
the  reader  is  encouraged  to  see  'who'  approaches  and  what  is  offered  in  this  approach. 
In  this  way,  her  poetics  resembles  the  Christ  which  is  figured  in  the  Gospel  of  St.  John  in 
the  post-Easter  encounter  of  Thomas  and  the  risen  Christ: 
520  Felicia  Bonaparte,  "Introduction  to  Middlemarch"  in  Middlemarch  (Oxford:  Oxford  World  Classics, 
1988,1998)  p.  xiii. 
521  Paul  Ricoeur  in'7he  Bible  and  Genre7,  Figuring  the  Sacre&  Religion,  Narrative,  and  Imagination 
(Minneapolis:  Fortress  Press,  1995)  p.  189. 
217 A  week  later  his  disciples  were  again  in  the  house,  and  Thomas  was  with  them. 
Although  the  doors  were  shut,  Jesus  came  and  stood  among  them  and  said, 
"Peace  be  with  you!  '.  Then  he  said  to  Thomas,  "Put  your  finger  here  and  see  my 
hands.  Reach  out  your  hand  and  put  it  in  my  side.  Do  not  doubt  but  believe". 
lbomas  answered  him,  "My  Lord  and  My  Godl"523 
Her  poetics  in  Scenes  of  Clerical  life,  Adam  Bede,  and  Mill  on  the  Floss,  visually  dense  and  yet 
thoroughly  'unsutured'  in  its  woundedness,  asks  the  reader  to  enter  into  the  narrative 
wounds  re-imagined  and  refigured  through  reading  in  the  character  and  context  of  her 
female  characters  -  Milly  Barton,  Janet  Dempster,  Hetty  Sorrel,  Dinah  Morris,  and 
Maggie  Tulliver.  The  reader  is  encouraged  ultimately  to  allow  this  'body'  figured  in  the 
poetics  to  come  forward  and  is  encouraged  'not  to  doubt  but  believe'.  This  act  is  the 
essence  of  fiction  that  in  turn  is  the  truest  essence  of  Gospel  as  'true  fiction'. 
When  reflecting  upon  the  culminating  theme  of  his  He's  work,  Heideggcr 
reflected  that  his  project  was  "an  on-tbe-way  in  the  field  of  paths  for  the  changing 
questioning  of  the  manifold  question  of  Beine'.  524  This  metaphor  of  "the  field  of  paths" 
is  an  apt  one.  As  seen  in  his  idea  of  die  lichtung  des  Seins  or  the  clearing  ofBeing  mentioned 
in  'The  End  of  Philosophy  and  the  Task  of  Thinking"525,  Heidegger  draws  from 
colloquial  German,  eine  licbtung,  which  is  the  sense  of  a  forest  "clearing"  made  manifest 
to  allow  "light"  to  shine  upon  the  Being  (Sein  ).  Paths  to  these  clearings  exist  yet  are  not 
522  Jonathan  Culler,  Framing  the  Sign:  Criticism  and  its  Institutions,  p.  ix. 
523  John  20:  26-28  NRSV. 
524  Heidegger's  last  reflections  on  his  lifework  from  the  unfinished  notes  to  preface  Frahe  Schriften  as  a 
review  of  his  collected  writings  (Gesamtausgabe  letzter  Hand).  Cited  by  Dorothea  Frede  in  "The 
Question  of  being:  Heidegger's  project"  from  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Heidegger,  ibid.  p.  42. 
525  Martin  Heidegger,  "The  End  of  Philosophy  and  the  Task  of  Thinking7-  1964  in  Basic  Writings  of 
Martin  Heidegger  ed.  David  Farrell  Krell  (London:  Routledge,  1996):  "We  call  this  openness  that 
grants  a  possible  letting  appear  show  'clearing'.  ..  The  forest  clearing  (lichtung)  is  experienced  in 
contrast  to  dense  forest,  called  Dicktung  in  our  older  language.  The  substantive  Lichtung  goes  back  to 
the  verb  lichten.  The  adjective  licht  is  the  same  word  as  'light'.  To  lighten  something  means  to  make  it 
light,  free  and  open,  e.  g.  to  make  the  forest  free  of  trees  in  one  place.  The  free  space  thus  originating 
the  clearing.  What  is  light  is  the  sense  of  being  free  and  open  has  nothing  in  common  with  the  adjective 
'light'  which  means  'bright',  neither  linguistically  nor  materially.  This  is  to  be  observed  for  the 
difference  between  clearing  and  light...  Light  can  stream  into  the  clearing,  into  its  openness,  and  let 
brightness  play  with  darkness  in  it.  But  light  never  first  creates  clearing.  Rather,  light  presupposes  it... 
218 charted  on  any  maps.  Yet,  when  one  undertakes  the  task  of  walking  through  the  woods, 
these  woodpaths  are  evident  -  there  is  a  way  through  although  not  defined  or  mapped. 
This  thesis,  in  conclusion,  has  sought  to  see  George  Elioespoetics  in  her  early 
fiction  as  an  "on-the-way  in  the  field  of  paths"  of  the  formation  of  subjectivity  and  the 
figuring  of  the  sacred.  As  Heidegger  saw  that  only  by  walking  amidst  the  woods  would 
a  woodpath  be  made  evident,  so  it  is  that  writers  such  as  George  Eliot  see  form  arise 
only  after  being  on-tbe-way  of  writing.  In  this  way,  the  'paths'  formed  in  her  journey 
toward  a  poetics  exhibit  a  'poetic  cartography  of  grace'  where  one  can  orient  oneself  and 
be  invited  to  search  for  the  nexus  of  the  subject  and  the  sacred  -  to  touch  the  wounds 
and  truly  to  believe.  Where  the  traditional  understanding  of  cartography  is  that  of 
mapping  space  on  a  two-dimensional  field  of  north/east/west/south,  a  'poetic 
cartography  of  grace',  I  argue,  is  the  'mapping'  not  merely  of  space  uitbin  poetics,  but  the 
very  fullness  of  space  and  time  itself  -  in  short,  a  mapping  of  meaning.  In  the  poetic 
cartography  of  George  Eliot,  the  poetics  are  embodied  and  embody  both  in  the  poetics 
and  the  reader  -  you  are  in  Christ  as  Christ  is  in  you.  This  'mapping'  has  no  boundary  or 
"edge'  that  would  announce  the  end  of  the  world  or  a  Emit  to  the  universe  that  creates  a 
sense  of  beginning  and  end,  but  is  fully  enclosed  and  three-dimensional,  moving  itseyin 
the  fullest  breath,  depth,  and  height  of  time  and  space526  as  one  who  comes 
unannounced  and  beating  gospel  -  good  news. 
Derrida  states  in  "This  Strange  Institution  Called  Ilterature"  that  the  power 
within  the  space  of  literature  is  a  '!  flc,  6ve  insfitudon  which  in  principle  allows  one  to  say 
everything"  that  is  seen  in  its  ability  to  "break  out  of  prohibitions  in  every  field  where 
law  can  lay  down  the  law.  The  law  of  literature  tends,  in  principle,  to  defy  or  lift  the 
The  clearing  is  the  open  region  for  everything  that  becomes  present  and  absent".  pp.  441,442. 
526  1  am  seeing  this  notion  of  'poetic  cartography'  as  akin  to  the  attempts  put  forward  by  women  mystics 
such  as  Theresa  of  Avila.  See  E.  Ann  Matter  "Internal  Maps  of  an  Eternal  External"  and  Laurie  Finke 
"Mystical  Bodies  and  the  Dialogics  of  Vision"  in  Maps  of  Flesh  and  Light  ed.  Ulrike  Wiethaus  (New 
York:  Syracuse  University  Press,  1993)  pp.  28ff- 
219 law...  It  [Eterature]  is  an  institution  which  tends  to  overflow  the  institution.  "527  What  I 
have  argued  in  this  thesis  is  that  a  poetics  of  Jesus  is  an  act  which  'overflows  the 
institution'  of  writing  so  that  bon,  the  story  is  told  is  as  important  as  the  story  itself. 
George  Eliot's  concern  was  not  only  to  tell  "the  simple  storý',  but  also  a  desire  for  a 
poetics  that  finds  its  very  form  exhibiting  the  qualities  of  a  re-imagined  incarnation  of  the 
Christ  whose  figuring  "made  her  endure".  While  most  of  the  so-called  Historical  Quest 
for  Jesus  concerned  itself  with  the  content  and  facts  concerning  this  one  who  "comes  to 
us  as  one  unknown",  it  was  the  form  ofjesus  and  what  this  person  represents  that 
intrigued  and  gave  noticeable  shape  to  the  arising  poetics  of  Elioesfiction  and  gives  a 
face  to  this  one  unknown.  As  Paul  writes  in  the  second  letter  to  the  Corinthians,  it  is 
deep  within  the  Christian  story  to  figure  this  face  where 
we  all,  with  unveiled  face,  beholding  the  glory  of  the  Lord,  are  being  transformed 
into  his  likeness  from  one  degree  of  glory  to  another...  For  it  is  the  God  who 
said,  Ught  will  shine  out  of  the  darkness',  who  has  shown  in  our  hearts  to  the 
fight  of  the  knowledge  of  the  glory  of  God  in  the  face  of 
Christ.  528 
Ginther  Bornkamm's  statement  that  "no  one  is  any  longer  in  the  position  to 
write  a  life  ofjesus"529remains  before  many  scholars  as  we  come  into  the  new  millenium. 
While  the  writing  of  various  'lives  ofjesus'  such  as  D.  F.  Strauss'  Das  Leben  jesu  may  be 
seen  as  a  dead  end,  nrifing  which  recaUs  a  poetics  of  Jesus  continues  to  bring  new  forms 
and  new  fife  to  the  person  of  Jesus.  This  is  a  poetics  that  takes  its  form  through  a 
retrieval  of  Jesus'  words  at  the  institution  of  the  Eucharist: 
And  when  the  hour  came,  he  sat  at  table,  and  the  apostles  with  him.  And  he  said 
to  them,  "I  have  earnestly  desired  to  eat  this  passover  with  you  before  I  suffer; 
for  I  tell  you  I  shall  not  eat  it  until  it  is  fulfffled  in  the  kingdom  of  God.  "  And  he 
527  Jacques  Derrida,  '7his  Strange  Institution  Called  Literature",  p.  36. 
528  2  Corinthians  3:  18,4:  6  NRSV.  David  Ford  in  his  recent  book  Self  and  Salvation  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1999)  has  an  extended  reflection  on  this  notion  of  'facing'  in  relation  to 
the  figuring  of  Christ. 
529  GUnther  Bornkamm,  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  p.  13. 
220 took  a  cup,  and  when  he  had  given  thanks  he  said,  "Take  this,  and  divide  it 
among  yourselves;  for  I  tell  you  that  from  now  on  I  shall  not  drink  of  the  fruit  of 
the  vine  until  the  kingdom  of  God  comes.  "  And  he  took  bread,  and  when  he  had 
given  thanks  he  broke  it  and  gave  it  to  them,  saying,  "Ms  is  my  body  which  is 
given  for  you.  Do  this  in  remembrance  of  me.  "530 
As  evidenced  by  George  Eliot,  there  is  an  authenticity  that  comes  in  and  through 
the  poetic  act  that  is  truly  a  re-membrance  of  Jesus.  Ibc  directive  of  Jesus  for  this 
remembrance  is  a  creative  act  as  seen  in  verse  19  where  the  'do  this'  CrOll'  )TO  710tUTC)  of 
remembrance  rccaUspoiesis,  which  is  the  root  of  'poetics'.  Such  was  the  act  of 
remembrance  that  George  Eliot  found  in  writing.  That  which  was  sought  for  by  writers 
of  the  nineteenth  century  -  this  one  who  comes  as  one  unknown  -  does  indeed  arise  in 
the  act  of  remembrance  Eliot  celebrated  through  a  poetics  of  Jesus.  As  she  mused  in 
Middlemareb  -  "Who  shall  tell  what  may  be  the  effect  of  writing-?  "  In  the  same  way,  as 
readers  of  such  poetics  we  are  invited  to  come,  as  St.  Paul  wrote,  "with  unveiled  face, 
beholding  the  glory  of  the  Lord,  are  being  transformed  into  his  likeness  from  one  degree 
of  glory  to  another".  Such  is  the  invitation  to  'do  this'-poiesis  -  in  remembrance  of  him. 
i 
530  Luke  22:  14  -  19.  NRSV. 
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